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Sadanandan v. Pradeepan & Ors.

Kerala High Court
May 25, 2001
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act — Sec. 20 Revision)

Factual and Procedural Background

The revision petitioner is Respondent No. 5 in R.C.P. 31 of 1994 before the Rent Control Court, Kuthuparamba, and seeks revision under Sec. 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act. The original owner of the building was Dr. Vijayan, who let the building to Kumaran (predecessor-in-interest of respondents 1 to 4) under Ext. A2. Kumaran sublet the building to the present revision petitioner (the alleged sub-tenant).

Dr. Vijayan issued a notice dated 3-10-1986 (Ext. A4) under the proviso to Sec. 11(4)(i) calling upon the tenant to evict the sub-tenant but did not initiate eviction proceedings. Later, by Ext. A3 dated 9-2-1994, Dr. Vijayan assigned the building to the present landlord (respondent No. 1). The assignee-landlord issued a notice under the proviso to Sec. 11(4)(i) and filed a petition for eviction under Sec. 11 (including sub-sections (2), (4)(i) and (4)(v)). The Rent Control Court found the revision petitioner to be an unauthorized sub-tenant, found rent in arrears and that the tenant had ceased occupation for over six months, and ordered eviction under Sec. 11(2), 11(4)(i) and 11(4)(v). The sub-tenant alone appealed; the Appellate Authority affirmed the Rent Control Court's findings and dismissed the appeal. The sub-tenant then filed the present revision under Sec. 20 challenging the Appellate Authority's decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the eviction application filed under Sec. 11(4)(i) of the Rent Control Act is barred by limitation (specifically Art. 137 of the Limitation Act) because a prior notice had been issued by the previous landlord in 1986.
  2. Whether the assignee-landlord (who received the property from Dr. Vijayan) could maintain the eviction application — i.e., whether a landlord can "assign" a right to sue to evict or whether the transfer of property carried the right to sue.
  3. Whether the Rent Control Court's and Appellate Authority's finding that the revision petitioner was a sub-tenant (and not a direct tenant) was sustainable on the evidence.
  4. Whether, once subletting is found, an order for eviction under Sec. 11(4)(v) can also be maintained (raised but not decided conclusively in this opinion).

Arguments of the Parties

Revision Petitioner / Appellant (sub-tenant) — Mr. Sohan

  • Contended that the eviction application under Sec. 11(4)(i) was barred by limitation under Art. 137 of the Limitation Act because Dr. Vijayan had earlier issued a notice on 3-10-1986 and no eviction application followed within three years of that notice.
  • Argued that a landlord cannot assign a right to sue, implying that Dr. Vijayan could not transfer a right to evict under Sec. 11(4)(i) to the assignee (i.e., the present landlord/respondent No. 1).
  • Challenged the factual finding that there had been no surrender by Kumaran and no fresh lease/attornment in favour of the revision petitioner, asserting that he had become a direct tenant under Dr. Vijayan.
  • Contended that once subletting is found, the Rent Control Court could not pass an eviction order under Sec. 11(4)(v) (this ground was raised but not pursued to finality by the Court).

Respondents / Landlord (assignee)

  • Relied on the assignment of the property from Dr. Vijayan (Ext. A3 dated 9-2-1994) and the subsequent notice issued by the assignee-landlord under the proviso to Sec. 11(4)(i) as giving a fresh cause of action and a right to apply for eviction under the Rent Control Act.
  • Maintained that the subletting was unauthorized, that no reliable evidence existed of a surrender by Kumaran and a fresh lease to the revision petitioner, and that the Rent Control Court and Appellate Authority rightly found the revision petitioner to be a sub-tenant.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gopalan v. Aboobacker, 1995 (2) KLT 205 Illustrates application of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act (condonation of delay) with reference to Sec. 29(2) Limitation Act and the period prescribed for appeal under Sec. 18 of the Rent Control Act. The Court noted the decision to explain that where special law prescribes a period for appeal, Sec. 5 Limitation Act may apply to condone delay; used to distinguish why Sec. 29(2) of the Limitation Act is not attracted here because the Rent Control Act prescribes no period of limitation for initiating eviction proceedings (only for appeals).
Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P. Kunhaliumma, (1976) 4 SCC 634 : AIR 1977 SC 282 Holds that Art. 137 of the Limitation Act governs applications to a civil court and, by extension, to courts constituted under special enactments (i.e., residuary application of Art.137). The Court considered this authority but held it inapplicable to the present question because the Rent Control Court under the Rent Control Act is not a "civil court" in the strict sense; therefore the ratio in T.P. Kunhaliumma could not be used to apply Art.137 to proceedings initiated before the Rent Control Court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a series of legal and factual analyses, explaining why each of the revision petitioner's principal contentions failed:

  1. Procedural admissibility of the limitation plea:

    The Court observed that the limitation objection (Art. 137) was not raised before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority. It emphasised that limitation in this context is a mixed question of fact and law and that the failure to raise it earlier militates against permitting it to be raised for the first time in revision under Sec. 20. For that reason alone the Court was disinclined to admit the point; nonetheless, because it was argued, the Court proceeded to consider it on merits.

  2. Whether Art. 137 applies to proceedings before the Rent Control Court:

    The Court recognised that Art. 137 is a residuary article and that the Supreme Court in T.P. Kunhaliumma applied Art. 137 to applications to civil courts and to proceedings under special enactments. However, it concluded that the Rent Control Court (appointed under Sec. 3 of the Rent Control Act) is not a "civil court" in the strict sense and that there is controversy about whether it is a court or a persona designata. Consequently, the Court rejected the application of T.P. Kunhaliumma to hold that Art. 137 applies to the initiation of proceedings before the Rent Control Court. (The Court noted that a different view may obtain when executing an eviction order because Sec. 14 creates a fiction leading to approach to the Munsiff's Court.)

  3. Recurring cause of action in subletting cases:

    The Court analysed the nature of a landlord's right when subletting is involved, describing it as a recurring cause of action: "Every moment the objectionable sub-tenancy continues, the landlord gets a right to apply for eviction" after complying with the proviso to Sec. 11(4)(i). There is nothing in the Rent Control Act to extinguish that right merely because a prior landlord issued a notice and did not follow it by filing an eviction application. Therefore, the earlier notice by Dr. Vijayan did not bar the assignee-landlord from issuing his own notice and filing a fresh eviction application; the assignee's notice gave a fresh cause of action which the assignee-landlord pursued within three years of his notice (and no allegation was made that he failed to do so).

  4. Assignment of property vs. assignment of right to sue:

    The Court rejected the submission that a landlord cannot assign a right to sue. It distinguished between a mere assignment of the right to sue (which might be suspect) and an absolute transfer/conveyance of the property. Because Dr. Vijayan had conveyed the property absolutely to the assignee, all rights incidental to ownership passed to the transferee, including the right to seek eviction under the Rent Control Act. Thus the assignee-landlord was entitled to invoke statutory remedies after fulfilling the statutory preconditions.

  5. Assessment of the evidence on surrender/fresh lease:

    The Court reviewed the record (subject to the recognized limits of revisional jurisdiction) and agreed with the two courts below that there was no reliable or acceptable evidence to prove that Kumaran had surrendered the tenancy to Dr. Vijayan and that Dr. Vijayan had thereafter executed a fresh lease in favour of the revision petitioner. The Court found the revision petitioner's oral, interested testimony insufficient to establish surrender and re-entrustment/attornment. Consequently, the revision petitioner remained a sub-tenant and not a direct tenant of the landlord.

  6. Other grounds of eviction (Sec. 11(4)(v)):

    The revision petitioner argued that once subletting is found, an order under Sec. 11(4)(v) should not be passed. The Court noted this is an interesting question but held it unnecessary to decide in the present case. It indicated that once eviction under Sec. 11(4)(i) (subletting) is sustained, the sub-tenant's ability to challenge other grounds becomes of limited utility and thus the point need not be pursued further.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that the revision petition did not disclose any ground to admit it and accordingly dismissed the revision.

Implications and direct consequences:

  • The Rent Control Court's order of eviction under Sec. 11(2), Sec. 11(4)(i) and Sec. 11(4)(v) as affirmed by the Appellate Authority stands against the revision petitioner (the sub-tenant).
  • The Court rejected the limitation defence based on an earlier notice by the prior landlord and held that the assignee-landlord's notice and subsequent application gave a fresh cause of action; therefore the eviction application was not barred by Art. 137 of the Limitation Act in the circumstances of this case.
  • The Court held that an absolute transfer of property passes the attendant rights to the transferee, so this was not a case of a mere assignment of a right to sue.
  • The Court did not purport to lay down a broad, novel precedent on every theoretical issue raised (for example, the detailed interplay between Sec. 11(4)(i) and Sec. 11(4)(v) when subletting is found). The opinion confined itself to the facts and issues raised and therefore does not establish an expansive new legal principle beyond its factual holdings.

If more detailed source documents (pleadings, evidence, lower court judgments) are required, they were not included in the provided opinion and are therefore not summarized here.

Show all summary ...

Balasubramanyan, J.:— Respondent No. 5 in R.C.P 31 of 1994 on the file of the Rent Control Court, Kuthuparamba is the petitioner in this revision filed under Sec. 20 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act. The landlord of the building, respondent No. 1 herein, filed the application for eviction under sub-sections (2), (4)(i), (4)(ii) and (4)(v) of Sec. 11 of the Act. The application was allowed by the Rent Control Court by ordering eviction under sub-sections (2), (4)(i) and (4)(v) of Sec. 11 of the Act. An appeal filed by the revision petitioner herein, who was found to be a sub-tenant by the Rent Control Court, was dismissed by the Appellate Authority. It is challenging the decision of the Appellate Authority that this revision is filed by the person found to be a subtenant.

2. The building belonged to one Dr. Vijayan. It was let out by Dr. Vijayan under Ext. A2 Kychit to one Kumaran, the predecessor in interest of respondents 1 to 4 before the Rent Control Court. It appears that the building was sublet by Kumaran to the present revision petitioner, impleaded as respondent No. 5 before the Rent Control Court. Dr. Vijayan thereupon issued a notice, Ext. A4, dated 3-10-1986 in terms of the proviso to Sec. 11(4)(i) of the Act calling upon the tenant to evict the sub-tenant. Dr. Vijayan did not initiate any steps as such for eviction under Sec. 11(4)(i) of the Act. Subsequently, under Ext. A3, dated 9-2-1994 Dr. Vijayan assigned the building to the present landlord, who is respondent No. 1 before us. That landlord issued a notice in terms of the proviso to Sec. 11(4)(i) of the Act and followed it up by a petition for eviction, inter alia under Sec. 11(4)(i) of the Act. He impleaded the sub-tenant as respondent No. 5 before the Rent Control Court. Respondents 1 to 4, the legal heirs of Kumaran, did not seriously challenge the right of the landlord. But, respondent No. 5, the alleged subtenant, raised a contention that though he was originally let into possession by Kumaran, subsequently he, along with Kumaran, had approached the landlord Dr. Vijayan and Kumaran, had surrendered the tenancy to Dr. Vijayan and Dr. Vijayan had orally leased out the building to respondent No. 5, the revision petitioner. Therefore, the revision petitioner was a direct tenant under Dr. Vijayan. Necessarily the Rent Control Court looked for evidence of this surrender by Kumaran and a fresh entrustment in favour of the present revision petitioner. Before the Rent Control Court there was no reliable or acceptable evidence regarding the surrender by Kumaran, set up by the revision petitioner, and a fresh lease in favour of the revision petitioner. Thus, the Rent Control Court found that the landlord was entitled to have an order for eviction/under Sec. 11(4)(i) of the Act in view of the fact that the revision petitioner was a sub-tenant and that sub-tenancy was not one authorised by the lease or one created with the consent of the landlord. The Rent Control Court also found that rent was in arrears. It further found, in view of this conclusion, that the sub-tenant was in occupation and that the tenant had ceased to occupy the building for a period exceeding six months. Thus, the Rent Control Court ordered eviction under sub-sections (2), (4)(i) and (4)(v) of Sec. 11 of the Act.

3. The sub-tenant alone appealed. His right to challenge the order under Sec. 11(2) of the Act and under Sec. 11(4)(v) of the Act depended upon his establishing that he was not a sub-tenant as found by the Rent Control Court, but he was a direct tenant under Dr. Vijayan, the previous landlord. The Appellate Authority scrutinised the pleadings and the evidence in that regard and came to the conclusion that the Rent Control Court was justified in holding that the revision petitioner, the appellant before the Appellate Authority, was a sub-tenant and not a direct tenant under the landlord as claimed by him. In view of that finding, the Appellate Authority agreed with the Rent Control Court in ordering eviction under Sec. 11(4)(i) of the Act. The Appellate Authority also found that there was no reason to interfere with the orders under sub-sections (2) and (4)(v) of Sec. 11 of the Act. Thus, the Appellate Authority dismissed the appeal.

4. Challenging the decision of the Appellate Authority, learned counsel for the sub-tenant Mr. Sohan argued that the application for eviction under Sec. 11(4)(i) of the Act was barred by limitation. We may notice here that no such contention was raised either before the Rent Control Court or before the Appellate Authority. We are not quite sure whether, in such a situation, this court could permit such a question to be raised in exercise of its jurisdiction under Sec. 20 of the Act. A question of limitation cannot be said to be a pure question of law in that sense. It is essentially a mixed question of fact and law and the fact that no such point was raised before the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority will stand in the way of the revision petitioner raising such a question for the first time in revision.

5. In the circumstances of the case, we are not satisfied that we should permit such a question to be raised for the first time in this revision. Since the point was argued before us, we may also deal with for completion. What is argued is that Dr. Vijayan, the prior landlord, had issued a notice under the proviso to Sec. 11(4)(i) of the Act on 3-10-1986 and no application having been filed within three years of that date, the application for eviction must be held to be barred under Art. 137 of the Limitation Act. The Rent Control Act does not prescribe any period of limitation for making an application for eviction under that Act. But, it does prescribe a period of limitation for filing an appeal. At the same time it does not prescribe a period of limitation for filing a revision under Sec. 20 of the Act. In Gopalan v. Aboobacker (1995 (2) KLT 205), the Supreme Court held, with reference to Sec. 29(2) of the Limitation Act and the period prescribed for the appeal under Sec. 18 of the Act, that Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act would apply and hence the Appellate Authority under the Rent Control Act had the jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing an appeal before it. Mr. Sohan argued that in the light of the provision under Sec. 29(2) of the Limitation Act and the ratio of the decision in Gopalan's case, it must be held that Art. 137 of the Limitation Act would also govern an application for eviction under the Rent Control Act. As we have noticed, no period of limitation is prescribed by the special law for making of an application for eviction under the Rent Control Act. Therefore, there is no question of Sec. 29(2) of the Limitation Act being attracted.

6. Then the question is whether Art. 137 of the Limitation Act could be applied in a case where a claim for eviction is made under the Rent Control Act by filing an application under Sec. 11 of that Act. Art. 137 of the Limitation Act is a residuary article. It has been held by the Supreme Court in Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P Kunhaliumma ((1976) 4 SCC 634 : AIR 1977 SC 282) that any application to a civil court, whether it be under the Code of Civil Procedure or under a special enactment like the Indian Telegraph Act, is governed by Art. 137 of the Limitation Act. The question is whether Art. 137 of the Limitation Act would apply to a Rent Control Court, notified under Sec. 3 of the Act. Sec. 3 provides for appointment of the Rent Control Court by a notification as a person entitled to exercise jurisdiction over a particular local area. There is considerable controversy whether a Rent Control Court is a “court” or merely “persona designata”. In any event, the Rent Control Court is not a “civil court” in the strict sense of the term on the scheme of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. We are, therefore, of the view that the decision of the Supreme Court in T.P Kunhaliumma's case cannot be applied to hold that Art. 137 of the Limitation Act would apply to initiation of a proceeding before the Rent Control Court. Of course, in execution of an order for eviction, in view of the fiction enacted by Sec. 14 of the Act, it is the Munsiff's Court that is approached and different considerations would apply.

7. We are also of the view that where a subletting is involved, the landlord gets a cause of action, which can only be described as a recurring clause of action. Every moment the objectionable sub-tenancy continues, the landlord gets, a right to apply for eviction under the Act after complying with the requirement of the proviso to Sec. 114)(i) of the Act. There is nothing in the Act which provides for the extinguishment of the right, once a notice under the proviso is issued, but it is not followed up by a petition for eviction. The objectionable subletting does not become an authorised subletting by that process. The right to apply for eviction will continue so long as the objectionable subletting subsists. Therefore, merely because Dr. Vijayan issued a notice and did not pursue the same by filing an application for eviction under Sec. 11(4)(i) of the Act, it cannot lead to the position that the assignee landlord cannot initiate action under Sec. 11(4)(i) of the Act. Nor can the objectionable subletting be deemed to be an authorised subletting in the absence of any other conduct or happening. That aspect, of course, is not relevant while considering the question of limitation. In this case, the assignee-landlord, in his turn, issued a notice in terms of the proviso to Sec. 11(4)(i) of the Act calling upon the tenant to abate the sub-tenancy. The tenant did not put an end to the sub-tenancy. This gave the assignee-landlord a fresh cause of action for applying for eviction under Sec. 11(4)(i) of the Act. There is no case that the assignee-landlord had not filed the application for eviction within three years of the notice issued by him in terms of the proviso to Sec. 11(4)(i) of the Act even if that is necessary. We may notice here that the issuance of a notice under the proviso to Sec. 11(4)(i) of the Act and the failure of the tenant to put an end to the subletting is a condition precedent for applying for eviction under Sec. 11(4)(i) of the Act on the ground of subletting. Therefore, a right had accrued to the assignee-landlord on his issuing a notice in terms of the proviso to Sec. 11(4)(i) of the Act and on the tenant failing to put an end to the sublease. In that situation, in any event, the assignee-landlord has made his application within three years of the notice issued by him. Therefore, the contention sought to be raised by Mr. Sohan on the basis of Art. 137 of the Limitation Act does not carry him far in this case. We are, therefore, satisfied that the application for eviction under Sec. 11(4)(i) of the Act cannot be held to be barred by limitation.

8. Mr. Sohan then argued that a landlord cannot assign a right to sue and Dr. Vijayan, the prior landlord, could not assign a right to evict under the Rent Control Act with reference to Sec. 11(4)(i) of the Act. When the property itself is conveyed by a person to another, all rights that are incidental to such transfer, pass to the transferee and that transferee is entitled to work out his rights or seek remedies on the basis of the right over the property and the attendant rights that are conveyed to him by the transfer. This is not a case where Dr. Vijayan merely assigned the right to evict and retained the ownership of the building with himself. This is a case where Dr. Vijayan transferred the property absolutely to the assignee. In that situation, it is not possible to accept an argument that this is merely an assignment of the right to sue. Moreover, as we have observed, having taken an assignment of the property, the assignee-landlord had acquired a right to invoke the Rent Control Act. In that situation, when he found that there was a subletting which was not authorised by the lease, he was certainly entitled to seek eviction on the grond provided for by the Rent Control Act, in that behalf after complying with the statutory requirements. This is what the assignee-landlord has done. We, therefore, overrule the argument of Mr. Sohan that this was a case of an assignment of a right to sue simpliciter.

9. Mr. Sohan could not make much head-way in his challenge to the findings of the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority that the revision petitioner has failed to prove that there was a surrender of the lease by Kumaran and there was a fresh lease in favour of the revision petitioner after Kumaran had let him into possession. Even if we forget for a moment our limitations in revisional jurisdiction and re-appreciate the pleadings and the evidence, we would not be able to find that the said findings rendered by the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority is in any manner incorrect. In fact, on the materials it will be impossible to find that there had been a surrender by Kumaran and a fresh lease in favour of the revision petitioner or a fresh attornment by the revision petitioner after he was let into possession by the tenant, Kumaran. The interested oral evidence of the revision petitioner is clearly insufficient to find such a case. It is, therefore, clear that the status of the revision petitioner is only that of a sub-tenant. The sub-tenancy having been created not as authorised by the lease or with the consent of the landlord, the order for eviction under Sec. 11(4)(i) of the Act is fully justified. Mr. Sohan sought to raise a contention that once a subletting is found, the Rent Control Court could not pass an order for eviction under Sec. 11(4)(v) of the Act. That is an interesting aspect which, infact, has troubled us on more occasion than one. But for the purpose of this case, we find that it is not necessary to go into that question and once an order for eviction under Sec. 11(4)(i) of the Act on the ground of subletting is confirmed, the right of the sub-tenant to question the order for eviction on other grounds becomes highly suspect. Infact, going by the view taken by this court, he may not be entitled to challenge the order against the tenant on those grounds. In that situation, we do not think it necessary to pursue this aspect further.

10. Thus, we are satisfied that no grounds are made out for admitting this revision. We, therefore, dismiss the same.