N. Krishnan Nair, J.:— The landlord in R.C.P 23/1990 on the file of the Rent Control Court, Thiruvananthapuram is the revision petitioner. The revision petitioner filed the petition for eviction of the respondent/tenant from the scheduled building under Ss. 11(2) and 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The Rent Control Court allowed the petition on both the grounds. Aggrieved by the order of eviction, the tenant preferred R.C.A No. 122/1991 before the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Thiruvananthapuram. The Rent Control Appellate Authority by the impugned order set aside the order of the Rent Control Court and remitted the matter back to the court below for fresh disposal. Aggrieved by the order of remand, the landlord has come up with this appeal.

2. The petition scheduled building forms part of a line building belonging to the revision petitioner. The respondent is in occupation of the building as a tenant with effect from 1982. According to the landlord initially, the rate of rent was Rs. 200/- per mensem and it was subsequently enhanced to Rs. 250/- with effect from September, 1986. Alleging that the tenant kept the rent in arrears since 1986 and the building is bonafide required for occupation of the revision petitioner's mother-in-law and her two sons, the petition was filed on the grounds under Ss. 11(2)(b) and 11(3) of the Act. The respondent/tenant resisted the petition contending that the need urged by the landlord is not genuine. The rate of rent was also disputed. According to the respondent, the amount of rent fixed was Rs. 100/- per month from 1982 onwards which was subsequently enhanced to Rs. 150/- per month. It was also contended by the respondent that the rent had been paid till December, 1989.

3. Both the parties adduced evidence in support of their rival contentions. The evidence consists of the depositions of PW 1 to PW 3 and CW1, Exts. A.1 to A.4, B1 to B5 and Ext. CI. On an elaborate consideration of the evidence, the Rent Control Court found that the respondent defaulted in the payment of rent at the rate of Rs. 150/- from July, 1986 till December, 1989. The Rent Control Court also found that the need urged by the landlord is genuine. But, the Appellate Authority found that the finding of the Rent Control Court that the rate of rent at the rate of Rs. 150/- per month is without any basis. On the basis of the representation made by the counsel for the respondent herein before the Appellate Authority that the modier-in-law of the, petitioner is no more, the Appellate Authority remitted the matter back to the Rent Control Court for fresh disposal.

4. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner contended that the order of the Appellate Authority is clearly illegal and cannot be sustained either in law or on facts. According to the learned counsel, the Appellate Authority set aside the order of the Rent Control Court without any reason. He further contended that the observation of the Appellate Authority that no reason is given by the Rent Control Court as to the fixation of the rent at the rate of Rs. 150/- per month is baseless. It was also contended by the learned counsel mat the fact that the mother-in-law of the revision petitioner is no more is also no ground to remit the case back to the Rent Control Court. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent supported the order of the Appellate Authority and urged that there is no ground for interference.

5. The question arising for consideration is whether the impugned order of remand is sustainable. On a consideration of the materials on record, we are of the view that the Appellate. Authority should not have interfered with the finding of the Rent Control Court that the rate of rent was Rs. 150/- per month. According to the landlord, initially, the rate of rent was Rs. 200/- per mensem and subsequently, it was enhanced to Rs. 250/- with effect from September, 1986. On the other hand, the respondent would contend that originally, the rate of rent fixed was Rs. 100/- per month and subsequently, in 1983, the rent was enhanced to Rs. 150/- per month. Though the landlord has asserted in his evidence that initially, the rate of rent was Rs. 200/- per month and it was subsequently enhanced to Rs. 250/- with effect from September, 1986, the Rent Control Court was not inclined to accept his evidence in this regard. On the other hand, the Rent Control Court accepted the rate which was admitted by the tenant. The tenant as PW 1 has stated that the building was taken on rent at the rate of Rs. 100/- per month and subsequently, it was enhanced to Rs. 150/- per month in 1983. On the basis of the evidence of the tenant, the Rent Control Court found that the rate of rent is only Rs. 150/- per month. Therefore, the finding of the Rent Control Appellate Authority that “no reasoning has been shown by the Court below as to how the rate of rent has been fixed as Rs. 150/- per month” is clearly unsustainable.

6. We also find no infirmity in the finding of the Rent Control Court regarding the date of default in the payment of rent. According to the landlord, the rent is kept in arrears since 1986. The tenant would contend that he has paid rent till December, 1989. The burden is on the tenant to prove that he paid the rent upto December, 1989. Apart from the interested testimony of the tenant, there is no reliable material on record to show that the rent was paid till December, 1989. The tenant has not produced the rental receipts to show that he had paid the rent upto December, 1989. S. 9(1) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act lays down that every tenant who makes a payment on account of rent or advance shall be entitled to obtain a receipt in the prescribed form for the amount paid, duly signed by the landlord or his authorised agent. The Section also provides that in a case where the landlord refuses to issue receipt, it is open to the tenant to send rent by way of Money Order after deducting the Money Order commission or issue a notice to the landlord requiring the landlord to specify a bank into which the tenant could remit the rent due. In this case, if the landlord was not prepared to issue receipts, the tenant should have taken recourse to S. 9 of the Act. As observed by a Division Bench of this Court in Bhaskaran Assan v. Ammukutty Amma (1992 (2) KLT 565) if a tenant is not prudent enough to resort to that course it will require very strong evidence on his side to substantiate a plea that he has paid the rent without obtaining receipts for the same. In this case, as stated earlier, there is no reliable evidence on record to show that the rent was not paid upto December, 1989. No doubt, it is in evidence that the tenant had sent an amount of Rs. 150/- on 29.1.1990 by Money Order which was refused by the landlord. As observed by the Rent Control Court, in the absence of evidence regarding payment of rent prior to January, 1998, mere sending of a sum of Rs. 150/- in January, 1998 would not help the tenant to prove that the rent prior to that was infact paid. Therefore, we are in full agreement with the view taken by the Rent Control Court that the tenant kept the rent in arrears since 1986. Under these circumstances, the Appellate Authority should not have interfered with the finding of the Rent Control Court under S. 11(2)(b) of the Act

7. The next question arising for consideration is whether the need urged by the landlord is genuine as found by the Rent Control Court The necessity pleaded by the landlord is that he required the premises for the residence of his mother-in-law and her two children. According to the landlord, they are now residing with him and their accommodation is causing much inconvenience to the members of his family. The tenant would contend that the need urged by the landlord is not bona fide and the landlord has other buildings of his own to accommodate his mother-in-law and her two children. On an elaborate consideration of the evidence on record, the Rent Control Court found that the scheduled building is bonafide required by the landlord for the residence of his mother-in-law and her two children. Admittedly, the mother-in-law died during the pendency of the appeal before the Rent Control Appellate Authority. It appears that the Appellate Authority remanded the case mainly on the ground that the mother-in-law of the landlord is no more. The learned counsel for the tenant strongly contended that since the mother-in-law of the landlord died during the pendency of the proceedings, the need urged by the landlord does not survive and therefore, he is not entitled to get an order of eviction under S. 11(3) of the Act. We cannot agree. The need put forward by the landlord was not for the separate residence of his mother-in-law alone, but also for her two children. The tenant has no case that after the death of the mother-in-law of the landlord, her two children are residing separately. In this connection, it is relevant to note the decision of the Supreme Court in Shantilal Thakordas v. Chimanlal Maganlal Telwala ((1976) 4 SCC 417). It has been held by the Supreme Court that if the law permitted the eviction of the tenant for the requirement of the landlord “for occupation as a residence for himself and members of his family”, then the requirement was both of the landlord and the members of his family. In that case, the Supreme Court was not inclined to take the view that the requirement of the occupation of the members of the family of the original landlord was his requirement and ceased to be the requirement of the members of his family on his death. In this case, since the building is required for the residence of the two children of the mother-in-law of the landlord also, it cannot be said that the need urged in the petition has ceased to exist on the death of the mother-in-law.

8. The learned counsel for the tenant further contended that the mother-in-law and her two children cannot be said to be the members of the family of the landlord and therefore, the landlord is not entitled to get an order under S. 11(3) of the Act. We cannot agree. As per S. 11(3), a landlord is entitled to get an order of eviction, if he bonafide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation of any member of his family dependent on him. No doubt, the expression ‘family’ has not been defined in the Act. In Muhammed v. Sinnamalu Amma (AIR 1978 Ker. 21), a learned Single Judge of this Court observed as follows:

“It is obvious that the expression ‘family’ which is undefined by the Act is elastic and that its ambit has to be determined in all the circumstances of the case, having regard to the habits, ideas and socio-economic milieu of the parties.”

9. In Balabhadra v. Premchand (AIR 1953 Nag. 144), a Division Bench of Nagpur High Court has held that the need of a widowed daughter and her children must be deemed to be those of her landlord-father entiting him to claim possession of a building for their residence as they were depending on him, even though by marriage she had passed out of his family and gone into that of her husband”. In Balakrishna Menon v. District Judge (1994 (1) KLT 102), this Court held that even though under the Hindu Mitakshara Law, the married woman ceased to be a member of her family and becomes a member of her husband's family, for the intention and purpose of S. 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, the husband of the landlady and his sister, will come within the wider expanded meaning of the expression ‘any member of the family of the landlord’ under S. 11(3) of the Act. We are in full agreement with the views expressed by the learned Judges in the cases referred to above. It is also settled position that the word ‘dependent’ is not restricted to persons financially dependent, but is comprehensive enough to include persons who are depending on the landlord for residential accommodation. In this case, there is nothing on record to indicate that the two children of the mother-in-law of the landlord are not depending him for residential accommodation. In our view, the mother-in-law and her children will come within the wider expanded meaning of the expression ‘any member of the family of the landlord’ under S. 11(3) of the Act. Therefore, we are not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the mother-in-law of the landlord and her children are not the members of the family of the landlord dependenton him.

10. The learned counsel for the tenant also contended that in view of the first proviso to S. 11(3) of the Act, the landlord is not entitled to get an order of eviction. The first proviso to S. 11(3) provides that the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building, if the landlord has another building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village, except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for special reasons in any particular case it will be just and proper to do so. The landlord has admitted in his evidence that in the same compound there are five buildings with 12 T.C Nos. Ext. CI report filed by the Commissioner deputed by the Rent Control Court gives the details of all the buildings in the compound. It is gatherable from the Commission Report that a building bearing “T.C No. 29/1819 is unoccupied and the other buildings owned by the landlord are in the possession of the tenants. It is settled position that if the other buildings owned by the landlord are in the possession of other tenants, the first proviso to S. 11(3) is not attracted. (See the decision in Anthony Kochuvariathu v. Chakkalinga Nadar, 1971 KLT 119).

11. Then the question for consideration is whether the building bearing T.C No. 29/1585 is fit for occupation. The landlord has stated in his evidence that some of his wooden articles are stocked in the said building bearing No. 29/1585 and the same is unfit for human inhabitation. The respondent has also admitted in his evidence that till 1982, he was residing in T.C No. 29/1585 and he shifted his residence to the petition scheduled building due to lack of space in T.C 29/1585. Though the respondent has stated in his evidence that the building was subsequently rented out to one Kuttan Pillai, the said Kuttan Pillai was not examined in the case. A tenant who vacated the building due to lack of space and convenience cannot be heard to say that it is fit for providing accommodation to the family members of the landlord.

12. The tenant has also a case that the landlord has rented out two buildings owned by him after issuing the notice for eviction. Ext. A.1 notice was sent on 3.2.1990 There is no reliable evidence on record that at the time of issuing the notice, the two buildings were not in the occupation of the tenants. The landlord has asserted in his evidence that the said two buildings were rented out to the tenants in June and October 1988, before Ext. A.1 notice was issued.

13. It is seen that the Rent Control Court, on a consideration of the evidence on record has found that the landlord is entitled to get an order of eviction under Ss. 11(2)(b) and 11(3) of the Act. We see no infirmity in the order. The Rent Control Appellate Authority has set aside the order of the Rent Control Court without sufficient reasons. It appears that the Rent Control Appellate Authority has not properly scanned or weighed the evidence in the case. We are of the view that the Rent Control Appellate Authority should not have interfered with the order of the Rent Control Court.

14. In the result, the impugned order of the Rent Control Appellate Authority is set aside and the order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court is restored.

15. This revision is thus allowed. We make no order as to costs.