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Mathenkutty & Anr. v. State Of Kerala

Kerala High Court
Apr 21, 1995
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Sec. 116(6) CrPC issue)

Factual and Procedural Background

Petitioners (who were counter-petitioners in M.C. No. 25 of 1995 before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Palai) were the subject of proceedings instituted by the Magistrate on the basis of a police report dated 4.8.1994 alleging they were likely to commit breach of peace in the Panichipara kara area of Poonjar Nadubhagam village, Meenachil Taluk. By order dated 25.8.1994 (Ext. P2) the Sub-Divisional Magistrate directed the counter-petitioners to appear on 8.9.1994 and show cause why they should not execute a bond of Rs.1,000 with two sureties for one year to keep the peace.

Petitioners earlier moved this Court in Crl. M.C. No. 1825 of 1994 to quash Ext. P2; that request was rejected on 1.12.1994. By Ext. P6 dated 8.12.1994, the Magistrate directed petitioners to execute an interim bond without sureties to keep the peace until final disposal. Thereafter the 1st petitioner filed O.P. No. 17991 of 1994 seeking writ relief to quash the Magistrate's proceedings; that petition was declined with an observation that the Magistrate should give opportunity to represent grievance.

Petitioners moved the Magistrate under Section 116(6) CrPC seeking that the proceedings be dropped because the inquiry had not been completed within six months. Petitioners alleged the Magistrate had adjourned for taking evidence and had issued a bailable warrant to witnesses who did not appear on 25.3.1995. They sought quashing of Ext. P6 and a direction to drop proceedings under Section 116(6).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the six-month period prescribed under sub-section (6) of Section 116 of the Code of Criminal Procedure commences from the date of appearance of the parties to the inquiry proceedings or from the date on which recording of evidence (i.e., commencement of inquiry/trial) begins.
  2. Whether, applying that interpretation to the present facts, the inquiry in this case stood terminated on expiry of six months, thereby obliging the Magistrate to drop proceedings and precluding further steps such as issuance of summons to witnesses or insistence on an interim bond.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • Counsel for petitioners contended that the six-month period under Section 116(6) should be calculated from the date of appearance of both parties before the Magistrate. On that basis, the six months had expired by 25.2.1995 and the proceedings stood automatically terminated.
  • Petitioners argued that once the six-month period expired the Magistrate was not competent to continue the proceedings and therefore was bound to drop the same when petitioners requested it to do so.
  • Petitioners asserted that the Magistrate improperly proceeded with the inquiry and issued summons to witnesses after the statutory period had expired, rendering those steps illegal; they also sought quashing of Ext. P6 (the interim bond order).

The opinion does not set out, in comparable detail, any specific counter-arguments advanced on behalf of the State or the Magistrate in opposition to petitioners' submissions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
J.C. Mehta v. State (1982 Crl. L.J. 1488) — Delhi High Court Held that the date on which the person appears or is brought before the Magistrate is the date when the Magistrate is supposed to proceed under Section 116(1); supports computation from appearance. Identified as part of the body of authority taking the view that the six-month period begins on appearance; the Court considered this view but ultimately did not adopt it.
Sitaram Singh v. Ram Autar Singh (AIR 1980 Patna 257) — Patna Full Bench Full Bench view that forming the conclusion to proceed to inquire takes place on the day the party appears in court (supporting calculation from appearance). Noted as a leading authority relied upon by courts taking the "appearance" view; the present Court recorded that Delhi High Court followed this decision.
Dwarkanath Ramachandra v. State of Maharashtra (1977 Cri. L.J. 120) — Bombay High Court Expressed the view that the six-month period commences from appearance of parties. Listed among decisions holding commencement from appearance; considered but not followed by this Court.
Hasan Ali v. State of Rajasthan (1979) 12 WLN 151 — Rajasthan High Court Expressed the view that the period commences from appearance of parties. Noted as supporting the "appearance" view; the Court contrasted it with authorities it preferred.
Sona Khan v. State (1981 Cri. L.J. 39) — Orissa Full Bench Held that "commencement of inquiry" means when the Magistrate attempts legally to put the allegations to test (i.e., when inquiry/recording of evidence commences); treated commencement as common to sub-sections (3) and (6). Cited approvingly; the present Court expressed respectful agreement with this Full Bench and adopted its reasoning to hold that the six-month period runs from the date recording of evidence begins.
Madhu Limaye v. State ((1970) 3 SCC 739 ; AIR 1971 SC 2481) — Supreme Court Held that an interim bond can be asked for only when enquiry has commenced (i.e., commencing of a trial according to summons procedure); Magistrate cannot postpone inquiry and ask for interim bond without conducting the inquiry. Quoted by the Orissa Full Bench and relied upon in the Court's reasoning to support the proposition that "commencement" means starting the trial/recording of evidence; the present Court invoked this principle.
Uchhaba Jena (1978 Cri. L.J. 124) — Orissa Division Bench Earlier Division Bench view consonant with the Full Bench that "commencement of inquiry" in sub-sections (3) and (6) refer to the same stage (i.e., commencement of legal inquiry/recording of evidence). Cited as antecedent authority supporting the Orissa Full Bench conclusion; referred to in the chain of reasoning the Court accepted.
Motilal Jivanbhai v. Jesangbhai Nag Jibhai (1988 Cri. L.J. 255) — Gujarat High Court Held that the phrase "period of six months from the date of its commencement" means from the date on which recording of evidence begins. Noted and followed (the Court expressly stated its respectful agreement with Gujarat's view) as supporting commencement from recording of evidence.
Paresh Ch. Hati v. Ahitosh Panda (82 C.W.N. 922) — Calcutta Division Bench Held that inquiry under Section 107 does not commence with mere appearance; it commences when the opposite party challenges allegations or the Magistrate decides to proceed to ascertain truth by taking evidence. Cited with approval; the present Court relied on its reasoning to support the proposition that commencement is when the Magistrate begins to ascertain truth (e.g., by recording evidence).
Tushar Kanti Banerji v. The State of West Bengal (82 C.W.N. 652) — Calcutta Bench Considered the meaning of "trial" and held that "trial" commencement depends on context (example given for Sessions trial: after plea and then taking evidence); used to show meaning depends on statutory context. Referred to by the Calcutta Division Bench and noted by this Court for the proposition that the meaning of "trial" and "inquiry" depends on context and the applicable statutory procedure.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by setting out the statutory framework in Section 116 CrPC: Section 116(1) requires a Magistrate, when an order under Section 111 has been read or explained or when a person appears in compliance with summons or warrant, to proceed to inquire into the truth of the information and to take such further evidence as may appear necessary; subsection (3) permits the Magistrate, after commencement and before completion of the inquiry, to direct a person to execute a bond; and subsection (6) requires that the inquiry under the section be completed within six months from the date of its commencement, failing which proceedings stand terminated unless extended for special reasons recorded in writing.

The Court recognized a divergence in High Court authorities: some courts (Gujarat, Orissa, Calcutta) read "commencement" as the date when recording of evidence (i.e., the practical start of the inquiry/trial) begins; other courts (Delhi, Bombay, Patna, Rajasthan) treated "commencement" as the date of appearance of the parties.

The Court examined the authorities in detail, relying particularly on the reasoning in the Orissa Full Bench (Sona Khan), the Supreme Court's observations in Madhu Limaye, Gujarat High Court (Motilal Jivanbhai) and the Calcutta Division Bench (Paresh Ch. Hati). The Orissa Full Bench's analysis emphasized that the phrase "commencement of inquiry" used in subsections (3) and (6) must carry the same meaning, and that the Magistrate's power to call for an interim bond presupposes an actual commencement of inquiry—i.e., taking steps in a legally cognizable manner to test allegations, which ordinarily means beginning the procedure for recording evidence rather than merely noting an appearance.

The Court quoted Madhu Limaye to underscore that a Magistrate cannot defer the inquiry, hear nobody and yet require an interim bond; an inquiry must in meaningful terms have commenced (a trial according to summons procedure) before demanding such a bond.

Applying the statutory language and the weight of the authorities that construe "commencement" to mean the start of recording evidence or the stage at which the Magistrate actually sets about ascertaining truth, the Court concluded that the latter view accords with the provisions of Section 116. The Court expressly stated respectful agreement with the Orissa Full Bench, the Gujarat and Calcutta authorities that favoured this interpretation.

On the facts, the Court noted: notice under Section 107 was sent on 25.8.1994 directing appearance on 8.9.1994; the interim bond direction was issued on 8.12.1994; and, according to petitioners, evidence was taken on 9.3.1995. If inquiry commenced when recording of evidence began (9.3.1995), the Magistrate had six months from that date to complete the inquiry; that period had not expired when petitioners sought the direction to drop proceedings. Consequently, the Magistrate's continuation of proceedings and issuance of summons was not barred by Section 116(6) on the ground urged by petitioners.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court adopted the view that the "commencement" of inquiry under Section 116(6) CrPC is the stage when the Magistrate starts recording evidence or otherwise commences the legal inquiry to ascertain the truth of allegations. Applying that rule to the facts, the Court held that the inquiry in the present case had not terminated by efflux of six months and therefore declined petitioners' request to direct the Magistrate to drop the proceedings. The petition was dismissed.

DISPOSITION: The Criminal Miscellaneous Petition is dismissed.

Direct Consequences for the Parties

  • The Magistrate was entitled to continue the inquiry; the request to quash Ext. P6 (interim bond order) and to direct dropping of proceedings under Section 116(6) was refused.
  • Because the Court held the six-month period starts from commencement of recording evidence (here indicated as 9.3.1995), the statutory period had not expired at the time petitioners sought relief.

The opinion does not set out any broader policy pronouncement beyond adopting the interpretation described above; it resolves the statutory interpretation dispute in this case by aligning with the authorities that construe "commencement" as the start of recording evidence.

Show all summary ...

1. The Short question for consideration is whether the period of six months prescribed under Sub-section (6) of section 116 of the Code of Criminal Procedure commences from the date of appearance of both parties to the enquiry proceedings or from the date of starting recording of evidence. Petitioners are counter-petitioners in M.C No. 25 of 1995 before Sub Divisional Magistrate, Palai. The proceedings were initiated by the Magistrate on the basis of the report submitted by the Sub Inspector of police, Erattupetta on 4.8.1994, that the counter-petitioners therein (petitioners herein) are likely to commit breach of peace, in the locality, disturb public tranquility and do wrongful acts that may cause a breach of the peace in and around the area of Panichipara kara in Poonjar Nadubhagam village of Meenachil Taluk. By Ext. P2 order dated 25.8.1994, the Sub Divisional Magistrate directed the counter-petitioners to appear before him at Palai on 8.9.1994 and show cause why they should not be ordered to execute a bond for a sum of Rs. 1000/- along with two sureties each for the like sum for a period of one year to keep peace in the locality. Petitioners had moved this Court earlier by Crl. M.C No. 1825 of 1994 to quash that order. That request was rejected by order rendered on 1.12.1994 Since then the Magistrate by Ext. P6 order dated 8.12.1994 directed petitioners to execute an interim bond without sureties for keeping peace and public tranquility till the final disposal of the complaint.

2. In the meantime, 1st petitioner had filed an Original petition before this Court as O.P No. 17991 of 1994 seeking a writ of certiorari or other appropriate direction to quash the proceedings pending before the Magistrate. That request was also declined by this Court with the observation that the Sub Divisional Magistrate shall give opportunity to petitioners to represent their grievance before him. Since then petitioners moved a petition before the Magistrate under Sec. 116(6) of the Code for dropping the proceedings for the reason that the enquiry had not been completed within a period of six months as prescribed in that sub-section. The grievance of petitioners is that the Magistrate had not heeded to the submissions made by them in this behalf and the proceedings were adjourned for taking evidence. A bailable warrant is also alleged to have been issued to the witnesses who had not appeared before him on 25.3.1995 Quashing of Ext. P6 is sought by petitioners. A direction to the magistrate to drop the proceedings under Sec. 116(6) of the Code is also claimed.

3. Heard counsel for petitioners.

4. In a proceeding under Sec. 116 of the Code, the Magistrate has to inquire into the truth of the information. He is bound to follow the procedure prescribed for recording evidence in summons cases. Sec. 116(1) says that when an order under Sec. 111 has been read or explained under Sec. 112 to a person present in Court, or when any person appears or is brought before a Magistrate in compliance with, or in execution of, a summons or warrant issued under Sec. 113, the Magistrate shall proceed to inquire into the truth of the information upon which action has been taken, and to take such further evidence as may appear to be necessary. After commencement and before the completion of the inquiry under sub-sec. (1), the Magistrate, if he considers that immediate measures are necessary for prevention of a breach of the peace, may direct the person to execute a bond with or without sureties for keeping peace or maintaining good behaviour until the enquiry is concluded. Sub-sec. (6) of Sec. 116 of the Code directs that the enquiry under the Section shall be completed within a period of six months from the date of its commencement. If the enquiry is not so completed, the proceedings under the Chapter shall, on the expiry of the said period, stand terminated unless, for special reasons to be recorded in writing, the Magistrate otherwise directs. That sub-section contains a proviso which is not relevant for the purpose of this petition.

5. On the basis of these provisions learned counsel for petitioners contends that the calculation of six months has to be made from the appearance of both parties to the enquiry proceedings and the six months' period having been over by 25.2.1995, the proceedings stand automatically terminated. The Magistrate, according to counsel, was therefore not competent to continue the proceedings and was bound to drop the same when a request was made by petitioners in that behalf. The grievance is that the Magistrate has proceeded with the enquiry and had issued summons to the witnesses, which, according to petitioners, is illegal.

6. The question for consideration is whether the calculation of the period of six months under Sec. 116(6) of the Code has to be made from the date of commencement of proceedings or from the date on which the Magistrate has started recording of evidence. On this aspect, the decisions of the Court in this country are not uniform. The Gujarat, Orissa and Calcutta High Courts are of the view that the period commences from starting of recording of evidence whereas the Delhi, Bombay, Patna and Rajasthan High courts are of the view that the period commences from the date of appearance of the parties to the enquiry proceedings. To ascertain the correct legal position, the decisions rendered by the various High Courts are to be understood in the light of the various provisions contained in Sec. 116 which had been adverted to earlier.

7. The Delhi High Court in the decision in J.C Mehta v. State (1982 Crl. L.J 1488) is of the view that the date on which the person sought to be proceeded against appears or is brought before the magistrate is the date when the latter is supposed to proceed with the enquiry as contemplated in Sec. 116(1) of the Code. In coming to this conclusion, the Court followed a Full Bench decision of the Patna High court in 1. Sitaram Singh v. 2. Ram Autar Singh (AIR 1980 Patna 257). The Full Bench observed that the forming of conclusion to proceed to enquire into the allegations takes place on the very day the party noticed appears in court. Similar view was expressed by a Bench of the Bombay High Court in Dwarkanath Ramachandra v. State of Maharashtra (1977 Cri. L.J 120 and Rajasthan High Court in Hasan Ali v. State of Rajasthan, (1979) 12 WLN 151.

8. The contra view is expressed in a Full Bench decision of the Orissa High Court in Sona Khan v. State (1981 Cri. L.J 39). The Full Bench after referring to Madhu Limaye's case ((1970) 3 SCC 739 : AIR 1971 SC 2481) considered the question as to when the enquiry commences for the purpose of computing the period stipulated under sub-sec. (6) of Sec. 116 of the Code. The Full Bench observed that commencement of enquiry is a concept common to sub-sections (3) and (6). The mandate in sub-sec. (1) is that after appearance of the delinquent, the order has to be read out and inquiry has to follow. The Full Bench observed that as pointed out in Madhu Limaye's case, it is not open to the Magistrate to defer the inquiry and call for an interim bond. It was held that commencement of inquiry starts when the Magistrate attempts in a legal way to put the allegations to test for finding out whether they are facts. Both sub-sections (3) and (6) of Sec. 116 refer to chis stage as the commencement of inquiry. The Full Bench has quoted the observations of the Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye's case that it is not an inquiry within an inquiry. Ordinarily, the interim bond is asked for on the allegations forming the foundation for the basic proceedings. There may be instances where fresh allegations also come up and become material for an interim bond. The Full Bench observed that “commencement of inquiry” in sub-sections (3) and (6) refers to the same stage. The well accepted rules of interpretation that when the same phrase occurs in the same section at different places and there is no indication of legislative intent that a different meaning is intended thereby, both the phrases have to be given the same meaning were followed by the Full Bench. It is with these observations that the Full Bench agreed with an earlier Division Bench decision of the same High Court in Uchhaba Jena's case (1978 Cri. L.J 124) that “commencement of inquiry” in sub-sec. (3) and (6) refers to the same stage.

9. The Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye's case (Supra) held:

“……… A Magistrate can ask for an interim bond only if he cannot complete the enquiry and “during the completion of enquiry” postulates a commencement of the enquiry, which means commencing of a trial according to the summons procedure. The power to ask for an interim bond is not given to the Magistrate to postpone the case and hear nobody and yet ask a person to furnish a bond for good conduct…….”

10. The Full Bench of the Orissa High Court has referred to the new sub-section (3) of Sec. 116 which starts with “after the commencement and before the completion of the inquiry”. This change according to the Full bench has been made so as to put the matter beyond doubt that an interim bond can be called for only after the commencement of the inquiry and before its completion.

11. The Full Bench decision of the Orissa High Court was followed by the Gujarat High Court in Motilal Jivanbhai v. Jesangbhai Nag Jibhai (1988 Cri. L.J 255) Where it was held that the expression “period of six months from the date of its commencement” means from the date on which recording of evidence begins.

12. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court had occasion to consider this aspect in Paresh Ch. Hati v. Ahitosh Panda (82 C.W.N 922). A question arose whether the enquiry commences from the date of appearance of the party in answer to a show-cause notice and whether the proceeding terminates oil the expiry of six months from such commencement. The Division bench held that an enquiry in a proceeding under Sec. 107 of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973 does not commence with the mere appearance of the opposite party in answer to the notice to show cause. It depends upon the nature of the cause shown. It was held that the enquiry commences as soon as the opposite party challenges the allegations made against him or refuses to admit the same or submits a petition showing cause against the allegations or the magistrate otherwise has reason to proceed or proceeds or decides to ascertain the truth of the allegations made against the opposite party by taking evidence or otherwise. The Division Bench observed that the word ‘proceed’ appearing in sub-section (1) of Sec. 116 indicates that with mere appearance of the opposite party, inquiry does not commence. Moreover, there is the word ‘commencement’ in sub-section (6) of Sec. 116 of the Code. It is observed that this word again implies that after the starting of a proceeding under Sec. 107, there is a stage when inquiry commences. There may be cases where the opposite party pray for time for showing cause against the charges on reasonable and bona fide grounds. There may be occasions where the opposite party challenges the allegations and the magistrate may think it necessary to start an inquiry. It was held that the inquiry starts in a proceeding under Sec. 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as soon as the Magistrate thinks it necessary to ascertain the truth of the information upon which he has already taken action on the basis of the plea of the opposite party or the cause shown or otherwise. In that case it was held that the enquiry commenced as soon as the opposite party challenged the allegations made by the first party.

13. The meaning of the word “trial” in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 116 was also considered by the Division bench. Reference is seen made to the bench decision of the same High Court in Tushar Kanti Banerji v. The State of West Bengal (82 CWN 652). The question which arose in that case was when does a trial before the Sessions Judge commence. It was held that a trial does not commence before the Sessions Judge until after the accused committed for trial pleads guilty or pleads not guilty and claims to be tried under section 228 of the Code and the Sessions Judge proceeds to take evidence and follow the procedure laid down in Sec. 231. The meaning of the word “trial” must largely depend on the context in which it is used and the scheme of the enactment. The inquiry referred to in Sec. 116 of the Code has to be made in the manner prescribed for conducting trial and recording evidence in summons cases. This led the Bench to hold thus:

“When the inquiry referred to in section 116 of the Cr. P. Code is to be in the nature of trial in-summons cases, we must hold, as has been discussed by us hereinbefore, that it commences as soon as the opposite party in proceeding under section 107 challenges the allegations made against him or refuses to admit the same or submits a show causes petition against the allegation or the Magistrate otherwise has reason to proceed or proceeds, or decides to ascertain the truth of the allegation made against the opposite party by taking evidence or otherwise.”

14. The latter view commends to me since it is in accordance with the provisions contained in Sec. 116 of the Code. I am in respectful agreement with the views expressed by the Full Bench of the Orissa High Court and the Gujarat and Calcutta High Courts aforementioned, and hold that the enquiry under Sec. 116 of the Code commences from the date on which the magistrate starts recording of evidence. Viewed in the light of the above principle, the enquiry in the present case does not stand terminated. The notice under Sec. 107 is seen to have been sent on 25.8.1994 directing petitioners to appear before the Magistrate on 8.9.1994 The direction to execute interim bond was issued only on 8.12.1994 Even according to petitioners, the case was taken for evidence on 9.3.1995 The magistrate is expected to complete the enquiry within a period of six months from that date. That not being over, the request for a direction to drop the proceedings is declined. In the circumstances, there is no justification for the request to quash Ext. P6 order directing petitioners to execute the interim bond.

15. For the aforesaid reasons, the Cri. M.C is dismissed.