- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Muneer
Structured Summary of the Opinion delivered by R. Basant, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The insurer is the appellant challenging the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal. The claimants are the father, mother and brother of a child aged about four years. The Tribunal awarded a total amount of Rs. 1,50,000 as compensation. It was recorded that the requisite leave under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act had been given to the insurer by the Tribunal. The appeal concerns whether the Tribunal's quantum of compensation is legally sustainable.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the multiplier method is an appropriate or safe method to quantify loss in the case of a very young child (about 4 years old) for the purpose of compensation.
- Whether, in a claim brought under Section 166/168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, courts can and should treat the structured formula in the Second Schedule under Section 163-A as a minimum guide (i.e., whether compensation awarded under Section 166/168 can be less than that which would be payable under Section 163-A).
- Whether the Second Schedule to Section 163-A is so riddled with errors, inaccuracies and mistakes that Section 163-A cannot be operated or enforced.
- Whether the insurer's challenge to the Tribunal's award of Rs. 1,50,000 merits admission / succeeds on the merits.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (Insurer)'s Arguments
- The insurer was aggrieved by the quantum and challenged the compensation fixed by the Tribunal (Rs. 1,50,000).
- It was argued that the multiplier method is not a safe method for quantification in the case of a young child; reliance was placed on United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ajith (2002 (3) KLT 330) to support the proposition that a global amount may be appropriate.
- The insurer contended that the Second Schedule is riddled with errors, inaccuracies and mistakes, and hence it is impossible to follow the Second Schedule to compute amounts payable under Section 163-A; reliance was placed on decisions including 1996 (2) KLT 218 (SC) and (2001) 5 SCC 175 to argue that Section 163-A cannot now be operated because the Schedule abounds in mistakes.
Claimants' Arguments
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the claimants' legal arguments. It is recorded that the claimants do not appear to have preferred any appeal against the Tribunal's award.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ajith (2002 (3) KLT 330) | Authority relied upon for the proposition that multiplier method is not a safe method for young/deceased persons and that a global amount may be payable. | The court held this decision may not assist here because the death in that case occurred before the 1994 amendment which introduced Section 163-A; thus it does not reflect post-amendment law governing the availability of the Second Schedule as a guide. |
| U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Trilok Chandra (1996 (2) KLT 218 (SC)) | Authority indicating that Section 163-A may safely be used as a guide to ascertain quantum even in claims under Section 166/168. | The court referenced the decision to support the proposition that, notwithstanding timing of an accident, Section 163-A's schedule can be used as a safe guide in assessing compensation under Section 166/168. |
| Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala ((2001) 5 SCC 175) | Holds that claims under Section 168 and Section 163-A are alternative and a claimant cannot claim both and ask for adjustment of amounts paid under one to the other; also noted perceived errors in the Second Schedule but did not declare Section 163-A unenforceable. | The court relied on this to explain that although claims under Section 168 and 163-A are alternative, that principle does not prevent a claimant who litigates under Section 166/168 from receiving at least the minimum guaranteed compensation that the Second Schedule under Section 163-A would provide. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeds in calibrated steps based on the statutory scheme and post-amendment context:
- The court observed that quantification of compensation for the loss suffered by parents of a minor child is especially difficult because many imponderables (future earning potential, special skills) cannot reliably be ascertained for a child of about four years. Consequently, the multiplier method is not a safe or reliable method in such cases.
- The court emphasised a significant change in law following the 1994 amendment to the Motor Vehicles Act by which Section 163-A (and its Second Schedule) was introduced. Even though the present claim is under Section 166/168, the court held that the schedule to Section 163-A may be reckoned as a safe guide while attempting to compute compensation payable under Section 166/168.
- The court contrasted burdens: a claimant under Section 163-A faces a much lighter burden (no requirement to prove negligence) than a claimant under Section 166/168. The object of Section 163-A is to expedite compensation by a structured formula, and the court held that courts must bear in mind the amount a claimant would have received under Section 163-A when deciding claims under Section 166/168.
- The court stated clearly that the quantum awarded under Section 166/168 should not be less than the amount which would have been payable under the structured formula of Section 163-A; denying that minimum would be unjust and contrary to the compassionate purpose of the statute.
- Applying the Second Schedule, the court treated the four-year-old deceased as a non-earning person within clause 6(a) of the Second Schedule (entry for persons up to 15 years). The court rejected the contention that only persons of "the age of earning" can be attributed notional income under the schedule, reasoning that the schedule explicitly covers persons up to 15 years and the legislative purpose accommodates non-earning minors.
- Using the schedule's structured table, the court showed that for persons up to 15 years a multiplier of 20 is reflected in the schedule and that, for a notional annual income of Rs. 15,000, the compensation figures in the Second Schedule yield a death compensation of Rs. 3,00,000 (with one-third deduction leading to Rs. 2,00,000 payable in the relevant scenario). The court contrasted this with the Tribunal's award of Rs. 1,50,000 and concluded that the Second Schedule gives a higher figure than the Tribunal award.
-
The court addressed and rejected the insurer's contention that the Second Schedule is riddled with errors making it unenforceable. The court acknowledged minor arithmetical or typographical discrepancies in certain entries but characterised them as innocuous and overlooking them would not impair operation of the scheme. It explained that:
- The multiplier column in clause 1 is irrelevant to death claims because the schedule itself specifies the amounts payable for death in the appropriate columns; the multiplier is more relevant to non-fatal/disability clauses.
- Some arithmetic anomalies exist but are not substantial enough to make the Second Schedule unreasonable or unenforceable; courts can correct or interpret minor errors and use averaging or the multiplier rationale where necessary.
- Perceived incongruities (e.g., distribution of income columns, absence of exact Rs. 15,000 column) are surmountable: courts may interpolate or average adjacent columns to reach a fair result.
- The court reiterated that it is not the role of the judiciary, in interpreting the statute, to invalidate or discard the legislative choices merely because some entries appear inelegant or contain minor imperfections. The statutory scheme must be given effect to wherever possible.
- Because the claimants did not challenge the award and did not appeal for enhancement, the court found it unnecessary to itself order enhancement; however, the insurer's challenge was without merit and the appeal did not deserve admission.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The appeal is dismissed in limine.
Immediate consequences and implications:
- The Tribunal's award of Rs. 1,50,000 stands as against the insurer's challenge; the insurer's appeal against the quantum is dismissed.
- The court concluded that, as a matter of law, when a claim is post-amendment the structured formula in the Second Schedule under Section 163-A can be used as a safe guide to ascertain minimum compensation even where the suit is framed under Section 166/168; ordinarily compensation under Section 166/168 should not be less than the amount payable under the structured formula of Section 163-A.
- The court rejected the contention that the Second Schedule is so defective as to render Section 163-A unenforceable: minor arithmetical or drafting errors do not invalidate the schedule and the statutory provision must be given effect.
- No enhancement was awarded by the appellate court because the claimants did not seek enhancement; the court noted that the Second Schedule would in fact yield a higher figure than the Tribunal award, but it did not itself enhance the award in the absence of a claim by the claimants.
- The decision clarifies appellate approach: courts should interpret and apply Section 163-A's structured formula where appropriate and should not lightly discard it for minor imperfections; however, the decision does not purport to strike down any provision nor to hold Section 163-A invalid.
No new statutory provision was declared invalid; the court interpreted existing law and applied established precedents. The court expressly dismissed the insurer's attack on the Second Schedule's enforceability and disposed of the appeal summarily.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
R. Basant, J.:— The insurer is the appellant. The insurer is aggrieved by the quantum of compensation paid to the claimants. The claimants are the father, mother and brother of a child aged about 4 years. The Tribunal had awarded a total amount of Rs. 1,50,000 as compensation. It is submitted at the bar that the requisite leave under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act was given to the insurer by the Tribunal.
2. The quantification of the compensation payable for the loss suffered by the parents of a minor child has been one of the vexing problems of law. There are so many imponderables. In the instant case the child was aged about 4 years. It is too early an age to ascertain the potentials of the child. It is too early to assess the capabilities, special skills etc. of the child. How then is the compensation to be assessed? The multiplier method is not a very safe one in such a case, it is trite. Reliance was placed on the decision reported in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ajith (2002 (3) KLT 330) in support of the proposition that the multiplier method is not a safe method and that only a global amount is payable. The decision reported in 2002 (3) KLT 330 may not be of any great help and assistance in resolving the challenge raised in this appeal. The death in the said case occurred on 3-2-1992 before the 1994 amendment of the Motor Vehicles Act came into force. Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act was not there on the statute book when the accident in 2002 (3) KLT 330 occurred. We are of opinion that there definitely has been a change in law after the amendment of the Motor Vehicles Act in 1994 by which Section 163-A was brought into the statute book. Of course this is not a claim under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. This claim is under Section 166/168 of the Motor Vehicles Act. But it is now trite that the schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act can be reckoned as a safe guide while attempting to compute compensation payable even under Section 166/168 of the Motor Vehicles Act. In the decision reported in U.P State Road Transport Corporation v. Trilok Chandra (1996 (2) KLT 218 (SC), the Supreme Court notwithstanding the fact that the accident in that case had taken place on 1-8-1977 long prior to the 1994 amendment, indicated that Section 163-A may safely be used as a guide for the purpose of ascertainment of the quantum of compensation even in a claim under Section 166/168 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
3. At the outset we must note that the burden under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act on a claimant is much less than on a claimant under Section 166/168 of the Motor Vehicles Act. No negligence need be proved in a claim under Section 163-A. The objects and reasons of the Amendment Act clearly reveal a yearning to avoid time consuming disputes and to make available compensation expeditiously as per a ready reckoner structured formula by a rough and ready method. This was the obvious motivation. We are of opinion that in respect of a post amendment accident even when the claim is raised under Section 166/168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the courts are obliged to bear in mind the quantum of compensation which the claimant would have received under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. We would and need only say that normally the quantum of compensation awarded under Section 166/168 of the Motor Vehicles Act can never be lesser than the amount payable under the structured formala under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. Merely because the claimant had wrongly quoted the Section as 166/168 of the Motor Vehicles Act and had not specifically claimed under Section 163-A, it would be unjust, unreasonable and improper to deny to the claimant the minimum compensation which would have been payable under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. A tribunal which has imbibed the compassion of the statute cannot perhaps resort to such a course.
4. In this view of the matter we hold that even in a claim under Section 166/168 of the Motor Vehicles Act the quantum of compensation cannot fall below the amount prescribed in the structured formula stipulated under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. Such an approach, we are satisfied, will only advance the legislative intent to make just and reasonable compensation available to victims of motor accidents expeditiously.
5. Of course it is now evident after the dictum in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala ((2001) 5 SCC 175) that the claims under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act and 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act are alternative and a claimant cannot claim under both with a prayer to adjust the amount paid under Section 163-A to his claim under Section 166/168. But that is far from saying that a claimant who has chosen to stake his claim under Section 166/168 of the Motor Vehicles Act cannot get the minimum guaranteed compensation under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. Of course it is true that the Legislature wanted to encourage persons to claim under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act to ensure that such persons would be paid just and reasonable compensation guaranteed under Section 163-A without the Tribunal/court being obliged to go into the claim in very great and meticulous detail. But even then we are of opinion that merely because a claimant had chosen to claim a higher amount under Section 166/168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, it may not be just and equitable to deny him the pre fixed compensation guaranteed under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act.
6. Going by the structured formula under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, it is evident that the deceased in this case - a four year old child, is one who had not started earning. A child aged 4 years according to us would certainly fall under the head of non earning persons under clause 6(a) of the 2nd schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act. We find no merit in the contention that a deceased person must be “of the age of earning” and then only the assumption of notional income under clause 6 of the schedule can be invoked. This approach is obviously incorrect as we find the first entry in clause 1 of the second schedule relates to “persons upto 15 years”. It is idle to assume that the legislature was not aware of the embargo against child labour in this country and had while fixing the quantum of compensation payable for persons upto 15 years of age assumed that such children would also be working and earning the income stipulated under the table in the second schedule. Obviously therefore the conclusion appears to be inevitable that non earning persons in entry 6(a) of the Second Schedule must take within its sweep all non earning persons - including children irrespective of the question whether they can at all be expected to earn at that age or not. According to us notional income can be pressed into service under the Second Schedule in cases where the persons concerned are not actually earning or have not reached the age of earning. In both cases the notional income under clause 6 of schedule 2 can be assumed. Any contra interpretation would stultify the purpose of Section 163-A and the laudable objectives which the amendment was intended to achieve. For all children Opto 15 years, compensation would be payable depending on their earnings if any or the notional income which they are assumed to earn. For persons aged upto 15 years and who earn (or are assumed to earn) Rs. 15,000, Rs. 3,00,000 is the compensation payable in respect of death as per the table in clause 1 of the Second Schedule. Out of this one third has to be reduced. In that event also Rs. 2 lakhs would be payable as compensation. In the instant case the compensation awarded is only Rs. 1,50,000. The claimants do not appear to have preferred any appeal. This appeal at the instance of the appellant/insurer does therefore, in these circumstances, deserve to be dismissed. The appeal does not deserve admission.
7. The learned counsel for the appellant insurer contends that the second schedule is riddled with errors, inaccuracies and mistakes. It is hence impossible to follow the second schedule to compute the amount payable under Section 163-A, it is urged. The, learned counsel relies on the observations in 1996 (2) KLT 218 (SC) and (2001) 5 SCC 175 to contend that Section 163-A cannot now be operated as the Schedule abounds in mistakes.
8. We are unable to accept this contention at all. In 1996 (2) KLT 218 (SC) the Supreme Court was dealing with a claim under Section 166/168 of the Motor Vehicles Act. It was not dealing with a claim under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. The language of Section 163 A must clearly show that Section 163-A cannot be operated without the second schedule. Section 163-A declares a new absolute statutory liability. The liability is on the owner or the insurer. For the first time, under Section 163-A, the insurer is made statutorily liable primarily. The language of the Section is of crucial significance. The policy of insurance is relevant only to ascertain the status of the authorised insurer as such insurer in respect of the vehicle. The liability is primarily on the insurer, The insurer is not directed to indemnify the insured. The very liability is placed on the shoulders of the authorised insurer. Significantly the driver is not made liable at all. The Section mandates that such owner or insurer shall be liable to pay the amounts stipulated in the Second Schedule. We only intend to note that without the second schedule Section 163-A cannot be operated. It is significant to note that no court has so far taken the view that Section 163-A deserves to be struck out of the statute book for the reason that it is unreasonable - on the ground that the Second Schedule abounds in mistakes. No arguments have been advanced before us that Section 163-A deserves to be set aside for the reason that it is grossly unreasonable and perverse. In (2001) 5 SCC 175 the Supreme Court had occasion to consider Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. The said decision shows that though the Supreme Court perceived that some errors/inaccuracies in the Second Schedule deserve to be corrected, the Supreme Court did not say the Section 163-A is null and unenforceable on the ground of unreasonableness. Certainly therefore Section 163-A remains on the statute book and the same has to be given effect to.
9. What are the errors, inadequacies and imperfections in the Second Schedule? Firstly it is contended that the multipliers given in the second column of the table in clause 1 do not justify the quantum of compensation fixed in the event of death. We are of opinion that this is obviously a mistaken impression. A reading of the second schedule as a whole shows that the multiplier shown in the 2nd column of the table is irrelevant while ascertaining the compensation payable in respect of death. In respect of death, compensation payable for various age groups and income groups are stipulated specifically in the subsequent columns. The Tribunals/Courts do not themselves have to apply the multiplier method. One has to ascertain the age group. Then one has to go to the particular entry relating to that age group. The relevant monthly income group has to be ascertained in the columns. Once it is ascertained there is specific entry of the compensation payable in “Rupees in thousands”. The entries in the second column under the head ‘Multiplier’ are intended to be taken into account only when the quantum of compensation payable in respect of non-fatal accidents under clause 5a and b of the second Schedule is taken up for consideration. Perhaps the error is in showing the multiplier in column 2 of the table, instead of showing the same under clause 5. This is the only mistake as far as we can ascertain in respect of the multiplier shown in column 2 of the table in clause 1 of schedule 2.
10. We then come to the criticism that the quantum payable has not been reasonably fixed. If we consider the amount in thousands specified in the remaining columns of entry 1 of the second schedule, we can say that a method has been followed. It is perhaps possible to identify the multiplier which the legislature adopted to compute the quantum of compensation payable in the case of death. In respect of persons aged upto 15 years, 20 is the multiplier adopted. This is evident from 60 thousand stipulated as compensation for persons whose annual income is Rs. 3000 and Rs. 800 thousand stipulated for persons whose annual income is Rs. 40000. Similarly for entries 2 and 3 in the table i.e for persons aged 15 to 20 years, and for persons of 20 to 25 years 19 and 18 are the respective multipliers adopted to fix the compensation payable. For all such entries for the various age groups it is thus possible to ascertain the method followed by the legislature. The following table will make the position very clear. We make use of the first and the last columns of persons earning Rs. 3000 and Rs. 40000 per year to ascertain the multiplier which the legislature had in mind while fixing the quantum of compensation payable for death.
Age group Annual Income of Rs. 3000 Annual income of Rs. 40,000 Multiplier reckoned by the legislature Upto 15 years 60,000 (3000 × 20) 800000 (40000 × 20) 20 15-20 years 57,300 (3000 × 19) 760000 (40000 × 19) 19 20-25 years 54,000 (3000 × 18) 720000 (40000 × 18) 18 25-30 years 51,000 (3000 × 17) 680000 (40000 × 17) 17 30-35 years 50,000 minimum 640000 (40000 × 16) 16 35-40 years 50,000 minimum 600000 (40000 × 15) 15 40-45 years 50,000 minimum 560000 (40000 × 14) 14 45-50 years 50,000 minimum 480000 (40000 × 12) 12 50-55 years 50,000 minimum 400000 (40000 × 10) 10 55-60 years 50,000 minimum 320000 (40000 × 8) 8 60-65 years 50,000 minimum 240000 (40000 × 6) 6 Above 65 years 50,000 minimum 200000 (40000 × 5) 5
11. Of course we note that there are some minor discrepancies/arithmetical errors in the following instances.
Age group Income group Amount shown Actual amount that ought to be shown 15-20 years 5400 102 102.6 (5400 × 19) 45-50 years 24000 286 288 (24000 × 12) 55-60 years 36000 286 288 (36000 × 8)
12. These are obvious innocuous errors and can certainly be overlooked.
13. The error is in the courts assuming that the multiplier in column 2 of the table is necessary to identify the quantum of compensation payable in respect of death of victims. In respect of death of victims the multiplier method need not be followed by the court as the legislature in the structured formula (table) in the second schedule has specified the amount itself.
14. The next contention is that it is preposterous that in the case of death a higher multiplier is used and in the case of permanent disability a lesser multiplier is used. This of course is the case in respect of the following age groups.
Age group Multiplier for permanent disability Multiplier for death 1 to 15 years 15 20 15 to 20 years 16 19 20 to 25 years 17 18 60 to 65 years 5 6
15. For two age groups ie 55-60 years and ‘above 65 years’ the multiplier adopted for death and permanent disability is the same ie 8 and 5 respectively. For all other age groups the multiplier stipulated for permanent disability is higher than the multiplier accepted for death. To question the rationale, wisdom and the philosophy of the legislature is not certainly the function of the courts while interpreting statutory provisions. We make it clear that we are not attempting to subject the statutory provision to judicial review. But are only attempting to interpret the legislative stipulations. We must remind ourselves that the Supreme Court has never said that Section 163-A is null and unenforceable for the reason that the table in the second schedule is grossly unreasonable and perverse. We are of the opinion that it is not necessary for us exercising appellate jurisdiction under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act to question the wisdom of the legislature in prescribing higher multipliers in respect of death of victims of certain age groups than the multiplier fixed for permanent disability of such groups.
16. If Rs. 15000 is to be assumed as the notional annual income for non earning persons, why does the second schedule give 9 columns to cover cases of persons earning less than Rs. 15000 per annum? This question is posed with great fervour. This might appear at the first blush to be unnecessary and superfluous. But we must alertly note that at least theoretically the notional income is of persons who are “non earning persons”. If a person is actually earning, actual earning can be reckoned. Will anyone admit that he is earning less if his earning is less than Rs. 15000 per annum, it is queried. We need only mention that it is not only admissions which would be relevant. An opposite party can always show that a person was not a non-earning person but was an earning person and was actually earning below Rs. 15000 per annum. Of course it is difficult to understand why the benefit given to non earning persons cannot be extended to all persons including those who earn less than Rs. 15,000 per annum. But at any rate this alleged incongruity cannot persuade us to hold that Section 163-A cannot be worked and the quantum payable cannot be ascertained from the second schedule.
17. It is contended that for non earning persons Rs. 15000 per annum is the notional income assumed. For the surviving spouse of such a person only one third of the income can be assumed notionally. This is perverse, it is contended. We find no merit in this contention also. According to us all spouses who are non earning persons can be assumed to earn Rs. 15000 per annum. Clause 6(b) would come into operation only if the annual income earned by the surviving spouse exceeds Rs. 45000. The assumption is in respect of the non earning spouse. The notional income of such spouse can be assumed at one third of the income of the surviving earning spouse, only when this works out to the advantage of the non earning spouse. Only if the said spouse can claim more than Rs. 15000 per annum as his notional income under clause 6(b), will this clause come into play at all. That again is therefore not a defect which can lead us to the conclusion that the second schedule is unreasonable and perverse.
18. If Rs. 15,000 per annum is the notional income, why is not that reckoned as a relevant income group in the table (structured formula). After Rs. 12,000 per annum, the next column is only Rs. 18000 per annum. This is of course unfortunate. Rs. 15000 being the assumed notional income of a non-earning person, in fairness and in the fitness of things, there must have been a relevant column for persons earning that income in the table (structured formula). But the omission is of no crucial significance as it is always possible to arrive at the relevant quantum of compensation for death payable by taking into account the relevant multiplier ascertained already or by working out the average between the compensation fixed for persons having the annual income of Rs. 12000 and Rs. 18000. That again is not hence a defect or deficiency which can persuade us to ignore or jettison the Second Schedule.
19. Each entry in column No. 1 of the Schedule prescribes a range of age upto 15 years, above 15 not exceeding 20 years etc. But similar stipulation is not made when we consider the annual income. Specific amounts (and not range) are prescribed in each column. If a person's income is between the two specified income, how do we ascertain the quantum of compensation payable for death? This question need not also detain us any longer as it is always possible to ascertain the quantum by arriving at the proper multiplier indicated above or by taking the average between the two adjacent specified income groups. Of course it would have been better if the range were specified in each column. But that inelegance or imperfection is again not sufficient to discard the second schedule. The above discussions lead us to the conclusion that the second schedule does not suffer from any vice which can persuade a court to ignore or discard the second schedule altogether. The courts cannot throw their hands up in helplessness merely because of inelegance or seeming imperfections in the statute. Statutory interpretation is both an act and a science. It would be improper to develop cold feet and to lose sight of the destination when one comes across such surmountable obstructions. The quantum of compensation payable under Section 163-A can thus certainly be ascertained and granted. It does in the instant case far exceed Rs. 1,50,000. The claimants having not chosen to challenge the award and to claim enhancement of compensation, it is not necessary for us in this appeal to consider the question whether the amount awarded deserves enhancement. At any rate the challenge by the insurer against the quantum is without any merit.
20. In the result this appeal is dismissed in limine.
Alert