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Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. R. Krishnarjunan
Factual and Procedural Background
The assessment year concerned was 1981-82. The assessee filed a return disclosing a sale of land measuring 1 acre and 15.325 cents for Rs. 42,250 and included a note that no capital gains arose, relying on the Bombay High Court decision in Manubhai A. Sheth v. N.D. Nirgudkar [1981] 128 ITR 87. A summary assessment under section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act was completed by the Income-tax Officer by order dated April 30, 1983, showing a total income of Rs. 33,700.
The Income-tax Officer subsequently issued a notice under section 143(2)(b) and, by order dated February 22, 1984, made an additional demand of Rs. 11,859 on the basis that the 143(1) assessment was incorrect. The ITO's order recorded that the assessee had admitted urban agricultural land to be a capital asset and that sale proceeds were capital receipts.
On appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (first appellate authority) issued an order dated December 17, 1985, noting that the return's accompaning statement placed relevant facts within the knowledge of the Income-tax Officer at the time of the summary assessment and observing that section 143(2)(b) is not synonymous with sections 147(a) or 147(b). The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal in an order dated June 12, 1986 (annexure "D") held that reopening under section 143(2)(b) was impermissible because the return was neither incorrect nor incomplete and that the ITO must have had some information or material to base a doubt as to correctness or completeness.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal has correctly interpreted the provisions of section 143(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act?
- Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is right in holding that no capital gains would arise on the sale of urban agricultural land?
Arguments of the Parties
Assessee's Arguments
- The assessee relied on the Bombay High Court decision in Manubhai A. Sheth v. N.D. Nirgudkar [1981] 128 ITR 87 to support the contention that no capital gains arose on the sale of the land.
- It was argued before the first appellate authority that the explanatory statement accompanying the return put the necessary facts within the knowledge of the Income-tax Officer when he completed the summary assessment under section 143(1), and therefore there was no scope for a fresh look or reopening.
- Submissions made before the Tribunal contended that inherent conditions for the exercise of powers under section 143(2)(b) were necessary — specifically, that the Income-tax Officer must have some information or material in his possession that gives rise to doubt as to the correctness or completeness of the return.
Revenue / Income-tax Officer's Arguments
- The Income-tax Officer's order recorded that the assessee admitted urban agricultural land to be a capital asset and that the sale would give rise to capital receipts.
- The ITO relied on a Supreme Court distinction between capital receipts and revenue receipts to support the conclusion that proceeds from realisation of the capital asset (land) constituted capital receipts and not agricultural income.
- The ITO exercised the statutory power under section 143(2)(b) on the basis that the 143(1) assessment was incorrect, and made an additional demand accordingly.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Commr. Of Income Tax v. Sarala Devi [1987] 167 ITR 136 | Holds that where the source of the amount is the realisation of capital assets (agricultural land), the receipt is capital gains and cannot be treated as income derived from agricultural land. | The court followed this decision and relied on its principle to conclude that sale proceeds of agricultural land are capital gains and not agricultural income; the court described the Bombay High Court's contrary view as fallacious in this respect. |
| Manubhai A. Sheth v. N.D. Nirgudkar, Second ITO [1981] 128 ITR 87 (Bombay High Court) | Plaintiff/assessee relied on this decision to contend that no capital gains arose on the sale of the land. | The court noted that the assessee and the lower authorities had relied on this Bombay High Court decision, but the court did not follow it and stated that the law as laid down by this court differs from the Bombay High Court decision relied upon. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The judgment addresses the two framed questions in sequence, although the court observed at the outset that only question No. 1 ultimately survived in controversy. The court's reasoning unfolded in two main strands: (A) treatment of receipts from sale of agricultural land, and (B) interpretation and scope of the power under section 143(2)(b).
(A) On whether sale proceeds of urban agricultural land constitute capital gains:
- The court relied on the decision in Commr. of Income Tax v. Sarala Devi, which considers the source of the amount. If the source is realisation of the capital asset (agricultural land), the receipt is capital in nature and cannot be treated as income derived from the land for the purposes of agricultural income.
- The court also referred to the definition of "agricultural income" in section 2(1)(a) and observed that the provision (added with retrospective effect) indicates that receipts arising from the use of land may be agricultural income, but receipts relatable to disposal or sale of the land itself are to be classified as capital gains.
- On this basis the court concluded that proceeds of sale cannot be agricultural income and must be treated as capital gains.
(B) On whether the ITO properly exercised powers under section 143(2)(b):
- The court examined the statutory scheme: section 143(1) provides for summary assessment based on the return and its accompaniments and permits rectification of arithmetical errors; it is a summary process that ordinarily does not require production of evidence.
- Section 143(2)(b) independently empowers the Income-tax Officer to verify the correctness and completeness of the return when the officer finds it necessary or expedient to do so. The plain language of section 143(2)(b) does not impose a statutory requirement that the officer must have acquired additional information subsequently (i.e., there is no explicit precondition that some new information must first come into the officer's possession before the power may be exercised).
- The court rejected attempts to import into section 143(2)(b) the requirements applicable to reopening under sections 147 and 148 (which concern escapement of assessment), holding that those provisions and their preconditions cannot be transposed to section 143(2)(b) so as to nullify its plain statutory language.
- Applying these principles to the facts, the court held that the assessment was in fact incorrect because the sale proceeds had been treated (in the return) in a manner inconsistent with the legal position (they were agricultural income in form, whereas they were capital gains by law). Given this, the Income-tax Officer's satisfaction to verify the correctness and completeness of the return under section 143(2)(b) was sustainable.
The court therefore concluded that the Tribunal erred in holding that reopening under section 143(2)(b) required possession of subsequent information or material; the statutory text permits the ITO to exercise the power on his satisfaction that verification is necessary, and in this case the verification and demand were justified because the return was incorrect in law.
Holding and Implications
Holding: Question No. 1 is answered in the negative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee; and Question No. 2 is answered in the negative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The court upheld the ITO's action under section 143(2)(b) and sustained the additional demand made on the basis that the return was incorrect; it also held that receipts from the sale of the agricultural land are capital gains and not agricultural income, which supports the Revenue's assessment position.
- On statutory interpretation: The decision clarifies that section 143(2)(b) is an independent power exercisable when the Income-tax Officer finds it necessary or expedient to verify correctness and completeness of the return and that the plain language does not mandate antecedent possession of fresh information as a precondition for invoking the power.
- Broader precedent: The court followed the position in Commr. of Income Tax v. Sarala Devi and expressly did not follow the Bombay High Court decision relied upon by the assessee; the opinion does not state that it is laying down a new general rule beyond its application to the facts before the court. The direct consequence is the vindication of the Revenue's position in this case and the negation of the assessee's reliance on the Bombay High Court decision.
Administrative note contained in the opinion: A copy of the judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar was to be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, as required by law.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
V.V Kamat, J.:— The question that is required to be considered by us really needs reading of the text of section 143 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Although the following two questions expect an answer, what survives is only question No. 1. The two questions are as follows:
“(1) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal has correctly interpreted the provisions of section 143(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act?
(2) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is right in holding that no capital gains would arise on the sale of urban agricultural land?”
2. Question No. 2 relating to receipts as a result of the sale of urban agricultural land, whether can be treated as capital gains or not, gets covered in more than one way. The decision of this court in Commr. Of Income Tax v. Sarala Devi [1987] 167 ITR 136 considers the basic question as regards the source of the amount. If the source of the amount is the realisation of the capital assets — agricultural land — it cannot be considered as anything other than capital gains and would not be income derived from agricultural land and, therefore, not chargeable under the Act. This court by its decision in Commr. Of Income Tax v. Sarala Devi [1987] 167 ITR 136 has correctly found out the fallacy that when the land is sold, the sale proceeds cannot be understood to be revenue but capital, obviously because it cannot be understood as income derived from the land as the land itself is realised when it is sold.
3. The question can yet be seen from another independent angle, referring to section 2(1)(a) telling us what is “agricultural income”. There is no dispute that the provision is added with retrospective effect and a bare perusal of the provision would show that the receipt as a result of realisation of the land cannot be considered as agricultural income. Various provisions make it clear that it must be one arising out of the use of the land to gain the character of agricultural income and if the amount of receipt is relatable to the disposal or sale of the land itself, it would naturally amount to be classified and understood as capital gains having direct relationship with the sale of the capital asset in question.
4. Thus question No. 2 gets answered in the negative, i.e, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
5. Question No. 1 requires introduction of the factual matrix. The assessment year is 1981-82. The assessee came to be assessed by resort to summary procedure under section 143(1) of the Act by the Income-tax Officer by order dated April 30, 1983, on the basis of a total income of Rs. 33,700. At this time in the return a transaction of sale of the land admeasuring 1 acre and 15.325 cents sold at Rs. 42,250 was shown in the return, with an explanatory note below thereunder that no capital gains arose in view of the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Manubhai A. Sheth v. N.D Nirgudkar, Second ITO [1981] 128 ITR 87. The assessment under section 143(1) of the Act came to be completed, as stated above.
6. Thereafter, the Income-tax Officer exercised the powers under section 143(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Naturally a notice thereunder was issued and by the order dated February 22, 1984, Rs. 11,859 came to be demanded as an additional amount on the basis of incorrectness in regard to the assessment completed under section 143(1) of the Act. In reaching this conclusion, the Income-tax Officer in paragraph 5 of the order held that the assessee admitted that urban agricultural land is a capital asset and sale of such land would give rise to capital receipts by way of sale proceeds. The Income-tax Officer on the strength of the decision of the Supreme Court in regard thereto observed that there is a fundamental distinction between capital receipts and revenue receipts and the distinction is that when one receives the amount from the use of the capital asset and not by its realisation, the amount can be understood as revenue only in the situation. The Income-tax Officer corrected the position and ordered addition as stated above.
7. The first appellate authority — the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Trivandrum—considered the question by order dated December 17, 1985. The appellate authority considered the location of the agricultural land being within the municipal limit of Alleppey as well as appreciating the statement accompanying the return, relies on the decision of the Bombay High Court in Manubhai A. Sheth v. N.D Nirgudkar, Second ITO [1981] 128 ITR 87, what was contended before the first appellate authority was that in view of the statement accompanying the return, the necessary facts will have to be understood as being within the knowledge of the Income-tax Officer when, under section 143(1) of the Act, summary procedure was initiated and completed. On the strength of this position, it was submitted that there was no scope for a fresh look. The first appellate authority took the view that the summary assessment was converted into a scrutiny assessment by resorting to the provisions of section 143(2)(b) of the Act. It was also observed that section 143(2)(b) of the Act is not synonymous with the contents of section 147(a) or section 147(b) of the Act.
8. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal took up the question for consideration in the impugned order dated June 12, 1986 (annexure “D”). The question was taken up for consideration by the Tribunal in paragraph 3 of its order. The submissions with regard to the language of section 143(2)(b) were made to contend that certain inherent conditions for justification of the action under section 143(2)(b) of the Act are necessary. It was contended that it has to be found that the return is incomplete or incorrect and in regard thereto the Income-tax Officer must have some information on material in his possession as the basis of doubt as to the correctness or completeness of the return.
9. The Tribunal accepted the contention that in order to embark on the exercise of the powers under section 143(2)(b) of the Act requiring a foundational existence in relation to the correctness and completeness of the return, the Income-tax Officer should have come into possession of some information about the correctness or completeness of the return. The Tribunal further observes that it is only after the Income-tax Officer is satisfied, resort to exercise of the powers under section 143(2)(b) of the Act can be understood as have justification. The Tribunal emphasised that the return filed by the assessee was neither incorrect nor incomplete and, therefore, the reopening would have to be regarded as impermissible.
10. We have already shown in relation to our discussion for answering question No. 2 that if the land is agricultural land, the amount received by the assessee as a result of sale thereof could not be considered as agricultural income in any sense of the term. We have already observed and held in regard thereto that the receipt of the amount as a result of the realisation of the capital assets could only be considered as “capital gains”. In the process, we have also observed the law laid down by this court, which we respectfully follow, as different from the Bombay High Court relied upon by the assessee and the taxation authorities below. The law of this State is abundantly clear as stated above.
11. A bare look at the concerned statutory provision Would show requirements necessary to exercise the powers under section 143(2)(b) of the Act as was initiated by the authorities. Section 143(1) of the Act speaks of initiation of summary procedure which does not require the presence of the assessee or the production of any evidence in support of the return and requires the Assessing Officer to act in a summary manner on the basis of the return and its accompaniments. The provision also empowers the Income-tax Officer proceeding with the summary assessment to rectify arithmetical errors in the return, accounts and documents. The power is of a summary nature empowering the Income-tax Officer to deal with cases requiring no further probe in regard thereto.
12. At the other end, section 143(2) of the Act speaks of a situation (section 143(2)(a)) seeing the assessee objecting to such assessment within a period of one month from the notice of demand in-pursuance thereof placing objections in regard thereto.
13. Apart therefrom, the provisions of section 143(2)(b) independently empower the Income-tax Officer, whether or not any assessment is made under section 143(1), to exercise the powers under the provision and all that it requires is that the officer finds it necessary or expedient to verify the correctness and completeness of the return. It must be said that reading the entire provision, there is no statutory requirement for the exercise of the powers under section 143(2)(b) of the Act that the Income-tax Officer must have some information, gathered subsequently, leading him to the situation as regards the correctness and completeness of the return. The plain language of the provision under consideration shows that it is a power given by the statutory provision irrespective of a situation showing exercise of the powers under section 143(1) of the Act, as an independent power and this power is based on the satisfaction for verification of the correctness and completeness. The plain language again does not speak of the requirement of any independent information in regard thereto and subsequent thereto in the context of point of time. The submissions which were made before the Tribunal, and apparently have sweared before the Tribunal, will have to be considered as stemming from the requirements of section 147 and section 148 of the Act dealing with the situation of escapement of assessment and the law in regard thereto. It is not possible to introduce the requirements of section 147 and section 148 of the Act and consequently violate the plain statutory provision of section 143(2)(b) of the Act, for expecting the necessity of some other additional information having a source at a later occasion in the context of point of time. The language of the provision under consideration is more than clear and it is that the Income-tax Officer has to consider it necessary and expedient to verify the correctness and completeness of the return. As is seen hereinbefore, the assessment was incorrect obviously because the amount received as a result of the sale of the agricultural land, may be urban or rural, could not be understood as agricultural income in any sense of the situation, but is capital gain directly flowing from the realisation of the capital assets. If, on the basis of the plain situation of law, treating the amount as income would inevitably result in the conclusion that the return is based on incorrect and incomplete situation.
14. The result of the above discussion is the negative answer to question No. 1.
15. For the above reasons, question No. 1 is answered in the negative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. Question No. 2, as stated above, is answered in the negative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
16. A copy of this, judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, as required by law.
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