Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Roshy v. State Of Kerala

Kerala High Court
Jul 3, 2005
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion — K. Thankappan, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Accused Nos. 1 to 3 in S.C. No. 86/1999 (Addl. Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-I, Palakkad) are the appellants to this Court. The offence charged against the appellants (and a fourth accused who was discharged by this Court by order dated 28-5-2002 in Crl. R.P. No. 206/2000) was under S. 57A(1)(iii) of the Abkari Act.

As per the prosecution case, on 15.4.1996 at about 3 p.m., appellants 2 and 3 were transporting 400 litres of toddy in two 200-litre plastic barrels in Mini Lorry KL 7B 745 pursuant to a permit said to be issued to the 1st appellant (the toddy shop contractor for specified groups of Thrithala Range for 1996–1997). The excise party stopped the vehicle, took a sample of the toddy, and on chemical examination chloral hydrate was detected in the sample.

At the trial the prosecution examined P.W.s 1 and 2; documents marked were Exts. P-1 to P-5 and M.O.1 (sample bottle). The defence called no witnesses and marked no documents. The appellants denied the allegations when questioned under S. 313 Cr.P.C. The Trial Court convicted the appellants under S. 57A(1)(iii) of the Abkari Act and sentenced each to rigorous imprisonment for three years and a fine of Rs. 10,000 (with 6 months simple imprisonment in default). The appellants appealed to this Court against that conviction and sentence.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the chemical analysis report (Ext. P-3) can be relied upon as admissible evidence under S. 293 Cr.P.C., given the manner in which the sample was collected, transmitted and produced.
  2. Whether the appellants committed an offence punishable under S. 57A(1)(iii) of the Abkari Act on the basis of the evidence produced (including Ext. P-3).
  3. Whether the conviction of the 1st appellant can be sustained in the absence of proof that adulteration occurred with his knowledge or consent and whether the statutory presumption (referred to in the opinion under S. 64 of the Abkari Act) could be invoked on the basis of the permit documents produced (Exts. P-2 and P-5, which were photocopies).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The Trial Court's findings were not based on legal grounds or properly appreciated evidence.
  • The Trial Court misread the evidence of the excise officials (the prosecution witnesses) and failed to appreciate their evidence in its true spirit.
  • The charge under S. 57A(1)(iii) of the Abkari Act would not lie on the admitted evidence.
  • The excise officials violated mandatory provisions relating to transmission of the sample to the Chemical Examiner, rendering the chemical report unreliable.

Prosecution's Case (as presented at trial)

  • The appellants were transporting toddy pursuant to a transit permit allegedly held by the 1st appellant.
  • On seizure and sampling by excise officials, chemical analysis (Ext. P-3) detected chloral hydrate in the samples, and the prosecution treated this as evidence of adulteration under S. 57A(1)(iii) Abkari Act.
  • Prosecution adduced evidence of seizure and the chemical report (P.W.s 1 and 2; Exts. P-1 to P-5; M.O.1).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ashok Dulichand v. Madhavlal Dube, (1975) 4 SCC 664 : AIR 1975 SC 1748 Secondary evidence (e.g., photostat copy) cannot be admitted unless it is shown that the original document is not in the possession of the person entitled to produce it. The Court relied on this authority to hold that Ext. P-3 (a copy of the alleged chemical report) could not be admitted as secondary evidence because neither P.W. 1 nor P.W. 2 testified that the original of Ext. P-3 was lost.
Ali v. State of Kerala, 2001 (2) KLT 389 Where there is doubt about the authenticity of the sample that reached the laboratory, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt. The Court invoked this decision to reinforce the conclusion that Ext. P-3 could not be used as a basis for conviction when there were irregularities in transmission and doubts about authenticity.
Sreedevi Amma v. Jayalakshmi, 1998 (1) KLT 197 A copy of a document cannot be presumed to be genuine unless it is proved that the original is lost. The Court relied on this decision to hold that photocopies of transit permits (Exts. P-2 and P-5) could not be used to invoke the statutory presumption unless the originals were shown to be lost; thus the presumption under the Abkari Act could not be invoked on that basis.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining the statutory provision under which conviction was recorded (S. 57A(1)(iii) of the Abkari Act) and then critically assessed the evidentiary foundation supporting the conviction, with particular focus on Ext. P-3 (the chemical analysis report).

Admissibility and reliability of Ext. P-3 (chemical report)

  • The Court noted that Ext. P-3 recorded the presence of chloral hydrate in certain items, giving measured quantities (Ext. P-3 stated chloral hydrate was detected in items 3 and 4 with values of 8.3 mg and 8 mg respectively per one hundred millilitres), but did not expressly state the sample was adulterated with a noxious substance likely to endanger human life.
  • Under S. 293 Cr.P.C., a government scientific expert's report may be used as evidence if (i) the sample was duly sent for chemical examination and (ii) the report was obtained in the course of a proceeding under the Code. The Court found these conditions not satisfied.
  • P.W. 1 admitted sending the sample for chemical analysis without permission of the Court; this was contrary to R.17(b)(2) of the Kerala Chemico-Legal Examination Rules, 1959, which requires an application to the Court forwarding articles to the Chemical Examiner to be submitted along with the charge sheet.
  • The sample was sent through a person (K.N. Mohanan) who was not examined as a witness; the Court regarded this as an infirmity in the chain of custody/transmission.
  • The Court observed violations of Ss.100(4) and 102(3) Cr.P.C. in that no two or more independent and respectable inhabitants were called upon to witness the search/seizure or to attest the mahazar (Ext. P-1), despite the interception occurring on a public Panchayat road where such witnesses were available.
  • Since S.36 of the Abkari Act requires searches to be made in accordance with the Cr.P.C. and its proviso specifically requires independent witnesses (not being abkari, police or Village Officer), the absence of such independent witnesses undermined the legality of the search/seizure procedure. While such infraction does not ipso facto vitiate a trial, the Court concluded that the cumulative irregularities were material here and prevented reliance on Ext. P-3.
  • Ext. P-3 was a copy and not the original. The Court invoked S.64 Indian Evidence Act principles (primary evidence must be produced) and the Apex Court decision in Ashok Dulichand to hold that secondary evidence (photocopy) could not be admitted in the absence of proof that the original was lost. No such proof was given by P.W. 1 or P.W. 2, and Ext. P-3 was not shown to have been received in evidence during any proceeding before the Court. Thus Ext. P-3 could not be considered acceptable evidence.
  • The Court reinforced this conclusion with the local authority Ali v. State of Kerala holding that doubts about authenticity of a sample reaching the laboratory entitle the accused to benefit of doubt.

Whether the material proved an offence under S. 57A(1)(iii)

  • Even accepting Ext. P-3's reported presence of chloral hydrate, the Court observed there was no evidence that chloral hydrate is a "noxious substance" or one likely to endanger human life. The opinion cites an explanatory reference (World Book Dictionary) describing chloral hydrate as a colourless, crystalline drug used to quiet nervousness, and notes the absence of any government notification declaring chloral hydrate a noxious substance under the relevant Abkari Act rule-making provision (Cl. (k) of sub-s. (2) of S. 29).
  • The Court pointed out that if chloral hydrate were present, the material would, on the evidence before it, at best be relevant to an offence under S. 55(a) of the Abkari Act (as opposed to S. 57A(1)(iii)), but crucially there was no notification or proof making chloral hydrate a noxious substance under the statutory scheme.
  • Ext. P-3 itself did not make clear whether necessary tests were properly conducted to establish presence of chloral hydrate; combined with transmission and custody defects, the Court found Ext. P-3 unreliable.

Liability of the 1st appellant (knowledge or consent; statutory presumption)

  • The prosecution relied upon the 1st appellant being the permit-holder for the relevant period. However, the Court found that the prosecution did not prove that any alleged adulteration occurred with the knowledge or consent of the 1st appellant.
  • The Court held that the statutory presumption (referred to in the opinion under S. 64 of the Abkari Act) could not be invoked in the absence of cogent evidence proving knowledge or consent.
  • Exts. P-2 and P-5 (transit permits) were photocopies, not originals; the Court applied the principle in Sreedevi Amma v. Jayalakshmi that a copy cannot be presumed genuine unless the original is shown to be lost. Because the originals were not proved to be lost, the photocopies could not support the presumption required to fix liability on the 1st appellant.
  • Thus, even if the prosecution evidence were otherwise accepted, the conviction of the 1st appellant could not be sustained for lack of proof of his knowledge or consent.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence, and acquitted the appellants.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The conviction and sentence imposed by the Trial Court under S. 57A(1)(iii) of the Abkari Act were quashed; the appellants were acquitted.
  • Evidence-related consequence: The Court refused to rely on Ext. P-3 (the chemical analysis report) because of irregularities in sampling, transmission, witness attendance at seizure, and because only a copy of the report was placed on record without proof of loss of the original.
  • On statutory presumption and documentary proof: Photocopies of transit permits (Exts. P-2 and P-5) could not be used to raise the statutory presumption against the 1st appellant in the absence of proof that originals were lost.
  • Broader precedent: The opinion applied existing authorities on admissibility of secondary evidence, chain of custody/authenticity of samples, and presumptions regarding photocopies. The Court did not purport to lay down a novel legal principle beyond its application of those authorities to the facts of this case.

This summary is confined strictly to the content and reasoning contained in the provided opinion. No information beyond the opinion has been added.

Show all summary ...

K. Thankappan, J.:— Accused 1 to 3 in S.C No. 86/1999 on the file of the Court of the Addl. Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-I, Palakkad are the appellants. The offence alleged against the appellants and the 4th accused, who was discharged by this Court as per order dated 28-5-2002 in Crl. R.P No. 206/2000, is under S. 57A(1)(iii) of the Abkari Act. As per the prosecution case, on 15.4.1996 at about 3 p.m while on the basis of the permit issued to the 1st appellant, who was the toddy shop contractor of Group Nos. IH, XIII, XVI, XVIII and XXIX of Thrithala Range for the period 1996-1997, appellants 2 and 3 were transporting 400 litres of toddy in two plastic barrels of 200 litres each in the Mini Lorry KL 7B 745, the excise party stopped the vehicle and took the sample of toddy for examination and on chemical examination 8 milligram of chloral hydrate per one millilitre was found in the sample of the toddy, which, according to the prosecution, is a dangerous substance to human life. Before the Trial Court, the prosecution examined P.Ws 1 and 2 and Exts. P-1 to P-5 were marked. M.O 1 sample bottle was also marked. Neither any witness was examined nor any document marked on the side of the defence. While the appellants were questioned under S. 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, they denied their involvement in the offence as alleged by the prosecution. On considering both oral as well as documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution, the Trial Court found the appellants guilty of the offence under S. 57A(1)(iii) of the Abkari Act and they were convicted thereunder and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- each and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for 6 months each. Aggrieved by the above, the appellants have approached this Court by filing the appeal.

2. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants submits that the findings entered by the Trial Court are not based on any legal basis or evidence.

3. Learned counsel also submits that the Trial Court misread the evidence of the Excise Officials who are the only witnesses examined on the side of the prosecution to prove the prosecution case and failed to appreciate the evidence in its true spirit. Further learned counsel submits that the charge under S. 57A(1)(iii) itself will not lie in the light of the evidence adduced in the case. It is also submitted that the Excise Officials had violated all the mandatory provisions with regard to the transmission of the sample to the Chemical Examiner.

4. Before considering the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants, it is advantageous to consider S. 57A(1)(iii) of the Abkari Act, which reads as follows:

“57A. For adulteration of liquor or intoxicating drug with noxious substances, etc.:

(1) Whoever mixes or permits to be mixed any noxious substance or any substance which is likely to endanger human life or to cause grievous hurt to human beings, with any liquor or intoxicating drug, shall, on conviction, be punishable—

******

(iii) in any other case, with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than one year, but which may extend to ten years, and with fine which may extend to twenty-five thousand rupees.”

5. A reading of the above provision would clearly indicate that who ever mixes or permits to be mixed any noxious substance or any substance which is likely to endanger human life or to cause grievous hurt to human beings with any liquor or any intoxicating drug shall be punishable either under sub-cls. (i), (ii) or (iii). This Court shall consider Ext. P-3 chemical analysis report. In Ext. P-3 it is stated that chloral hydrate was detected in items 3 and 4 and those items contained 8.3 mg. and 8 mg. respectively of chloral hydrate per one hundred millilitres of the same. But in Ext. P-3 it is not stated that the sample is adulterated with any noxious substance which is likely to endanger human life. In this context, it is to be noted that there is no evidence to show that the toddy, from which sample is taken, caused injury to any person who consumed the same. Admittedly, the Excise Officials themselves allowed the accused to transport the entire toddy after taking the sample.

6. The question to be examined is whether Ext. P-3 report can be relied on as evidence purporting to be a report obtained under S. 293 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. S. 293(1) of the Cr.P.C reads as follows:

“293. Reports of certain Government Scientific Experts.— (1) Any document purporting to be a report under the hand of a Government Scientific Expert to whom this section applies, upon any matter or thing duly submitted to him for examination or analysis and report in the course of any proceeding under this Code, may be used as evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code.”

7. Reading of the above proviso would indicate that the evidentiary value of a report received under S. 293 Cr.P.C would depend on two conditions: (1) the sample should be duly sent for chemical examination and (2) report should be obtained in the course of any proceeding under the Code. This Court finds that action of P.W 1 with regard to the taking of the sample, sending the same for analysis and the production of Ext. P-3 report is not in accordance with the above conditions. P.W 1 deposed that he sent the sample for chemical analysis without any permission of the Court. In this context R. 17(b)(2) of the Kerala Chemico-Legal Examination Rules, 1959 is very relevant, which stipulates that the Excise Officials shall submit along with the charge sheet, the prescribed application before the Court for forwarding the articles to the Chemical Examiner's Laboratory, for examination or analysis as the case may be. It is the admitted case of P.W 1 that the sample was sent for chemical analysis through one K.N Mohanan. He was not examined in the case. Apart from the above infirmity, yet another irregularity and illegality have been committed by P.W 1 while taking the sample and getting the report from the Chemical Analyst. As per Ss. 100(4) and 102(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is imperative on the part of the officer who makes any search or seizure to call upon two or more independent and respectable inhabitants of the locality to attend and witness the search and may issue an order in writing to them or any of them so to do. It is seen from the evidence that the vehicle in question was intercepted on the Koottanad Panchayat road where so many independent witnesses are available to witness the search. But no independent witness was called upon to witness the search or to attest Ext. P-1 mahazar. Apart from the above, as per S. 36 of the Abkari Act, all searches under the provisions of the Act shall be made in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Proviso to S. 36 would clearly states that persons called upon to attend and witness such searches shall include at least two persons neither of whom is an abkari, police or Village Officer. It means persons called upon to attend and witness the search shall be independent witnesses. Infraction of the proviso by itself does not vitiate the trial, if materials brought on record justify the conviction. But in the present case the action of the Excise Officials in taking the sample, preparation of the mahazar and forwarding the same to the Chemical Examiner is not in accordance with the provisions of Ss. 100(4) and 102(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and also S. 36 of the Abkari Act. Hence, this Court is of the view that P-3 cannot be relied on as basis to prove the case against the appellants. Further, it is seen that Ext. P-3 is copy of the alleged chemical report. As per S. 64 of the Indian Evidence Act, documents which could be relied on in evidence must be proved by primary evidence except in the case mentioned in Ss. 65, 65A and 65B. In this context a decision of the Apex Court reported in Ashok Dulichand v. Madhavlal Dube, (1975) 4 SCC 664 : AIR 1975 SC 1748 is relevant. In the above decision the Apex Court held that the petitioner could not be permitted to lead secondary evidence in the shape of photostat copy unless it is proved that the original document was in possession of the respondent. In the case in hand either P.W 1 or P.W 2 have not given any evidence before the Trial Court that the original of Ext. P-3 is lost. It is also pertinent to note that Ext. P-3 is not received as evidence during the course of any proceeding before the Court. On that score also Ext. P-3 cannot be considered as an acceptable document. To support this, this Court fortifies the observations made by this Court in a decision reported in Ali v. State of Kerala, 2001 (2) KLT 389, wherein it is held that when there was doubt with regard to the authenticity of the sample that reached the laboratory the accused was entitled to the grant of benefit of doubt. So, Ext. P-3 cannot be considered as a basis to find the appellants guilty of the offence committed Under S. 57A(1)(iii) of the Abkari Act.

8. The next point to be considered is whether the appellants have committed any offence punishable under S. 57A(1) and (iii) of the Abkari Act. Though Ext. P-3 reported that the sample was unfit for human consumption, there is no evidence to show that the chloral hydrate is a noxious substance or any substance which is likely to endanger human life. In this context it may be noted that as per World Book Dictionary, chloral hydrate as a colourless, crystalline drug used to quiet nervousness. Even if the presence of chloral hydrate in the sample is admitted, it will come only as an offence under S. 55(a) of the Abkari Act. Cl. (k) of sub-s. (2) of S. 29 of the Abkari Act provides that Government makes rules prohibiting the use of any article which shall be deemed to be noxious or otherwise objectionable in the manufacture of liquor or of any intoxicating drug. It has come out in evidence that there is no notification prescribed by the Government notifying that the chloral hydrate is a noxious substance to endanger human life. From Ext. P-3 it is hot clear whether necessary test is conducted to find out chloral hydrate in the sample. Hence, Ext. P-3 report cannot be relied on.

9. The next contention to be decided is that even if the evidence of prosecution is accepted as such, the conviction entered against the 1st appellant cannot be sustained. It is the case of the prosecution that 1st appellant is a holder of toddy transit permit for the relevant period. But it is not proved by the prosecution that the sample is adulterated with knowledge or with the consent of the 1st appellant.

10. In this context, the presumption under S. 64 of the Abkari Act cannot be invoked, unless it is proved by cogent evidence that the offence was committed with his knowledge or his consent. In this context, it may be noted that even though P.W 1 admits that the 1st appellant is the permit holder for the period 1996-1997, it is not proved that the permit has been renewed or not during the relevant time. That apart Exts. P-2 and P-5, transit permits, are the photocopies and not the originals. So, Exts. P-2 and P-5 could not be utilised to have the presumption under S. 64 of the Evidence Act, unless it is proved that they are lost. So, the non-production of the original of Exts. P-2 and P-5 is inadmissible. To the above conclusion this Court relies on a decision of this Court reported in Sreedevi Amma v. Jayalakshmi, 1998 (1) KLT 197 wherein this Court held that copy of the document could not be presumed to be genuine unless it is proved that originals are lost. Hence the findings entered by the Trial Court with regard to the offence charged against the 1st appellant is not sustainable.

11. From the discussions made above, the conviction and sentence ordered against the appellants are set aside and the appellants are acquitted.

12. The appeal is allowed as above.