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P.N Salim v. P.J Thomas & Another
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal challenges an appellate judgment of acquittal in a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (N.I. Act). The material facts, as recorded in the opinion, are:
- The cheque in question (Ext. P1) is dated 23/12/1991 and was dishonoured on 21/01/1992 on the ground that the account was closed.
- The account on which the cheque was drawn had been closed by the accused on 30/01/1990, well before the date appearing on Ext. P1.
- The signature on the cheque is admitted by the accused.
- The accused asserted that the cheque was not issued for discharge of any legally enforceable debt to the complainant; rather, he said the cheque had been handed to a third person (Vijayan) as security and was allegedly misused by the complainant.
- At trial, P.W.s 1–3 and Exhibits P1–P6 were produced by the prosecution; the defence led D.W.s 1–3 and Exhibits D1–D4.
- The trial court found that all ingredients of the offence under Section 138 were established and convicted the accused. The appellate court reversed and acquitted, holding (a) that Section 138 does not apply to a cheque issued after the account was closed and (b) that the cheque was not proved to have been issued for discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability.
- The present judgment is an appeal against that appellate acquittal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a cheque drawn after the date of closure of the drawer's account falls within the sweep of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
- Whether the cheque was issued for the due discharge of any legally enforceable debt or liability (i.e., whether the accused rebutted the presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act).
Arguments of the Parties
Accused's (Respondent's) Arguments
- To attract Section 138, the cheque must be drawn "on an account maintained by him" at the time of drawing; it is not enough that the account had been maintained at some earlier time. Because the account was closed before the cheque was drawn, Section 138 cannot apply.
- The accused contended the cheque was issued to a third person (Vijayan) as security and not for the discharge of any legally enforceable debt/liability to the complainant.
Appellant/Complainant's Arguments
- The phrase "on an account maintained by him" should not be given a narrow temporal meaning (i.e., limited to accounts live on the date of drawal). It refers to an account of the accused maintained or which he had maintained with the bank; the present continuous tense is not used in the statute.
- The status of the account on the date of the cheque (live or closed) is irrelevant for the purposes of Section 138; excluding cheques drawn on accounts closed prior to issue would be an artificial escape route for those who fraudulently issue cheques after closing accounts.
- Accordingly, Section 138 should be held to apply to cheques drawn on accounts that the drawer maintained with the bank even if the drawer had closed the account prior to issue of that cheque.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| NEPC Micon Ltd. v. Magma Leasing Ltd. ((1999) 4 SCC 253 : AIR 1999 SC 1952) | Section 138, though penal, must be interpreted to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy; promote efficacy and credibility of cheques in commercial transactions. | The court relied on NEPC to support a purposive/mischief-based interpretation of Section 138 and to reject an interpretation that would permit perpetrators to evade liability by closing accounts before issuing cheques. |
| Goaplast (P) Ltd. v. Chico Ursula D'souza ((2003) 3 SCC 232) | Supportive Supreme Court authority referenced in relation to language and interpretation of Section 138. | The court cited Goaplast as a later Supreme Court decision consistent with the broader interpretation that cheques issued on accounts the drawer had maintained fall within Section 138 even if closed before issue. |
| Shivendra v. Adineo (1996 Cri. L.J 1816) (Bombay High Court) | Observation that an account holder who retains unused cheque leaves without surrendering them may be regarded as continuing to maintain the account for purposes of legal responsibility. | The court drew support from observations in Shivendra to hold that where cheque leaves are retained by a drawer after account closure, the drawer can be treated as continuing to maintain the account for the purpose of Section 138 until the cheque leaves are returned or accounted for. |
| Japahari v. Priya (1993 (2) K.L.T 141) | A contrary (narrow) view: for Section 138 the drawer must have had a live account on the date the cheque was drawn. | The court noted this as an earlier Kerala High Court single-judge decision taking the narrower view, but ultimately held that it does not represent the prevailing law after contrary pronouncements by a Division Bench. |
| Joseph… v. Philip Joseph…. (2000 (2) K.L.J 679) | Another Kerala High Court single-judge decision following Japahari and taking a narrower view. | Referenced as part of the line of narrower decisions; the court explained these were considered and displaced by the later Division Bench decision (Vathsan). |
| Vathsan v. Japahari (2003 (3) KLT 972) (Division Bench of Kerala High Court) | Held that cheques issued against an account which was closed prior to the date of drawal shall come within the fold of Section 138 to attract criminal liability. | The court treated Vathsan as the authoritative declaration of law in the jurisdiction, answering a reference and preferring the wider interpretation; this decision was a primary basis for rejecting the accused's contention and for overturning the appellate acquittal. |
| Anilkumar v. Shammy (2002 (3) K.L.T 852) | Principles governing imposition of sentence in prosecutions under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. | The court referred to Anilkumar when considering appropriate sentencing principles and to justify a lenient substantive sentence coupled with a restoratory compensation direction under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeds in distinct steps, each tied closely to textual interpretation and precedent as set out in the opinion:
- Statutory Text and Central Question: The court began by closely examining the wording of Section 138 — in particular the phrase "cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him" — and framed the central interpretive dispute: whether "maintained" requires the account to be live at the precise moment of drawal or whether it can include an account that the drawer had maintained earlier.
- Purposive/Mischief-Based Interpretation: Drawing on NEPC Micon Ltd., the court applied the mischief rule and purposive interpretation even though Section 138 is penal. The legislative purpose identified is making cheque transactions effective and credible and preventing dishonest methods of defeating cheque liability. The court emphasized that interpretation should suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.
- Rejection of Narrow Temporal Reading: The court rejected the accused's proposed narrow reading (which would limit Section 138 to cheques drawn on accounts live at drawal) as artificial and inconsistent with legislative intent. It observed that such a narrow view would allow a dishonest drawer to escape liability simply by closing the account prior to issue.
- Alternative Factual Approach — Continued Maintenance: The court advanced an alternative, fact-sensitive approach: if a drawer closes an account but retains unused cheque leaves and fails to return them to the bank, the drawer should be regarded as continuing to "maintain" the account for the purposes of Section 138 until the cheque leaves are surrendered or their non-return explained. The court expressly relied on observations in Shivendra to justify this position.
- Precedent Landscape and Binding Authority: The court reviewed conflicting Kerala High Court single-judge decisions (Japahari and Joseph) that took a narrower view. It then relied on the Division Bench decision in Vathsan v. Japahari, which had expressly held that cheques issued against accounts closed prior to drawal fall within Section 138. The court treated the Division Bench declaration as settling the law and obviating the narrower dicta.
- Application to Present Case — Section 138: Applying the above interpretive conclusions and authorities, the court held that a cheque issued by the accused on an account he had maintained with the bank falls within the sweep of Section 138 despite prior closure of the account.
-
Presumption under Section 139 and the Accused's Defence: The court then turned to the statutory presumption under Section 139 that the holder of a dishonoured cheque is entitled to assume the cheque was issued for the discharge of debt. The accused bore the burden of rebutting this presumption on a balance of probabilities (a lesser civil standard), but the court found his evidence insufficient:
- The accused asserted the cheque was issued to Vijayan as security and that Vijayan had discharged the liability, but Vijayan was not examined.
- No tangible corroborative evidence was produced; mere suggestion in the reply to the demand notice was inadequate.
- The accused's conduct after service of the notice (no notice issued to Vijayan, silence/inaction) undermined the credibility of his defence.
- Conclusion on Guilt: Given the interpretive conclusion on Section 138 and the failure to rebut Section 139 presumption, the court concluded that the appellate court's acquittal was based on an erroneous view of law and facts; it allowed the appeal and restored the trial court's conviction.
- Sentencing Analysis: The court considered sentencing principles previously discussed in Anilkumar v. Shammy. Observing that imposition of a deterrent substantive prison sentence would not achieve penological objectives in the circumstances of the case, the court opted for a lenient substantive custodial order (imprisonment till rising of the court) plus a restoratory compensation order under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C.
Holding and Implications
Holding (core ruling):
The appeal is allowed; the appellate judgment of acquittal is set aside; the trial court's conviction under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is restored.
Specific orders made by the court (direct, party-level consequences):
- The accused is sentenced under Section 138 of the N.I. Act to undergo imprisonment till the rising of the court.
- The accused is directed to pay Rs. 17,500 as compensation under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C.; in default of payment he shall undergo simple imprisonment for three months. If realised, the entire amount shall be released to the complainant/appellant.
- The learned Magistrate is directed to take steps for execution of the sentence and to produce the accused for execution at the appointed time; the Magistrate may invoke powers under Section 446 Cr.P.C. if the accused fails to appear.
Broader legal implication (as declared in the opinion):
- The court declared that a cheque drawn on an account which the drawer had maintained with the bank falls within the sweep of Section 138 of the N.I. Act even if the drawer had closed that account prior to the date of the cheque (subject to the factual context and relevant exceptions, e.g., genuine absence of any relation to the account). The court relied on NEPC, Goaplast, and the Division Bench decision in Vathsan to adopt this wider interpretation.
- The opinion also articulated that a drawer who retains unused cheque leaves after instructing account closure may be treated, for the purpose of Section 138, as continuing to maintain the account until the cheque leaves are returned or their non-return explained.
Note on precedent and novelty: The court's holding aligns with prior Supreme Court and Division Bench authorities cited in the opinion (NEPC Micon Ltd., Goaplast, Vathsan). The judgment applies those authorities to the facts at hand and restores the trial conviction; it does not purport to overrule the cited higher court precedents.
1. Does a cheque issued after the date of closure of the account fall within the sweep of Sec. 138 of the N.I Act? This is the question of law thrown up for consideration in this appeal against an appellate judgment of acquittal. Fundamental facts are not in dispute. The cheque in question is Ext. P1. It is dated 23/12/1991. It is dishonoured on 21-01-1992. The account on which the cheque was drawn was closed by the accused long earlier - on 30-01-1990. The cheque was dishonoured on the ground that the account was closed. Signature in the cheque is admitted. The accused contended that the cheque was not issued for the due discharge of any legally enforceable debt/liability to the complainant. It was issued to another person - one Vijayan by name. The obvious suggestions was that the undated cheque handed over to the said Vijayan as security was being misused by the complainant.
2. P.Ws 1 to 3 were examined and Exts. P1 to P6 were marked. On the side of the accused D.Ws 1 to 3 were examined and Exts. D1 to D4 were marked.
3. The trial court held that all ingredients of the offence punishable under Sec. 138 of the N.I Act have been established. The appellate court took the view that Sec. 138 of the N.I Act does not apply to a cheque issued after the date of closure of the account. It was further held that the cheque is not proved to be one issued for the due discharge of any legally enforceable debt/liability.
4. Arguments have been heard. It will be apposite to extract Sec. 138 of the N.I Act. Proviso is omitted as it is not of relevance here.
“138. Dishonour of cheque for inssuficiency, etc., of funds in the account.—
Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both”.
(emphasis supplied)
5. The short argument of the learned counsel for the accused is that to attract Sec. 138 of the N.I Act the cheque must be one drawn “on an account maintained by him”. It is not enough if it is a cheque drawn “on an account (which was) maintained by him”. Inasmuch as there was no live account on the date of issue of the cheque, Sec. 138 of the N.I Act can have no application at all.
6. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the appellant/complainant contends that the expression “on an account maintained by him” cannot have any artificial or unrealistic connotation. The cheque must be drawn on an account which the accused maintained with the bank. The status of the account whether it was live or dead on the date of the cheque is irrelevant. It must be an account which the accused maintains or had maintained with the bank. Present continuous tense is not used by the legislature. The expression used is not “is maintained by him”. The cheque must have reference to an account of the accused. Its status as on the date of the cheque is irrelevant. It would be artificial and unrealistic to exclude persons who fraudulently issue cheques on accounts maintained by them merely because prior to the issue of the cheque they had closed the account. The learned counsel for the complainant/appellant hence contends that the sweep of Sec. 138 of the N.I Act would and should take within it an accused like the one in this case who has chosen to issue a cheque drawn on an account maintained by him with the bank notwithstanding the fact that prior to the issue of the cheque he had closed the account.
7. Any attempted interpretation must take note of the destination that is to be reached. The legislative purpose, goal and dream cannot be lost sight of. In the modem era financial transactions will not depend on cash. The concept of plastic money must rule to facilitate the monetary transactions in the modem world. Cheques drawn on banks must have credibility. Transactions in cheques must be as effective, efficient, credible and sure as transactions in cash. This is the purpose/goal/dream entertained by the legislature. The mischief rule in interpretation cannot be lost sight of. Interpretation must lead a court to the ultimate goals which the legislature wants to be reached. In respect of a penal statute also this principle of interpretation cannot be altogether ignored. It will be apposite in this contex to refer to the decision reported in NEPC Micon Ltd. v. Magma Leasing Ltd. ((1999) 4 SCC 253 : AIR 1999 SC 1952. It would be sufficient if I extract the relevant passage in para - 15:
“15. In view of the aforesaid discussions we are of opinion that even though Section 138 is a penal statute, it is the duty of the Court to interpret it consistent with the legislative intent and purpose so as to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. As stated above, Section 138 of the Act has created a contractual breach as an offence and the legislative purpose is to promote efficacy of banking and of ensuring that in commercial or contractual transactions cheques are not dishonoured and credibility in transacting business through cheques is maintained. The above interpretation would be in accordance with the principle of interpretation quoted above ‘burst away the cobweb varnish, and show the transactions in their true’ ‘light’ (Wilmot C.J) or (by Maxwell) ‘to carry out effectively the breach of the statute, it must be so construed as to defeat all attempts to do, or avoid doing, in an indirect or circuitous manner that it has prohibited”.
(emphasis supplied)
8. If the interpretation can vassed by the accused were accepted, a person before he receives the cheque will have to ensure that the account is live. If he does not, he runs the risk of the benefit under Sec. 138 of the N.I Act being denied to him. That evidently would not have been the legislative intent. The legislature takes care of normal events and does not make the law to meet rare eventualities. The legislature must have felt that the expression “an account maintained by him” would normally cover all cases. A mischievous account holder if he retains a cheque leaf even after closure of the account to defraud an honest payee should not be permitted to go out of the net cast by Sec. 138 of the N.I Act. Such an interpretation would defeat the purpose of the statute. The same has to be avoided. Unless binding precedents are there which oblige the court to accept the interpretation canvassed by the learned counsel for the respondent/accused, this Court cannot be persuaded to accept that.
9. A controversy was raised earlier in law as to whether the dishonour of the cheque on the ground that the account is closed can be reckoned as one of the two reasons enumerated in Sec. 138 of the N.I Act. That controversy was laid to rest by the decision in NEPC Micon Ltd. case referred above. Of course, that decision does not deal specifically with cheques issued on accounts which were closed prior to the date of the issue of the cheque. No observation in NEPC Micon Ltd., indicates that such cases were intended to be taken out of the sweep of Sec. 138. of the N.I Act. In these circumstances, I do not find any reason to adopt the narrower interpretation which would not advance and would, in fact, defeat the legislative objects and purpose underlying the enactment of Sec. 138 of the N.I Act. According to me, the expression “an account maintained by him” must necessarily take in account (that was) maintained by him as also an account (that is) maintained by him.
10. There is yet another way of looking at the problem. A person like the accused in this case who closes the account with his bank but retains unused cheque leaves with him without surrendering the same to the bank must certainly be held to continue to maintain the account, at least for the purpose of Sec. 138 of the N.I Act, notwithstanding the fact that he had instructed his bank to close the account. It is the duty of every bank and every customer to insist and ensure that all unused cheque leaves are returned to the bank before the account maintained by him is Closed. Only when that happens can it be held that he has ceased to maintain the account with the bank. Until the last unused cheque leaf is returned or the non-return explained to the bank, it must be held that such account holder continues to maintain the account with the bank. This must be so at least for the purpose of Sec. 138 of the N.I Act. I get support for this reasoning from the observations made by Mr. Justice T.K Chandrashekhara Das of the Bombay High Court in para - 9 of the decision reported in Shivendra v. Adineo (1996 Cri. L.J 1816).
11. Thus, going by the observations in NEPC Micon Ltd., (cited supra) as well as the later decision of the Supreme Court in Goaplast (P) Ltd. v. Chico Ursula D'souza ((2003) 3 SCC 232), going by the language and in Sec. 138 of the N.I Act and drawing inspiration from observations of the Bombay High Court in the decision referred above. I have no hesitation to agree that a cheque issued by the accused on an account which he had maintained with the bank will continue to fall within the sweep of Sec. 138 of the N.I Act notwithstanding the fact that he had closed the account before the date of the cheque/issue of the cheque.
12. The learned counsel for the accused placed reliance on two decisions of the Kerala High Court. Both were rendered by the learned single Judges. In Japahari v. Priya (1993 (2) K.L.T 141) the following observations appear in paras - 5 and 8:
“5…… No doubt, if any person manages to issue a cheque without an account with the bank concerted its consequences would not snowball into the offence described under S. 138 of the Act. Such acts may amount to other offences. For the offence under Sec. 138 of the Act there must have been an account maintained by the drawer at the time the cheque was drawn….”.
“8…Of course, the complainant has to establish on the facts of this particular case that on the date the cheque was drawn petitioner had a live account with the bank concerned.”
13. In a later decision in Joseph… v. Philip Joseph…. (2000 (2) K.L.J 679) also, following the observations in Japahari's case (cited supra) and after taking note of the decision in NEPC Micon Ltd., (cited supra) a contrary view was taken. The corrections of the dictum in these cases was doubted and the matter was referred to a Division Bench. The Division Bench in the decision reported in Vathsan v. Japahari (2003 (3) KLT 972) has preferred the wider interpretation.
14. It is contended that these decisions have not been overruled by the Division Bench and continue to hold the field. Admittedly, on a reference made to it, the Division Bench had considered the very same question in the said decision. It is contended that both the decisions referred above though referred to in that decision have not been overruled. It is, in these circumstances, contended that the dictum in the said two decisions cannot be said to be overruled by the Division Bench.
15. I find no merit whatsoever in this contention. In para - 6 of the decisions in Vathsan (cited supra), the learned Judges of the Division Bench had, after thorough discussion, declared the law thus:
“6. So, we are of the view that (in) situations where cheques have been issued against an account, which has been closed prior to the date of drawal of the cheques, (such cheques) shall also come within the fold of Section 138 of the Act to attract criminal liability. The reference is answered accordingly”.
In view of the declaration of the law by the Division Bench, according to me, there can be no trace of doubt on the law applicable. The Division Bench after adverting to all the five decisions referred above had declared the law thus. There can hence be no doubt that the dictum in Japahari and Joseph (cited supra) do not any more hold the field.
16. Why then did the Division Bench not overrule the said decisions? Specific overruling was perhaps found to be not necessary in view of the clear declaration of the law. May be, the Division Bench must have felt that in cases where the account is not one maintained at all the accused, graver offences of deceit and cheating would be involved and they do not fall within the purview of Sec. 138 of the N.I Act. If ‘A’ who does not maintain any account with the bank gets hold of a cheque leaf issued to ‘B’ by his bank to operate his account and misleads ‘C’ to believe that the account is his and persuades him to accept such a cheque signed and issued by him, probably the offence committed is graver and Sec. 138 of the N.I Act will not at all apply in that situation. This is so inspite of the dictum laid down by decision of the Division Bench. Probably, Their, Lordships must have felt that the observations in para-5 of Japahari (cited supra) that “if a person manages to issue a cheque without an account with the bank concerned, its consequences would not snowball into the offence described under See. 138 of the Act” are to be preserved to that extent. I am unable to draw any other inference from the mere omission to specifically overrule Japahari and Joseph (cited supra) by the Division Bench.
17. In view of the clear declaration of law by the Division Bench, the acquittal of the accused in this case on the ground that the account was closed on 30-01-1990 long prior to the date/issue of the cheque on 23-12-1991 cannot be upheld. The challenge on that ground must succeed.
18. The learned Sessions Judge appears to have accepted the case of the accused that the cheque was not issued for the due discharge of any legally enforceable debt/liability. That the accused did maintain an account with the bank is admitted. That the cheque - Ext. P1 bears his signature is not disputed. That he had financial transactions earlier with the complainant is admitted clearly in the evidence trendered by the accused as D.W 3. The burden, in these circumstnaces, was undoubtedly heavy on the shoulders of the accused to rebut the presumption under Sec. 139 of the N.I Act. Has he done it? This is the next question to be considered.
19. The burden on an accused to rebut the presumption under Sec. 139 of the N.I Act must certainly be discharged by him. This burden, it is trite, and it has often been repeated, is not certainly as heavy and onerous as the initial paramount burden on the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The lesser/inferior yardstick/touchstone of proof by preponderance of possibilities and probabilities as in a civil case will alone be adopted while considering the case of the accused. But it is not suffucient if fanciful doubts are raised. His evidence will be tested/measured on the touchstone/yardstick of proof by preponderance of possibilities and probabilities as in a civil case.
20. According to the accused, he had issued the cheque to one Vijayan. That Vijayan has not been examined. To Vijayan the cheque was issued as security. That liability had been discharged. Still Vijayan did not return the cheque. Fanciful suggestions would not be sufficient. There must be tangible evidence to inspire the confidence of the court. That this defence was promptly raised in the reply to the notice of demand is by itself insufficient to tilt the scales. That a later cheque bearing No. 157386 (Ext. P1 cheque bears the No. 157380) was presented for encashment on 13-09-1998 cannot also be reckoned as final, conclusive or clinching. These are not sufficient to discharge the burden to rebut the presumption under Sec. 139 of the N.I Act.
21. The course of conduct adopted by the accused after receipt of the notice of demand is indeed relevant while considering whether his burden has been discharged. The said Vijayan has not been examined. No notice has been issued to the said Vijayan even after the accused came to know that the cheque handed over to Vijayan and which he pleaded was lost, was misused. Inaction/silence is eloquent and goes a long way to influence the court while considering the acceptability of the defence version advanced.
22. The conclusion appears to be inevitable that the accused has not discharged his burden under Sec. 139 of the N.I Act. The appellate court had gone wrong in accepting the plea of the accused and exonerating him of the allegations. Though conscious of the limited scope of the jurisdiction of this Court in an appeal against acquittal, I am satisfied that this is a fit case where the misdirection of the appellate court in law and on facts deserves appellate correction. The challenge succeeds.
23. Coming to the question of sentence, I have already adverted to the principles which should govern the imposition of sentence in a prosecution under Sec. 138 of the N.I Act in the decision reported in Anilkumar v. Shammy (2002 (3) K.L.T 852). The cheque for Rs. 11,000/- is dated 23/12/1991. Sec. 138 of the N.I Act was brought into the Statute Book only in 1988.1 am satisfied that imposition of a deterrent substantive sentence of imprisonment has no penological object to be achieved in a case like the instant one. An appropriate and lenient substantive sentence of imprisonment coupled with an appropriate restoratory direction under Sec. 357(3) of the Cr. RC. shall serve the interests of justice, I am convinced. In the result:
(a) This appeal is allowed.
(b) The impugned judgment of acquittal is set aside.
(c) The verdict of guilty and conviction by the trial court are restored.
(d) The accused is sentenced under Sec. 138 of the N.I Act to undergo imprisonment till the rising of the court.
(e) He is further directed to pay an amount of Rs. 17,500/- (Rupees Seventeen thousand and five hundred only) as compensation under Sec. 357(3) of the Cr. RC. and in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months. If realised, the entire amount shall be released to the complainant/appellant.
24. The learned Magistrate shall take necessary steps to execute the sentence hereby imposed. The accused/respondent shall appear and his sureties shall produce him before the learned Magistrate at 11 a.m on 01-04-2004 for execution of the sentence. Needless to say, the learned Magistrate shall be at liberty to invoke his powers under Sec. 446 of the Cr. P.C against the accused and his sureties if the accused does nto appear before the learned Magistrate as directed.
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