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St. Mary'S H.S v. Beji Abraham & Ors.
Structured Summary of the Opinion (K.S. Radhakrishanan, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The appeal was preferred by the Manager of an aided school against a judgment of the learned single Judge which upheld the writ petitioner's claim under Rule 51-A for appointment to the post of High School Assistant (Mathematics) in a vacancy that arose on 6-6-2001.
The writ petitioner had earlier been appointed to a leave vacancy for the period 17-11-1997 to 17-1-1998 by an appointment order dated 17-11-1997; that appointment was approved by the District Educational Officer (DEO) on 16-2-1998. When the vacancy arose on 6-6-2001 the writ petitioner claimed entitlement under Rule 51-A, but the present Manager advertised and filled the post by appointing the third respondent. The writ petitioner challenged that appointment.
The single Judge directed the DEO to consider the writ petitioner's claim with notice to parties and to withhold approval of the appointee's appointment pending such consideration. When the matter came before this court, counsel for both sides requested a final adjudication by the court rather than remitting the matter back to the DEO.
A factual dispute existed about the validity of the then Manager, N.K. Poulose. The present Manager contended Poulose was not properly elected (allegedly elected by a priest who was not the Vicar) and was therefore incompetent; litigation between rival fractions of the church and a pending civil suit (O.S. No. 30 of 1997) sought declaration as to lawful managership and an injunction had been granted by the District Court on 6-4-1998 restraining Poulose from acting as Manager. Poulose subsequently died; the dispute over managership remained.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an appointment of the writ petitioner effected by an approved manager (N.K. Poulose), whose own election/appointment was later contested as illegal or irregular, could be treated as invalid for the purpose of depriving the writ petitioner of a claim under Rule 51-A.
- Whether the writ petitioner, having been appointed in a leave vacancy and having had that appointment approved by the District Educational Officer (thereby obtaining approved service), had a continuing claim under Rule 51-A for appointment to the vacancy that arose on 6-6-2001.
- Whether the de facto doctrine (saving acts of officers de facto) applies to preserve the validity of appointments and other acts performed by a manager whose appointment was subsequently held or alleged to be illegal or irregular.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant-Manager's Arguments
- The writ petitioner's earlier appointment was illegal and irregular because it was made by N.K. Poulose, who was an incompetent or illegally elected Manager.
- All appointments effected by Poulose during his tenure must be declared null and void because he was an intruder and had no lawful authority to act as Manager.
- Attempted to distinguish the precedent relied upon by the writ petitioner (Padmanabhan Nambiar) on facts, arguing the de facto doctrine should not apply in the present circumstances.
Writ Petitioner / First Respondent's Arguments
- Relied on the Division Bench decision in Padmanabhan Nambiar v. Government of Kerala (1997 (2) KLT 725) to support the claim that acts of a manager de facto are saved.
- Pointed out Poulose had been the approved Manager at the time the writ petitioner was appointed and that the DEO's approval of the appointment had not been reversed, supporting the proposition that the writ petitioner obtained approved service.
- Maintained that, having been appointed in a leave vacancy and obtaining approval, the writ petitioner thereby acquired a Rule 51-A claim for future appointment and was entitled to be considered for the vacancy of 6-6-2001.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Padmanabhan Nambiar v. Government of Kerala, 1997 (2) KLT 725 | Support for applying the de facto doctrine to save acts done by a manager de facto and thereby protect rights of appointees. | The court relied on this decision as an authoritative statement that the de facto doctrine protects appointees' rights where appointments were made by a manager who was approved at the time and whose approval had not been set aside. |
| P.S. Menon v. State of Kerala, AIR 1970 Ker. 165 (Full Bench) | Explanation and endorsement of the de facto doctrine: officers de facto whose acts public policy requires should be considered valid. | The court quoted and relied on the Full Bench rationale to justify treating acts performed by an officer de facto (such as the Manager) as valid for public policy and necessity. |
| Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of A.P., (1981) 3 SCC 132 : AIR 1981 SC 1473 | Approval by the apex court of the de facto doctrine; judgments and acts of a judge de facto have the same efficacy as those of a judge de jure. | The court cited this apex court decision as authority that acts of persons exercising office albeit unlawfully still carry efficacy and thereby support the preservation of appointees' rights. |
| C. Rangaswamiah v. Karnataka Lokayukta, (1998) 6 SCC 66 | Followed the principle that acts of de facto officers are to be upheld. | Used as an additional apex court authority showing the continuity of the de facto doctrine in Supreme Court jurisprudence. |
| Union of India v. Charanjit S. Gill, (2000) 5 SCC 742 | Held that the de facto doctrine is born out of necessity and upheld it. | Cited to demonstrate recent apex court affirmation that the de facto doctrine remains valid and based on necessity. |
| New Zealand and Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886) | International (U.S. Supreme Court) articulation that official acts of persons clothed with insignia of office are recognized as valid on grounds of public policy and protection. | Quoted to illustrate the long-standing and international character of the de facto principle, reinforcing the court's reasoning that public policy supports upholding such acts. |
| Re James (An Insolvent), 1977 (1) All E.R. 364 (CA) — (Lord Denning) | Illustration of the principle that it is the office that matters; a person holding and exercising an office de facto has his orders upheld unless successfully challenged on appeal. | Quoted to support the proposition that as long as a person exercises the office and its functions duly, their orders are not nullities; used as persuasive authority in favour of upholding acts of de facto office-holders. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded along statutory, factual and doctrine-based lines, as follows:
-
Statutory framework: The court examined provisions of the Kerala Education Act and Kerala Education Rules:
- Section 7: educational agency may appoint a Manager subject to approval by educational authorities; Manager responsible for conduct of school under the Act and Rules.
- Section 11: teachers in aided schools are to be appointed by Managers subject to Government rules and conditions; qualifications prescribed under Section 10.
- Rule 3 (Chap. III): management may be vested in a Manager; in corporate management the proprietory body may choose the Manager.
- Rule 2(4): the Educational Agency is bound by the acts of the Manager.
- Rule 4: educational authorities are competent to approve appointment of Managers and changes.
- Rule 9: duties and powers of Managers, including signing bills and appointing qualified candidates.
- Rule 9 of Chap. XIV-A: appointment order shall not be affected by any change in the Educational Agency or the manager.
- Factual application: The court found that when the writ petitioner was appointed to the leave vacancy, Poulose was the approved Manager and the DEO subsequently approved the appointment on 16-2-1998. There was no order from a court or educational authority restraining Poulose from making appointments at the relevant time.
- Doctrine of de facto officer: The court held that even if Poulose's appointment was later found to be illegal or irregular, that fact "could not take away the rights of the appointees." The court explained the de facto doctrine—introduced as a matter of public policy and necessity to protect interests of the public and individuals affected by acts of persons exercising duties without being lawful officers—and relied on domestic Full Bench and apex court authorities and persuasive foreign authorities to justify application of the doctrine.
- Public interest and students' interest: The court emphasized practical considerations — that leaving a leave vacancy open while the managership dispute was resolved would have adverse consequences for students. The managerial and educational authorities had an obligation to protect students' interests by filling the vacancy at the time.
- Conclusion from statutory and doctrinal points: Because the writ petitioner had been appointed by an approved Manager, had DEO approval (i.e., had approved service), and because actions by a manager de facto are saved by the de facto doctrine, the writ petitioner retained a Rule 51-A claim for future appointment. Therefore he was the legitimate person to be considered for the vacancy which arose on 6-6-2001.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court held that the writ petitioner had rights under Rule 51-A and was the eligible person to be appointed to the vacancy that arose on 6-6-2001. The court dismissed the writ appeal.
DISPOSITION: Writ appeal dismissed; rights of the writ petitioner under Rule 51-A are declared and he is the eligible person for appointment to the stated vacancy.
Implications: The direct effect on the parties is that the writ petitioner retains his Rule 51-A claim and is entitled to the protection and consideration of that claim for appointment in the vacancy of 6-6-2001. The opinion applies and re-affirms the established de facto doctrine to preserve acts done by a manager approved at the time and subsequently relied on DEO approval; the court did not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond applying existing authority.
K.S Radhakrishanan, J.:— This appeal is preferred by the Manager of an aided school aggrieved by the judgment of the learned single Judge upholding Rule 51-A claim of the writ petitioner for appointment to the post of High School Asst. (Mathematics) in the vacancy which arose in the school on 6-6-2001. Appellant-Manager took up the stand that writ petitioner was appointed by an incompetent Manager. Consequently the very appointment of the writ petitioner earlier was illegal and irregular.
2. Counsel for the writ petitioner - first respondent herein placed reliance on the decision of a Division Bench of this court in Padmanabhan Nambiar v. Government of Kerala (1997 (2) KLT 725). Writ petitioner was appointed by one N.K Poulose, then approved Manager of the school in a leave vacancy which arose from 17-11-1997 to 17-1-1998 by appointment order dated 17-11-1997. That appointment was approved by the District Educational Officer on 16-2-1998. Vacancy of H.S.A (Mathematics) arose in the school with effect from 6-6-2001. Writ petitioner expected since he was a Rule 51-A claimant he would be appointed in the said vacancy by the present Manager. Instead, manager invited applications from candidates by publication. The writ petitioner then sent a letter dated 25-5-2001 to the Manager claiming appointment to the post of H.S.A (Mathematics). Disregarding his claim, Manager appointed third respondent in the vacancy which arose on 6-6-2001. Aggrieved by the same writ petition has been preferred. Learned single Judge disposed of the writ petition on 14-6-2001 directing the District Educational Officer to consider the claim raised by the writ petitioner with notice to him as well as the Manager and the appointee. It was ordered that till orders are passed, appointment of third respondent would not be approved. When the matter came up for hearing counsel on either side submitted that this court should decide the matter finally rather than driving the parties to the District Educational Officer. Certain facts are not disputed in this case. The fact that N.K Poulose was approved Manager of the school is not denied. Case put up by the present Manager was that N.K Poulose was incompetent to function as Manager since he was not appointed by the Vicar of the church. St. Mary's High School, managership of which was in dispute at the relevant time, was owned by St. Mary's Church, Kandanad. With regard to ownership of the church etc. there was litigation between the two fractions of the church, namely Catholicos faction and Partriarch faction. Contention was raised by the present Manager that N.K Poulose was illegally elected manager in a meeting held on 8-9-1996 by the priest who was not the Vicar of the Church. Based on the decision taken in the meeting held on 8-9-1996 N.K Poulose got his appointment as Manager approved by the District Educational Officer on 11-9-1996. Present Manager of the school-filed O.S No. 30 of 1997 seeking declaration that he is lawfully elected Manager of St. Mary's High School and that N.K Poulose was not validly elected Manager. Injunction was also sought for restraining him from functioning as Manager of the school. Injunction was granted by the District Court in I.A No. 2217 of 1997 on 6-4-1998 restraining N-K. Poulose from acting as Manager of the school and also restraining one Father John Punnachalil from functioning as Vicar of St. Marthoma Orthodox Syrian Church, Kandanad till the disposal of the suit. Suit is still pending consideration. Pending suit Poulose died.
3. Counsel for the appellant-second respondent contended that since Poulose was not legally elected Manager of the school, appointments effected by him during his tenure are illegal and irregular. Counsel for the writ pettioner, as we have already indicated, placed reliance on the decision of this court in Padmanabhan Nambiar's case, supra (1997 (2) KLT 725). Counsel also submitted that Poulose was the approved Manager of the school. Even though appeal was filed against the order of approval by the District Educational Officer to the Deputy Director of Education, the said order has not been reversed.
4. We find writ petitioner was appointed by the then manager in a leave vacancy which arose from 17-1-1997 to 17-11-1998. When writ petitioner was appointed, admittedly Poulose was the approved Manager even though the manner in which he was appointed was questioned before the civil court. Appointment of the writ petitioner was also subsequently approved by the District Educational Officer on 16-2-1998.
5. Section 7 of the Kerala Education Act authorises the educational agency to appoint any person to be the manager of an aided school subject to approval of the educational authorities authorised by the Government. Manager shall be responsible for the conduct of the school in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Sec. 11 deals with appointment of teachers in aided schools, which says that subject to the rules and conditions laid down by the Government teachers of aided schools shall be appointed by the managers of such schools from among persons who possess the qualifications prescribed under Sec. 10 of the Act. Rule 3 of Chap. III of the Kerala Education Rules says that management of every aided school may be vested by the Educational Agency in a person who shall be referred to as the Manager and who shall be responsible to the department for the management of the institution. In the case of aided institutions under individual management the individual proprietor may be the Manager. In the case of aided institutions under Corporate management the proprietory body may choose the Manager in accordance with the rules in that behalf referred to in Rule 2. Sub-rule (4) says that the Educational Agency shall be bound by the acts of the Manager. Rule 4 deals with approval of appointment of Manager. Educational authorities shall be competent to approve the appointment of Managers by Educational Agencies and to approve changes in the personnel of the managers. Rule 9 prescribes the duties and powers of the managers of aided schools. Manager shall also abide by the orders that may be issued from time to time by the Government and the Department. He shall also sign all the bills relating to the maintenance and other grants specifically granted to the management. Managers shall appoint candidates who possess the requisite qualifications under the Rules as teachers. Rule 9 of Chap. XIV-A stipulates that appointment order shall not be affected any change in the Educational Agency or the manager. It is in compliance with the aforementioned statutory provisions Poulose who was the approved Manager appointed the writ petitioner in a leave vacancy. Appointment of the writ petitioner was also approved by the District Educational Officer. Since he has got approved service and since he was relieved he has got a claim under Rule 51-A for future appointment. Therefore when vacancy arose on 6-6-2001 he was the legitimate person to be considered for appointment in that vacancy.
6. We are of the view mere fact that the appointment of the Manager was subsequently found to be illegal or irregular could not take away the rights of the appointees. As far as appointees are concerned, they are appointed by approved Manager. They are not concerned with the dispute with regard to the managership of the school. There was no order either from the court or from the educational authorities restraining the then Manager from appointing the writ petitioner. Even if there is some illegality or irregularity in the appointment of the manager, action taken by him during the tenure of his managership would not be illegal or irregular. All rights and liabilities flowed from those actions would be saved by the defacto doctrine. This principle has been upheld by this court in Padmanabhan Nambiar's case, supra. Counsel for the appellant Sri. B.G Bhaskar contended that since Poulose happened to be an intruder to the office of the manager, all actions taken by him during his tenure as Manager will have to be declared as null and void. Counsel submitted that N.K Poulose was elected to the post of Manager by a person who has no legal right to conduct election. Counsel tried to distinguish the aforementioned decision of the Division Bench stating that de facto doctrine would not apply since that was a case where there was a joint application by both the Managers to effect appointment. He tried to distinguish the said decision on facts.
7. De-facto doctrine saves the acts of the officers de facto performed within the scope of their assumed official authority. Whatever defects there may be in the nature of their appointment it is based upon the principle of public policy and necessity. Such a doctrine was introduced into the law as a matter of policy and necessity, to protect the interest of the public and the individual whose interests were, involved in the official acts of persons exercising the duties of an office without being lawful officers. Aforementioned doctrine was applied by a Full Bench of this court in P.S Menon v. State of Kerala (AIR 1970 Ker. 165) and held as follows:
“The doctrine was engrafted as a matter of policy and necessity to protect the interest of the public and individuals involved in the official acts of persons exercising the duty of an officer without actually being one in strict point of law. But although these officers are not officers de jure they are by virtue of the particular circumstances, officers, in fact, whose acts, public policy requires should be considered valid.”
8. The judgment of the Full Bench was quoted with approval by the apex court in Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of A.P, (1981) 3 SCC 132 : AIR 1981 SC 1473. That was a case where appointment of Sessions Judge was subsequently declared as invalid on the ground that the appointment was in violation of Art. 233 of the Constitution of India. The apex court held that the judgments pronounced by him and acts done by him when he was clothed with the powers and functions of the office, albeit unlawfully, have the same efficacy as judgments pronounced and acts done by a Judge de jure. Above decision was subsequently followed by the apex court in C. Rangaswamiah v. Karnataka Lokayaukta ((1998) 6 SCC 66). The apex court in a recent decision in Union of India v. Charanjit S. Gill ((2000) 5 SCC 742) upheld the de facto doctrine and held that the doctrine in borne out of necessity. United States Supreme Court in New Zealand and Norton v. Shelby County (1886-118 US 425) while dealing with doctrine and held as follows:
“Where an office exists under the law, it matters not how the appointment of the incumbent is made, so far as the validity of his acts are concerned. It is enough that he is clothed with the in signia of the office, and exercises its powers and functions…. The official acts of such persons are recognised as valid on grounds of public policy, and for the protection of those having official business to transact.”
9. It is apposite to refer to the pronouncement of Lord Denning. The observations of Lord Denning are as follows:
“He sits in the seat of a Judge. He wears the robes of a judge. He hold the office of a judge. May be he was not validly appointed. But still he holds the office. It is the office that matters, not the incumbent … so long as the man holds the office and exercises it duly and in accordance with law, his orders are not a nullity. If they are erroneous they may be upset on appeal. But it not erroneous they should be upheld. (Re James (An Insolvent), 1977 (1) All. E.R 364 (CA).
10. In the instant case we find Manager was elected and the same was approved by the educational authorities. Appointment effected by the Manager in a leave vacancy was also approved by the educational authorities. If appointment was not effected at that time in a leave vacancy students would have been adversely affected. Manager and the educational authorities were legally obliged to protect the interest of the students. It will not be in the interest of the students to keep the leave vacancy open till the dispute with regard to the managership is resolved. We have already pointed out public interest demands that the post of High School Assistant (Mathematics) be not kept unfilled till the dispute with regard to the managership is resolved, instead that post has been filled up by the erstwhile managed even if his appointment was irregular. We are of the view whatever rights accrued to the appointee on the basis of that appointment would enure to his benefit and in our view would not be lost. We therefore hold that writ petitioner has got a claim and protection under Rule 51-A of Chap. XIV-A of the Kerala Education Rules. Rights are declared. Writ petitioner is the eligible person to be appointed in the vacancy which arose in the school on 6-6-2001. Writ appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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