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Dhanapalan v. Commissioner Of Income Tax

Kerala High Court
Aug 22, 2001
Smart Summary (Beta)

Judgment Summary — Kurian Joseph, J.

Source: Judgment concerning the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme (Finance Act, 1998), decision by Kurian Joseph, J. The following summary is strictly confined to information contained in the provided opinion text.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petition arises under the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998 (introduced in the Finance Act, 1998), and concerns whether a taxpayer's proceedings were "pending" for the purpose of entitlement to benefits under S.95(i)(c) of the Scheme. The petitioner is an assessee whose assessments for the years 1980-81 to 1984-85 led to appeals disposed of on 24.12.1985. A revision petition (Ext. P1) was filed on 16.1.1990 with a condonation petition for delay (Ext. P2 dated 18.1.1990). The revision petition was posted on multiple occasions and ultimately dismissed on 23.12.1993 for inordinate delay, as recorded in Ext. P6. On 24.10.1996 the petitioner filed a rectification application under S.154 of the Income Tax Act (Ext. P7) seeking amendment of the dismissal order, asserting that adjournment arrangements and explanations for delay had not been considered.

While the S.154 rectification petition was pending, the Government introduced the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme. The petitioner submitted a declaration under the Scheme (Ext. P8). The respondent rejected the declaration on the ground that "there is no valid revision petition pending as on the date of filing the declaration" and referred to the dismissal of the revision petition on 23.12.1993; this rejection was communicated in Ext. P9 and is the subject-matter of the Original Petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the pendency of an application for rectification under S.154 of the Income Tax Act (filed after dismissal of a revision petition) can be regarded as "pendency" of a revision petition for the purposes of Clause 95(i)(c) of the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme (i.e., whether such pendency qualifies the declarant to claim benefits under the Scheme).
  2. Whether the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme ought to be interpreted purposively and liberally (as beneficial legislation) so as to include situations where a revision had been dismissed but a rectification under S.154 remained pending.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme is intended to put an end to litigation and facilitate tax recovery; therefore, it should be given a purposive interpretation to extend benefits to the petitioner.
  • Because the rectification petition under S.154 was pending, there was an ongoing litigation between the petitioner and the Department; thus the petitioner's position should be treated as if the revision were pending at the time the declaration was filed.
  • Relied on this Court's decision in Lukkose John Thoppil v. Commissioner of Income-Tax (2000 (1) KLT 57 : (2000) 242 ITR 1) for the proposition that what is required for the Scheme is simply the pendency of a revision or appeal at the time of filing the declaration, and that maintainability of the revision is not relevant.

Respondent's (Revenue) Arguments

  • The Scheme is a self-contained code and a concession; therefore it must be construed strictly and not extended beyond its terms.
  • Pendency of a petition under S.154 for rectification of an order passed under S.264 of the Act cannot be equated with pendency of a revision petition before the Commissioner; a Government clarification dated 3 September 1998 supports that position.
  • Relied on precedents (Renuka Datla v. C.I.T. and Gopal Films v. Deputy C.I.T.) to support the strict interpretation of the Scheme and to caution against creating artificial pendency or extending relief beyond the Scheme's express terms.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dr. Mrs. Renuka Datla v. C.I.T. (1999) 240 ITR 463 (Andhra Pradesh Division Bench) The provisions of the Finance Act, 1998 introducing the KVS Scheme should be given a strict interpretation since they grant exemptions/concessions; courts should refrain from expanding the scheme by judicial embellishment. The Court cited this decision to support the position that the Scheme must be strictly construed and that judicial expansion to further the Scheme's objectives is inappropriate.
Gopal Films v. Deputy C.I.T. (1999) 237 ITR 655 (Karnataka High Court) Pendency for the purposes of the KVS Scheme must be bona fide; attempts to create artificial pendency (for example by belated revision together with condonation of delay) are impermissible. The Court relied on this authority to underscore that a revision dismissed earlier cannot be treated as pending merely because an application (or belated filing) is made later; pendency must be real and not contrived.
Lukkose John Thoppil v. Commissioner of Income-Tax (2000 (1) KLT 57 : (2000) 242 ITR 1) For the purpose of the Scheme, what matters is the existence of a revision or appeal pending at the time the declaration is filed; maintainability of the revision is not relevant to the question of pendency. The Court considered this decision carefully but distinguished it: in Lukkose John Thoppil the revision petitions were filed and were actually pending at the time of declaration, whereas in the present case the revision petition had been dismissed long before and only an S.154 rectification petition remained pending.
International Cotton Corporation (P) Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer (1975) 3 SCC 585 (reported also as (1975) 35 STC 1) A concession granted by statute is not a matter of right; concessions should be interpreted within the terms and limitations set by the legislature and cannot be expanded by judicial decree. The Court invoked this Supreme Court authority to reinforce the principle that the KVS Scheme, being concessional, must be strictly and narrowly applied rather than liberally expanded.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began with the legislative context: the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme was designed to settle tax arrears locked in litigation by offering concessions, and S.95 of the Finance Act, 1998 lists categories excluded from the Scheme, including Clause 95(i)(c) which (in relevant part) excludes cases "where no appeal or reference or Writ Petition is admitted and pending ... or no application for revision is pending before the Commissioner on the date of filing of the declaration."

Factual findings were central. The Court noted the timeline: appeals disposed in 1985; revision petition filed in 1990 (Ext. P1) then dismissed on 23.12.1993 due to inordinate delay; a rectification petition under S.154 was filed on 24.10.1996 (Ext. P7). When the KVS declaration (Ext. P8) was filed, the revisional petition had already been dismissed and only the S.154 rectification application was pending.

Addressing the petitioner's contention that the pending S.154 application should be treated as if the revision were pending, the Court analyzed the text and purpose of Clause 95(i)(c). The Court observed that the Scheme specifically contemplates only four types of pending proceedings for eligibility (appeals, references, writ petitions, and revision petitions) and that a rectification petition under S.154 is not included among those categories.

The Court considered the petitioner’s reliance on Lukkose John Thoppil (which held that maintainability of a revision was not relevant where a revision was actually pending at the time of declaration) but distinguished it: in that case a revision petition was genuinely pending on the relevant date, whereas in the present case the revision had been dismissed years earlier — only a S.154 rectification petition remained. Thus Lukkose did not assist the petitioner here.

The Court emphasized that the Scheme is not purely a litigation-settlement scheme but primarily a recovery scheme and a concession, and therefore must be construed strictly and confined to the categories expressly enumerated. To support this approach the Court cited authorities cautioning against judicial extension of concessions and the creation of artificial pendency (Renuka Datla, Gopal Films, and International Cotton Corporation).

Because Clause 95(i)(c) does not include S.154 rectification proceedings within the notion of "pending revision," and because concessions must be confined to their statutory terms, the Court concluded that the respondent was justified in rejecting the declaration filed by the petitioner.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Original Petition is dismissed. The respondent was justified in rejecting the petitioner's declaration under the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme on the ground that no revision petition was pending on the date of filing the declaration (the earlier revision had been dismissed on 23.12.1993 and only a S.154 rectification petition remained pending).

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The petitioner's declaration under the KVS Scheme was properly rejected and the Original Petition challenging that rejection was dismissed.
  • Legal consequence emphasized by the Court: The Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, being a statutory concession and a self-contained code for recovery, must be interpreted strictly; pendency for Scheme purposes is limited to the categories expressly enumerated in the Scheme (appeal, reference, writ petition, revision) and does not include S.154 rectification proceedings.
  • The Court did not indicate that it was establishing a new broad precedent beyond applying these principles to the facts; it applied existing authorities to reach the result that a dismissed revision cannot be treated as pending by virtue of a later S.154 petition.

Show all summary ...

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Kurian Joseph, J.:— Purchase of peace by putting an end to disputes was the noble idea in introducing the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme. It sounds irony, the instant case has paved way for a new controversy on the application of the Scheme itself. Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme, 1998 was introduced in the Finance Act, 1998. The Scheme makes an offer by the Government for settling tax arrears, locked in litigation, by giving substantial discount. S. 95 of the Finance Act, 1998 contemplates certain categories which are not entitled for the benefits under the Scheme. To the extent it is relevant for the purpose of resolution of the issue raised in the Original Petition, the provision is quoted below:

“95. The provisions of this Scheme shall not apply-

(i) in respect of tax arrear under any direct tax enactment,-

(a) in a case where prosecution for concealment has been instituted on or before the date of filing of the declaration under S. 88 under any direct tax enactment in respect of any assessment year, to any tax arrear in respect of such assessment year under such direct tax enactment or in respect of a person who has been convicted for concealment on or before the date of filing the declaration;

(b) in a case where an order has been passed by the Settlement Commission under sub-s.(4) of S. 245D of the Income tax Act or sub-s.(4) of S. 22D of Wealth-tax Act, as the case may be, for any assessment year, to any tax arrear in respect of such assessment year under such direct tax enactment;

(c) to a case where no appeal or reference or Writ Petition is admitted and pending before any appellate authority or High Court or the Supreme Court on the date of filing of declaration or no application for revision is pending before the Commissioner on the date of filing declaration.”

2. The dispute in this case is relates to the pendency of a revision petition leading to the interpretation of sub-clause (c) of Clause 95(i) of the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme. Petitioner is an assessee on the files of the Income-tax Officer, Ward No. II, Kollam. Aggrieved by the orders of assessment for the years 1980-81 to 1984-85 petitioner preferred appeals before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Thiruvananthapuram, which were disposed of on 24.12.1985 Against the said order in appeals, petitioner filed revision petition as evidenced by Ext. P1. It is significant to note that the date of revision is 16.1.1990 ‘Since there was a delay of almost four years, petitioner also filed Ext. P2 petition to condone the delay and that is dated 18.1.1990 The revision petition was seen posted on 7.1.1991 and 9.11.1993 Thereafter it was posted to 23.11.1993 and again to 8.12.1993 In the absence of any response from the assessee or his representative the revision petition was dismissed on 23.12.1993 As seen from Ext. P6 the main reason for dismissal is that there was inordinate delay of more than four years in filing the revision petition and no reasons have been adduced by the assessee to explain the delay. Thereafter as per Ext. P7 dated 24.10.1996, after almost three years, petitioner filed an application for rectification of mistakes under S. 154 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). It is submitted in the said application that the petitioner had already made arrangements for adjournment of the case on 8.12.1993 and that the petitioner had offered sufficient explanation for the delay in filing the revision petition. Those crucial aspects having not been considered by the revisional authority, petitioner contended that he was entitled for an amendment of the order under S. 154 of the Act.

3. While the said petition for rectification of the order was pending, Government introduced the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme. Petitioner contending that he was an eligible declarant filed Ext. P8 declaration. However, the respondent rejected the declaration stating as follows:

“With reference to the above you are informed that there is no valid revision petition pending as on the date of filing the declaration. The revision petition filed was dismissed by the Commissioner of Income Tax on 23.12.93 Hence your declaration does not satisfy the terms of Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme.”

4. The said communication is under challenge in this Original Petition.

5. Sri. N. Venkatarama Iyer, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme is one introduced to put an end to litigation and also to see that the tax is collected from the assessee. According to the learned counsel, the rectification petition having not been disposed of, there is a pending litigation between the petitioner and the department. To put it on clearer terms it is submitted that the petitioner's case should be treated as if his revision was pending. There is also a further submission that Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme being a beneficial piece of legislation, the Scheme should be given a purposive interpretation so as to render the benefit of the Scheme to an assessee like the petitioner.

6. Sri. George K. George, learned counsel appearing for the Revenue contends that the Scheme being a self contained Code, it has to be construed strictly. It is also submitted that being a concession extended to an assessee, the Scheme has to undergo strict interpretation and there is no need to stretch it so as to rope in an assessee like the petitioner. It is further contended that the Government had already issued a clarification on 3rd September, 1998 exactly to the point wherein it was clarified that the pendency of a petition under S. 154 of the Act for rectifying a mistake in an order passed under S. 264 of the Act cannot be termed as pendency of the revision petition before the Commissioner and hence such a person was not entitled to the benefit of the Scheme. Learned counsel also relied on two decisions, firstly by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in Dr. Mrs. Renuka Datla v. C.I.T (1999) 240 ITR 463. The Division Bench was of the view that the provisions contained in the Finance Act, 1998 introducing the Scheme should be given a strict interpretation, since the provisions relate to granting exemption. At page 471 of the said decision it is held as follows:

“Diverse considerations and a host of economic factors play a role in moulding the policy of the State in bringing into force a scheme of this nature. By a process of judicial interpretation, the courts should refrain from making embellishments or refinements in the Scheme in the name of promoting the objective better. The court in exercise of jurisdiction under Art. 226, cannot ordain that the scheme should go the whole hog to achieve the avowed purpose and it should be more comprehensive or more relief oriented. Various decisions of the Supreme Court from the 1960s eloquently convey the message that the courts should be slow and cautious in interfering with the classification made in fiscal legislation and the modalities evolved for charging and recovering the taxes. We cannot expect a scheme or provision intended to extend tax relief to be most comprehensive giving coverage to every possible situation. Logical deductions and analogies do not always hold good”.

7. In another decision of the Karnataka High Court reported in Gopal Films v. Deputy C.I.T (1999) 237 ITR 655, the learned Judge in unmistakable terms had made it clear that even when a revision is filed along with a petition to condone the delay, it cannot be said that there was pendency of revision. At page 662 it is held as follows:

“The object of the KVS Scheme is to realise the revenue locked up in litigations pending at different levels, by giving incentive to honest tax payers. Having regard to the provisions of the KVS Scheme, pendency of a proceeding either by way of appeal or revision or reference or Writ Petition should be a bona fidependency. When a matter has attained finality and when no litigation is pending, creation of an artificial pendency, after the announcement of the scheme, merely to obtain the benefit of the scheme is impermissible. Any attempt to create such artificial pendency merely for availing of the benefit of the KVS Scheme, would defeat and dilute the scheme”.

8. That was a case where an attempt was made to maintain a revision petition as ‘pending’ by filing a belated revision petition along with a petition to condone the delay and on that ground the assessee sought the benefits under the KVS Scheme.

9. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies on a decision of this Court reported in Lukkose John Thoppil v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax 2000 (1) KLT 57 : (2000) 242 ITR 1. In that case the authority to accept the declaration under the Samadhan Scheme was the revisional authority itself. That authority dismissed the revision petition as not maintainable and then rejected the declaration on the ground that the revision was not pending. Rejecting such an unreasonable stand this court held that for claiming benefit under the Samadhan Scheme what was necessary was only pendency of a revision petition at the time when the declaration was filed. It was not for the revisional authority to hold that the revision petition was not maintainable and hence to reject the declaration. In case there was a revision petition pending on the date of the declaration, the authority had to accept the declaration. The relevant issue is dealt with at page 4 of the said decision as follows:

“Even otherwise, I am of the view that for the disposal of the declarations under the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme what is necessary is to find out whether there is a revision or appeal pending. S. 95(c) of Chapter IV of the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme states that the provisions of this scheme shall not apply to a case where no appeal or reference or Writ Petition is admitted and pending before any appellate authority or the High Court or the Supreme Court on the date of filing of the declaration or no application for revision is pending before the Commissioner on the date of filing of the declaration. In this case, the revision petitions were filed on October 28, 1998. The declarations were filed on November 2, 1998. Thus, it cannot be said that the revision petitions were not pending on the date of filing of the declarations. The further question whether the revision petitions filed were maintainable or any reliefs could be granted in the revision petitions, according to me, is not relevant. The object of the scheme appears to be to put an end to litigation and also to see that the tax is collected from the assessee. According to me, to read the word “revision” in S. 95(c) of the Scheme as a revision which is maintainable or in which relief could be granted will be amounting to re-writing the section. It is one of the cardinal principles of interpretation of statutes that unless there is an intention to the contrary, the words in a statute should be given their ordinary meaning.”

10. The learned counsel strongly relies on the observation in the judgment that the object of the scheme appears to be to put an end to litigation and also to see that the tax is collected from the assessee. The scheme contemplated only four types of litigation: (1) appeals, (2) references, (3) writ petitions and (4) revision petitions pending on the date of filing of the declaration. As held by Sankarasubban, J. for claiming a benefit under the Scheme “what is necessary is to find out whether there is a revision or appeal pending”. By any stretch of imagination it cannot be said that in the instant case Ext. P1 revision filed by the petitioner is pending. The same was dismissed as early as on 23.12.1993 What is pending is only a petition for rectification under S. 154 of the Act. The pendency of such a litigation by way of a petition under S. 154 of the Act is not an item included for relief under the self contained Code, the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme. True, the Scheme is a beneficial piece of legislation and the petitioner has not taken any steps to create a pendency for obtaining benefit under the Scheme. But what is to be noted is that it is not a litigation settlement scheme pure and simple; it is really a recovery scheme. After all it is a concession extended to an assessee. A concession cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Any Scheme extending concession has to be understood strictly in terms of the scheme only and nothing more and nothing less. I am fortified in my view by a decision of the Apex Court in International Cotton Corporation (P) Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer (1975) 35 STC 1 : (1975) 3 SCC 585. The Apex Court repelling a contention of discrimination held as follows:

“A concession is not a matter of right. Where the Legislature taking into consideration the hardships caused to a certain set of taxpayers gives them a certain concession, it does not mean that the action is bad as another set of taxpayers similarly situated may not have been given a similar concession. .It would not be proper to strike down the provision of law giving concession to the former on the ground that the latter are not given such concession. Nor is it possible for this court to direct that the latter set should be given a similar concession. That would mean legislation by this Court and this Court has no legislative powers.”

11. In the above circumstances, it cannot be said that a revision petition filed by the petitioner which was dismissed on 23.12.1993 can be said to be pending on the ground of a rectification petition dated 24.10.1996 filed under S. 154 of the Act is pending. Thus, according to me, the respondent is fully justified in rejecting the declaration filed by the petitioner as per Ext. P9. There is no merit in the Original Petition and it is accordingly dismissed.