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District Executive Officer v. Abel

Kerala High Court
Sep 5, 2005
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Kerala High Court)

Factual and Procedural Background

The central question in these matters was whether the Government has power to condone delay in filing an appeal beyond sixty days from the date of receipt of an order under Section 8(5) of the Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1985.

In O.P. No. 14892 of 1999 the writ petitioner was served with final determination orders for the periods 1993-94 and 1994-95 by registered post; the mail was returned with the endorsement "addressee unclaimed." Appeals were preferred before the Government on 8.4.1999, after delays of more than three to four years. The appellate authority rejected the appeals as time-barred, finding the explanation about postal non-delivery unacceptable.

The petitioner approached the High Court under Article 226 challenging both the appellate authority's dismissal of the appeals as time barred and the final determination orders themselves. The petitioner argued (inter alia) that the orders had not been served, that the postal endorsement was incorrect, that Section 5 of the Limitation Act permitted condonation of delay, and alternatively sought relief under Article 226.

A learned single Judge examined the merits, held that the liability in the final determination orders was bad in law and set aside aspects of the final order (ordering rectification of the schedule incorporating employee names) and of the appellate rejection. The District Executive Officer (Welfare Fund Board) appealed against that judgment.

Additional factual and procedural details relevant to O.P. No. 14892/1999: a provisional assessment (ET.619/97-98 dated 14.12.1998) directed payment of Rs. 45,456; no objections were filed by the stated deadline; the final determination was dated 14.12.1998. A later appeal (filed 20.2.2000 with a petition for condonation of 400 days) was rejected by Government. The petitioner had earlier filed a civil suit (O.S. No. 407 of 1996) which was dismissed. The petitioner also filed a writ petition on 28.3.2000; the learned single Judge dismissed that petition, leading to Writ Appeal No. 1462 of 2000. A separate Writ Appeal No. 2362 of 2002 is also referenced and decided in the opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Government (appellate authority) has the power under Section 8(5) of the Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1985 to condone delay and entertain appeals filed beyond the prescribed period of sixty days.
  2. Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be invoked to condone delay for appeals or applications filed before statutory authorities or quasi-judicial bodies (i.e., whether S.5 applies to proceedings before bodies other than courts).
  3. Whether the High Court should exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to entertain challenges to final determination orders when an aggrieved party has failed to avail itself of the statutory appellate remedy.

Arguments of the Parties

Counsel for the Board / District Executive Officer (Appellant)

  • Submitted that the learned single Judge erred in entertaining the writ petition because the appellate authority had dismissed the appeal as time-barred and the petitioner had not availed the statutory remedy.
  • Argued that where the statutory remedy of appeal exists, the merits should not be examined when the appeal was not filed within time.
  • Pointed to the counter-affidavit detailing steps taken to serve the final determination order and to the inquiry and evidence collected before issuing the final order.
  • Noted that the petitioner had earlier litigated (O.S. No. 407 of 1996) which was dismissed, and that the appellate authority had dismissed the later appeal because it had no power to condone delay.

Counsel for the Petitioner / Appellant in W.A. No. 1462 of 2000

  • Argued that even though the Government did not entertain the appeal due to delay, this Court under Article 226 could examine the validity of the final determination order (Ext. P1).
  • Contended respondents 3 to 7 were not his workers during the relevant period and that stage carriages were under repair, so respondents were not entitled to amounts under the Fund for 1997-98.
  • Contended no enquiry was conducted before passing the final determination order and that no provisional determination order was served on the petitioner as claimed.

Government Pleader

  • Contended the writ petition under Article 226 was not maintainable because the petitioner had not availed the alternate remedy under Section 8(5) of the Act.
  • Maintained that the Government rightly rejected the appeal for being filed out of time and that the Government has no power to condone such delay.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kerala Motor Transport W.W.F Board v. Government of Kerala (2001 (1) KLT 608) Interpreted S. 8(5) of the Act and held the Government is not entitled to entertain appeals filed beyond the prescribed 60 days; no implied power to condone delay. This Division Bench precedent was relied upon to confirm that the appellate authority lacks competence to entertain time-barred appeals under S.8(5) and that there is no implicit condonation power.
Kunhipokku v. District Executive Officer (1993 (2) KLT Short Notes p.4) Commentary that an express provision would be appropriate to provide for condonation of delay; absence of such a provision may lead to arbitrariness allegations; rule-making authority could address it. Cited to show that although a judicial view suggested express provision for condonation might be appropriate, the Legislature did not amend the provision; the court treated the legislature's inaction as deliberate for welfare-policy reasons.
Sakuru v. Tanaji, (1985) 3 SCC 590 Held that the Limitation Act, including S.5, does not apply to proceedings before non-court authorities (in that case, Collector under an Andhra Pradesh tenancy statute); Limitation Act is not per se applicable to such proceedings. Relied on to support the conclusion that S.5 of the Limitation Act would not apply to appeals before the appellate authority under S.8(5) of the Welfare Fund Act because the appellate authority is not a court.
L.S. Synthetics Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd., (2004) 11 SCC 456 Clarified that the Limitation Act, 1963 applies only to certain applications and proceedings (primarily civil and some special criminal proceedings) and does not generally apply to proceedings before bodies other than courts or to every tribunal proceeding. Quoted at length and applied to reinforce the principle that Limitation Act S.5 cannot be invoked to enable condonation of delay before a non-court quasi-judicial/ executive authority such as the Government in appeals under S.8(5).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by first setting out Section 8 of the Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act (including sub-sections (1)–(5)) and noting:

  1. Section 8 confers power on the Chief Executive Officer (or authorised officer) to determine amounts due and to conduct inquiries with powers comparable to a civil court; inquiries are treated as judicial proceedings within certain Penal Code sections; S.8(4) mandates reasonable opportunity to be heard; S.8(5) provides a right of appeal to the Government within sixty days from receipt of the order, and the decision of the Government on such appeal is final.
  2. The court observed the legislative design: the provision is part of a welfare statute aimed at prompt payment to workers; the legislature deliberately did not confer any power on the Government to condone delay, indicating an intent to prevent delay in payment to beneficiaries.
  3. The court reviewed prior judicial commentary (Kunhipokku) which suggested express provision for condonation would be appropriate; nevertheless, the Legislature did not amend S.8(5), and the court took this legislative inaction as indicative of policy (to avoid delaying payments).
  4. The contention that Section 5 of the Limitation Act could supply a remedy for condonation was considered and rejected. The court relied on apex-court authority (Sakuru v. Tanaji) and the later L.S. Synthetics decision to hold that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies to proceedings in courts and certain statutory applications but not to proceedings before bodies other than courts (i.e., not to appeals before an executive/quasi-judicial authority in this context).
  5. Applying these principles, the court concluded the appellate authority (Government) had no power to condone delay and therefore correctly rejected the time-barred appeals.
  6. On the question of invoking Article 226, the court reasoned that where a statutory remedy of appeal exists and finality has been attached to the determinations by the statute, the High Court should not exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to rescue a party who failed to avail the statutory remedy. Allowing such a writ would permit circumvention of the statutory scheme. Hence, the High Court ought not to exercise discretion under Article 226 in favour of a party who has not been vigilant in using the alternate remedy.
  7. Regarding the merits of the underlying final determination (in O.P. No. 14892/1999), the court noted factual findings: the petitioner was the employer during the relevant period (not controverted), a civil suit by the petitioner was dismissed, and the findings of the civil court and authorities were consistent. For these factual reasons, the learned single Judge was not justified in interfering with the final determination under Article 226.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding:

The court held that the appellate authority (the Government) has no power to condone delay in entertaining appeals under Section 8(5) of the Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act beyond the statutory period of sixty days. Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to permit condonation before such a non-court authority. Further, the High Court should not ordinarily exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 to bypass the statutory appellate remedy where an aggrieved party has failed to avail the remedy.

Direct Consequences / Orders:

  • The court agreed with the appellate authority that it had no power to condone delay; consequently the appeals filed beyond the sixty-day period were rightly rejected as time-barred.
  • The court held the learned single Judge was not justified in entertaining the writ and granting the reliefs sought in O.P. No. 14892 of 1999; on facts the petitioner was the employer during the relevant period and prior civil proceedings supported the authorities' findings.
  • As a result, W.A. No. 2362 of 2002 was allowed and the judgment of the learned single Judge was set aside. W.A. No. 1462 of 2000 was dismissed.

Broader Implications:

The opinion reinforces that (a) where a statute prescribes a final appellate forum and time-limit without an express power to condone delay, the appellate authority cannot implicitly exercise condonation; and (b) the Limitation Act, specifically S.5, does not furnish a general power to condone delay before non-court statutory bodies. The court emphasized the welfare-policy rationale behind refusing to permit condonation where prompt payment to workers is the objective. The opinion does not purport to extend a new general precedent beyond the specific statutory context; it follows and applies prior authoritative decisions on limitation and the non-application of S.5 to non-court bodies.

This summary reflects only the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

K.S Radhakrishnan, J.:— Whether the Government have got the power to condone the delay in filing an appeal beyond sixty days from the date of receipt of the order under S. 8(5) of the Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1985 is the question posed for consideration in these cases.

2. Writ petitioner in O.P No. 14892 of 1999 was served with the final determination order for the periods 1993-94 and 1994-95 by the District Executive Officer of the Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Board by registered post which was returned with the postal endorsement “addressee unclaimed”. Appeals were preferred before the Government on 8.4.1999 after a period of more than four years against the final determination order for the year 1993-94 and after a period of more than three years against the final determination order for the year 1994-95. Contention was raised before Government that final determination orders were wrongly and falsely returned by the postman to the District Executive Officer with the endorsement “addressee unclaimed” and therefore appeals preferred were liable to be entertained. Explanation was not acceptable to the appellate authority and the appeals were rejected as time barred. Petitioner has approached this court challenging the order of the appellate authority dismissing the appeal as time barred and also the final determination orders invoking Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. Contention was raised that the final determination orders were not served on the petitioner and that the endorsement made by the postman as “unclaimed” was not correct. Further it was also pointed out that even if there was delay in filing the appeals before the appellate authority, appellate authority has got power to condone the delay under S. 5 of the Limitation Act. Contention was also raised that even if the appeals are not maintainable, petitioner is entitled to invoke the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India.

3. Learned single Judge went into the merits of the case and took the view that liability cast on the writ petitioner as per the final determination orders were bad in law, so also government order rejecting the appeal. It was also ordered that the liability cast on the petitioner as per Ext. P7 order shall be recovered only after rectifying the mistake in the schedule to the said order incorporating the name of the employees. District Executive Officer of the Welfare Fund Board is aggrieved by the judgment and has filed this appeal.

4. Counsel appearing for the Board submitted that learned single Judge has committed a grave error in entertaining the writ petition since the appellate authority has dismissed the appeal as time barred. Counsel submitted that the question of examining the merits of the case does not arise in a case where petitioner had not availed of the statutory remedy of appeal before the Government. On merits also counsel submitted that learned single Judge has committed an error in granting the reliefs. Counter affidavit has dealt with in detail the steps taken by the District Executive Officer in serving the final determination order on the writ petitioner. Steps taken by the officer in conducting the enquiry and collecting evidence before the issuance of the final determination order have also been stated in the counter affidavit. Further it is also pointed out that the petitioner had filed a suit, O.S No. 407 of 1996 before the Sub Court, Thodupuzha which was dismissed. Later writ petitioner appeared before the District Executive Officer on 24.5.1999 and applied for the issuance of a copy of the final determination orders for the years 1992-93, -1993-94 and 1994-95 and filed an appeal before the Labour Secretary to Government, Trivandrum under S. 8(5) of the Act. Appellate authority dismissed the appeal since there was delay in filing the appeal. Further it is stated that the appellate authority has no power to condone the delay.

5. Original Petition No. 14892 of 1999 was filed seeking a writ of certiorari to quash Ext.P1 final determination order under Section 8 of the Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1985 and also for other consequential reliefs. District Executive officer of the Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Board issued a provisional assessment order No. ET. 619/97-98 dated 14.12.1998 directing the writ petitioner to pay an amount of Rs. 45,456/-. Petitioner was directed to file his objections on or before 26.11.1998 No objection was preferred. Consequently, the final determination order dated 14.12.1998 was issued. Petitioner did not take any step to file the appeal in time under section 8(5) of the Act. Later appeal was filed on 20.2.2000 with a petition for condonation of delay of 400 days. Petition for condonation of delay was dismissed by the Government, so also the appeal. Petitioner then preferred the present original petition on 28.3.2000 under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the final determination order. Learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition. Aggrieved by the same, Writ Appeal No. 1462 of 2000 has been preferred.

6. Counsel appearing for the appellant in W.A No. 1462 of 2000 submitted even though his appeal was not entertained by the Government due to delay in filing the appeal within the statutory period this court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India could examine the validity of Ext.P1 final determination order. Counsel submitted respondents 3 to 7 were not his workers during the period 1997-98. Further it is also stated both the stage carriages were kept in the workshop for repairs during the relevant period and therefore respondents 3 to 7 are not entitled to get any amount from the Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund during 1997-98. Further it is also contended that no enquiry was conducted before passing the final determination order and no provisional determination order was served on the petitioner as stated in Ext.P1

7. Learned Government Pleader on the other hand, contended that the Writ Petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable since petitioner had not availed of the alternate remedy under S. 8 (5) of the Act. Further it was also contended that Government have rightly rejected the appeal since the same was filed out of time and that the Government have no power to condone the delay in entertaining the appeal.

8. A Division Bench of this court in Kerala Motor Transport W.W.F Board v. Government of Kerala (2001 (1) KLT 608) while interpreting S. 8(5) of the Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1985 held that the Government is not entitled to entertain any appeal filed under S. 8(5) of the Act beyond the prescribed period of 60 days. This court took the view, in the absence of any provision expressly conferring power on the appellate authority to entertain an appeal on any count after the period of limitation prescribed under the statute, the appellate authority is not competent to entertain a time-barred appeal and there is no implied power conferred on the appellate authority to condone the delay and entertain the appeal.

9. In this connection we may refer to Section 8 for easy reference.

8. Determination of amount due from employers.

(1) The Chief Executive Officer or any other officer appointed under sub-s. (1) of S. 7 authorised by him in this behalf may, by order, determine the amount due from any employer under the provisions of this Act or of the scheme and for this purpose, may conduct such inquiry as he may deem necessary.

(2) Any officer conducting the inquiry under sub-section (1) shall for the purpose of such inquiry, have the same powers as are vested in a civil court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1908), in respect of the following matters, namely-—

(a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;

(b) requiring the discovery and production of documents;

(c) receiving evidence on affidavit;

(d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses.

(3) Any inquiry under this section shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Ss. 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code (Central Act 5 of 1860) and for the purposes of S. 196 of that Code.

(4) No order determining the amount due from any employer shall be made under sub-s. (1) unless the employer has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

(5) Any person aggrieved by an order under sub-s. (1) may, within sixty days from the date of receipt of the order, prefer an appeal to the Government or any other authority as may be specified by the Government in this behalf and the decision of the Government or of such authority on such appeal shall be final.

10. Power is conferred on the Chief Executive Officer under S. 8 (1) and 8(2) of the Act. As per S. 8(2) any officer conducting the inquiry under sub-s. (1) shall for the purpose of such inquiry, has the same powers as are vested in a civil court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Any inquiry conducted under the said provision is deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Ss. 193 and 232 of the Indian Penal Code and for the purpose of S. 196 of that Code, S. 8(4) provides that no order determining the amount due from any employer shall be made under sub-s. (1) unless the employer has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Right of appeal is also conferred on the aggrieved party before the Government and a finality has been attached to the order of the Government under S. 8(5) of the Act.

11. Legislature in its wisdom thought that Government be conferred with no power for condonation of delay with the object of not delaying payment of amount due to the employee on its determination by Chief Executive Officer, Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act is a welfare legislation. Canon of constructing welfare legislation is distinct from the canon of constructing ordinary law. Court cannot countenance any practice to circumvent or defeat the provisions of the welfare legislation. Kerala Motor Transport Workers Welfare Fund Act and the scheme framed thereunder are intended to achieve some urgent social demands, that is welfare of motor transport workers. State has got obligation to work out the welfare of the motor transport workers. It is with that objective the scheme has been framed. Legislature felt that if any person is aggrieved by the order passed by the Chief Executive Officer he could prefer an appeal within a period of sixty days from the date of receipt of the order. Legislature has not conferred power on the Government to entertain any appeal filed beyond the statutory period fixed.

12. We may in this connection refer to the judgment of a learned single Judge of this court in Kunhipokku v. District Executive Officer (1993 (2) KLT Short Notes page 4). Learned single Judge felt that having provided an appeal under S. 8 against orders determining the amount due from an employer, it will only be appropriate to expressly provide for condonation of the delay in filing appeals for sufficient cause or else, learned single Judge felt, a charge of arbitrariness is likely to be raised, that the Government refused to entertain the appeals filed beyond time despite the existence of sufficient cause, while in many other cases, they had entertained such appeals. Learned single Judge felt that it is for the rule making authority to consider this question. In spite of the opinion expressed by the learned single Judge, Legislature never thought of amending the said provision. Legislature in their wisdom felt no power to condone delay be conferred on the Government, lest the payment of the amount due to the workers, would be delayed.

13. Contention was raised that even though statute has not specifically conferred any power on the appellate authority to condone delay, delay could be condoned under S. 5 of the Limitation Act if there are sufficient reasons for not filing the appeal within the statutory time prescribed by the statute. We find it difficult to accept this contention since S. 5 of the Limitation Act would apply only to proceedings in court and not to appeals or applications before the bodies governed by the statutes. This legal position is well settled by the decision of the apex court in Sakuru v. Tanaji, (1985) 3 SCC 590). That was a case where apex court was dealing with S. 93 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telengana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950. Delay in filing the appeal before the Collector under S. 90 beyond the period prescribed under S. 93 was sought to be condoned. Rejecting the contention the Apex Court held that the Collector before whom the appeal was preferred by the appellant under S. 90 of the Act not being a court, the Limitation Act, as such has no applicability to the proceedings before him. It was also held that S. 93 of the Act prescribing the period of limitation applies to application before the Collector and the provisions of the Limitation Act applies relating to the computation of the period of limitation does not have the effect of rendering the provisions of S. 5 of the Limitation Act applicable to proceedings before the Collector. We may also refer to a recent decision of the Apex Court in L.S Synthetics Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd., (2004) 11 SCC 456) wherein the apex court held as follows:

“The Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable only in relation to certain applications and not all applications despite the fact that the words “other proceedings” were added in the long title of the Act in 1963. The provisions of the said Act are not applicable to the proceedings before bodies other than courts, such as a quasi-judicial tribunal or even an executive authority. The Act primarily applies to the civil proceedings or some special criminal proceedings. Even in a tribunal, where the Code of Civil Procedure or Code of Criminal Procedure is applicable, the Limitation Act, 1963 per se may not be applied to the proceedings before it. Even in relation to certain civil proceedings, the Limitation Act may not have any application. As for example, there is no bar of limitation for initiation of a final decree proceedings or to invoke the jurisdiction of the court under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure or for correction of accidental slip or omission in judgments, orders or decrees; the reason being that these powers can be exercised even sito motu by the court and thus, no question of any limitation arises.”

14. In view of the above mentioned legal position, we are in full agreement with the appellate authority that it had no power to condone the delay and consequently the appeal was rightly rejected as time barred. Counsel appearing for the respondent in W.A No. 2362 of 2002 however submitted that even though appeal was time barred learned single Judge was justified in invoking the jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in interfering with the final determination order. We find it difficult to accept the said contention. We are of the view, in a case where party was not vigilant and had failed to avail of the statutory remedy he is not justified in invoking the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Finality has been attached to the final determination order and this court shall not come to the rescue of the party who was not vigilant of his rights and has not availed of the statutory remedy available to him. By entertaining the writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India this court would be permitting a party to bypass the statutory remedy. We are, therefore, of the considered view, this court sitting in Article 226 of the Constitution of India shall not exercise the discretion in favour of the party who had not availed of the alternate remedy available under the statute.

15. Learned single Judge on facts also was not justified in granting the reliefs prayed for in O.P No. 14892 of 1999. Ext. P4 is the revenue recovery notice issued to the petitioner for recovery of the contribution towards motor workers welfare fund in respect of the vehicle KL I 4671 for the period 1992-1994. Revenue recovery notice was issued on the basis of the final determination order Ext.P6 Contention was raised by the writ petitioner before the learned single Judge that the vehicle was transferred to him only on 20.6.1994 Facts would evidently show that during the relevant time petitioner was the employer and the same was not controverted. Further, after the final determination order petitioner has filed a suit, O.S No. 407 of 1996 before the Sub Court, Thodupuzha which was also dismissed. Findings of the civil court as well as that of the authorities are consistent that the writ petitioner was the employer during the relevant period. In such circumstances, learned single Judge was not justified in interfering with the final determination order by invoking the powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. We therefore allow W.A No. 2362 of 2002 and set aside the judgment of the learned single Judge. W.A No. 1462 of 2000 would stand dismissed.