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K. Premavalli v. State Of Kerala .
Full Bench Opinion — Summary
Factual and Procedural Background
The central procedural posture arose from an appeal challenging the judgment and decree passed by a learned single Judge of this Court in an appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The appellant (the second claimant in L.A.R. No. 90 of 1983) had obtained a judgment from the Principal Sub Judge, Alleppey on 11 March 1988. The claimant preferred an appeal as L.A.A. 101 of 1990 under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act. That appeal was dismissed by a learned single Judge on 21 January 1992.
Subsequently the claimant filed A.F.A. 109 of 1994 under Section 5(ii) of the Kerala High Court Act seeking a Letters Patent appeal to a Bench of two Judges, together with a petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay of 899 days. When the delay condonation petition was heard by a Division Bench, the Bench expressed doubt about the maintainability of the Letters Patent appeal and referred the question to a Full Bench for authoritative determination.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an appeal lies to a Bench of two Judges under Section 5(ii) of the Kerala High Court Act against the judgment and decree of a learned single Judge rendered in proceedings under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
- Whether Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has curtailed or taken away the power of appeal to a Bench of two Judges under Section 5(ii) of the Kerala High Court Act or has made the decision of a single Judge final when the single Judge is exercising jurisdiction under Section 54 read with Section 3(13)(b) of the Kerala High Court Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Counsel for the appellant (Sri D. Krishna Prasad) contended that the appeal is maintainable before a Bench of two Judges under Section 5(ii) of the Kerala High Court Act.
- He argued that the award of the Land Acquisition Court is a "decree" within the meaning of Section 26(2) of the Land Acquisition Act and that an appeal lies to the High Court under Section 54 of the Act.
- Because the appeal to the High Court was heard by a single Judge in accordance with Section 3(13)(b) of the Kerala High Court Act, counsel submitted that a further appeal would lie to a Bench of two Judges under Section 5(ii) of the Kerala High Court Act (i.e., a Letters Patent appeal).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| S.A. Industries (P) Ltd. v. S.B. Sarup, AIR 1965 SC 1442 | Statute may give a right of appeal to the High Court; if the statute does not expressly take away Letters Patent appeal, the Letters Patent appeal may lie from a single Judge's judgment. | Used to illustrate that, absent express exclusion, a single Judge's judgment under a statute does not automatically bar a further appeal under Letters Patent. |
| Manavikraman Tirumalpadi v. Collector of Nilgiris, AIR 1919 Mad 626 | Held by Madras High Court that Letters Patent appeal was not maintainable in proceedings under Section 54 (as characterised in that decision). | The Full Bench regarded that decision as not correctly decided and of no assistance, particularly in view of subsequent amendment to Section 26 of the Land Acquisition Act. |
| Mahli Devi v. Chander Bhan, AIR 1995 Delhi 293 (Full Bench) | Full Bench view that a Letters Patent appeal to a Division Bench is maintainable in proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act; no conflict between S.54 and Letters Patent. | Cited as an example of a court taking the view that no bar exists to Letters Patent appeals in land acquisition matters; the referring Judges had disagreed with this Delhi Full Bench but it was considered in the analysis. |
| M.V. Elizabeth v. Harwan Investment and Trading, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 433 (AIR 1993 SC 1014) | Under appellate or discretionary jurisdiction High Courts have unlimited jurisdiction, including the power to determine their own powers. | Relied upon to emphasise the plenary and inherent powers of High Courts and their ability to determine the scope of their appellate jurisdiction. |
| Har Dial Shah v. Secretary of State, AIR 1923 Lahore 275 | Division Bench view that right of appeal to a Bench of two Judges is not impliedly barred by Section 54 read with Letters Patent provision. | Referred to as an early authority supporting the proposition that Section 54 does not implicitly bar a Letters Patent appeal. |
| Collector of Dacca v. Gholam Kuddus, AIR 1936 Cal 688 (Full Bench) | Accepted the Lahore Division Bench view that a Letters Patent appeal was not impliedly barred by Section 54. | Cited as supporting precedent for the proposition that Section 54 does not impliedly deny second appeals under Letters Patent. |
| Narayanadas Daga v. Ganpatrao, AIR 1944 Nag 284 (Division Bench) | Held that an appeal under Letters Patent lies from decision of a single Judge in a Section 54 context. | Used to show consistency among several High Courts that Section 54 does not automatically bar Letters Patent appeals. |
| Siri Chand v. Union of India, AIR 1963 Punjab 221 (Division Bench) | Expressed view that Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act does not contain prohibition against filing of a second appeal. | Referred to as another decision supporting non-exclusivity of Section 54 regarding further appeals. |
| Fr. Abraham Mathews v. Ittan Pillai, AIR 1981 Ker 129 (Full Bench) | Considered whether an appeal would lie to a Division Bench against decision of a single Judge in a civil miscellaneous appeal; examined interplay of Section 5(ii) Kerala High Court Act and provisions of C.P.C. restricting appeals. | Applied to distinguish the present case (no proceeding pending in the trial Court) and to note prior Kerala Full Bench reasoning on when second appeals contribute to delay. |
| Damodaran v. Sankaran, 1985 Ker LT 153 (Division Bench) | Similar view to the Kerala Full Bench in Fr. Abraham Mathews regarding restriction of further appeals to avoid delay. | Referred to for context and contrasted with the present case where no proceedings were pending in the Land Acquisition Court. |
| Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Co., AIR 1962 SC 256 | Example where statute (Arbitration Act s.39(2)) expressly prohibited a second appeal except to the Supreme Court; demonstrates legislature can expressly take away further appeals. | Used to illustrate how an express statutory bar will prevent a second appeal; by contrast, no such express bar was found in Section 54. |
| Municipal Corporation v. Kuldip Lal Bhandari, AIR 1970 Delhi 37 (Full Bench) | Interpreting S.110-D Motor Vehicles Act: a Letters Patent appeal lies from decision of single Judge where statute does not bar it. | Referred to as an instance where courts held Letters Patent appeals maintainable absent express bar in the relevant statute. |
| Shanti Devi v. G.M. Haryana Roadways, AIR 1972 P & H 65 (Full Bench) | Similar principle: Letters Patent appeal maintainable under comparable statutory regime. | Referred to as corroborative authority from another High Court. |
| M. Srinivas v. Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University, (1990) 3 Andh LT (SN) 3 (Full Bench) | Maintainability of Letters Patent appeal upheld where statute did not bar it. | Referred to as further support from another High Court Full Bench for keeping Letters Patent appeals available unless expressly ousted. |
| South Asia Industries (P) Ltd. v. S.B. Sarup Singh (same as S.A. Industries), AIR 1965 SC 1442 | See entry above: statutory right of appeal and interaction with Letters Patent appeals. | Again relied on in the Court's analysis. |
| Vanita M. Khanolkar v. Pragna M. Pai, AIR 1998 SC 424 | Considered S.6(3) Specific Relief Act vis-à-vis Letters Patent; Supreme Court observed that a statutory bar on appeals does not cut across constitutional power of High Court unless the statute expressly excludes Letters Patent appeals. | Applied to emphasise that express exclusion is required to bar Letters Patent appeals; used to support reading Section 54 as not having such an express bar. |
| C.I.T., A.P. v. Ashoka Engg. Co., 1993 Supp (1) SCC 754 (AIR 1993 SC 858) | Principle that provisions conferring a right of appeal should be read reasonably, practically and liberally. | Relied upon to support a liberal construction in favour of preserving the right of appeal where doubt exists. |
| Salimuddin Ahammed v. Rahim Sheiks, AIR 1926 Cal 1113 | When curtailment of right of appeal is at issue, slightest doubt should benefit the appellant. | Invoked to justify resolving doubts in favour of preserving the right to appeal. |
| Indo-Mercantile Bank Ltd. v. Commissioner, Quilon Municipality & Another, 1960 Ker LT 1091 (AIR 1961 Ker 96) (Full Bench) | Considered constitutional validity of the Kerala High Court Act and its regulation of practice and procedure of the High Court. | Referred to as authority that the Kerala High Court Act regulates practice and procedure and is within legislative competence. |
| Kochupennu Kochikka v. Kochikka Kunhipennu, 1961 Ker LT 275 (AIR 1961 Ker 226) (Full Bench) | Also dealt with scope and constitutionality of Kerala High Court Act provisions. | Referred to as supporting the proposition that the State legislature can regulate High Court practice and procedure. |
| Baljit Singh v. State of Haryana (Civil Appeals Nos. 16632–16668 of 1982) (unreported) | Mentioned as an unreported Supreme Court decision relied upon by the referring Judges (and by the Delhi Full Bench), decided on concession of parties. | Court noted it had not had the advantage of the unreported judgment and observed it was decided on concession; therefore it did not rely on it as authoritative for the present Full Bench conclusion. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Full Bench proceeded in stages, closely following the text of the statutes and the precedents cited in the record:
-
Construction of Section 54, Land Acquisition Act:
The Court read Section 54 as an enabling provision that confers a right of appeal to the "High Court" (and a further appeal to the Supreme Court). The provision uses a non-obstante clause and emphasises the forum (the High Court) rather than specifying the internal manner in which the High Court must hear the appeal.
-
Role of the High Court's internal rules:
Once an appeal is brought to the High Court under Section 54, the High Court determines the manner in which that appeal is to be disposed of in accordance with its rules and procedures (subject to any express statutory bar).
-
Interaction with the Kerala High Court Act:
The Kerala High Court Act regulates the business and exercise of the High Court's powers. Section 3(13)(b) provides that certain appeals (including original decrees or orders where the subject-matter value does not exceed Rs. 1 lakh) are to be heard by a single Judge. Section 5(ii) provides that a judgment of a single Judge in exercise of appellate jurisdiction would lie to a Bench of two Judges (Letters Patent appeal), unless specifically barred.
-
Precedent and principle on preservation of appeal rights:
The Court surveyed multiple decisions (both High Court and Supreme Court) showing the settled principle that a statutory right of appeal should be construed liberally in favour of preserving the right, and that a statute can bar further appeal only by express provision or necessary implication. The Court cited S.A. Industries and other authorities for this proposition.
-
Comparison with statutes that expressly bar appeals:
The Court noted authorities (for example, Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Co.) illustrating that where a statute expressly bars a second appeal, that bar must be respected. By contrast, Section 54 contains no express finality clause ousting Letters Patent appeals.
-
Conclusion from textual and precedential analysis:
Applying the above principles and surveying relevant decisions across jurisdictions, the Full Bench concluded that Section 54 did not, by express words or necessary implication, curtail the right of appeal to a Bench of two Judges under Section 5(ii) of the Kerala High Court Act nor render the single Judge's decision final.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The Full Bench held that an appeal shall lie to a Bench of two Judges under Section 5(ii) of the Kerala High Court Act against the judgment and decree of a learned single Judge rendered under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The Court's decision authorises the maintenance of a Letters Patent appeal to a Bench of two Judges in the circumstances under consideration (i.e., where the appeal to the High Court under Section 54 was heard by a single Judge in accordance with Section 3(13)(b) of the Kerala High Court Act).
- Limitations stated by the Court: The Full Bench expressly refrained from expressing any opinion on the merits of the delay condonation petition or on the admissibility of the Letters Patent appeal; those matters were left open for determination.
- Broader implications: The opinion reasons that, absent an express or necessary implied bar in Section 54, the constitutional and statutory framework permits the High Court's internal provisions (such as Section 5(ii) of the Kerala High Court Act) to operate. The Full Bench did not, however, purport in the text to address or catalogue further systemic consequences beyond the direct ruling in this case.
Order accordingly.
Radhakrishnan, J.:— The question that has come up for consideration before us is as to whether an appeal shall lie to a Bench of two Judges under S. 5(ii) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958 against the judgment and decree of a learned single Judge rendered under S. 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
2. Appeal was preferred against the judgment in L.A.A 101 of 1990 under S. 5(ii) of the Kerala High Court Act along with a petition under S. 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay of 899 days in filing the appeal. When the delay petition came up for hearing before a Division Bench, Bench expressed doubt as to whether the appeal itself would be maintainable.
3. According to the learned Judges, Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act does not provide a further appeal to the Division Bench against the judgment and decree of the learned single Judge. It was stated, S. 54 provides only one appeal to the High Court and a further appeal to the Supreme Court. Since several second appeals are pending before the Division Bench it was felt that the matter requires an authoritative pronouncement by a Full Bench. Accordingly, the matter was placed before the Full Bench.
4. Appellant was the second claimant in L.A.R No. 90 of 1983. Judgment was delivered by the Principal Sub Judge, Alleppey on 11-3-1988. Against the said judgment and decree claimant preferred appeal before this Court as L.A.A 101 of 1990 under S. 54 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894. Appeal was dismissed by a learned single Judge on 21-1-1992. Against the said judgment claimant filed A.F.A 109 of 1994 under S. 5(ii) of the Kerala High Court Act along with a petition for condonation of delay.
5. Counsel for the appellant Sri D. Krishna Prasad contended that appeal is maintainable under S. 5(ii) of the Kerala High Court Act before a Bench of two Judges. According to him, award of the Land Acquisition Court is a ‘decree’ within the meaning of S. 26(2) of the Land Acquisition Act and that an appeal would lie before the High Court under S. 54 of the Act. According to counsel, since the appeal was heard by a single Judge as per S. 3(13)(b) of the High Court Act, a further appeal would lie to a Bench of two Judges under S. 5(ii) of Kerala High Court Act, 1958.
6. Learned Judges who referred the matter felt that since the appeal is a creature of the statute the maintainability or otherwise of the appeal should be considered within the framework of S. 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, which confers an appeal to the High Court and further appeal to the Supreme Court. Learned Judges stressed the words ‘such appeal’ as well as the words ‘decree of the High Court passed on such appeal aforesaid’. Reference was also made to a decision of the Supreme Court in S.A Indutries (P) Ltd. v. S.B Sarup, AIR 1965 SC 1442. Learned Judges also referred to an unreported decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeals Nos. 16632 to 16668 of 1982 and to the decision of the Madras High Court in Manavikraman Tirumalpadi v. Collector of Nilgiris, AIR 1919 Mad 626. Learned Judges disagreed with the decision of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court. In Mahli Devi v. Chander Bhan, AIR 1995 Delhi 293, where the Court took the view that appeal before a Bench of two Judges would lie under Letters Patent.
7. In order to examine this question it is necessary to understand the meaning and scope of Ss. 54 and 26(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 vis-a-vis S. 5(ii) of the Kerala High Court Act, we may extract S. 54 of the Land Acquisition Act for easy reference.
“Appeals in proceedings before Court—
Subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), applicable to appeals from original decrees, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment for the time being in force, an appeal shall only lie in any proceedings under this Act to the High Court from the award, or from any decree of the High Court passed on “such appeal as aforesaid” an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court subject to the provisions contained in S. 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and in Order XLV thereof.”
Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act is an enabling provision enacted to confer right of appeal initially to the “High Court” and then to the “Supreme Court” against order of the Land Acquisition Court. Enabling words are to be construed as compulsory whenever the object of the power is to effectuate a legal right. The provision has also made it imperative using a non-obstante clause with a view to give an overriding impact on the powers of any other enactment. Under the above mentioned provision the appeal is provided to the “High Court” and not to a single Judge or to a Division Bench of the High Court. Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act emphasises the forum to which the appeal is provided, that is, to the “High Court” and further appeal to the “Supreme Court”. Once the matter is seized before the High Court by way of an appeal the manner in which that appeal has to be disposed of is to be decided by the “High Court” as per rules and procedure for disposing of appeals by the High Court unless it is otherwise barred.
8. The provision regulating the business and exercise of the powers of the High Court is enumerated in the Kerala High Court Act, 1958. High Courts in India are superior courts of record which owe their existence to the Constitution of India. Under Art. 214 of the Constitution of India, there shall be a High Court for each State and every High Court shall be a Court of record and shall have all the powers of such a Court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Articles 216 to 224 provide for the Constitution and organisation of High Court. Articles 225 to 228 deal with the general powers and jurisdiction of the High Court. The jurisdiction and powers of High Courts which were in existence on the date on which the Constitution came into force are preserved by Art. 225 subject to the conditions specified therein. Article 230 states that Parliament may by law extend the jurisdiction of a High Court to, or exclude the jurisdiction of a High Court from any Union Territory. Clause (2) of that Article states that where the High Court of a State exercises jurisdiction in relation to a Union Territory, nothing in the Constitution shall be construed as empowering the legislature of the State to increase, restrict or abolish that jurisdiction. The general powers and jurisdiction of the High Court are found in the above mentioned Articles. Therefore State Legislature or the Union Legislature would not be competent to pass a law to curtail or modify the limit of such jurisdiction and powers as defined in the body of the Constitution.
9. High Courts have got inherent and plenary powers. As held by the Supreme Court in M.V Elizabeth v. Harwan Investment and Trading, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 433 : (AIR 1993 SC 1014), “Under appellate or discretionary jurisdiction of the Court, High Courts have unlimited jurisdiction, including jurisdiction to determine their own powers”. In this connection it is profitable to refer to a passage from the Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn. Vol. 10, paragraph 713:
“Prima facie, no matter is deemed to be beyond the jurisdiction of a superior court unless it is expressly shown to be so, while nothing is within the jurisdiction of an inferior Court, unless it is expressly shown on the face of the proceedings that the particular matter is within the cognizance of the particular Court.”
10. The Kerala High Court Act, 1958 was enacted to make provisions regulating the business and the exercise of the powers of the High Court in the State of Kerala High Court of Kerala also in exercise of the powers conferred by Art. 225 of the Constitution of India, S. 122 of the C.P.C and all other powers enabling in this behalf published the Rules of the High Court of Kerala, 1971. The Kerala High Court Act and the Rules framed thereunder regulate the business and exercise of the powers of the High Court.
11. The Kerala High Court Act has been enacted by the State Legislature in exercise of its powers conferred under Entry 3 of List 2 of the Seventh Schedule read with Art. 225 of the Constitution of India. “Administration of Justice” is an item which was originally included in Entry 3 of List 2 of the Seventh Schedule” which enables the State Legislature to make law for regulating the practice and procedure of the High Court in relation to the administration of justice. By the 42nd Constitution Amendment Act, 1976 the expression “administration of justice” has been transferred from Entry 3 List II to the concurrent list and inserted as Entry IIA in List III of the Seventh Schedule. The constitutional validity of Kerala High Court Act, 1958 came up for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court in Indo-Mercantile Bank Ltd.…* v. Commissioner, Quilon Municipality & Another…, 1960 Ker LT 1091: (AIR 1961 Ker 96) (FB). The same question came up for consideration before another Full Bench in Kochupennu Kochikka v. Kochikka Kunhipennu, 1961 Ker LT 275: (AIR 1961 Ker 226) (FB). That Full Bench also held as follows (at p. 231 of AIR):
“The enactment of a law to regulate the practice and procedure in the High Court will certainly fall within the residual power of the State Legislature. Prior to the coming into force of the Constitution, the exercise of the jurisdiction and powers of the British Indian High Courts was regulated by the rules framed by the respective High Courts by virtue of the powers granted by the Letters Patent pertaining to such courts. This rule making power of the High Courts was preserved by S. 223 of Government of India Act, 1935. So far as the State High Courts were concerned, the exercise of the jurisdiction and powers of such Courts was regulated by the statutes passed by the sovereign legislature of the respective States. Article 225 of the Constitution provided for the continuance of these rules and statutes until other statutory provisions are made by the appropriate legislature. The Article runs as follows:—
“Subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the provisions of any law of this appropriate legislature made by virtue of powers conferred on the legislature by this Constitution, the jurisdiction of and the law administered in any existing High Court, and the respective powers of the Judges thereof in relation to administration of justice in the Court, including any power to make rules of Court and to regulate the sittings of the Court and of members thereof sitting alone or in Division Courts, shall be the same as immediately before the commencement of this Constitution.” This Article makes it clear that provisions regulating the exercise of the jurisdiction of the High Court and of the powers of the Judges thereof either sitting alone or in Division Courts have a direct bearing on the administration of justice which is made a State subject by its inclusion in item 3 of List 2. It will therefore be within the competence of the State legislature to enact a law governing those mattes.”
Therefore the Kerala High Court Act 1958 regulates the business and exercise of powers of High Court in the State of Kerala and therefore regulate the practice and procedure of the High Court. Section 3 of the Kerala High Court Act states the powers of High Court in relation to certain matters which are to be exercised by a single Judge. Section 3(13)(b) says that an appeal from original decree or order in any suit or other proceeding, where the amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit or other proceeding does not exceed one lakh rupees are to be heard by a single Judge. Therefore in accordance with the above mentioned S. 3(13)(b), the land acquisition appeal, L.A.A No. 101 of 1990, was heard by a single Judge. As per S. 5(ii) of the High Court Act, 1958 a judgment of a learned single Judge in exercise of appellate jurisdiction as mentioned above would lie to a Bench of two Judges. Therefore going by S. 3(13)(b) read with S. 5(ii) of the Kerala High Court Act, an appeal shall lie to a Bench of two Judges unless otherwise specifically barred.
12. The question that falls for consideration therefore is as to whether S. 54 of the Land Acquisition Act has, in any way, curtailed or taken away the power of appeal provided to a Bench of two Judges under S. 5(ii) of the Kerala High Court Act or gave finality to the judgment and decision of a single Judge of the High Court exercising powers under S. 54 of the Land Acquisition Act.
13. The right of appeal has always been regarded as a valuable and substantial right. A provision of law which confers, extends or regulates the right of appeal would be liberally construed with the object, if possible, of maintaining the right. Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act has conferred a right of appeal on an aggrieved party to the High Court against the award passed by Land Acquisition Court. Legislature can also take away or curtail the right of appeal. Legislature can also make provisions to make a decision on appeal final, enacting a finality clause. Supreme Court in S.A Industries (P) Ltd. v. S.B Sarup, AIR 1965 SC 1442, whiledealing with the Delhi Rent Control Act held as follows: (para 11 of AIR):
“A statute may give a right of appeal from an order of a Tribunal or a Court to the High Court without any limitation thereon. The appeal to the High Court will be regulated by the practice and procedure obtaining in the High Court. Under the rules made by the High Court in exercise of the powers conferred on it under S. 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915 an appeal under S. 39 of the Act will be heard by a single Judge. Any judgment made by the single Judge in the said appeal will, under cl. 10 of the Letters Patent, be subject to an appeal to that Court. If the order made by a single Judge is a judgment and if the appropriate legislature has, expressly or by necessary implication, not taken away the right of appeal, the conclusion is inevitable that an appeal shall lie from the judgment of a single Judge under cl. (10) of the Letters Patent to the High Court. It follows that, if the Act had not taken away the Letters Patent appeal, an appeal shall certainly lie from the judgment of the single Judge to the High Court.”
14. A Division Bench of the Lahore High Court in Har Dial Shah v. Secretary of State, AIR 1923 Lahore 275 considered the scope of S. 54 of the Land Acquisition Act read with cl. (10) of the Letters Patent and took the view that right of appeal to a Bench of two Judges is not impliedly barred by S. 54 of the Land Acquisition Act. The said view was accepted by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Collector of Dacca v. Gholam Kuddus, AIR 1936 Cal 688. A Division Bench of Nagpur High Court in Narayanadas Daga v. Ganpatrao, AIR 1944 Nag 284 considered the scope of S. 54 and held that appeal under the Letters Patent lies from the decision of a single Judge to a Division bench of the High Court. A Division Bench of the Punjab High Court in Siri Chand v. Union of India, AIR 1963 Punjab 221, took the view that S. 54 of the Land Acquisition Act does not contain any prohibition against filing of a second appeal. Identical question came up for consideration before a Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Mahli Devi v. Chander Bhan, AIR 1995 Delhi 293. After examining various case laws on the point the Full Bench took the view that there is no conflict between the provisions of S. 54 of the Land Acquisition Act and cl. (10) of the Letters Patent of the High Court. The Court took the view that there is no bar in maintaining the letters of Patent Appeal in proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act.
15. In this connection reference may also be made to certain statutes which confer right of appeal, as well as to regulate the right of appeal either making a decision final or restrict number of appeals. A Full Bench of this Court in Fr. Abraham Mathews v. Ittan Pillai, 1981 Ker LT 260: (AIR 1981 Ker 129) has considered the question as to whether an appeal would lie to a Division Bench against the decision of a single Judge in a civil miscellaneous appeal. Contention was raised that the provisions in S. 5(ii) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958 is a special or local law in force and that therefore sub-section (2) of S. 104 of the Code of Civil Procedure would not take away the right of appeal under S. 5(ii) of that Act. Interpreting Sections 100A and 104, C.P.C, the Full Bench expressed the view that appeals preferred under S. 104 of the Code are appeals from orders, and very often, from interlocutory orders, and in most of the cases where such appeals are preferred, the concerned suit itself would be pending. A further appeal from the decision of a learned single Judge to a Division Bench would therefore contribute to delay in final disposal of the suit or the main action. The learned Judges felt that the intention of the amending provisions was to restrict further right of appeal so that there will not be further delay in the disposal of the suit. Same is the view taken by the Division Bench in Damodaran v. Sankaran, 1985 Ker LT 153. We are of the view that the position in the instant case is different since no proceeding is pending before the Land Acquisition Court.
16. There may be situation where statute itself specifically restricts further appeals. In this connection it is relevant to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Union Of India v. Mohindra Supply Co. , AIR 1962 SC 256. In that case, S. 39(2) of the Arbitration Act expressly prohibited a second appeal from an order passed in appeal under S. 39(1) except an appeal to the Supreme Court. There is, therefore, clear indication inherent in sub-section (2) that expression ‘second appeal’ does not mean an appeal under S. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In other words, the Legislature has plainly expressed itself that the right of appeal against orders passed under the Arbitration Act may be exercised only in respect of certain orders. The right of appeal against other orders is expressly taken away.
17. There are also cases where there is no specific bar in the statute regarding the right of second appeal. Interpreting S. 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, a Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Municipal Corporation v. Kuldip Lal Bhandari, AIR 1970 Delhi 37 held that an appeal against the decision of a learned single Judge would lie under cl. (10) of the Letters Patent to a Division Bench. So also a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shanti Devi v. G.M Haryana Roadways, AIR 1972 P & H 65, took the same view. The maintainability of the appeal under the Letters of Patent were also upheld by the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in M. Srinivas v. Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University, (1990) 3 Andh LT (SN) 3.
18. Supreme Court in South Asia Industries (P) Ltd. v. S.B Sarup Singh, AIR 1965 SC 1442 held that no appeal would lie under cl. (10) Letters of Patent in a proceeding under the Delhi Rent Control Act. Delhi Rent Control Court allowed a second appeal to the High Court under S. 39(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Section 43 says as otherwise expressly provided in the Act, every order made by the Controller or an order passed on appeal under that Act, shall be final. In that case, Delhi Rent Control Act itself gave finality to the appeal decided by the High Court exercising powers under S. 39 read with S. 43 of that Act, so that an appeal under Letters Patent would not lie. Decision taken by a single Judge of the High Court under the Delhi Rent Control Act as well as a decision taken by a Division Bench in the Letters of Patent are independent proceedings, and not a continuation of the proceedings under the Delhi Rent Control Act. In other words, a statute which confers right of appeal can also restrict further appeal by incorporating a finality clause with the result no further appeal would lie under any other enactment including Letters Patent.
19. The Supreme Court in Vanita M. Khanolkar v. Pragna M. Pai, AIR 1998 SC 424 considered the scope of S. 6(3) of the Specific Relief Act vis-a-vis Letters of Patent. Section 6(3) specifically says that no appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under that section. In that context, the Supreme Court took the view that the decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court was right. However, since the Bombay High Court was exercising original jurisdiction, the Court took the view that appeal would lie. The Supreme Court in that case observed as follows: ‘It is well settled that any statutory provision barring an appeal or revision cannot cut across the constitutional power of a High Court. Even the power flowing from the paramount charter under which the High Court functions would not get excluded unless the statutory enactment concerned ex-pressly excludes appeals under Letters Patent. No such bar is discernible from S. 6(3) of the Act.’
20. Learned Judges who referred this matter to the Full Bench relied on an unreported decision of the Supreme Court in Baljit Singh v. Statd of Haryana, (Civil Appeals Nos. 1663 to 1668 of 1982). The same was referred to by the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Mahli Devi v. Chander Bhan, AIR 1995 Delhi 293. We did not have the advantage of going through that unreported judgment. As we see from the Full Bench judgment of the Delhi High Court the Baljit Singh's case, was decided on concession of parties. We are also of the view on the basis of the various principles laid down by the Supreme Court referred to hereinbefore, the decision in Manavikraman Tirumalpadi v. Collector of Nilgiris, AIR 1919 Mad. 626 is not correctly decided. In any view, in that case, the Madras High Court held that a Letters Patent Appeal is not maintainable mainly on the ground that the decision of the High Court in appeal under S. 54 of the Land Acquisition Act is not a judgment. That reasoning cannot hold good in view of the amendment of S. 26 of the Land Acquisition Act. We are also of the view that decision is of no assistance to determine the question involved in this appeal.
21. The principle that is deducible from the above mentioned decisions is that unless there is express or implied bar curtailing the right of appeal, the Court should always uphold the right of appeal. As held by the Supreme Court in C.I.T, A.P v. Ashoka Engg. Co., 1993 Supp (1) SCC 754 : (AIR 1993 SC 858), it is an equally well-settled proposition of law that, if there is a provision, conferring a right of appeal, it should be read in a reasonable, practical and liberal manner. In Salimuddin Ahammed v. Rahim Sheiks AIR 1926 Cal 1113, it was pointed out that in a matter which relates to the curtailment of the right of appeal, if there is slightest doubt in one's mind, the benefit of that doubt should go to the party who seeks to appeal.
22. In view of the above mentioned circumstances, we are of the view that S. 54 of the Land Acquisition Act does not curtail a right of appeal to a Bench of two Judges provided under S. 5(ii) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958, nor has it made the decision of a single Judge of the High Court under S. 54 of the Land Acquisition Act read with S. 3(13)(b) of the Kerala High Court Act, final.
23. We, therefore, hold that the appeal shall lie to a Bench of two Judges under S. 5(ii) of the Kerala High Court Act against the judgment and decree of a learned single Judge rendered under S. 54 of the Land Acquisition Act. We make it clear that we are not expressing any opinion on merits on the delay petition as well as with regard to the admissibility of the appeal.
Order accordingly.
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