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Varkey Jacob Co. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax And Another

Kerala High Court
Apr 11, 2002
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (C.N. Ramachandran Nair, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, an unregistered dealer and lessee of a rubber estate, received a share of compensation (including interest) when the estate was acquired by the Government. The initial award was in March 1974 and an application for enhancement culminated in a judgment of this Court dated 28 January 1987. Pursuant to that judgment the petitioner filed returns admitting its share of the interest for assessment years 1979–80 to 1984–85. On receipt of returns dated 3 January 1990 the Assessing Officer initiated reassessment proceedings and completed assessments dated 30 October 1990 under section 143(3) read with a reference to section 147(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

The petitioner later contended that those returns were non est and that the Department lacked authority to complete reassessments under the then-applicable limitation of section 147(b) (four years). The Department conceded that the petitioner's case did not fall under the pre-amended section 147(a)/(b) but maintained that the reassessments were properly completed under the substituted (amended) section 147 effective 1 April 1989. The petitioner filed revision petitions under section 264 challenging the assessments; the Commissioner overruled objections, sustained the assessments (concluding the misquotation of section 147(a) was an obvious mistake and invoking section 292B to rule that misquotation did not invalidate the assessments), and found the assessments to be within the statutory time limits. The petitioner challenged the Commissioner's order (exhibit P13) before this Court by an original petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether assessments initiated after 1 April 1989 must be governed by the substituted (amended) section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, rather than the pre-amendment sub-clauses (a) and (b) of section 147.
  2. Whether the assessments completed by the Department are invalid because the Assessing Officer mistakenly quoted section 147(a) instead of the substituted section 147.
  3. Whether the taxpayer's returns filed after the final award (which admitted interest income) are "non est" returns such that the shorter limitation under the pre-amended section 147(b) would apply and invalidate the reassessments.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The returns filed long after the relevant assessment years are non est (of no legal effect) and should not be treated as valid returns for reopening assessments.
  • Because the petitioner treats those returns as non est, the appropriate provision for completing reassessments would be section 147(b) of the pre-amended Act (with a four-year limitation), and hence the reassessments are time-barred and should be cancelled.
  • The petitioner relied on authorities (including a Calcutta High Court decision and a Madras High Court decision) to argue that a subsequent reaffirmation by the Supreme Court that does not furnish new information does not constitute information to reopen an assessment under section 147(b).

Revenue's (Income-tax Department) Arguments

  • Sub-clauses (a) and (b) of the old section 147 are not relevant because they were omitted and replaced by a substituted section 147 effective 1 April 1989; thus assessments initiated after that date must be under the substituted section 147.
  • The Department did not proceed on the basis that the returns were treated as ordinary returns; instead, the Assessing Officer had "information" regarding escaped income (the admissions in the returns) and proceeded under section 147 as substituted.
  • The reference to section 147(a) in the assessment orders was a clerical or obvious mistake; section 292B of the Income-tax Act prevents invalidation of an order merely because the wrong section was cited, provided the officer had authority under the correct provision.
  • As a matter of law (relying on precedent), interest on enhanced compensation in land acquisition matters accrues year to year, so the filing of returns after the final award was consistent with that legal position and provided information for reassessment under the substituted section 147.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rama Bai v. CIT, [1990] 181 ITR 400 (SC) That interest on enhanced compensation in land-acquisition matters accrues year to year; filing returns after the final award can be consistent with that position. The Court relied on this settled position to treat the interest admitted in the petitioner's returns as income accruing year to year and as information that supported invoking the substituted section 147.
Peter John v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, [1986] 157 ITR 711 (Full Bench) Adopts the same view (as cited) that interest accrues year to year in such land-acquisition cases. The Court noted that the Full Bench had taken the same view and used that to support the conclusion that filing returns after the final award was consistent with established law.
L. Madanlal (Aluminium) P. Ltd. v. ITO, [1978] 115 ITR 293 (Calcutta HC) Under pre-amended section 147, a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court that merely reaffirms an earlier view (and does not lay down new information) does not by itself constitute "information" for reopening under section 147(b). The petitioner relied on this decision to argue against reopening; the Court acknowledged the authority but distinguished it on the basis that it arose under the pre-amended provisions and did not undercut the applicability of the substituted section 147 and the facts here.
CWT v. Varadharaja Theatres Pvt. Ltd., [2001] 250 ITR 523 (Madras HC) Used by the petitioner to contend that the amended provisions should not apply and that the pre-amendment section 147(b) is relevant. The Court recorded that the petitioner relied on this decision but concluded that the substituted section 147 (effective 1 April 1989) governed assessments initiated after that date and therefore the contention was not accepted.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeds in a step-by-step application of statutory timing, the content of the substituted provision, and the factual record:

  1. Substitution and Temporal Operation of Section 147:

    The Court observed that clauses (a) and (b) of the pre-amended section 147 are not retained in the substituted section 147 which came into force on 1 April 1989. The substituted section itself provides for completion of assessment and expressly contemplates pending assessments; thus, the form of section 147 in force at the date of initiation of proceedings governs the assessment process.

  2. Procedural Law Applicable on Date of Initiation:

    It is a settled procedural principle (as stated by the Court) that a procedural section authorising assessment must be in force on the date proceedings are initiated. Since the reassessment proceedings in this matter were initiated after 1 April 1989, the substituted section 147 applies.

  3. Content of the Returns and Existence of "Information":

    The petitioner filed returns admitting interest income after the final award. The Court treated those admissions as information regarding escaped income, not as the exercise of the returns regime such that the Assessing Officer was constrained to proceed under the pre-amendment subsection (b). The Assessing Officer was therefore entitled to issue notice under the substituted section 147.

  4. Limitation Period under the Substituted Section:

    Because there had been no prior assessment under section 143(3) for the relevant years, the limitation available to the Department under the substituted provision is ten years. The Court noted that, since the tax that would have been evaded for these years exceeded Rs. 50,000 for each year, notice could be issued within the ten-year period provided by the substituted section 147.

  5. Effect of Misquoting the Provision and Section 292B:

    The Assessing Officer's citation of "section 147(a)" in the assessment orders was treated as an obvious mistake. The Court relied on section 292B of the Income-tax Act (as applied by the Commissioner) to hold that mere misquoting of a statutory provision does not invalidate an assessment order where the officer had authority to issue the order under the correct provision.

  6. Interaction with Case Law Cited by the Parties:

    The Court accepted the revenue's reliance on authority that interest on enhanced compensation accrues year to year (Rama Bai and the Full Bench in Peter John) and treated the filing of returns after the final award as consistent with that principle. The petitioner’s reliance on pre-amendment authority (e.g., L. Madanlal) was noted but the Court found that the statutory substitution and the facts here (admission of income and initiation of proceedings after 1 April 1989) brought the matter within the substituted section 147's ambit.

  7. Conclusion of Analysis:

    Given that the Assessing Officer had information of escaped income, acted pursuant to the substituted section 147 (notwithstanding a clerical reference to 147(a)), and that the notice was within the ten-year limitation provided by the substituted provision, there was no scope to sustain the petitioner's challenge to the assessments or to set aside the Commissioner's decision under section 264.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The original petition is dismissed and there is no interference with the order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax under section 264; the Commissioner's sustention of the reassessments is upheld.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the reassessments completed by the Assessing Officer (dated 30 October 1990) stand validated and the petitioner's challenge based on application of pre-amendment section 147(a)/(b) and limitation under section 147(b) fails.
  • The Court accepted that a misquotation of the statutory provision (reference to section 147(a)) was an obvious mistake and that section 292B permits the order to remain valid where the officer had authority under the substituted provision actually applicable.
  • No broader or new precedent beyond this application's result is articulated by the Court; the decision applies the substituted section 147 to assessments initiated after 1 April 1989 and confirms the Assessing Officer's entitlement to proceed where the officer has information of escaped income and the substituted section's limitation is met. (The opinion does not purport to announce a novel principle of law beyond these applications.)
Show all summary ...

C.N Ramachandran Nair, J.:— The petitioner, an unregistered dealer, was the lessee of a rubber estate which was acquired by the Government. Consequent on the acquisition, the petitioner got a share of the compensation for the land acquired and consequent termination of lease. The initial award was in March, 1974. Thereafter there was a claim for enhancement of compensation which ended up in the judgment of this court on January 28, 1987. Pursuant to the said judgment, the petitioner returned the income received as interest by filing returns for the assessment years 1979–80 to 1984–85 admitting its share of interest awarded in the land acquisition case. The Assessing Officer on receipt of the returns dated January 3, 1990, initiated reassessment proceedings apparently by issuing notices under section 147(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. It may be noticed that the assessments were completed under section 143(3) read with section 147(a) of the Act. The impugned assessments are dated October 30, 1990. Even though the petitioner-filed returns offering to pay tax on the interest, the petitioner later felt that the Department is not authorised to complete the assessments on account of limitation for proceeding under section 147(b) of the Act which was only four years. According to the petitioner, its case is not one falling under section 147(a) of the Act and that is the position conceded by the Department also. Therefore, revision petitions were filed challenging the assessments before the first respondent under section 264 of the Act. The Commissioner overruled the objections of the petitioner and sustained the assessments under the amended provisions of section 147 of the Act which was introduced with effect from April 1, 1989. The Commissioner found that the section quoted as section 147(a) in the assessment is an obvious mistake and the assessments can only be under the amended provisions of section 147. Further, he has relied upon section 292B of the Act to hold that the assessments are not invalidated by the misquoting of the section. The Commissioner has gone into the period of limitation and on being satisfied, he has held that the assessments are completed within time. Thus, he has sustained the assessments. It is against the order of the Commissioner produced as exhibit P13, the petitioner has approached this court by filing this original petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India.

2. I have heard Mr. N. Srinivasan and Mr. M.P Abraham, learned counsel for the petitioners, and Mr. P.K.R Menon, learned senior Central Government standing counsel for the Income-tax Department.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that section 147(b) of the Act is the section that has to be applied for completion of the assessments because, according to him, the returns filed by the petitioner after so many years of the relevant assessments are non est returns not to be taken note of. According to him, the assessments completed have to be treated as orders under section 147(b) of the Act. In view of the limitation, he prays for cancellation of the orders on this basis. On the other hand, learned standing counsel for the Income-tax Department contended that sub-clauses (a) and (b) of section 147 of the Act have no relevance as the same are no longer available with effect from April 1, 1989, when the same was substituted by section 147 of the Act which provides new set of situation including the ground and limitation for completing the assessment.

4. The further contention of learned standing counsel is that the assessments are not completed on the basis of the returns, but the Department has taken note of the same informations for the purpose of proceeding under section 147. According to him, the Assessing Officer by mistake quoted section 147(a) instead of section 147. Besides this, section 292B of the Act provides the settled position of law that misquoting of any section cannot invalidate an order provided the officer passing the order has authority to issue the order under any other section. Now it is a settled position by virtue of the decision reported in Rama Bai v. CIT, [1990] 181 ITR 400 (SC) that interest on enhanced compensation in land acquisition matters accrues from year to year. In fact the filing of returns by the petitioner after the final award of compensation by this court is consistent with the law laid down by the Supreme Court. In fact the Full Bench of this court has taken the same view in Peter John v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, [1986] 157 ITR 711. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of the Calcutta High Court in L. Madanlal (Aluminium) P. Ltd. v. ITO, [1978] 115 ITR 293 and contended that the basis for the assessment that is the information based on which the assessment was completed was not intimated. That was of course a case under the pre-amended provision of section 147 of the Act wherein the Supreme Court has held that a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court which lays down no new information but reaffirms the view taken earlier does not itself constitute information for reopening the assessment under section 147(b) of the Act. The petitioner has also relied upon the decision of the Madras High Court in CWT v. Varadharaja Theatres Pvt. Ltd., [2001] 250 ITR 523 and contended that the amended provisions will not apply to the case and what is relevant is section 147(b) of the Act. On the other hand, learned standing counsel for the Income-tax Department has contended that section 147(a) and (b) are not retained for any purpose when the same was substituted by section 147 of the Act with effect from April 1, 1989, and therefore the petitioner cannot rely on section 147(a) and (b) of the Act which is no longer available in the statute. Therefore, the short question is whether the amended provision of section 147 or section 147(a) and (b) is to be taken for the purpose of assessment.

5. There is nothing provided in the said amended provision of section 147 to retain clauses (a) and (b) of section 147 for the purpose of assessment for the years prior to 1989–90 when the new provision came into force. Further, on going through section 147 of the Act in the substituted form, it is clear that all assessments initiated after April 1, 1989, have to be only under the said section and not under the repealed section. In fact section 147 introduced with effect from April 1, 1989, itself provides for completion of assessment and pending assessments. Further it is a settled position of law that a procedural section which provides for assessment has to be in force as on the date of initiation of the proceedings. In the circumstances, I feel that section 147 that is in force as on the date of initiation of the assessment has to be applied. The petitioner admitted escaped income by filing revised returns on the basis of which assessment was initiated. Since there was no prior assessment under section 143(3), limitation available for the Department is ten years. Since tax that would have been evaded for these years is more than Rs. 50,000 for each year, notice could be issued within ten years under the new section 147.

6. Therefore, I feel that the Commissioner is right in rejecting the contentions of the petitioner. The contention of the petitioner that returns are non est does not have any relevance because the returns are not treated as returns for the purpose of assessment. The Assessing Officer has got information regarding the escaped income and thereafter assessment was completed after issuing notice under section 147 though mistakenly quoted as section 147(a) of the Act. Section 147 of the Act authorises the Assessing Officer to make an assessment for charging the escaped income if the officer has reason for the same. In this case the assessment on the settled position of law is about the returned income which constituted information for invoking the amended provision of section 147 of the Act. When the Assessing Officer has sufficient reason for the assessment, there is no scope for examination as to whether the officer has proceeded under the amended provision of section 147 of the Act.

7. In the circumstances, I see no ground to interfere with the order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax under section 264 of the Act and the original petition is therefore dismissed.