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The Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. C.F Thomas

Kerala High Court
Jun 6, 2006
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Judgment delivered by Ramkumar, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns two connected proceedings arising from the assessment year 1989-90:

  • I.T.R. 134/99 — a reference under Section 256(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 filed by the Revenue challenging the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in I.T.A. 859.Coch/1992 (an appeal originally filed by the assessee C.F. Johnson).
  • I.T.A. 123/00 — an appeal under Section 260A of the Act filed by the Commissioner of Income Tax, Cochin, challenging Annexure 'D' order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal passed in I.T.A. 187.Coch/1994 relating to the assessment of C.F. Raju.

Both proceedings involve whether the assessees received Rs. 10,00,000 by way of "pakidi" from their tenant, one Sundaresa Pai, associated with an unregistered lease deed dated 10-2-1989 under which the ground floor of a commercial building (about 1350 sq. ft., prime location near M.G. Road, Emakulam) was let at Rs. 5,000 per month for 20 years and a refundable security deposit of Rs. 2,00,000 was recorded in the lease instrument.

The Tribunal had accepted the assessees' contention that there was no evidence of receipt of Rs. 10,00,000 by way of pakidi. The matter was argued before the High Court with Sr. Advocate P.K. Raveendranatha Menon appearing for the Revenue and counsel for the two assessees.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the unregistered lease deed and related transaction amounted to a "transfer" of a capital asset within the meaning of Sections 2(14), 2(47) and Section 45 of the Income Tax Act so as to attract capital gains tax.
  2. Whether the assessees had in fact received Rs. 10,00,000 by way of "pakidi" from their tenant Sundaresa Pai and, if so, whether that amount is taxable as capital gains.

Arguments of the Parties

Assessees' Arguments

  • The lease deed dated 10-2-1989 is an unregistered instrument reserving monthly rent of Rs. 5,000 for 20 years and is therefore a compulsorily registrable instrument (citing Section 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act, 1908 and Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882).
  • As a legal matter, there was no transfer of interest in immovable property that would attract capital gains; the transaction remained a lease.
  • The lease document expressly recorded only a refundable security deposit of Rs. 2,00,000 and is silent about any Rs. 10,00,000 pakidi; it is impermissible to infer such a payment from silence in the instrument.
  • The only piece of material relied upon by the department (a sworn statement by the tenant Sundaresa Pai) was not put to the assessees and they were denied an opportunity to cross-examine him; consequently the Tribunal was right to dislodge the findings of the assessing and appellate authorities.
  • Searches conducted by the department (including a search at one assessee's premises on the same day as the tenant's search) yielded nothing to indicate receipt of Rs. 10,00,000.

Revenue's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the Revenue's legal arguments as presented at hearing; it is recorded only that the Commissioner (Revenue) challenged the Tribunal's orders and sought a different conclusion on the issues identified above.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Anthony v. K.C. Ittoop and Sons, (2000) 6 SCC 394 The existence of an unregistered instrument does not preclude the court from determining whether a lease was in fact created; the mere fact of an unregistered instrument would not prevent the court from finding a lease otherwise than through such deed. Used to reject the contention that the unregistered nature of the lease deed alone prevents the court from treating the transaction as a lease (i.e., a transfer enabling enjoyment of immovable property); supported the proposition that the instrument could amount to transfer for capital gains purposes.
Commissioner of Income Tax v. T.M.B. Muhammed Abdul Khader (Madras High Court) Proposition: where there is no registered document of transfer by an assessee partner of his immovable property in favour of the firm, there is no liability to capital gains (applies in partner-to-firm situations). The Court held this authority had no application to the present facts, because the present case involved a clear transfer of interest in immovable property to a third party (tenant), not a partner-to-firm conveyance.
Addanki Narayanappa v. Bhaskara Krishnappa, AIR 1966 SC 1300 Illustrates that when a partner makes over his personal asset to the firm, there is no transfer involved for capital gains purposes. Cited as part of a line of authorities establishing the partner-to-firm exception; Court acknowledged the principle but distinguished it as not applicable to the present facts.
Commissioner of Income-Tax, West Bengal, Calcutta v. Juggilal Kamalapat, AIR 1967 SC 401 Same principle as above regarding partner-to-firm transactions and distribution on dissolution not constituting transfer. Noted by the Court as part of the established position that certain transfers do not amount to capital gains; distinguished from the present factual matrix.
S.V. Chandra Pandian v. S.V. Sivalinga Nadar, (1993) 1 SCC 589 As above: authorities concerning when transfers do or do not constitute capital gains (partner/firm context). Cited in support of the general rule but held inapplicable to the present case.
Gangadhar Madhavrao Bidwai (Dead) By Lrs. v. Hanmantrao Vyankatrao Mungale, (1995) 3 SCC 205 Further Supreme Court authority on transfers and when they are not treated as transfers for capital gains purposes (partner/firm-related contexts). Included in the line of cases the Court referenced to show that the partner-to-firm exception is well-settled but not applicable here.
N. Khadervali Saheb v. Gudu Sahib, (2003) 3 SCC 229 : AIR 2003 SC 1524 Another authority in the jurisprudence concerning transfer and non-transfer situations (partner/firm exceptions). Also cited to demonstrate the settled position that certain transfers do not attract capital gains; Court distinguished present facts from those authorities.
Commissioner of Income Tax v. M. Sreedharan, 190 ITR 604 Principle: where an order is vitiated for non-compliance with principles of natural justice, the proceedings do not end but are restored to the stage prior to the impugned order. Applied to justify that though earlier orders may be quashed for procedural infirmity (non-confrontation of tenant's statement), the matter should be restored and the Revenue given an opportunity to proceed fairly rather than ending the proceedings outright.
Kaporchand Shrimal v. Commissioner of Income Tax (Andhra Pradesh), 131 ITR 451 Confirms that an appellate authority has jurisdiction and duty to correct errors and, if necessary, direct the authority against whose decision the appeal is preferred to dispose of the matter afresh. Invoked to support the power to remit the matter to the original Assessing Authority with directions for fresh disposal after affording opportunities to parties.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise manner:

  1. Legal definitions: The Court began by examining statutory definitions relevant to capital gains. "Capital gains" arise from transfer of a "capital asset" (Section 45). "Capital asset" is defined under Section 2(14) and "transfer" is defined under Section 2(47), which expressly includes any transaction or arrangement that has the effect of transferring or enabling the enjoyment of immovable property (including transactions by agreement or arrangement).
  2. Application to the lease instrument: The Court observed that the assessees did not dispute that the impugned instrument had the effect of enabling the enjoyment of immovable property. On that basis, the Court concluded that the instrument is a transfer of a capital asset and, therefore, profits or gains arising from it will generate capital gains.
  3. Unregistered instrument argument addressed: The Court rejected the assertion that because the lease instrument was unregistered (and therefore compulsorily registrable under Section 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act and Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act) it could not be treated as creating a transfer attracting capital gains. The Court relied on Anthony v. K.C. Ittoop and Sons to show that an unregistered instrument does not preclude a court from determining the true nature of the transaction (i.e., whether a lease or other transfer).
  4. Distinguishing partner-to-firm authorities: The Court acknowledged a body of authority establishing that transfers by a partner to his firm or distributions on dissolution do not constitute transfers attracting capital gains. Those authorities (cited) were deemed inapplicable because the present case involves transfer to a third party (the tenant), not a partner-to-firm conveyance.
  5. Evidence on "pakidi" and procedural fairness: As to the central factual question whether Rs. 10,00,000 was paid as pakidi, the Court noted competing points:
    • The assessing and appellate authorities relied on the sworn statement of the tenant Sundaresa Pai that he paid Rs. 10,00,000 as pakidi and that he had unaccounted income, part of which was brought to tax.
    • The Tribunal dislodged those findings because the assessees were not confronted with the tenant's sworn statement and searches did not disclose corroborating material at the assessees' premises.
    The Court acknowledged the significance of the tenant's sworn statement (it was self-incriminatory and declared sizeable unaccounted income), but held that it would be an infraction of the principles of natural justice to rely on such material against an assessee without affording them the opportunity to meet it.
  6. Remedy and procedural course: The Court emphasized that where an order is vitiated by non-compliance with natural justice, the result is not an end to proceedings; instead, the matter is restored to the earlier stage. Invoking precedent, the Court concluded that the Revenue should be given an opportunity to pursue its case following fair procedure. The Court therefore set aside the orders of the Tribunal, the Appellate Authority and the original Assessing Authority, and remitted the matter to the original Assessing Authority for a revised assessment after affording both the Revenue and the assessees an opportunity to substantiate their respective contentions.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Orders of the Tribunal, the Appellate Authority and the original Assessing Authority are set aside and the matter is remitted to the original Assessing Authority for a revised assessment.

The Court also expressly answered the question of law in favour of the Revenue (i.e., the instrument can amount to a transfer attracting capital gains).

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The immediate practical effect is that the earlier favorable findings for the assessees (that there was no evidence of Rs. 10,00,000 pakidi having been received) are set aside and the original assessing authority must reconsider the matter and proceed to a fresh assessment, after giving both the Revenue and the assessees opportunity to present and substantiate evidence and contentions. The assessees must be confronted with adverse material (such as the tenant's sworn statement) and given a fair chance to respond.
  • On precedent: The Court applied and distinguished existing authorities but did not purport to lay down a novel principle of law; it followed established principles regarding the definitions of "transfer" and the consequences of failure to comply with natural justice. The decision directs a procedural remedy (remand) rather than creating a new legal rule.

Disposition: The ITR and ITA were disposed of in accordance with the remand and directions summarized above.

Show all summary ...

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Ramkumar, J.:— I.T.R 134/99 at the instance of the Revenue is a reference under Sec. 256(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short). In the said income tax reference, the Commissioner of Income Tax, Cochin assails the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in I.T.A 859.Coch 1992 which was an appeal filed by the respondent namely C.F Johnson, the assessee. I.T.A 123/00 is an appeal filed by the Commissioner of Income Tax, Cochin, under Sec. 260A of the Act challenging Annexure ‘D’ order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal passed in I.T.A 187.Coch/1994 in the matter of the assessment of the respondent, C.F Raju. Both the proceedings relate to the assessment year 1989-90. The Tribunal had, inter alia, accepted the contention of the assessees that there was no evidence of the assessees having obtained a sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- (Rupees ten lakhs) by way of pakidi from their tenant one Sundaresa Pai to whom the ground floor of a commercial building situated by the side of M.G Road, Emakulam was let out as per an unregistered lease deed executed on 10-2-1989.

2. We heard Sr. Advocate Sri. P.K Raveendranatha Menon appearing for the revenue and the learned counsel appearing for the two assessees respectively.

3. Supporting the order of the Tribunal, the learned counsel appearing for the assessees made the following submissions before us:—

There was no transfer of interest in immovable property either under the provisions of the Act or under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 so as to attract capital gains. The lease deed dated 10-2-1989 is an unregistered document whereunder the monthly rent reserved was Rs. 5,000/- and the period of lease fixed was 20 years. — It was, therefore, a compulsorily registerable instrument within the meaning of Sec. 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act, 1908 and Sec. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Although the transaction recorded in the said instrument is a lease, legally there is no transfer of a capital asset so as to attract capital gains tax. Moreover, the document recites payment of a refundable security of Rs. 2 lakhs only. There is no whisper in the document to suggest payment of Rs. 10 lakhs by the tenant to the assessees by way of pakidi. When the document is silent about the payment of any amount by way of pakidi it is impermissible to find such a case. On the very same date on which a search was conducted in the premises of the tenant, the department had conducted a search in the premises of one of the assessees namely C.F Johnson. Nothing could be unearthed to indicate receipt of any amount over and above the some of Rs. 2 lakhs recited in the document of lease. In the absence of any circumstance to indicate receipt of any amount by way of pakidi by the assessees, it is not permissible to draw interferences founded on mere conjections to conclude that the assessees had received a sum of Rs. 10 lakhs by way of pakidi. The solitary piece of material namely the sworn statement by Sundaresa Pai was not put to the assessees nor were they given an opportunity to cross-examine the said Sundaresa Pai. Hence, the Tribunal was right in dislodging the findings reached by the assessing authority and the appellate authority that the assessees had obtained a sum of Rs. 10 lakhs by way of pakidi and that the said amount was liable to be assessed as capital gains in the hands of the assessee.

4. After hearing both sides at length, we are of the view that the matter has to be probed further before a conclusion either way could be reached.

5. We will first examine the contention of the assessees that there was no transfer of an interest in immovable property so as to attract capital gains tax. “Capital gains” in the context Sec. 45 of the Act to mean any profit or gain arising from the transfer of a capital asset. The word “capital asset” has been defined under Sec. 2(14) of the Act to mean property of any kind held by an assessee, whether or not connected with his business or profession. Thus, in order to attract capital gains tax there must be profit or gain arising from the transfer of a capital asset. “Transfer” in the context of the Act has to be considered with reference to the said expression as defined under Sec. 2(47) which reads as follows:

“47) (“transfer” in relation to a capital asset, includes,—

i) the sale exchange or relinquishment of the asset; or

ii) the extinguishment of any rights therein; or

iii) the compulsory acquisition thereof under any law; or

iv) in a case where the asset is converted by the owner thereof into, or is treated by him as, stock-in-trade of a business carried on by him, such conversion or treatment) (or)

v) any transaction involving the allowing of the possession of any immovable property to be taken or retained in part performance of a contract of the nature referred to in section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882); or

vi) any transaction (whether by way of becoming a member of, or acquiring shares in, a co-operative society, company or other association of persons or by way of any agreement or any arrangement or in any other manner whatsoever) which has the effect of transferring, or enabling the enjoyment of any immovable property

Explanation - For the purposes of sub-clause (v) and (vi) ‘immovable property’ shall have the same meaning as in clause (d) of section 269UA)”

(underlining by us to supply emphasis)

6. Thus, any transaction by way of any agreement or arrangement which has the effect of transferring or enabling the enjoyment of any immovable property is a transfer within the meaning of the Act. The assessees have no case that the instrument in question does not amount to a transaction by way of an arrangement having the effect of enabling the enjoyment of immovable property. Hence, the instrument in question is clearly a transfer of a capital asset and therefore any profit or gain arising out of such transfer will definitely generate capital gains.

7. Even under the general law, merely, because the instrument is a compulsorily registrable one by virtue of Sec. 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act and Sec. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, the transaction in question does not become anything other than a lease transaction. The apex court had occasion to consider this aspect of the matter in Anthony v. K.C Ittoop and Sons, (2000) 6 SCC 394. There also the instrument in question was an unregistered one purporting to create a lease for 5 years and, therefore, compulsorily registrable. Although the Supreme Court held that the instrument as such could not be looked into for holding that the executee thereunder was a lessee, it was observed as follows:—

“When lease is a transfer of a right enjoy the property and such transfer can be made expressly or by implication, the mere fact that an unregistered instrument came into existence would not stand in the way of the court to determine whether there was in fact a lease otherwise than through such deed.”

8. 1661. T.R 207 - Commissioner of Income Tax v. T.M.B Muhammed Abdul Khader (Madras High Court) relied on by the assessees has no application to the facts of the present case. In the above decision, the proposition of law that was laid down was that in a case where there is no registered document of transfer by the assessee partner of his immovable property in favour of the firm in which he is a partner, there is no liability to capital gains. This legal position is well settled. When a partner makes over his personal asset to the firm in which he is a partner, there is no transfer involved. Similarly distribution of surplus properties of the dissolved firm among the partners after settlement of accounts also does not involve any transfer and does not require registration. (Vide Addanki Narayanappa v. Bhaskara Krishnappa, AIR 1966 SC 1300, Commissioner of Income - Tax, Commissioner Of Income Tax, West Bengal, Calcutta v. Juggilal Kamalapat , AIR 1967 SC 401, S.V Chandra Pandian v. S.V Sivalinga Nadar, (1993) 1 SCC 589, Gangadhar Madhavrao Bidwai (Dead) By Lrs. v. Hanmantrao Vyankatrao Mungale., (1995) 3 SCC 205 and N. Khadervali Saheb v. Gudu Sahib, (2003) 3 SCC 229 : AIR 2003 SC 1524). Where there is no transfer of immovable property involved in a transaction it cannot be gainsaid that there is no capital gains arising from such transaction so as to give rise to a liability for capital gains. But, that is not the position in the case on hand. Here, there is a clear transfer of interest in immovable property by the assessees in favour of Sundaresa Pai referred to above attracting capital gains tax on the profits and gains arising therefrom.

9. What now survives for consideration is the further question as to whether the assessees had received 10 lakhs by way of pakidi under the lease arrangement in question. The respondent/assessees are brothers. They are co-owners in respect of the commercial building constituting the subject matter of the aforementioned lease deed. No doubt, the original assessing authority and the appellate authority placed reliance upon the sworn statement of Sundaresa Pai the tenant of the assessees to hold that he had paid Rs. 10 lakhs to the assessees by way of pakidi from out of his unaccounted money. The Tribunal dislodged the findings recorded by the authorities below for the reason that the assessees were not confronted with the sworn statement of Sundaresa Pai and that even the search conducted in the premises of one of the assessees on the very same day on which the premises of Sundaresa Pai, the tenant were searched, did not yield any material to indicate receipt of Rs. 10 lakhs allegedly paid to the assesses. It is true that the assesses did not have the opportunity of challenging the sworn statement given by the tenant. But the fact that about 1350. square feet of commercial premises with all amenities on the ground floor of a three storeyed building bearing Cochin Corporation Door No. 38/2154 situated in a prime location near the Jayalakshmi Textile Shop and by the side of M.G Road, Emakulam, were let out by the assessees to Sundaresa Pai on 10-2-1989 fixing a monthly rent of Rs. 5,000/- for a period of 20 years after admittedly receiving a refundable security deposit of Rs. 2 lakhs, cannot be lost sight of. The building is in a prime location. Both the assessees are business men. Their tenant, Sundaresa Pai is a jeweller and a partner in Geeri Pai Jewellery Shop, Broadway, Emakulam (as is discernible from his sworn statement). The proviso to Sec. 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 indicate that the law does not forclose the existence of contemporaneous oral agreements regarding such matters on which the written instrument is silent. Adjudicatory authorities cannot ignore the ground realities and the common course of human conduct and also the mercantile malpractices. It is pertinent in this context to note that the tenant of the assessees in his sworn statement has in unequivocal terms declared his unaccounted income to the tune of Rs. 17,44,226/- out of which Rs. 10 lakhs was stated to be the pakidi given to the assessees. He had brought the said amounts to tax. This statement of the tenant was one made against his own pecuniary and proprietary interest because, by making such a statement, he was running the risk of incurring additional tax liability. But then, the assessees were not confronted with the aforesaid sworn statement of Sundaresa Pai. It would be an infraction of the cardinal principles of natural justice to rely upon a piece of material against an assessee behind his back. But then in a case where the order is vitiated for non-compliance of the principles of natural justice, the proceedings do not come to an end. Upon the quashing of the order the matter will stand restored to the stage prior to the one at which the order impugned was passed. (See 190 ITR 604 - Commissioner of Income Tax v. M. Sreedharan). We are therefore inclined to give the revenue an opportunity to pursue its case by following a fair procedure. It is well settled that an appellate authority has the jurisdiction as well as the duty to correct all errors in the proceedings under appeal and to issue, if necessary, appropriate directions to the authority against whose decision, the appeal is preferred, to dispose of the whole or any part of the matter afresh, unless forbidden from doing so by statute. (See Kaporchand Shrimal v. Commissioner of Income Tax (Andhra Pradesh), 131 ITR 451).

10. Since we are of the considered view that the Revenue should be given an opportunity to find out whether Rs. 10 lakhs or any amount by way of pakidi was received by the assessees from their tenant Sundaresa Pai while letting out their commercial building as per the lease deed dated 10-2-1989, the orders of the Tribunal, Appellate Authority and the original Assessing Authority are set aside and the matter is remitted to the original Assessing Authority for a revised assessment after giving the Revenue as well as the assessees an opportunity to substantiate their respective contentions. The question of law raised in the I.T.A is answered in favour of the revenue.

11. The ITR and ITA are disposed of accordingly.