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Travancore Cements Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner Of Income Tax

Kerala High Court
Sep 1, 2006
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Judgment Summary — K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is a State Government company engaged in manufacture of cement and cement paints and an assessee under the Income Tax Act, 1961. For the assessment year (A.Y.) 2000-2001 the petitioner filed an original return on 28.11.2000 (declaring income of Rs. 2,37,56,900) and a revised return on 05.01.2001 (declaring income of Rs. 1,91,32,250) with an audit report under S. 44AB. The return was processed and accepted under S. 143(1) on 31.01.2002. The regular assessment under S. 143(3) was not completed and the period for completion had expired on 31.03.2003.

On 28.03.2005 the petitioner was served with a notice (Ext. P3) under S. 148 proposing reassessment for A.Y. 2000-2001 on the ground that income chargeable to tax had escaped. The petitioner filed a return in response and requested reasons for reopening (Ext. P5). After six months the assessing officer communicated reasons by letter dated 17.10.2005 (Ext. P6), stating that excise duty (16%) had not been included in valuation of closing stock (A.Y. 2000-01 and 2001-02) and that provision for bad debts had not been added back.

The petitioner was served with notices Exts. P7 and P8 dated 31.10.2005 under S. 143(2) and S. 142(1), calling for production of documents and information including proof of fixed asset additions, proposed disallowance of a provision of Rs. 46,13,711 for shortage of lime-shell stock, objections to inclusion of excise duty in closing stock, break-up of interest paid, and ledgers and vouchers for repairs. The petitioner objected (Ext. P9) and filed a petition under S. 144A (Ext. P11) requesting that proceedings under S. 148 and the notices under Ss. 143(2) and 142(1) be dropped. The petitioner also contended that Exts. P7 and P8 were illegal and contrary to this Court's guidelines in Tolins Rubbers.

The assessing officer issued an order Ext. P12 dated 18.11.2005 directing compliance with the statutory notices and rejecting the petitioner's objections, stating that the officer had complied with the guidelines in GKN Driveshafts before issuing notices under Ss. 143(2) and 142(1) and that the legality of S. 147 proceedings could not be questioned after issuance of those statutory notices. An assessment order Ext. R1(A) dated 02.06.2006 was later passed (after obtaining permission from the court), completing assessment under S. 143(3) read with S. 144A and S. 147, disallowing the lime-shell provision and estimating interest, and initiating penalty proceedings.

The petitioner challenged Ext. P12 and related notices by filing the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the assessing officer, having issued a notice under S. 148, may proceed to call for information and documents under Ss. 143(2) and 142(1) in respect of items that are unrelated to the reasons recorded under sub-section (2) of S. 148 (i.e., whether S. 148(2) must be complied with separately for items which are totally unconnected with the reasons already disclosed).
  2. Whether issuance of Exts. P7 and P8 (notices under Ss. 143(2) and 142(1)) amounted to a roving or fishing inquiry into matters which were time-barred for regular assessment and/or unrelated to the grounds for reopening under S. 147/148.
  3. Whether the petitioner can invoke writ jurisdiction under Article 226 to challenge Exts. P7, P8 and P12, or whether the petitioner must pursue statutory remedies (i.e., maintainability of the writ petition).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Section 147 can be invoked only when the assessing officer has a reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment; the power cannot be used to conduct a roving enquiry.
  • The petitioner's return had been accepted under S. 143(1)(a) and the assessing officer was required to complete any regular assessment under S. 143(3) on or before 31.03.2003; failure to do so cannot justify invoking S. 147 later to conduct inquiries that are effectively regular assessment queries.
  • Exts. P7 and P8 seek information and documents unrelated to the grounds of reopening and thus amount to an impermissible fishing exercise; no cogent reasons were stated for reopening and the notices under S. 143(2) did not disclose reasons.
  • Reliance placed on GKN Driveshafts (259 ITR 19), Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sun Engineering Works (198 ITR 297), and Vipin Khanna (255 ITR 220) to support the limits on reassessment powers and the need for reasons to be furnished and limited scope of inquiry.

Revenue's Arguments

  • Reasons for reopening were communicated by letter dated 17.10.2005 (Ext. P6), satisfying the requirement of S. 148; once reasons are recorded the assessing officer has jurisdiction to reassess escaped income and any other income chargeable to tax which comes to notice during proceedings.
  • Amendments to S. 147 (effective 1.4.1999) allow the assessing officer to reassess income which he has reason to believe has escaped assessment, including income subsequently discovered in the course of proceedings.
  • Notices under S. 143(2) and S. 142(1) were legitimately issued to verify that there was no understatement of income and to obtain documents necessary for assessment; whether previous assessment was completed under S. 143(1) or S. 143(3) is immaterial for initiating reassessment under S. 147.
  • Reliance placed on authorities (including Selected Dalurband Coal Co. Pvt. Ltd. (217 ITR 597) and Praful Chunilal Patel (236 ITR 832)) supporting the proposition that the assessing officer can reassess income that comes to notice in the course of proceedings; also cited Family of V.A.M. Sankaralinga Nadar (48 ITR 314) for related historical jurisprudence.
  • Ext. P12 is a preliminary order and the petitioner has alternate remedies under the Act (and an appeal after assessment), so extraordinary relief under Article 226 was inappropriate.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, (2003) 259 I.T.R. 19 When a notice under S. 148 is issued the assessee may file a return and seek reasons for reopening and the assessing authority is bound to furnish reasons within a reasonable time. The Court relied on GKN to underscore the requirement that reasons for reopening must be furnished; the Court found that reasons for points in Exts. P7 and P8 were not recorded as required and that the assessee was not served with proper S. 148(2) reasons for those points.
Tolins Rubbers v. Assistant Commissioner Of Income-Tax (2004) 270 I.T.R. 280 Contains guidelines (as asserted by the petitioner) concerning issuance of notices under Ss. 143(2) and 142(1) (as relied on by the petitioner). The petitioner relied on this Court's guidelines in Tolins Rubbers to contend that Exts. P7 and P8 were illegal; the opinion records that reliance but bases its decision primarily on statutory interpretation and other authorities.
Garden Finance Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (2004) 268 I.T.R. 48 Authority cited on maintainability of writ in matters concerning reassessment proceedings and interference by writ jurisdiction. The Court referenced Garden Finance among authorities supporting the proposition that writ relief is available where the assessing officer has no jurisdiction to proceed on certain items; used in part to support maintainability of the petition.
V. Jaganmohan Rao v. C.I.T. (1970) 75 I.T.R. 373 Addresses the scope of reassessment proceedings and whether reassessment wipes out the original assessment (what reassessment is confined to). The Court observed that Jaganmohan Rao does not lay down that reassessment wipes out the original assessment; it rejected the submission that reassessment permits revisiting the entire assessment irrespective of escaped items.
Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sun Engineering Works P. Ltd. (1992) 198 I.T.R. 297 Holds that jurisdiction in proceedings under S. 147 is confined to income which has escaped assessment or been under-assessed and does not extend to revising or reconsidering the whole assessment. The Court relied on this authority to emphasize that reassessment cannot be employed to revisit concluded matters that do not have material suggesting escapement of income.
Vipin Khanna v. Commissioner of Income Tax (2002) 255 I.T.R. 220 Considered whether assessing officer could inquire into issues not connected with reasons for reopening; held directions relating to matters unconnected with the reason cannot be sustained. The Court expressly agreed with the reasoning in Vipin Khanna and applied it to hold that Exts. P7 and P8 were not sustainable as they related to matters unconnected with the reasons recorded under S. 148(2).
Income Tax Officer v. Selected Dalurband Coal Co. Pvt. Ltd. (217 ITR 597) Cited by Revenue for the proposition that an assessing officer can reassess income which comes to his notice subsequently during proceedings. The Court noted the Revenue's reliance on this decision but held that, for items totally unconnected with the reasons recorded under S. 148(2), separate compliance with S. 148(2) is required; thus the reliance did not justify proceeding on the unconnected items.
Praful Chunilal Patel v. Asst. C.I.T. (236 ITR 832) Cited by Revenue as authority supporting reassessment of income that comes to notice during proceedings. The Court recorded the Revenue's reliance but determined that statutory safeguards (recording of reasons under S.148(2)) limit reassessment on unrelated points not covered by the original reasons.
Family of V.A.M. Sankaralinga Nadar v. C.I.T. (1963) 48 I.T.R. 314 Historical authority on reassessment procedures under older statutory provisions (S.34 of Indian Income Tax Act 1922), cited by Revenue to support broader reassessment power. The revenue relied on this earlier decision; the Court noted the reliance but decided the present case on contemporary statutory text and related authorities.
Gursahal Saigal v. C.I.T. (48 ITR 1) Authority on the availability of writ jurisdiction in certain income-tax matters where assessing officer has no jurisdiction to proceed. The Court cited Gursahal Saigal in support of its conclusion that writ relief under Article 226 is available where the assessing officer lacks jurisdiction to proceed on particular items; used to hold the petition maintainable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed its analysis around the statutory scheme of S. 147 read with Ss. 148 and 143. It emphasized that S. 148 requires the Assessing Officer (AO), before making an assessment/reassessment under S. 147, to serve a notice requiring the assessee to furnish a return; and sub-section (2) of S. 148 mandates that the AO must record reasons for issuing such a notice. Recording reasons before issuing the notice is a mandatory requirement under the statute.

The Court identified the critical legal question as whether compliance with S. 148(2) must be separately observed where, during proceedings on one item for which reasons have been recorded, the AO seeks to assess or reassess other items that are totally unconnected with the recorded reasons. The Court reasoned that:

  • If two items of escaped income are interlinked, a single recorded reason under S. 148(2) may suffice if the second item comes to the officer's notice in the course of proceedings into the first. The statutory language ("subject to the provisions of Ss. 148 to 153" in S. 147) supports treating connected items together.
  • However, if the additional items are unconnected and totally alien to the reasons for reopening, the AO must comply with S. 148(2) afresh in respect of those items; otherwise the AO lacks jurisdiction to proceed on them.
  • In the present case, Ext. P3 (notice under S. 148) initially did not record reasons as required by sub-s. (2) but Ext. P6 later disclosed reasons limited to non-inclusion of excise duty and non-addition of bad debts. Exts. P7 and P8 sought information on matters (for example, the Rs. 46,13,711 lime-shell provision) that were not connected to the reasons set out in Ext. P6. The Court concluded that S. 148(2) had not been complied with in respect of the matters covered by Exts. P7 and P8.
  • The Court also observed that general enquiry under S. 143(2) can be made only within the stipulated period; here the general enquiry window had expired on 31.03.2003. The AO could not, under the guise of reassessment, reopen time-barred regular-assessment matters unrelated to the recorded reasons for reopening.
  • The Court relied on GKN Driveshafts for the proposition that reasons must be furnished and Vipin Khanna and Sun Engineering Works to emphasize the confined scope of reassessment proceedings. While the Revenue relied on authorities to support a broader reassessment power (including assessment of income coming to notice in proceedings), the Court held that statutory safeguards (especially S. 148(2)) constrain the AO from delving into unrelated items without fresh recorded reasons.
  • On the maintainability point, the Court held that where the petitioner can establish that the assessing officer has no jurisdiction to proceed (as here for Exts. P7 and P8), writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is available; it relied on precedents to support this proposition.

Applying these principles, the Court found that the AO had followed S. 148(2) only in respect of items identified in Ext. P6, but had not followed that procedure for the additional items in Exts. P7 and P8. Therefore the AO lacked jurisdiction to proceed with those items and the notices/orders in respect of them were invalid.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is allowed. The Court quashed Ext. P12 (order dated 18.11.2005) and also quashed Exts. P7 and P8 (notices under Ss. 143(2) and 142(1)).

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner is relieved from compliance with Exts. P7 and P8 and the departmental preliminary order Ext. P12 is set aside insofar as those notices and related inquiries concern matters not covered by the reasons recorded under S. 148(2) (as communicated in Ext. P6).
  • Jurisdictional guidance: The decision reiterates that the assessing officer must record reasons under S. 148(2) for the specific items on which reassessment is proposed and cannot proceed on unrelated matters without fresh compliance with S. 148(2). Regular-assessment inquiries that were time-barred cannot be revived under the guise of reassessment when unrelated to the recorded reasons.
  • Availability of writ relief: The Court held that Article 226 is available where the assessee can show the assessing officer has no jurisdiction to proceed on particular items, confirming the maintainability of the writ in such circumstances.
  • No broader new precedent was announced beyond application of existing statutory requirements and cited authorities; the judgment applies established principles (as recorded in the opinion) to the facts of this case and quashes the specific notices and order at issue.

This summary is based exclusively on the contents of the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences not present in the original text.

Show all summary ...

K.S Radhakrishnan, J.:— This Writ Petition has been filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India challenging Ext. P12 order dated 18.11.2005 issued by the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax directing the assessee to ensure compliance with the statutory notification issued under S. 143(2) and 142(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 without fail and also for other consequential reliefs.

2. Petitioner is a company owned by the State Government engaged in the business of manufacture of cement and cement paints at Kottayam and is an assessee under the Income Tax Act 1961, on the files of the second respondent. In respect of the assessment year 2000-2001 petitioner filed its original return on 28.11.2000 declaring a total income of Rs. 2,37,56,900/-. A revised return was filed on 05-01-2001 with a revised total income of Rs. 1,91,32,250/- along with the audit report under S. 44AB. The return was processed and accepted by the assessing authority under S. 143(1) of the Act on 31.01.2002 Return of income was not taken up for scrutiny under S. 143(3) of the Act. The date for completing the regular assessment under S. 143(3) was however expired on 31.03.2003

3. Petitioner was later served with a notice Ext. P3 dated 28.03.2005 under S. 148 of the Act by the first respondent informing he has reason to believe that income chargeable to tax for the assessment year 2000-2001 has escaped assessment within the meaning of S. 147 of the Act. Petitioner was therefore informed by the first respondent that he has proposed to reassess the income for the said assessment year and was therefore directed to submit a return in the prescribed form within thirty days from the date of the said notice. In response to the notice petitioner filed its return showing the income as shown in the original return. Petitioner also sent a letter Ext. P5 dated 18.04.2005 requesting the first respondent to intimate the reasons recorded for the purpose of reopening the assessment as per the ruling of the Apex Court in GKN. Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, (2003) 259 I.T.R 19. Later, after the expiry of six months, petitioner was served with a letter, Ext.P6 dated 17.10.2005 stating as follows:

“The reasons recorded for reopening of the case are as follows:

A.Y 2000-01 Excise duty (16%) has not been included in valuation of closing stock. A.Y 2001-02 Excise duty (16%) has not been included in valuation of closing stock. Further, provision for bad debts has not been added back to total income.”

4. Petitioner was later served with notices Exts. P7 & P8 dated 31.10.2005 under S. 143(2) and 142 of the Act directing the petitioner to appear before the first respondent so as to get further information in connection with the return of income submitted by the petitioner on 18.04.2005, vide Ext. P8 notice issued under the S. 142 for the assessment year 2000-2001. Petitioner was also directed to file fresh return and also to produce the following document.

i) Proof of addition to fixed assets and proof of installation.

ii) It is proposed to add back Rs. 46,13,711/- being provision for shortage of lime shell stock as this is in the nature of a mere provision and was not ascertained in the year end 31.3.2000 Objections, if any, may be filed.

iii) Objections, if any, to the inclusion of excise duty @ 16% in calculation of closing stock.

iv) Break-up of interest paid.

v) Ledger with narration and supporting bills/vouchers regarding repairs to building and repairs to machinery.

Petitioner in the meanwhile filed detailed objection to Ext. P6 vide Ext. P9 reply dated 14.11.2005 requesting to drop proceedings initiated under S. 148 being contrary to the provisions of S. 147 since there was no escapement of income. Petitioner has also pointed out that there is no escapement of income on account of the reason that the excise duty (16%) has not been included in valuation of closing stock. Petitioner also preferred a petition Ext. P11 under S. 144A of the Act before the Additional Commissioner of Income-tax requesting to issue appropriate direction to the subordinate officers to drop the proceedings initiated under S. 148 of the Income Tax Act and also the proceedings initiated vide Exts. P7 and P8. Petitioner has also stated that the notices Exts. P7 and P8 issued under Ss. 143(2) and 142(1) are illegal and contrary to the guidelines issued by this court in Tolins Rubbers v. Assistant Commissioner Of Income-Tax (2004) 270 I.T.R 280. Reference was also made to the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Garden Finance Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (2004) 268 I.T.R 48.

5. The petitioner was then served with Ext. P12 order dated 18.11.2005 stating that the assessing authority has complied with the guidelines prescribed in GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, (2003) 259 I.T.R 19 before issuing notices under Ss. 143(2) and 142(1) of the Act and therefore it is not open to the assessee to question the legality of S. 147 proceedings before the assessing officer, that is, after the issuance of the statutory notices under S. 143(2) and 142(1). Various other objections raised by the petitioner were therefore rejected stating that the reason for reopening the assessment stated in Ext. P3 notice issued under S. 148 is legal. Petitioner was therefore directed to ensure compliance with statutory notices under Ss. 143(2) and 142(1) without fail. Aggrieved by the same this Writ Petition has been preferred.

6. Assessing authority in the meanwhile passed the assessment order Ext. R1(A) dated 2.6.2006, after seeking permission from this court. Reason recorded for reopening the assessment was stated to be non-inclusion of excise duty (16%) in the valuation of closing stock but assessment was completed after issuing notices under Ss. 143(2) and 142(1). It was stated that the loss by shortage of stock of lime-shell was not crystallized in the year under consideration and it would not crystallize till Government of Kerala accords its approval to write off the same. Consequently it was pointed out that stock was thus prematurely written off. It was pointed out that the provision for Rs. 46,13,711/- being shortage of stock of lime shell be debited in the profit and loss account for the financial year 1999-2000 cannot be allowed as a deduction. The contention of the assessee that the assessing officer cannot launch enquiry on grounds not covered in the reassessment notice was rejected placing reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in V. Jaganmohan Rao v. C.I.T (75 ITR 373). Assessment order was therefore passed under S. 143(3) read with S. 144A and 147 of the Act and interest was also estimated under S. 234D from 1.6.2003 Penalty proceedings were also ordered to be initiated under S. 271(1) (c) of the Act.

7. Counsel appearing for the petitioner Sri Joseph Markos submitted that it is settled law that S. 147 of the Act can be invoked only when assessing authority has reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. Counsel submitted that under the guise of exercising power under S. 147 assessing authority cannot be permitted to make a roving enquiry. Counsel submitted that the petitioner's return was accepted under S. 143(1) (a) and the assessing authority was entitled to complete the regular assessment under S. 143(3) on or before 31.3.2003 and in order to get over the period of limitation, assessing authority has sought to invoke S. 147 to make a detailed enquiry which is reflected in Exts.P7 and P8 notices. Counsel submitted that the assessing authority after having chosen not to complete the regular assessment under S. 143(3) cannot be permitted to make a further enquiry which would amount to virtually reopening for earlier assessment. Counsel submitted that no cogent reasons have been stated for reopening the assessment; nor furnished any details in the notices under S. 143(2). The assessing authority according to the counsel, cannot make a roving enquiry on the basis of notice issued under S. 143(2) and 142 without disclosing any reasons. Counsel submitted that by issuing notice under Ss. 142 and 143(2) as well as S. 148(1) assessing authority cannot call for any details which are totally unconnected with the grounds shown for reopening the assessment under S. 147. Counsel submitted that the details called for under Ss. 143(2) and 142 are totally unconnected with the grounds disclosed to the assessee under S. 148 of the Act. Counsel placed considerable reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in GKN Driveshaft's case, supra (259 ITR 19). Reliance also placed on the decision of the Apex Court in Commissioner of Incometax v. Sun Engineering Works P. Ltd. ((1992) 198 ITR 297). Counsel also placed reliance on the Bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Vipan Khanna v. Commissioner of Income Tax (2002 (255) ITR 220). Sri P.K Raveendranatha Menon, Standing Counsel appearing for the Revenue, on the other hand, contended that reasons for reopening the assessment were communicated to the assessee as per letter dated 17.10.2005, consequently requirement of S. 148 has been satisfied. Counsel submitted that under the amended provisions of S. 147 with effect from 1.4.1999, the assessing officer can assess or reassess income which he has reason to believe has escaped assessment and can assess or reassess any income chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment and which comes to the notice subsequently in the course of the proceeding. Counsel submitted that notice under S. 143(2) was issued calling upon the assessee to produce evidence in support of the return when the assessing officer needs to ensure that there is no understatement of income. Notice under S. 142(1) was issued to produce document as the assessing authority may require for the purpose of making the assessment. Counsel submitted that whether assessment was completed under S. 143(1) or under S. 143(3) is of no moment for initiating reassessment under S. 147. Counsel submitted that once the proceeding were validly initiated by issuing notice under S. 148 after recording reasons assessing authority has jurisdiction to assess or reassess any income chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment and which comes to his notice subsequently in the course of the proceedings. Counsel placed reliance on the decision of the Madras High Court in Family of V.A.M Sankaralinga Nadar v. C.I.T (1963) 48 ITR 314) pertaining to proceedings initiated under S. 34 of the Indian Income Tax Act 1922. Counsel submitted that the non issuance of the notice under S. 143(2) does not in any way affect the power of the assessing officer to issue notice under S. 148. Counsel submitted that non existence of the original ground which led the officer to believe that income had escaped is not a bar to reassessment of escaped income and does not vitiate such reassessment. Counsel submitted that the statutory requirement of reasonable belief rooted in information in the possession of the officer is a safeguard the assessee from vexatious proceedings and is not a mantle of protection against taxation of income found to have escaped assessment. Counsel submitted that in determining the question of escaped assessment the assessing officer has to satisfy that there were enough materials on the basis of which authority can reopen the case and the correctness or otherwise of the same has to be considered by the court. Counsel also placed reliance on the decisions in Income Tax officer v. Selected Dalurband Coal Co. Pvt. Ltd. (217 ITR 597), and Praful Chunilal Patel v. Asst. C.I.T (236 ITR 832). Counsel submitted that Ext.P12 is a preliminary order and therefore remedy open to the petitioner is not to invoke the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India since petitioner has got an alternate remedy under the Act. Counsel submitted, in any view of the matter, since assessment order has been passed petitioner has got a remedy of appeal before the authorities and this Writ Petition is not a proper remedy. Counsel also submitted that provision in S. 147 is a machinery provision.

8. It is trite law that the provisions in a taxing statute have to be construed in accordance with the clear intention of the legislature which is to make the charge levied effective. Validity of Exts. P6, P7, P8 and P12 is to be adjuded in the light of Ss. 147 and 148 read with S. 143 of the Act. At the outset we may point out that we find no infirmity in the Department issuing Ext. P3 under S. 148 or Ext. P6 communication disclosing reasons for reopening the assessment. Ext. P3 is a notice issued under S. 148 of the Act proposing to reassess the income of the petitioner for the assessment year 2000-01. But no reasons were recorded in Ext. P3 notice as required sub-s. (2) of S. 148. Later on a request made by the petitioner, reasons were disclosed by Ext.P6 letter dated 17.10.2005 Still the moot question is whether the assessing authority without following the procedure under sub-section (2) of S. 148 assess or reassess any income chargeable to tax which virtually has no connection with the reason already disclosed in the notice issued under S. 148(2). Admittedly no notice under sub-section (2) of S. 148 was issued in respect of the income which is stated to have escaped for which notice under S. 143(2) and 142 was issued by Exts. P7 and P8. For example, in Ext. P8 it is stated that the assessing authority has proposed to add back Rs. 46,13,711/- being provision for shortage of lime shell stock, which is totally unconnected with the reason stated in the notices issued under S. 148, vide Exts. P5 and P6. Can the assessing authority under the guise of proceeding under S. 147 make scrutiny of assessment under S. 143(3), which proceeding was barred by limitation?. Petitioner specifically states that his return was accepted under S. 143(1)(a) under Ext. P2 intimation. Consequently the assessing authority was entitled to complete the regular assessment under S. 143(3) on or before 31.3.2003 Petitioner further submits that the assessing authority having chosen not to complete the regular assessment under S. 143(3) cannot be permitted to verify all the statements under the guise of assessing escaped income. Petitioner submits that Exts.P7 and P8 requiring him to produce books of accounts and furnishing information on various points are not warranted in a proceeding under S. 147 of the Act.

9. S. 148 deals with issue of notice where income has escaped assessment. It states that before making the assessment, reassessment or recomputation under S. 147, the Assessing Officer shall serve on the assessee a notice requiring him to furnish within such period, as may be specified in the notice, a return of his income or the income or the income of any other person in respect of which he is assessable under this Act during the previous year corresponding to the relevant assessment year, in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner and setting forth such other particulars as may be prescribed. Sub-s. (2) of S. 148 states that the assessing officer shall before doing so record his reasons for issuing such notice. Recording of reasons before issuing notice is a mandatory requirement. Assessing officer is also empowered under S. 147 assess or reassess such income and also any other income chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment and which comes to his notice subsequently in the course of proceedings under S. 147. Assessing officer gets jurisdiction under S. 148 to assess or reassess the income which has escaped assessment only after sub-s. (2) of S. 148 is complied with. The question is whether sub-s. (2) of S. 148 has to be complied with if any other income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, or which comes to his knowledge subsequently in the course of the proceedings. In other words, when proceedings are already on in respect of one item in respect of the income for which he had already recorded reasons is it necessary that he should record reasons for assessing or reassessing any of the items which are totally unconnected with the proceedings already initiated. Suppose under two heads, income has escaped assessment and those two heads are interlinked and connected, the proceedings initiated or notice already issued under sub-s. (2) of S. 148 would be sufficient if the escaped income on the second head comes to the knowledge of the officer in the course of the proceedings. But if both the items are unconnected and totally alien then the assessing authority has to follow sub-s. (2) of S. 148 with regard to the escaped income which comes to his knowledge during the course of the proceedings. The expression “subject to the provisions of Ss. 148 to 153” in S. 147 lends support to the above view.

10. When we apply the above principles to the present case, it is evident that the reasons stated were under sub-section (2) of S. 148 only. In Ext. P6 those reasons are unconnected with the reasons stated in Ext. P8. The assessing authority has therefore no jurisdiction to proceed with the items covered by Exts. P7 and P8 due to non compliance of sub-section (2) of S. 148. We may in this connection refer to the decision of the Apex Court in GKN Driveshafts' case, supra (259 ITR 19) wherein the Apex Court has held that when a notice under S. 148 of the Income Tax Act is issued, the proper course of action for the assessee is to file a return and if he so desires, to seek reasons for issuing notices and the assessing authority is bound to furnish reasons within a reasonable time. So far as this case is concerned the assessee was not served with any notice under S. 148; nor the assessing officer recorded reasons as provided under sub-s. (2) of S. 148 for the points highlighted in Exts. P7 and P8.

11. The Punjab and Haryana High Court had occasion to consider an identical issue in Vipin Khanna v. Commissioner of Income Tax (255 ITR 220). That was a case where proceedings under S. 147 were initiated. The question arose as to whether assessing officer was justified in launching an inquiry into the issues which were not connected with the issue of depreciation. The court held that the assessee can claim credit in respect of terms finally concluded in the original assessment and the letter dated 30.7.1998 issued by the assessing officer in so far as it relates to matters unconnected with the issue of depreciation and also the directions issued by the Deputy Commissioner under S. 144A cannot be sustained. We are in agreement with the reasoning given in Vipin Khanna's case, supra (255 ITR 220).

12. The next question to be considered is whether assessing officer by issuing Ext. P7 notice under S. 143(2) of the Income Tax Act as well as Ext. P8 notice under S. 142 of the Income Tax Act has embarked upon a roving enquiry on issues which are unconnected with the issue which forms the basis of proceedings initiated under S. 147 of the Act vide Exts. P5 and P6. It is trite law that general enquiry can be made only by issuing notice under sub-s. (2) of S. 143 within the stipulated period, which in the present case has already expired on 31.03.2003 We have already indicated that it is not the case of the Revenue that during the course of proceedings under S. 147 of the Act it has come across any material relating to the items mentioned in Ext.P8 suggesting escapement of income under any of those heads mentioned therein. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax cannot make any fishing enquiry in concluded matters unconnected with the issue on the basis of which proceedings under S. 147 was initiated as per Exts.P5 and P6. Further, there is no allegation of escapement or under assessment of income either in the reasons recorded or during the course of proceedings under S. 147 of the Act in the notices issued, Exts. P7 and P8. It is pertinent to note in this connection that the words “such income aid also any other income” in S. 147 of the Act as it stands with effect from 1st April, 1989 will clearly indicate that the escaped income for which reassessment proceedings are initiated should continue to exist so as to clothe the assessing officer with jurisdiction to assess or reassess any other escaped income chargeable to tax and which has come to his notice subsequently in the course of the reassessment proceedings. Return filed by the assessee had already become final and that finality could not be disturbed even in a proceeding under S. 147 of the Act in respect of issues on which there is no material on record suggesting escapement of income. Reference may be made to the decision of the Apex Court in C.I.T v. Sun Engineering Works Pvt. Ltd. (1992) 198 ITR 297) where the court held that the jurisdiction of the Income Tax Officer in proceedings under S. 147 of the Act is confined only to such income which has escaped tax or has been under assessed and does not extend to revising, reopening, or reconsidering the whole assessment or permitting the assessee to reagitate the questions which had been decided in the assessment proceedings. Proceedings under Exts. P7 and P8, in our view, are totally unconnected and have no relation whatsoever with the proceeding initiated as per Exts. P5 and P6. In Jaganmohan Rao v. C.I.T (1970) 75 ITR 373) the Apex Court has not laid down the proposition that the reassessment proceedings wipes out the original assessment and re-assessment is not only confined to “escaped assessment” or “under assessment”, but to the entire assessment. As rightly opined by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Vipin Khanna's case, supra (255 ITR 220) such an approach would be erroneous. We find vide Exts. P7, P8 and P12, that the assessing officer is requiring the petitioner to furnish explanation on issues which are totally unconnected with the issue of non-inclusion of excise duty (16%) in the valuation of closing stock for the assessment years 2000-01, 2001-02 and also for not adding back the bad debts on the basis of which proceedings were initiated under S. 148. There is no allegation on the part of the Revenue of any escapement or under assessment of income with regard to issues raised in Ext.P8 either in the reason disclosed in Ext.P6 or the same came to his knowledge in the course of proceedings under S. 147 of the Act.

13. The assessing authority has followed the provisions of sub-section (2) of S. 148 only in respect of points referred to in Ext. P6. Sub-s. (2) of S. 148 was not followed in respect of the points referred to in Exts. P7 and P8. No fresh enquiry can be initiated in respect of the points mentioned in Exts. P7 and P8, since the date of completing the regular assessment under S. 143(2) had already expired on 31.3.2003

14. We also reject the contention of the Revenue that the Writ Petition is not maintainable. In a case where petitioner can establish that assessing officer has no jurisdiction to proceed under Ext. P7, P8 and Ext. P12, remedy under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India is always available, a position settled by the decisions of the Apex Court in Gursahal Saigal v. C.I.T (48 ITR 1), GKN Driveshaft's case, supra and also the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Garden Finance Limited v. Asst. Commissioner of Income Tax (268 ITR 48). We therefore hold that the Writ Petition is maintainable.

15. In such circumstances, we allow this Writ Petition and quash Ext. P12. Exts. P7 and P8 have no legs to stand and they also stand quashed.