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Kunju Kunju v. State Of Kerala

Kerala High Court
Sep 16, 2004
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Structured Summary of the Court Opinion (N.K. Sodhi, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Multiple writ petitions and two appellate matters (O.P. Nos. 30458 & 34803 of 2001, 8725 & 34586 of 2002 and W.A. Nos. 256 & 277 of 2002) were heard together because they concerned common questions about selection to the posts of Industries Extension Officers in the Department of Industries and Commerce.

Historically, recruitment to the post was governed by a Government Order dated 23 August 1962 (the G.O.), which provided three routes of appointment: direct recruitment (50% of vacancies), promotion from Kerala Industries Subordinate Service (25%) and transfer from Gram Sevaks (25%), and listed multiple alternative qualifications for direct recruitment. Most of the cadre (192 of 193 posts) were at one point occupied by temporary promotees under Rule 31 of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958.

The Kerala Public Service Commission issued notifications: on 26 May 1992 inviting applications for 33 direct recruitment posts and 11 transfer posts; on 27 October 1998 inviting applications for 7 posts reserved for Scheduled Tribes. A written test (March 1995) shortlisted candidates; interviews were scheduled for December 2000 but were stayed by an interim order on 13 December 2000; that stay was vacated on 5 April 2001 and interviews were held in May 2001. Rank lists were notified on 24 August 2001 (direct recruits and transfers) and a separate list for Scheduled Tribes dated 28 August 2001.

Meanwhile, on 17 February 2001 the State Government promulgated the Special Rules for the Kerala Industries Subordinate Service, 2001 (deemed to have effect from 1 July 1983), superseding earlier rules and the G.O. The Special Rules substantially altered methods of appointment, qualifications and ratios (eliminating transfer as a mode and prescribing stricter engineering degree requirement for direct recruitment; appointment ratio changed to direct recruitment : promotion = 3:7).

Several proceedings ensued: provisional promotees challenged interviews and selections (including O.P. No. 34827 of 2000 and later Writ Appeals), while those whose names featured in the Commission's rank lists challenged the Special Rules and sought appointment in accordance with the rank lists prepared under the earlier G.O. The Court was called upon to decide whether selections ought to be governed by the G.O. (and rank lists) or by the Special Rules (as promulgated, with retrospective effect).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Special Rules for the Kerala Industries Subordinate Service, 2001 (promulgated on 17 February 2001, operative retrospectively from 1 July 1983) are valid and applicable to the selection process that commenced earlier (1992) but was not completed before promulgation of the Special Rules.
  2. Whether the selections and rank lists prepared by the Public Service Commission pursuant to notifications issued in 1992 and 1998 (under the G.O.) must be given effect to, or whether the vacancies must be filled under the Special Rules.
  3. Whether the retrospective operation of the Special Rules (going back over 17 years) renders them arbitrary or violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
  4. Whether appointments by transfer (from Gram Sevaks / Village Extension Officers) are to be treated as promotions for purposes of the right to be considered for promotion under Article 16.
  5. Whether the failure (if any) to lay the Special Rules before the Legislative Assembly within the time contemplated by sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Kerala Public Services Act, 1968, invalidates the Special Rules.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners (candidates on the Commission's rank lists and Village Extension Officers)

  • The Special Rules are invalid because they were not laid "as soon as may be" before the Legislative Assembly as required by sub-s. (2) of Section 2 of the Kerala Public Services Act, 1968.
  • Since the selection process commenced with the Commission's notification dated 26 May 1992 (and later 27 October 1998), the petitioners acquired a right to be considered for appointment under the method and qualifications then prescribed; that limited right could not be taken away by later Rules unless those Rules were made retrospective.
  • The Special Rules, though promulgated in February 2001, purported to operate retrospectively from 1 July 1983 over a long period and are therefore arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16. Counsel relied on T.R. Kapur and related authorities to contend retrospective ineligibility of candidates over a long backdate is constitutionally impermissible.
  • If the Court's interim order in O.P. No. 34827 of 2000 had not delayed interviews, the rank lists would have been finalized prior to promulgation of the Special Rules; the petitioners should not be prejudiced by the delay caused by the Court's interim order.
  • Argument (advanced for transfer-applicants): their claim for transfer to the higher post effectively amounted to a claim for promotion and, therefore, their right to be considered for promotion under Article 16 has been infringed.

Appellants / Temporary (Provisional) Promotees

  • The appellants (temporary/promotional appointees under R.31 of the 1958 Rules) sought enforcement of the Special Rules and urged that appointments should be made in accordance with the Special Rules which were promulgated (with retrospective effect) and which superseded the earlier G.O.
  • They contended the Commission's continuing selection under the G.O. after the Special Rules had been promulgated was erroneous because the Special Rules altered the method of appointment, qualifications and ratios and were made retrospective, hence they govern pending selections.
  • They relied on the Government's power under Section 2(1) of the Act to frame retrospective rules and pointed to the factual position that 192 of 193 posts were occupied by provisional promotees.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
T.R. Kapur v. State of Haryana (1986 Supp SCC 584; AIR 1987 SC 415) Retrospective amendment which renders already-made promotions invalid (or seeks to revert/promotions) can violate Articles 14 and 16; retrospectivity that affects already-promoted employees must satisfy constitutional tests. The Court distinguished T.R. Kapur: here no one had already been promoted and then sought to be reverted. Therefore T.R. Kapur did not support petitioners' challenge to the retrospective Special Rules in the present facts.
Ajit Singh & Ors. (II) v. State of Punjab ((1999) 7 SCC 209) Recognition that the right to be considered for promotion is a protected right under Article 16 (used to argue vested rights to promotion). The Court noted the authority but held the petitioners here sought appointment by transfer (per G.O.) not promotion and therefore Ajit Singh did not directly help them.
Chairman, Railway Board v. C.R. Rangadhamaiah ((1997) 6 SCC 623) Support for the proposition that right to be considered for promotion is protected under Article 16 (cited by petitioners). The Court observed the proposition but rejected the application to the facts because petitioners sought transfer (provided for by the G.O.) rather than promotion.
Devidayal Rolling Mills v. Prakash Chiman Lal Parikh ((1993) 2 SCC 470; AIR 1993 SC 1982) Cited by petitioners in support of the contention that parties should not be prejudiced by the acts of the Court and equitable relief may be warranted where delay prejudices parties. The Court considered the submission but concluded the selection process was not improperly continued by the Court's intervention and that once Special Rules were promulgated retrospectively the Commission should not have continued selection under the old G.O.
State of M.P. v. M.V. Vyavasaya & Co. ((1997) 1 SCC 156) Cited similarly to support arguments about prejudice caused by delay or procedural acts. The Court noted the citation but held that delay caused by the interim order did not justify continuing the selection under the superseded G.O. after retrospective Special Rules had been promulgated.
Y.V. Rangaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh ((1983) 3 SCC 284; AIR 1983 SC 852) Principle that vacancies which occurred prior to an amendment are governed by the old rules (where amendment is prospective); selection proceedings pending at the time of a prospective amendment continue under the law in force when proceedings commenced. The Court relied on this line of authority to explain the general rule that pending selections are governed by existing rules unless the amendment is retrospective; that precedent provided context for distinguishing prospective vs retrospective amendments.
A.A. Calton v. Director of Education ((1983) 3 SCC 33; AIR 1983 SC 1143) If selection proceedings commenced before an amendment and the amendment is prospective, the selection must be completed according to the law as it stood at commencement. Used to illustrate the rule that pending proceedings are not affected by prospective amendments; the Court emphasized that had the Special Rules been purely prospective, the result would differ.
P. Mahendran v. State of Karnataka ((1990) 1 SCC 411 referenced) Reiterates that a candidate acquires a right to be considered under the rules and advertisement in force at the time of application; amendment cannot affect that limited right unless made retrospective. The Court applied the principle to state the general rule and then observed that since the Special Rules were expressly made retrospective, they displace the earlier rules for the pending selection.
N.T. Devin Katti v. Karnataka Public Service Commission ((1990) 3 SCC 157) Affirms that a candidate acquires a vested right only to be considered for selection under the rules current on the date of advertisement; such limited right cannot be affected by subsequent amendment unless the amendment is retrospective. The Court relied on this authority to confirm the settled proposition and then applied it: because the Special Rules were retrospective, the amended rules govern the selection.
Jan Mohammad Noor Moohamad Bagban v. State of Gujarat (AIR 1966 SC 385) Provision requiring rules to be placed before the legislature is directory (failure to place does not invalidate the rules); rules are valid from date made. The Court cited this authority to hold that sub-s. (2) of S.2 (requirement to lay the Special Rules before the Assembly) is directory, and non-compliance would not automatically invalidate the Rules; in any event the Special Rules here were laid and remained unmodified.
Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana ((1979) 2 SCC 196; AIR 1979 SC 1149) Holding that a statutory requirement to lay orders/rules before the legislature is directory and non-compliance does not render the order void. Reinforced the Court's conclusion that the laying requirement in sub-s. (2) of S.2 is directory; the Special Rules were in fact laid and not annulled or modified.
Sarabjit Singh v. Ex. Major B.D. Gupta ((2000) 7 SCC 67) Support for the proposition that the right to be considered for promotion is protected under Article 16. The Court acknowledged the authority but explained that petitioners were seeking transfer under the G.O. and not promotion; hence the principle did not assist them in the factual matrix before the Court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a stepwise legal analysis grounded in established precedent about the interaction between (a) recruitment rules in force at the commencement of selection proceedings and (b) subsequent amendments to those rules, including retrospective amendments.

  1. The Court first summarized the settled proposition from Supreme Court authorities: a candidate who applies pursuant to an advertisement acquires a limited right to be considered under the recruitment rules and advertisement terms existing at the time of application; an amendment made while selection is pending cannot affect that right unless the amendment is expressly or by necessary implication retrospective. (Authorities cited: P. Mahendran, A.A. Calton, N.T. Devin Katti, Y.V. Rangaiah).
  2. Having stated the general rule, the Court then examined the character of the Special Rules: they were promulgated on 17 February 2001 and expressly made operative retrospectively from 1 July 1983, superseding the G.O. Because the Special Rules were made retrospective, the Court concluded that they govern the selection process even though the selection had commenced earlier.
  3. The Court considered and rejected petitioners' contention that T.R. Kapur required the Special Rules to be struck down as violative of Articles 14 and 16. It distinguished T.R. Kapur on the material factual ground that that case sought to render already-made promotions invalid (i.e., to revert or impair vested, already-exercised promotion rights), whereas in the present matter no one had been promoted and then reverted; the petitioners before the Court had only applied for selection and had not acquired the post. The Court noted that retrospective rules that affect pending selections are permissible under Section 2(1) of the Act.
  4. The Court addressed the argument that transfer-applicants were effectively seeking promotion and hence a protected right to be considered for promotion had been infringed. The Court held that a claim for appointment by transfer (as specifically provided for under the G.O.) cannot be equated with promotion merely because the post is higher; the G.O itself distinguished promotion and transfer as separate modes. Therefore, authorities recognizing a right to be considered for promotion (Ajit Singh, Sarabjit Singh, Rangadhamaiah) did not assist the petitioners in the factual context.
  5. The Court rejected the argument that the length of retrospective operation (over 17 years) rendered the Special Rules arbitrary. The Court reiterated the settled position that the mere length of retrospective operation is not decisive and will not invalidate rules unless a fundamental right is shown to have been violated as in T.R. Kapur.
  6. On the contention that the Court's earlier interim order delayed the selection and caused prejudice, the Court observed the timeline: notification (1992), written test (1995), shortlisting (November 2000), interim stay (13 Dec 2000), vacation of stay (5 Apr 2001), promulgation of Special Rules (17 Feb 2001) and interviews held in May 2001 (after promulgation). The Court found that once Special Rules were promulgated with retrospective effect, the Commission ought not to have continued selection under the earlier G.O.; the fact that an interim order had earlier stayed interviews was not a sufficient ground to give effect to rank lists prepared under the G.O. after the retrospective Special Rules were in place.
  7. Concerning the statutory requirement to lay rules before the Legislative Assembly (sub-s. (2) of S. 2 of the Act), the Court analyzed the provision and precedent (Jan Mohammad and Atlas Cycle). It held that the provision is directory and that non-laying does not automatically invalidate rules. Moreover, the Special Rules were in fact laid on the table on 2 July 2001, remained before the Assembly for more than 14 days and were neither modified nor annulled. Hence the laying requirement was satisfied and in any event would be directory rather than mandatory.
  8. Drawing these strands together, the Court concluded that the Special Rules (being retrospective) displaced the G.O. and that the Commission erred in selecting candidates and preparing rank lists in terms of the G.O. after the Special Rules had come into force retrospectively.

Holding and Implications

Final Disposition: The Court dismissed all the Writ Petitions and allowed the two Writ Appeals. It held that vacancies in the posts of Industries Extension Officers shall be filled in accordance with the Special Rules and not from the rank lists prepared by the Public Service Commission in terms of the earlier G.O. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Implications:

  • The immediate legal consequence is that the rank lists prepared by the Commission under the G.O. (dating to the selection process started in 1992) are of no effect for filling vacancies in light of the Special Rules made retrospective; appointments must be made under the Special Rules.
  • The Court affirmed established principles: (a) pending selection proceedings are ordinarily governed by the rules in force at commencement unless the amendment is retrospective; (b) retrospective rules are permissible if lawfully promulgated and do not unlawfully impair vested promotions; and (c) procedural requirements to lay rules before the legislature are, in the circumstances considered, directory and do not automatically invalidate rules where they are otherwise made and placed before the legislature.
  • No new legal principle was laid down; the decision applies settled authorities to the facts and distinguishes T.R. Kapur to show that retrospective rules which do not seek to revert already-made promotions are not per se unconstitutional.

All information in this summary is taken exclusively from the provided Court opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

N.K Sodhi, C.J:— O.P Nos. 30458 and 34803 of 2001, 8725 and 34586 of 2002 and W.A Nos. 256 and 277 of 2002 can be conveniently disposed of together as common questions of law and fact arise in them and they all pertain to the selection of Industries Extension Officers in the Department of Industries and Commerce.

2. Recruitment to the posts of Industries Extension Officers was not governed by any statutory rules. The State Government by its order dated August 23, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the G.O ‘) in consultation with the Kerala Public Service Commission (for short ‘the Commission’) prescribed the following method of appointment and qualifications for the said post:

“1. Method of appointment.— (a) By direct recruitment.

(b) By promotion from the Kerala Industries Subordinate Service.

(c) By transfer from the Gram Sevaks in the Development Department.

Note.—

(i) 50 per cent of the vacancies shall be filled up by direct recruitment; 25 per cent by promotion and 25 per cent by transfer.

(ii) Appointment by transfer of Gram Sevaks will also be made by the Public Service Commission on the basis of merit to ensure the best candidates.

(iii) Promotion from the Kerala lndustries Subordinate Service will be made by the Director of Industries and Commerce.

2. Qualifications.— (i) For direct recruitment.—

(a) Degree or Diploma in any branch of Engineering; or

(b) Diploma in Rural Services with Village Industries as optional subject awarded by the National Council of Rural Higher Education; or

(c) Degree in Arts, Science, Commerce or Business Management; or

(d) Diploma in Textile Technology; or

(e) Diploma in Food Technology.

(ii) For promotion and transfer.— Same qualification as for direct recruitment but with not less than five years service.”

3. It will, thus, be seen that appointment to the post is made by direct recruitment, by promotion from the Kerala Industries Subordinate Service and also by transfer from the Gram Sevaks in the Development Department and 50 per cent vacancies were meant for the direct recruits and 25 per cent each for the promotees and transferees.

4. The total cadre strength of the Industries Extension Officers is 193 as averred in paragraph 4 in O.P No. 30458 of 2001 which fact has not been denied by the respondents therein. It may be mentioned that 192 posts out of 193 had been occupied by temporary promotees who had been promoted under R. 31 of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958 (for short ‘the 1958 Rules’). This Rule provides that where it is necessary in public interest owing to an emergency which had arisen to fill immediately a vacancy in a post and borne on the cadre of a higher category in a service or class by promotion from a lower category and there would be undue delay in making such promotion in accordance with the Rules, the appointing authority may promote a person otherwise than in accordance with the Rules temporarily. It is further provided in the Rule that a person so promoted shall be replaced as soon as possible by the member of the service who is entitled to the promotion under the Rules or by a candidate appointed in accordance with the Rules as the case may be.

5. By notification dated 26th May, 1992, the Commission invited applications for 33 posts of Industries Extension Officers to be filled up by direct recruitment and for 11 posts to be filled by transfer from Village Extension Officers (previously known as Gram Sevaks). The qualifications prescribed in the notification were the same as prescribed in the G.O Petitioners in O.P Nos. 34803 of 2001 and 34586 of 2002 applied in response to the advertisement for posts meant for direct recruits and petitioners in O.P No. 30458 of 2001 submitted their applications for posts to be filled by transfer. The Commission also made a special recruitment for scheduled tribe candidates and published a notice on 27th October, 1998 inviting applications for direct recruitment for 7 posts meant for them. The petitioners in O.P No. 8725 of 2002 who belong to scheduled tribes, applied in response to this notification.

6. A written test was held by the Commission on the basis of which the candidates were short listed. Interviews were notified by the Commission and these were to be held between 26th December, 2000 to 30th December, 2000. Some of the employees who had been temporarily promoted under R. 31 of the 1958 Rules filed O.P No. 34827 of 2000 in this Court challenging the interviews and an interim order was issued by a learned Single Judge on 13th December, 2000 restraining the Commission from conducting the interviews without obtaining further orders from the Court. The stay order was, however, vacated on 5th April, 2001 and the interviews were eventually held in May 2001.

7. Before the Commission could complete the selection process and even before the interviews were held, the State Government, in exercise of its powers under sub-s. (1) of S. 2 of the Kerala Public Services Act, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) framed Rules for recruitment to the Kerala Industries Subordinate Service. These Rules were called the Special Rules for the Kerala Industries Subordinate Service, 2001 (hereinafter called ‘the Special Rules’). These Rules were published in the Kerala Gazette on 17th February, 2001 and were deemed to have come into force with effect from July 1, 1983. The Special Rules were framed superseding all the existing Rules and Orders including the G.O pertaining to the recruitment to the Kerala Industries Subordinate Service. The method of appointment and qualifications for the post of Industries Extension Officer were altered substantially. The method of appointment and the qualifications for the post as prescribed by R. 3 of the Special Rules are as under:

TABLE Name of category Method of appointment Qualification Industries Extension Officer (i) By Direct Recruitment A Degree in any branch of Engineering

(ii) By promotion from the following Categories in the order of preference. 1 Senior Co-operative Inspector (S.G) 2 Senior Co-operativeor Inspector. 3 Development Officer (Handicrafts) 4. In the absence of qualified hands from Senior Co-operative Inspector qualified Junior Co-operative Inspector. 1. A Degree in any branch of Engineering with not less than 5 years service in the Department; or 2 A degree Diploma in any branch of Engineering or any branch of Technology with not less than 5 years service in the Department. or 3. A Degree in Arts, Science, Commerce, Social Sciences or Business Management with not less than 5 years service in the Department.

Note.— 1. Appointment by direct recruitment and promotion shall be made in the ratio 3:7. While filling up the post by promotion the following categories will be considered in the order of preference. 1. Senior Co-operative Inspector (S.G), 2. Senior Co-operative Inspector, 3. Development Officer (Handicrafts), 4. Junior Co-operative Inspector.

8. A perusal of the aforesaid Table would show that there are two methods of appointment, one by direct recruitment and the other by promotion. The Special Rules do not permit appointment to the post by transfer which could earlier be made in terms of the G.O It will also be seen that for direct recruitment, the qualification prescribed is a Degree in any branch of Engineering whereas under the G.O, five alternative qualifications had been prescribed including Diplomas in Engineering and other subjects/disciplines. Qualifications for promotion to the post have also been changed and so also the ratio in which the appointments are to be made. Under the G.O the appointments could be made by direct recruitment, by promotion and by transfer in the ratio of 50:25:25 whereas under the Special Rules, appointments could be made only by direct recruitment and promotion in the ratio of 3:7.

9. After the promulgation of the Special Rules in February 2001, the Commission interviewed the candidates who had applied for the post by way of direct recruitment and also by way of transfer. As already observed, these interviews were held in May 2001 and the selection process which was started on 26th May, 1992 was completed only on 24th August, 2001 when two rank lists were notified by the Commission. List I was in regard to direct recruits and List II pertained to recruitment by transfer from Village Extension Officers. There was yet another list which came into force with effect from 28th August, 2001 and it pertained to the special recruitment made only for candidates belonging to Scheduled Tribes. The names of the two petitioners in O.P No. 34586 of 2002 appear at SI. Nos. 21 and 24 of List I and the sole petitioner in O.P No. 34803 of 2001 figures at Sl. No. 10 in the list. The five petitioners in O.P No. 30458 of 2001 figure in List II at Sl. Nos. 6, 10, 17, 33 and 47. The two petitioners in O.P No. 8725 of 2002 who belong to Scheduled Tribes figure at Sl. Nos. 7 and 6 of the separate list. Some of the employees who had been temporarily promoted to the post of Industries Extension Officer filed O.P Nos. 18047 and 38589 of 2001 for a mandamus directing the Commission not to proceed with the selection process which commenced in pursuance to the notifications dated 26th May, 1992 and 27th October, 1998 since Special Rules had been promulgated and the method of appointment and qualifications for the post had substantially changed. These two Writ Petitions came up for hearing before two Single Benches and were dismissed holding that the petitioners therein were provisional appointees under R. 31 of the 1958 Rules and had no enforceable right to insist that they should be permitted to continue. Since the persons whose names appeared in the rank list had not been impleaded, the Writ Petition was dismissed on that ground as well. The petitioners also contended that in view of the Special Rules, the posts were meant for promotees and the Commission could not be allowed to make direct recruitment. This plea was also negatived in O.P No. 38589 of 2001 and it was held that the process for direct recruitment could not be brought to a halt merely because some other persons had subsequently become eligible for promotion because of the promulgation of the Special Rules with retrospective effect. This petition was also dismissed. The petitioners in these two cases have filed W.A Nos. 256 and 277 of 2002 which are being disposed of by this order. O.P Nos. 34803 of 2001 and 8725 and 34586 of 2002 have been filed by those persons, who have been selected by the Commission by way of direct recruitment in pursuance to the notifications issued on 26th May, 1992 and 27th October, 1998 and whose names appear in the rank lists prepared by the Commission. O.P No. 30458 of 2001 has been filed by the Village Extension Officers who had been selected by the Commission for appointment by transfer to the post of Industries Extension Officer and whose names appear in Rank List II. The appellants in the two Writ Appeals are temporary/provisional promotees under R. 31 of the 1958 Rules and they want the Special Rules to be enforced and appointments made in accordance therewith. The petitioners in the Writ Petitions, on the other hand, challenge the validity of the Special Rules and want the appointments to be made as per the rank lists prepared by the Commission in accordance with the G.O We are called upon to decide as to which of the two stands is correct.

10. Mr. Thottathil Radhakrishnan, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners in O.P No. 34586 of 2002, strenuously contended that the Special Rules are invalid as they were not laid as soon as may be after they were made before the Legislative Assembly while it was in session and therefore these would have no effect. According to the learned Counsel, the provisions of sub-s. (2) of S. 2 of the Act stood violated. Mr. Sudhakara Prasad, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners in O.P No. 30458 of 2001, emphatically urged that since the selection process had commenced on 26th May, 1992 when the Commission invited applications and prescribed the method of appointment and the qualifications for the post of Industries Extension Officer, the petitioners had a right to be considered for selection in accordance with the method and qualifications so prescribed and such a right could not be taken away by the Special Rules retrospectively. His argument is that such a right had vested in the petitioners and the Special Rules which have taken away such a right are invalid, arbitrary and unconstitutional. The grievance of the petitioners is that they were eligible for being considered for appointment in terms of the notification issued by the Commission but the Special Rules by operating retrospectively had made them ineligible by altering the method of appointment and also the qualifications for the post. It is also contended by Sri. Sudhakara Prasad that the petitioners are working as Village Extension Officers (previously known as Gram Sevaks) and when they were seeking appointment by transfer to the post of Industries Extension Officer which is a higher post with a higher scale of pay, they were, in fact, seeking appointment by promotion and that this right of theirs to be considered for promotion is a vested right which could not be taken away by the Special Rules operating retrospectively. He placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in T.R Kapur v. State of Haryana (1986 Supp SCC 584 : AIR 1987 SC 415). The argument indeed is that a right to be considered for promotion is a fundamental right which could not be taken away. He also relied on the Judgment of the Apex Court in Chairman, Railway Board v. C.R Rangadhamaiah ((1997) 6 SCC 623) and also in Ajit Singh & Ors. (II) v. State of Punjab ((1999) 7 SCC 209). Another argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that the Special Rules even though promulgated in February, 2001 were made operative with effect from 1st July, 1983 and in view of the length of time covered by the retrospective operation, the Special Rules are arbitrary. He also argued that if this Court had not restrained the Commission from conducting the interviews, the rank lists would have been prepared earlier to the promulgation of the Special Rules and that the persons named in the rank lists like the petitioners would have been appointed. The contention is that no party should be allowed to be prejudiced by the acts of the Court and, therefore, the respondents should be directed to make appointments in accordance with the rank lists prepared by the Commission. He cited the decisions in Devidayal Rolling Mills v. Prakash Chiman Lal Parikh ((1993) 2 SCC 470 : AIR 1993 SC 1982) and State of M.P v. M.V Vyavasaya and Co. ((1997) 1 SCC 156) in support of his contention.

11. We shall first deal with the contentions raised by Mr. Sudhakara Prasad, learned Counsel for some of the writ petitioners. It is argued that since the selection process commenced in the year 1992 when the Commission invited applications for direct recruitment, the same had to be completed as per the Rules which then existed notwithstanding the promulgation of the Special Rules in February, 2001 with retrospective effect. This argument, as advanced, cannot be accepted.

12. Y.V Rangaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh ((1983) 3 SCC 284 : AIR 1983 SC 852), was a case pertaining to the appointments to the posts of Sub Registrars Grade II. As per the Rules which were prevalent on the date when the posts fell vacant, Lower Division Clerks in the Department were entitled to be promoted for which purposes the Government was required to prepare a panel in September each year. The panel which was due in September, 1976 was not prepared till 1977 by which time the Rules were amended whereby the Rule providing for consideration of Lower Division Clerks for appointment as Special Registrars Grade II was done away with and promotion or transfer to that category was to be made from amongst the Upper Division Clerks employed in the Department. The amendment was made prospectively. The action of the Department in filling up the posts as per the amended Rules was challenged and Their Lordships accepted the plea of the petitioner therein and observed as under:

“The vacancies which occurred prior to the amended rules would be governed by the old rules and not by the amended rules………………………………But the question is of filling the vacancies that occurred prior to the amended rules. We have not the slightest doubt that the posts which fell vacant prior to the amended rules would be governed by the old rules and not by the new rules.”

13. In A.A Calton v. Director of Education ((1983) 3 SCC 33 : AIR 1983 SC 1143), the dispute pertained to the appointment of a Principal of an Intermediate College belonging to a minority institution. Under S. 16F(4) of the U.P Intermediate Education Act, 1921, the power to appoint a Principal vested in the Director if the recommendation made under sub-s. (2) had been disapproved twice. This provision was amended with effect from August 18, 1975 taking away the power of the Director to make the appointment in the case of a minority Institution. The selection process commenced in the year 1973 and even though the appointment was made after the amendment in 1975, it was made by the Director under the unamended law. This was challenged before the Allahabad High Court which dismissed the petition. In appeal, the Order of the Director was upheld and it was observed as under:

“It is no doubt true that the Act was amended by U.P Act 26 of 1975 which came into force on August 18, 1975 taking away the power of the Director to make an appointment under S. 16F(4) of the Act in the case of minority institutions the amending Act did not, however, provide expressly that the amendment in question would apply to pending proceedings under S. 16F of the Act Nor do we find any words in it which by necessary intendment would affect such pending proceedings ………………………………In the instant case admittedly the proceedings for the selection had commenced in the year 1973 and after the Deputy Director had disapproved the recommendations made by the Selection Committee twice the Director acquired the jurisdiction to make an appointment from amongst the qualified candidates who had applied for the vacancy in question………………………………Although the Director in the present case exercised that power subsequent to August 18.1975 on which date the amendment came into force, it cannot be said that the selection made by him was illegal since the amending law had no retrospective effect. It did not have any effect on the proceedings which had commenced prior to August 18, 1975. Such proceedings had to be continued in accordance with the law as it stood at the commencement of the said proceedings. We do not, therefore, find any substance in the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the law as amended by the U.P Act 26 of 1975 should have been followed in the present case.”

(emphasis supplied)

14. In this case also, the amendment was prospective and did not affect the pending proceedings. Had the amendment been made retrospectively, the decision would have been different.

15. In P. Mahendran v. State of Karnataka ((1983) 3 SCC 33 : AIR 1983 S.C 1143), the Rules were amended prospectively after the selection process had commenced and it was held that the selection process had to be completed in accordance with the Rules as they stood at the time of its commencement. Their Lordships followed their earlier decision in Calton's case (supra) and observed as under:

“It is true that a candidate does not get any right to the post by merely making an application for the same. But a right is created in his favour for being considered for the post in accordance with the terms and conditions of the advertisement and the existing recruitment rules. If a candidate applies for a post in response to advertisement issued by Public Service Commission in accordance with recruitment rules he acquires right to be considered for selection in accordance with the then existing Rules. This right cannot he affected by amendment of any Rule unless the amending Rule is retrospective in nature.”

(emphasis supplied)

16. Here again, Their Lordships had made it clear that a selection process which once commences shall have to be completed in accordance with the Rules as they existed at the time of its commencement and the right of a person to be considered for appointment could not be affected by any subsequent amendment to the Rules unless the amendment is made retrospectively. In other words, if an amendment is made in the recruitment rules retrospectively, then the appointment shall have to be made in terms of the amended Rules.

17. Again, in N.T Devin Katti v. Karnataka Public Service Commission ((1990) 3 SCC 157), Their Lordships reiterated the aforesaid proposition of law and Justice K.N Singh (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Bench observed as under:

“Lest there be any confusion, we would like to make it clear that a candidate on making application for a post pursuant to an advertisement does not acquire any vested right of selection, but if he is eligible and is otherwise qualified in accordance with the relevant rules and the terms contained in the advertisement, he does acquire a vested right of being considered for selection in accordance with the rules as they existed on the date of advertisement. He cannot be deprived of that limited right on the amendment of rules during the pendency of selection unless the amended rules are, retrospective in nature.”

(underlining is ours)

18. Referring to the earlier decisions, Justice K.N Singh observed in paragraph 13 of the Judgment as under:

“It is well accepted principle of construction that a statutory rule or Government Order is prospective in nature unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective effect Where proceedings are initiated for selection by issuing advertisement, the selection should normally be regulated by the then existing rules and Government Orders and any amendment of the rules or the Government Order pending the selection should not affect the validity of the selection made by the Selecting Authority or the Public Service Commission unless the amended Rules or the amended Government Orders issued in exercise of its statutory power either by express provision or by necessary intendment indicate that amended Rules shall be applicable to the pending selections. See P. Mahendran v. State of Kamataka ((1990) 1 SCC 411).

(emphasis supplied)

19. It is, thus, clear that a person who applies for appointment to a post in response to an advertisement does not acquire any right much less a vested right to get selected. If he is eligible and is otherwise qualified in accordance with the recruitment rules governing the post and the terms and conditions contained in the advertisement, he gets a right of being considered for selection in accordance with theories as they existed on the date of advertisement. This limited right cannot be taken away by any authority amending the terms and conditions in the advertisement or by amending the recruitment Rules unless the amendment is made with retrospective effect. The authority which issued the advertisement or which framed the recruitment rules has a right to amend the terms and conditions of appointment to the post and also to amend the recruitment rules but no such amendment shall affect the selection process which had already commenced prior to the amendment unless the amendment is made retrospectively. In other words, if an amendment is brought about in the recruitment rules with retrospective effect, then the selection to the post shall be governed by the amended rules and no candidate can he heard to say that he has aright to be considered for appointment in terms of the Rules as they stood at the time of the commencement of the selection process. In the case before us, the Special Rules were promulgated in February, 2001 when the selection process had not been completed and it is common case of the parties that these Rules were made operative retrospectively with effect from 1st July, 1983 superseding all the Government Orders governing the field including the G.O Is, therefore, follows that the selection to the posts of Industries Extension Officers had to be made in accordance with the Special Rules and that the commission was in error in selecting the candidates and preparing the rank lists in terms of the G.O

20. It was then argued by Mr. Sudhakara Prasad, learned Counsel for the petitioners, that the Special Rules which were promulgated on 17th February, 2001 retrospectively with effect from 1st July, 1983 making the petitioners ineligible are arbitrary and violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. He places reliance on a Judgment of the Supreme Court in T.R Kapur v. State of Haryana (1986 Supp SCC 584 : AIR 1987 SC 415), wherein, according to the learned Counsel, a similar amendment made in the rules retrospectively taking away the eligibility of members of Class II Service for purposes of promotion to the posts of Executive Engineers in Class I service from a back date was declared constitutionally invalid. We have given our thoughtful consideration to this contention of the learned Counsel and having carefully gone through the judgment of the Apex Court in T.R Kapur's case (supra) are unable to accept the same. In T.R Kapur's case, R. 6(b) of the Punjab Service of Engineers, Class I, Public Works Department (Irrigation Branch) Rules, 1964 which was amended on June 22, 1984 with retrospective effect from 10th July, 1964 whereby the members of Class II Service who were diploma holders were made ineligible for purposes of promotion to the post of Executive Engineers in Class I Service from a back date ranging over 20 years was held to be violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution because it had the effect of rendering invalid the promotions already made. The submission made by the learned Counsel in T.R Kapur's case is noticed in paragraph 15 of the judgment in the following words:

“In substance, the submission is that a retrospective amendment of R. 6(b) by the impugned notification which seeks to take away the eligibility of members of Class II Service who are diploma holders for purposes of promotion to the posts of Executive Engineers in Class I Service from a back date ranging over 20 years and thereby renders invalid the promotions already made is constitutionally impermissible.”

21. Upholding this contention, Their Lordships observed in paragraph 16 of the Judgment as under:

“Therefore, unless it is specifically provided in the rules, the employees who are already promoted before the amendment of the rules cannot be reverted and their promotions cannot be recalled. In other words, such rules laying down qualifications “for promotion made with retrospective effect must necessarily satisfy the test of Arts. 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution.”

22. It is, thus, clear that the amendment to R. 6(b) was declared invalid because the employees who had already been promoted before the amendment were sought to be reverted as they were made ineligible from a back date. This, the Supreme Court said, could not be done, as it would violate the fundamental rights of those who had already been promoted. Such is not the case before us. The petitioners before us had only applied for being appointed either by direct recruitment or by way of transfer from Gram Sevaks in the Development Department and none of them had been appointed Who was sought to be reverted or transferred back on the promulgation of the Special Rules. As already observed, the petitioners had a limited right to be considered for appointment to the posts of Industries Extension Officers which could be taken away by promulgating the Special Rules retrospectively and this is precisely what the State Government has done. No fault can, thus, be found with the action of the Government in promulgating the Special Rules with retrospective effect. It is not in dispute that under S. 2(1) of the Act, the State Government has the power to frame service Rules retrospectively as well. It may be mentioned that 192 posts out of 193 in the cadre of Industries Extension Officers have been occupied by the provisional promotees under R. 31 of the 1958 Rules and not by any of the petitioners. In this view of the matter, we are clearly of the view that T.R Kapur's case does not help the petitioners.

23. It was then argued that even though the petitioners in O.P No. 30458 of 2001 were seeking appointment to the posts of Industries Extension Officers by way of transfer from Gram Sevaks yet they were seeking appointment to a higher post carrying a higher scale of pay and, therefore, for all intents and purposes they were seeking promotion to the posts of Industries Extension Officers and since their right to be considered for promotion has been taken away by the Special Rules, the said rules violate their fundamental right as observed by the Supreme Court in Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab ((1999) 7 SCC 209) and Sarabjit Singh v. Ex. Major B.D Gupta ((2000) 7 SCC 67).

24. It is true that their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ajith Singh's case (supra) and Sarabjit Singh's case (supra) have observed that a right to be considered for promotion is indeed a fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 16 of the Constitution but the petitioners before us are seeking appointment by way of transfer to the posts of Industries Extension Officers and they are not seeking any promotion. They are seeking appointment in terms of the G.O whereunder 25 per cent of the posts had to be filled up by transfer from Gram Sevaks. This appointment by transfer cannot be equated with appointment by promotion merely because the post to which they were seeking appointment is a higher post because the G.O itself makes a provision for appointment by promotion as well It may be recalled that 25 per cent of the seats under the G.O are to be filled by promotion from Kerala Industries Subordinate Service and another 25 per cent by transfer from Gram Sevaks in the Development Department. When the G.O provides for appointment both by promotion and by transfer, the mode of transfer cannot be equated with that of promotion. The very basis on which the argument is sought to be built is fallacious. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting this contention of the learned Counsel.

25. Mr. Sudhakara Prasad then contended that the Special Rules which have been promulgated with retrospective effect are operative from a back date ranging over more than 17 years and, therefore, they are arbitrary and invalid. We cannot accept this contention either. It is by now well-settled by the final Court that mere length of time covered by retrospective operation is not itself a decisive test to determine the validity of the provision.’ Therefore, merely because the Special Rules have been made retrospective and go back to cover a period of more than 17 years, will not be a ground to hold that they are invalid unless it can be shown that the retrospectivity violates any fundamental right as was the case in T.R Kapur's case where the already promoted employees were sought to be reverted after being made ineligible retrospectively. The learned Counsel could not point out any right in the petitioners which could be said to have been violated by retrospective operation of the Special Rules. This contention too is rejected.

26. It was then argued that had this Court not intervened in O.P No. 34827 of 2000 by restraining the Commission from conducting the interviews, the select lists would have been completed much prior to the promulgation of the Special Rules and the petitioners would have been appointed in terms thereof. The argument of the learned Counsel is that his clients should not be made to suffer because of the act of the Court in granting an interim order which delayed the finalization of the selection process. As already observed, the selection process started in May, 1992 when the Commission issued a notification inviting applications for direct recruitment and also for appointment by transfer. The written test held by the Commission in March, 1995 with a view to short-list candidates. The candidates were short-listed in November, 2000 and the interviews were notified to be held between 26th December, 2000 to 30th December, 2000. It was then that some of the provisional promotees under R. 31 of 1958 Rules filed O.P No. 34827 of 2000 challenging the interviews. Even though an interim order was passed on 13th December, 2000, it was vacated on 5th April, 2001 and the selection process was allowed to continue. The interviews were eventually held in May, 2001 almost three months after the promulgation of the Special Rules. We do not think that the selection process was delayed because of the intervention of this Court Once the Special Rules were promulgated with retrospective effect and the method of appointment and qualifications for the posts of Industries Extension Officers had been altered, the Commission ought not to have continued with the selection process which had earlier begun on the basis of the G.O In this view of the matter, we have no hesitation to hold that the rank lists prepared by the Commission were of no consequence in view of the Special Rules and that appointments to the posts of Industries Extension Officers will have to be made in terms of the Special Rules.

27. We may now consider the argument advanced by Mr. Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, learned Counsel for the petitioners in O.P No. 34586 of 2002. It is urged that the Special Rules were not laid as soon as may be after they were promulgated before the Legislative Assembly while it was in session for a total period of fourteen days and therefore the provisions of sub-s. (2) of S. 2 of the Act, stood violated and therefore the Special Rules are invalid and cannot be acted upon. There is no merit in this contention. S. 2 of the Act enables the Government to make rules either prospectively or retrospectively to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State of Kerala. The Special Rules were notified on 17th February, 2001 to regulate the recruitment for the Kerala Industries Subordinate Service. On that day the last session of the Tenth Kerala Legislative Assembly was on. This session commenced on 15th February, 2001 and lasted till 8th March, 2001. The Special Rules were not laid before the Assembly in this session. Fresh elections to the Legislative Assembly were held and the first session of the Eleventh Kerala Legislative Assembly was convened on 5th June, 2001 which continued for some time. The Special Rules were laid on the table of the Assembly on July 2, 2001 and it is common case of the parties that the Special Rules were before the Assembly for more than 14 days and that they were neither modified nor annulled. Sub-s. (2) of S. 2 of the Act provides as under:

“(2) Every rule made under this section shall be laid as soon as may be after it is made before the Legislative Assembly while it is in session for a total period of fourteen days which may be comprised in one session or in two successive sessions, and if before the expiry of the session in which it is so laid or the session immediately following, the Legislative Assembly agrees that the rule should be either modified or annulled, the rule shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be; so however that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anythingpreviously done under that rule.”

28. It is not uncommon that the Legislature makes such a provision requiring the rule making authority to lay before it the rules framed under the Act. The object of such a provision is to keep supervision and control over the rule making authority. The extent of control which the Legislature wishes to exercise will depend upon the language used in the statutory provision. It may require the rule making authority to simply place before it the rules framed under the Act or it may or may not require that the rules would be subject to its approval. The Legislature may also provide that it will have the power to modify or annul the rules if it so likes or it may like to exercise its control in such other manner as it may deem proper. It is equally open to the Legislature to provide as to what would be the effect if the rules are not laid before it. If no provision is made in this regard it would follow that the Legislature never intended that non-compliance with the requirement of laying rules before it should render them illegal or void. The language used in each statutory provision will show the extent of control and supervision which the Legislature wishes to exercise. In the case before us sub-s. (2) of S. 2 of the Act merely requires the rules to be laid as soon as may be after they are made before the Legislative Assembly while it is in session for a total period of 14 days and the Legislature has kept with it the power to modify or annul the rules so made making it clear that anything done under the original rules prior to their modification or annulment shall be valid. It is thus clear that the validity of the rules does not depend upon their being laid on the table of the Legislative Assembly because the section does not provide that the Special Rules will be valid only if they are laid before the Legislative Assembly. Of course, the Legislative Assembly could modify or annul them and in that event the modified rules would have effect or they would have no effect in case they were annulled and even if they had been modified or annulled any action taken under the original rules has been protected and the same would be valid notwithstanding the modification or annulment of the Special Rules. Since the Special Rules were neither modified nor annulled by the Legislative Assembly they were valid as originally laid before it. As there is no provision in sub-s. (2) of S. 2 of the Act as to what would be the effect if the rules are not laid before the State Legislature, we are clearly of the view that the Legislature did not intend that the rules would be invalid if they were not laid before it. In this view of the matter the provisions of sub-s. (2) of S. 2 of the Act have to be held to be only directory and not mandatory and, therefore, even if the Special Rules had not been laid before the Legislative Assembly they would be valid. The view that we have taken finds support from the observations of the Supreme Court in Jan Mohammad Noor Moohamad Bagban v. The State of Gujarat (AIR 1966 SC 385), where their Lordships in similar circumstances made the following observations:

“S. 26(5) of Bombay Act 22 of 1939 does not prescribe that the rules acquired validity only from the date on which they were placed before the Houses of Legislature. The rules are valid from the date on which they are made under S. 26(1). It is true that the Legislature has prescribed that the rules shall be placed before the Houses of Legislature, but failure to place the rules before the Houses of Legislature does not affect the validity of the rules, merely because they have not been placed before the Houses of the Legislature. Granting that the provisions of sub-s. (5) of S. 26 by reason of the failure to place the rules before the Houses of Legislature were violated we are of the view that sub-s. (5) of S. 26 having regard to the purposes of which it is made, and in the context in which it occurs, cannot be regarded as mandatory.”

29. Again, in Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana ((1979) 2 SCC 196 : AIR 1979 SC 1149), their Lordships were dealing with sub-s. (6) of S. 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 which provides that every order made under that section by the Central Government or any officer or authority of the Central Government shall be laid before both the Houses of Parliament as soon as may be after it is made. Holding that the said provision was directory, it was observed as under:

“From the foregoing discussions, it inevitably follows that the Legislature never intended that non-compliance with the requirement of laying as envisaged by sub-s. (6) of S. 3 of the Act should render the order void. Consequently non-laying of the aforesaid notification fixing the maximum selling prices of various categories of iron and steel including the commodity in question before both Houses of Parliament cannot result in nullification of the notification.”

30. However, the Special Rules were laid on the table of the Legislative Assembly and the provisions of sub-s. (2) of S. 2 of the Act were complied with.

31. As already observed, the rules were laid on the table of the Legislative Assembly on 2nd July, 2001 when the first session of the Eleventh Kerala Legislative Assembly was on and they remained on the table of the House for more than fourteen days thereafter because the session lasted much longer. There is, thus, no factual basis for the contention of the learned Counsel and we have no hesitation in rejecting the same.

32. No other point was raised.

33. In the result, all the Writ Petitions are dismissed and the two Writ Appeals allowed and it is held that the vacancies in the posts of Industries Extension Officers shall be filled up in accordance with the Special Rules and not from the rank lists prepared by the Commission in terms of the G.O The parties are left to bear their own costs.