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Joseph v. Marium Thomas & Anr.
Judgment Summary — R. Bhaskaran, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal was filed by a third party claimant in Execution Petition (E.P.) 2/2003 arising out of Original Suit (O.S.) 226/1993 on the file of the Family Court, Kottayam at Ettumanoor. The first respondent obtained a decree for maintenance against the second respondent and the decree expressly made the maintenance claim a charge on the plaint schedule property.
Chronology as set out in the opinion:
- Suit for maintenance was filed on 8-12-1993 before the Munsiff Court, Ettumanoor claiming Rs. 750 per month.
- The suit was decreed on 20-12-1995 directing payment of Rs. 500 per month from 1-1-1994 and charging the plaint schedule property for the maintenance claim.
- On the date of filing the suit a petition for attachment before judgment was presented and a conditional attachment was ordered.
- On 29-2-1996 the second respondent sold the property to the appellant for a stated consideration of Rs. 1 lakh.
- E.P. 49/1997 was filed by the first respondent for realisation of the decree debt; the appellant (purchaser) filed E.A. 85/98 claiming to be a bona fide purchaser and not bound by the decree; that application was dismissed on 9-4-1999 holding the transfer was subject to the decree.
- The appellant challenged that order in CRP 1379/99 which was dismissed by this Court on 27-7-1999 (holding the transfer was hit by lis pendens).
- The appellant also filed E.P. 39/99 offering to deposit Rs. 25,000 to get the property released; that petition was dismissed by the Munsiff Court; CRP 2583/1999 challenging that dismissal was also dismissed following the earlier CRP order.
- After the Family Court was established (noted as 19-9-1998 in the opinion), a jurisdictional contention arose and a fresh execution petition was filed before the Family Court; the earlier E.P. was dismissed and before the Family Court the appellant filed E.A. 42/2003 which was dismissed by the order under challenge in this appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the earlier proceedings (before the Munsiff/Civil Court) were without jurisdiction?
- Whether the decree obtained by the first respondent is a collusive decree and whether the decree exceeded the prayer made in the plaint (specifically, whether future maintenance was improperly granted)?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The orders of the Civil Court in earlier execution proceedings were passed after the establishment of the Family Court and therefore were without jurisdiction; earlier decisions (CRPs) following those orders are not binding on the appellant.
- The decree obtained by the first respondent against the second respondent is collusive — allegedly to defeat the appellant's interest — and the appellant was cheated by both husband and wife.
- The suit was only for past maintenance and the decree for future maintenance was not claimed in the plaint, rendering the decree for future maintenance inexecutable or improper.
- Interlocutory applications in earlier E.P.s lose relevance after disposal of the E.P.
Respondent's Arguments
- The transfer in favour of the appellant is hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, and even if the appellant is a bona fide purchaser, the transfer must be subject to the decree and the lis pendens principle; the appellant cannot ignore the decree.
- The contention that the earlier proceedings were without jurisdiction is without substance because the Civil Court had full jurisdiction to consider the petition for execution.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| G.M. Nair v. Jagadamma, 1994 (1) KLT 207 | Authority cited for the proposition that after establishment of Family Court, a Magistrate has no jurisdiction to execute an order passed under Chapter IX of the Criminal Procedure Code (as relied on by appellant). | The court held this decision distinguishable on facts and not applicable to the present case; it did not accept the appellant's attempt to rely on it to show earlier Civil Court proceedings were without jurisdiction. |
| Devaki v. Chandrika, 1997 (2) KLT 746; AIR 1998 Ker 190 | Division Bench decision that after establishment of Family Court a petition to set aside an ex parte decree passed by a Civil Court in matters within Family Court jurisdiction must be filed before the Family Court. | The court observed this decision but found it distinguishable on the facts; it did not accept that the existence of the Family Court rendered earlier execution proceedings void in this case. |
| Nagubai v. B. Shama Rao, AIR 1956 SC 593 | Held that Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is attracted where maintenance is claimed to be charged on a property and that a transfer of property pending such a suit is hit by lis pendens; a suit need not be strictly "relating to the property" if a charge is claimed. | The court relied on this Supreme Court authority to conclude that the appellant's purchase (made after the suit claiming a charge) is subject to the charge under the decree and is hit by Section 52; consequently the appellant cannot claim priority over the decree-holder. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court addressed the two points enumerated in the appeal and proceeded by applying statutory text and precedent to the specific facts. The analysis appears in two parts corresponding to the two points.
Point No. 1 — Jurisdiction of earlier proceedings
- The appellant principally relied on Section 8 of the Family Courts Act (exclusion of ordinary Civil Court jurisdiction in certain family matters) and stressed that the Family Court was established in Kottayam on 19-9-1998, after which the Munsiff Court could not proceed in matters within Family Court jurisdiction.
- The court examined Section 18 of the Family Courts Act, noting that a decree or order passed by a Family Court can be executed by the Family Court or by an ordinary Civil Court to which the decree is sent for execution; subsection (3) indicates that the Civil Court's jurisdiction to execute a Family Court decree is not ousted.
- The court reasoned it is not necessary to send to another court for execution where the decree was passed by the Civil Court itself; therefore the mere existence of the Family Court does not render earlier execution proceedings before the Civil Court void.
- The court further analysed the explanation to Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, observing that the exclusion of Civil Court jurisdiction applies to certain matters relating to proceedings between parties to a marriage. The appellant is a stranger to the marriage and is not claiming maintenance; hence clause (f) of the explanation to Section 7 does not oust Civil Court jurisdiction in this situation.
- The court rejected the submission based on Section 89 of the Registration Act (that attachment must be communicated to the Sub-Registrar) because that contention was not raised before the execution court and could not be considered for the first time on appeal.
- Conclusion on Point 1: The contention that the earlier proceedings were without jurisdiction was found unsustainable — it was not a case of absolute want of jurisdiction and the Civil Court retained competence to deal with the execution proceedings in the circumstances of this case.
Point No. 2 — Allegation of collusion and scope of decree
- The court observed that the appellant had not pressed a contention of collusion in the earlier proceedings; there was no such contention earlier in the record.
- The timing and factual matrix were considered: the suit was filed in 1993 whereas the appellant purchased the property in 1996 — the court found it improbable that the suit was filed collusively to defeat a prospective purchaser.
- The plaint was perused: it alleged the plaint schedule property was purchased with funds obtained by sale of the plaintiff's property and that the husband was trying to cut and remove valuable trees; the plaintiff had prayed for a charge over the property for maintenance. On these facts the court found the collusion allegation unsupported.
- On the argument that the decree awarded future maintenance though the plaint purportedly sought only past maintenance, the court observed the plaint did not expressly limit relief to past maintenance and noted that the court fee had been calculated on the basis of one year's maintenance — indicating a claim extending beyond mere past maintenance. Moreover, the appellant (a non-party) was not entitled to challenge the correctness of the decree.
- The court relied on the Supreme Court decision in Nagubai v. B. Shama Rao (AIR 1956 SC 593) concerning Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. That authority establishes that when a charge for maintenance is claimed on a property, Section 52 is attracted and transfers made after the suit is instituted are hit by the principle of lis pendens even if the suit is not strictly "relating to the property."
- Applying that principle to the facts — where the appellant purchased the property after institution of the maintenance suit that claimed a charge over the property — the court concluded that the appellant's purchase was subject to the decree and the charge, and the appellant could not claim preference over the decree-holder.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Direct consequences as stated in the opinion:
- The Execution First Appeal is dismissed and the order under challenge (dismissing the appellant's application before the execution/Family Court) stands. The dismissal is without any order as to costs.
- Because the purchase by the appellant occurred after the filing of the suit in which a charge over the plaint schedule property was claimed, Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act applies and the appellant's transfer is subject to the decree; the appellant cannot claim priority over the decree-holder.
Broader legal impact: The court applied established principles (including Nagubai v. B. Shama Rao on Section 52 and the lis pendens rule) to the facts and did not purport to lay down any new precedent. The decision confines itself to the direct effect on the parties — upholding the execution of the maintenance decree and rejecting the appellant's contentions.
Appeal dismissed.
R. Bhaskaran, J.:— This appeal is filed by a third party claimant in E.P 2/2003 in O.S 226/1993 on the file of the Family Court, Kottayam at Ettumanoor. The first respondent in the appeal obtained a decree for maintenance against the second respondent and the decree made it clear that the claim for maintenance will be a charge on the plaint schedule property. The suit was filed as early as on 8-12-1993 before the Munsiff Court, Ettumanoor claiming maintenance at the rate of Rs. 750/- per month. The suit was decreed on 20-12-1995 at the rate of Rs. 500/- per month from 1-1-1994 charging the plaint schedule property for the claim for maintenance. On the date of filing of the suit itself there was a petition for attachment before judgment and a conditional attachment was ordered. In the decree passed on 20-12-1995 the Munsiff Court granted a charge for the plaint claim over the plaint schedule property. On 29-2-1996 the second respondent sold the property in favour of the appellant showing a consideration of Rs. 1 lakh. Subsequently E.P 49/1997 was filed for realisation of the decree debt by the first respondent against the second respondent. On 26-11-1998 the petitioner filed E.A 85/98 claiming that the property is not liable to be sold as he is a bona fide purchaser for consideration and he was not bound by the decree. That application was dismissed on 9-4-1999 holding that the transfer in favour of the petitioner was subject to the decree against the second respondent. Challenging that order the petitioner filed CRP 1379/99 before this Court and that was dismissed by order dated 27-7-1999. It was held by this Court that the transfer in favour of the appellant was hit by principle of lis pendens. Subsequently the appellant filed E.P 39/99 offering to deposit Rs. 25,000/- and get the property released from the liability under the decree. That petition was also dismissed by the Munsiff Court, Ettumanoor. Against that order petitioner filed CRP 2583/1999 which was also dismissed following the order in CRP 1379/99.
2. While the earlier E.P was pending before the Munsiff Court a contention was raised that Family Court is established and only the Family Court has jurisdiction to execute the decree. Thereafter fresh E.P was filed before the Family Court and the earlier E.P was dismissed. Before the Family Court the appellant filed E.A 42/2003 which was also dismissed by the order under challenge.
3. In this appeal the learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the Court below was not correct in following the decisions in the earlier CRPs as the proceedings which were the subject matter of the two revisions were proceedings without jurisdiction and therefore orders in the CRPs were also not binding on the appellant. It is also argued that the very decree obtained by the first respondent against the second respondent is a collusive decree and the appellant was cheated by both the husband and wife. Thirdly it is contended that the suit itself is for past maintenance and the decree for future maintenance was not claimed for and the decree was inexecutable with respect to the claim for future maintenance. It is also argued that the interlocutory application in the earlier E.Ps have no legs to stand after the disposal of the E.P
4. The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand argued that none of these contentions can be sustained since the transfer in favour of the appellant is hit by Sec. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and even if he is a bona fide purchaser his transfer has to be subject to the decision in the suit and he is not entitled to ignore the decree obtained by the first respondent against the second respondent. It is also argued that the contention that the earlier proceedings were without jurisdiction is having no substance as the Court had full jurisdiction to consider the petition for execution.
5. In view of the above contention, the points for consideration in this appeal are:
(1) Whether the earlier proceedings were without jurisdiction? and
(2) Whether the decree obtained is a collusive decree and whether the decree was beyond the prayer made in the plaint.
Point No. 1:
6. The learned counsel for the appellant mainly relied on the provisions in Sec. 8 of the Family Court Act relating to exclusion of jurisdiction of the ordinary Civil Courts in respect of matters covered by explanation to Sec. 7 of the Act. According to the learned counsel the Family Court was established in Kottayam district on 19-9-1998 and the E.P which was pending before the Munsiff Court, Ettumanoor could not have been proceeded as after the establishment of the Family Court any order passed by the Munsiff Court, Ettumanoor was without jurisdiction. Therefore the order in revision challenging the orders in those applications are only to be ignored, contends the learned counsel. The learned counsel relied on the decisions of this Court in G.M Nair v. Jagadamma (1994 (1) KLT 207). In that case the learned single Judge K.T Thomas, J. as his Lordship then was held that after the establishment of Family Court, the Magistrate has no jurisdiction to execute an order passed under Chapter 9 of the Cr. P.C In Devaki v. Chandrika 1997 (2) KLT 746: (AIR 1998 Ker 190) a Division Bench of this Court held that after the establishment of the Family Court a petition to set aside an ex parte decree passed by a civil Court in matters within the jurisdiction of the Family Court has to be filed before the Family Court. The appellant had challenged the orders passed by the Munsiff Court in the earlier execution proceedings and he never challenged the jurisdiction of the Civil Court before this Court while arguing the CRPs. Therefore it is doubtful whether the appellant can now contend that those proceedings were without jurisdiction. But it is unnecessary to rest this decision on this basis. We find from Sec. 18 of the Family Court Act that the decree or order passed by a Family Court can be executed by the Family Court or ordinary Civil Court to which it is sent for execution. Sub-section (3) of Section 18 gives a clear indication to the fact that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to execute a decree of a Family Court is not ousted. According to the learned counsel for the appellant it is only if the Family Court sends decree for execution that the Civil Court will get jurisdiction. But it has to be remembered in this context that there the decree was passed by the Civil Court itself and there is no necessity to send it for execution to another Court. Even in cases where a decree is passed by the Family Court if the Civil Court has got jurisdiction to execute the decree we find no reason to doubt the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to execute the decree passed by the Civil Court itself. Therefore, the contention that the earlier proceedings were without jurisdiction and have only to be ignored is unsustainable. It is not a case where there is absolute want of jurisdiction as the Family Court itself recognises the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to execute the decree by the Family Court. There is one more reason to reject the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant as explanation to Sec. 7 excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Court only in certain matters which are relating to proceedings between the parties to a marriage. Of course it includes a suit or proceeding for maintenance but in this case the appellant is not a party to the marriage or is not claiming any maintenance. He is a total stranger and his claim for the property purchased from the husband cannot be brought in clause ‘f’ to explanation to Sec. 7 of the Family Courts Act. It is only in such cases that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted and in all other cases the Civil Courts continue to have jurisdiction. In that respect also the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to execute the decree passed by the Civil Court is unsustainable. The decisions referred to by the learned counsel for the appellant are therefore clearly distinguishable on the facts of the case and they are not applicable to the facts of the case. The learned counsel for the appellant also contended that under Section 89 of the Registration Act as applicable in Kerala it is mandatory that any attachment of immovable property should be communicated to the Sub Registrar's Office and if the same was not done there was no proper attachment. We find no such contention raised before the execution Court and it is not possible for us to examine this question in appeal for the first time.
Point No. 2:
7. The learned counsel for the appellant then contended that the decree obtained by the first respondent against the second respondent is a collusive decree and it was to defeat the interest of the appellant. He also contended that since that contention was not considered by the execution Court the same may be directed to be considered by that Court. We find that there was no such contention raised at any time in the earlier proceedings. Moreover the suit was filed as early as in 1993 and the appellant purchased the property only in 1996. It is too much to assume that the suit was filed anticipating sale of the property and to defeat the prospective purchaser. We perused the plaint in the suit and it is seen that the very allegation of the plaintiff in the suit is that the plaint schedule property was purchased with the fund obtained by the sale of her property. After the wife filed petition for maintenance the husband was trying to cut and remove valuable trees and she has prayed for a charge over the plaint schedule property for the maintenance claim. Therefore the contention that the suit itself was filed as a collusive suit does not appear to be correct.
8. The learned counsel also argued that in the suit there was no prayer for future maintenance and the decree passed granting the decree for future maintenance was not a proper decree. We perused the plaint and it is not stated in the plaint whether the plaintiff was claiming only past maintenance. In fact we find from the Court fee paid that it is calculated on the basis of one year's maintenance amount and therefore the decree passed directing the husband to pay maintenance in future cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. At any rate the appellant who is not a party to the suit is not entitled to challenge the correctness of the decree.
9. The Supreme Court in Nagubai v. B. Shama Rao, AIR 1956 SC 593 had occasion to consider the impact of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act when there is a prayer for maintenance to be charged on a property and whether the transfer of the property pending the suit for maintenance will be hit by the principle of lis pendens. The Supreme Court held that Sec. 52 is attracted and transfer is hit by the principle of lis pendens. Therefore for attracting Sec. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act it need not necessarily be a suit relating to a property. It is sufficient if a charge is claimed in respect of the property. In that case also the prohibition contained in Section 52 is attracted and any transfer after the filing of the suit will be hit by Sec. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. In this case admittedly the purchase of the property by the appellant was after the suit for maintenance claiming charge over the plaint schedule property. Therefore even if the appellant is a bona fide purchaser he cannot claim any right in preference to the claim for charge as ordered by the Civil Court. In that view of the matter also the appellant is not entitled to succeed.
In the result the Execution First appeal is dismissed without any order as to costs.
Appeal dismissed.
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