Kamat, J.:— This appeal is referred to us to consider the correctness of the decision of this Court,* in regard to the application of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The decision relates to a situation when a person makes admission of acknowledgment does not specify the quantum of liability whether it would operate as an acknowledgment in respect of specific sum. In other words when an acknowledgment relates to the part of the claim which is not specified, whether, without anything more, it would be available as an acknowledgment to save limitation under Section 18 of the Limitation Act.

2. In the reference order, are referred certain other decisions:

(i) Harrisons and Crossfield Ltd. v. State of Kerala (1963 Ker LT 215).

(ii) The decision of the Privy Council in Maniram v. Seth Rupchand ((1906) 33 Ind App 165).

(iii) Sitayya v. Rangareddi ((1887) ILR 10 Mad 259).

(iv) Jainarain v. Governor-General of India (AIR 1951 Cal. 462).

(v) Krishna Kurppu v. Raman Pillai (45 TLR 200).

that are specifically referred to in the earlier decision of this Court - 1963 Ker LT 215. We will have to consider the scope and application of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, obviously in relation to the facts of the present appeal.

3. The unsuccessful plaintiff has approached this Court in appeal, broadly, on the following averments:

(i) The appellant/plaintiff was carrying on business on giving on hire, steel folding chairs, steel folding tables etc. One Shri K.S Menon, the husband of the first defendant and the father of the second defendant was the Proprietor of a circus - “Bharat Circus”, during all over the country attracting large crowds at the various camps.

(ii) During the period from September 1, 1976, when the circus was camping at the Municipal Stadium, Nagercoil, plaintiff was approached by K.S Menon and his Manager with a request for the supply of 1000 steel chairs for hire, during the camp of the circus at Nagercoil. This was on a long term basis for use of the said chairs not only at this camp, but also in the neighbouring States of Kerala, Mysore and Andhra Pradesh. This was agreed at the rate of 10 paise per chair per day. Subsequently a regular agreement (Ext. A5) was entered into between the parties commencing on May 6, 1977.

(iii) The following are the terms of the said agreement as reproduced in the averments of the plaint:

(i) The plaintiff shall supply 1000 (One thousand) chairs to the Bharat Circus during its camp at Nagercoil.

(ii) The chairs shall be used, by the company till the last day of its camp at Nagercoil and thereafter the chairs shall be taken and used by the Circus Company at its succeeding camps.

(iii) If the Company required more chairs in any of the succeeding camps in bigger towns, the plaintiff shall supply such number of chairs as and when required.

(iv) The Company shall pay hire charges at the rate of 10 paise per chair per day for all the chairs supplied by the plaintiff.

(v) The Company need not pay hire charges for the chairs during the period of their transport from one camp to another. Normally there would be an interval of 3 days between one camp and the next.

(vi) The company would return to the plaintiff those chairs which got damaged or required repairs or repainting. If and when the Company required replacement of the old chairs in their use by a completely new set of chairs the plaintiff shall do so, and the company shall bear the transporting charges therefor.

(vii) The Company shall bear the expenses for transporting the chairs from one camp to the next.

(viii) Whenever the Company returned the chairs, if there was any shortage in the number of chairs, the Company would pay the value of the Chairs which were not returned.

(iv) On the basis of other agreement, from October 1976 the circus toured several times, when on May 13, 1979 there was a camp at Coimbatore. Thereafter the circus came to Palayamcottah in Tirunelveli and had shows at the said place from September 17, 1982 upto October 24, 1982. The Proprietor Shri K.S Menon expired in June 1977 leaving defendants 1 and 2 along with Shri K.S Mohan — the son of the first defendant in the management of the circus. Ultimately this K.S Mohan also expired in a car accident in June, 1980.

v) It is averred that till May 9, 1979, the plaintiff received payments of the hire charges upto the time of the camp of the circus at Perinthalmanna. During this time also payments were not regular. The irregularity commenced from the camp at Coimbatore. The statement of accounts as given in the plaint is as follows:

a) 17-10-1979 Letter by K.P Janardhanan Nambiar, Cashier in the Circus Company. b) 6-1-1980 Letter by the Manager, Bharat Circus, accompanied by a Demand Draft for Rupees 1000/- (One thousand) only. c) 21-6-1980: Letter by the Manager, Bharat Circus, sent from Nellore, Andhra Pradesh. d) 24-11-1980: Letter by K.P Janardhanan Nambiar, Cashier, on behalf of the Manager, sent from Tumkur, forwarding a Demand Draft for Rs. 15000/- only. e) 20-4-1981: Letter by K.P Janardhanan Nambiar from Trichur sent on behalf of the Manager, Bharat Circus forwarding a Demand Draft for Rupees 1000/- only.

vi) At the camp at Palaycottah there were disputes and the circus stopped functioning on and there from October 24, 1982. On the basis of the accounts the suit was filed for an amount of Rs. 1,00,520/- with future interest at the rate of 6% per annum from May 21, 1983 till recovery, from the assets of K.S Menon in the hands of the defendants.

4. This claim was practically not contested on merits and this would be especially after the perusal of the written statement of defendants Nos. 1 and 2. What is contended is that initially K.S Menon was the proprietor and therefore, on and from September 1, 1969, it was floated into a partnership of K.S Menon, first defendant, second defendant and K.S Mohan, in the name and style of Geetha Enterprises. The entire written statement thereafter consists of flat denials. It is pertinent to note that in spite of this agreement between the plaintiff and the circus is admitted. If contents of para 7 are seen, it is contended that the agreement was only between the plaintiff and Bharat Circus, and in practice and by consent of both the parties the amounts of rent were paid in cash. It is also contended that the statement of accounts appended to the plaint regarding the dues of rent and the number of chairs used in respect of various camps are false, exaggerated and not correct. The averment of the plaint that payments in full were made only, on May 1979, is also termed as a false and is denied.

5. It is pertinent to note on the basis of the contents of the written statement that the agreement is not denied, that the payments in cash from time to time are not denied, and that what is contended is only a statement that exaggerated figures are put up.

6. The reference to the correspondence and letters is replied in the written statement in the following manner.

“The plaintiff had obtained those letters mischievously from the dismissed and other terminated ex-employees with ulterior object for the purpose of the suit. These letters are only collusive documents and the persons who wrote the letters are not competent to write those letters and they have no authority to do so.”

7. Additionally it is contended that after the death of K.S Mohan one Mr. Nambiar looked into the affairs of the circus and under his evil influence and in collusion with the plaintiff the suit is filed without any bona fides.

8. If the written statement is taken into consideration the matter would have to be considered on the basis of certain admitted positions. The transactions are not denied and what is challenged is the nature of the accounts. Therefore the matter would be very simple on merits, because certain positions would have to be brought to the defendants on the basis of their own knowledge and consequent expectation of bringing the necessary material on the record through evidence.

9. The plaintiff examined himself and proved the statement of accounts. On the contrary, the witness who is examined on behalf of the defendants is a mere holder of power of attorney (Balakrishna Menon) who has given evidence on the basis of his knowledge. In the evidence the said witness does not depose anything about the nature of the accounts, as regards correctness or exaggerations in regard thereto.

10. The learned Judge (Second Additional Sub Judge, Trivandrum) by the impunged judgment dismissed the suit mainly or rather wholly, on the ground of limitation. The learned Judge has recorded as finding that no amount is claimed after May, 1979, in view of the admission that the entire hire charges upto May 9, 1979 were fully paid and the plaintiff claims hire charges only form May 13, 1979 upto Nov. 19, 1982 on the basis of the statement of accounts showing that 1700 chairs were returned by the second defendant to the plaintiff. The learned Judge on issue No. 6 has held that the claim of the plaintiff is barred by limitation. It is already stated that the plaintiff averred the limitation on the basis of various acknowledgments.

11. The specific averment is available in para 15 of the plaint, on the basis of which the plaintiff claims that his suit is within the requisite period of limit. The said averments are to the following effect:

“Even though the amount of Rs. 99,521/- due as arrears of the rent include the rent for the chairs for a period prior to 3 (three) years from before the date of suit, the claim for such rent is not barred by limitation for the following reasons:—

(i) The plaintiff is entitled, in the absence of any contract to the contrary between the parties, to appropriate the payments received within the period of 3 years towards the arrearss of hire charges due for the period earlier to 3 years.

(ii) There has been several acknowledgment of the liability in writing made by the Manager of the Bharat Circus, clearly undertaking to pay the arrears of rent due from 10-5-1979. The acknowledgment have been made in the following letters sent by the Bharat Circus to the plaintiff:

a) 17-10-1979: Letter by K.P Janardhanan Nambiar, Cashier in the Circus Company. b) 6-1-1980: Letter by the Manager, Bharat Circus, accompanied by a Demand Draft for Rs. 1,000/- (One thousand) only. c) 21-6-1980: Letter by the Manager, Bharat Circus, sent from Nellore, Andhra Pradesh. d) 24-11-1980: Letter by K.P Janardhanan Nambiar, Cashier, on behalf of the Manager, sent from Tumkur, forwarding a Demand Draft for Rs. 1,500/- only. e) 20-4-1981: Letter by K.P Janardhanan Nambiar from Trichur sent on behalf of the Manager, Bharat Circus forwarding a Demand Draft for Rs. 1,000/- only.

In addition, a detailed statement of accounts is annexed to the plaint.

12. It is in this context of the fabric of facts that we have to consider the question as to what is meant by an acknowledgment and what would be the compliance of the provisions of Section 18 of the Limitation Act.

13. We proceed to discuss these aspects hereafter.

14. The acknowledgment is writing creates a fresh period of limitation. An acknowledgment of liability is in respect of property or right, in writing, signed by the party or by any person to whom he derives his title or liability. It may be sufficient enough to specify the exact nature of the property or right and averments regarding the payments, of delivery, performance or enjoyment has not been refused or is contested by a claim to set off or addressed to some person who is not entitled to the property or right. In other words the requirement is not the specification of the exact nature of the amount, property or right; or specifically that a claim of set off is not addressed to a wrong person. The acknowledgment specifying the requirements of Section 18 creates a fresh period of limitation.

15. The underlying doctrine of acknowledgment is based on a legitimate presumption of payment, by a promise to pay. In this context even an un-conditional acknowledgment of debt or payment is considered on the basis of natural inference from the absence of not saying to the contrary. It presumes that the person making acknowledgment had some interest binding him, because had he no interest in an acknowledgment, there would not be any necessity of acceptance with reference to any part of the transaction. It must be made at the time of the existing liability by the party or his authorised person. It must be expressed or implied and in writing, not necessarily of the person but it can also be by an agent duly authorised in this behalf. It is not necessary that acknowledgment must accept that a debt or even a specified amount is actually due and admission of an unsettled account specifying the balance due with a promise to pay would be sufficient for the satisfaction of the requirements of Section 18 of the Limitation Act.

16. In substance it is an admission of the truth of one's liability. It must be made by a person who is under a liability at the material time and must be made at a time when the liability exists. It has to be understood that such an acknowledgment does not create a new right of action but merely extends the period of limitation by this act of acknowledgment. Therefore, the exact nature or specific character of the liability is not necessary but the words of acknowledgment must relate to a person and substantial liability; must indicate the existence of jural relationship between the parties, such as one is a debtor and the other is a creditor and there is an intention to admit such jural relationship.

17. The reference court found it difficult to accept the decision of this court, because it found that the amount is not specified and it could not be said that it would operate as an acknowledgment. This was a case with regard to a contract for manufacture and delivery of 1000 R.C.C poles 24 ft. long. Subsequently the work related to 500 more poles of the same specification was also awarded under the same terms and conditions. Supplemental schedule was signed by the parties. The work was completed on March 6, 1970. Some surplus material remained with the defendant after the completion of the work and it was to be returned to the plaintiff on obtaining receipts from the store keeper. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant did not return the surplus material. Registered letter was sent to the defendant, followed by subsequent letters. The defendant replied to the subsequent letter denying his laibility for return of the material. In the plaint an acknowledgment based on the letter dated March 19, 1971 was pleaded. The court took up for consideration the question that the acknowledgment is not of the entire claim but only related to a part of the claim, which was not specified. The court held that admission of liability for a lesser unspecified sum cannot operate as an acknowledgment of the entire claim to save the suit from the bar of limitation. In fact, reading of the judgement shows that the question as to what constitutes an acknowledgment was not taken up for consideration and the question arose on an entirely different set off facts. An acknowledgment, as stated above relates to the acceptance of jural relationship, transaction and liability arising therefrom. It is in the light of the above observations, the reference court found it difficult to accept the proposition.

18. We must record our strong disapproval of the approach of the learned Judge who has approached the question with a blind reliance on the above decision. The learned Judge, we record, has not approached the question with reference to the facts on the basis of which acknowledgments have been pressed into service, on the basis of a set on correspondence on record. Apart therefrom the learned Judge committed grave error in rushing to throw out the plaintiff on this part totally ignoring that the defendants have not pleaded their case on merits except and by way of bald denials as stated above.

19. We take up for consideration the Electricity Board question of the truth and exact meaning of the word acknowledgment on the basis of decided cases cited before us.

20. An acknowledgment does not require to be specific and direct. The substance of the decisions appear to be that it is not necessary that there should be a specific and direct acknowledgment of the particular liability which is sought to be enforced, but if there is an admission of facts of which the liability in question is a necessary consequence, there would be an acknowledgment within the meaning of Section 18 of the Limitation Act. What is necessary is admission of the existence of a debt, a liability for contribution, in case a part of it is paid and such an admission would operate to enlarge the period of limitation. The following decisions lay down the same proposition, when in the first case, the Court was dealing with the acknowledgment with regard to the railway consignment not delivered, calling upon to take the delivery, leading the Court to conclude with the letter from the railway department amounting an acknowledgment asking the plaintiff to take delivery of the goods. The same proposition is laid down in the second case when the Privy Council was dealing with the reply of the debtor that from the last five years he had opened a current account with the predecessors of the plaintiff, and when even the third decision, when it related to the demand to examine accounts to check the dues, such a demand was accepted as an acknowledgment.

21. This Court** independently had an occasion to consider as to what acknowledgment would be for the purpose of saving the rigour of limitation Act and it is observed that there should be specific and direct acknowledgment of the particular liability which is sought to be enforced, but if there is an admission of facts of which the liability in question is a necessary consequence there would be an acknowledgment as required to bring the suit within the period of limitation. This Court on facts was concerned with the admission of receipt of duty which was not actually due to the Government legally, but such an admission amounted to an acknowledgment of its liability, to refund the same. The matter related to the payment of customs duty arising out of a suit for recovery. The plaintiffs contended that duty was never realised from them with regard to the item of export of battens. It was specifically averred that there was a duty with the State to refund because the battens were non-duty. The court took the view that the letter admitted receipt of the amount by the State from the plaintiff and then amount was received as duty on goods which were non dutiable. Relying on the decision cited above the court held that it amounted to an acknowledgment.

22. The sum and substance of these decisions spell out that as to what amounts to an acknowledgment would depend on the factual position spelled out by the case at hand. Illustratively, if there is a dispute as regards the amount, if there is a demand for verification of the accounts, if there is a contention that the accounts are exaggerated if the relationship of a debtor and a creditor is admitted, and if even in the written statement this position is acknowledged, the situation would amount to an acknowledgment enough to extend the period of limitation, freshly under the provisions of Section 18 of the Limitation Act. The relevant case law that is considered above would not but spell out in every situation that acknowledgment would be a question of fact in every matter.

23. As stated above, paragraph 15 of the plaint clearly shows various dates relating to the correspondence. Equally well in the evidence also the correspondence is specified. It has to be noted that this correspondence is proved from the evidence of the plaintiff and there has been no challenge to the correspondence at all. It has further to be noted that even the agreement Ext. A5 is signed by the Manager Mr. Raghavan Nair. Additionally the agreement makes it clear that the expression first party would include General Manager and Managers on behalf of the circus. The entire correspondence is carried on behalf of the circus by the Manager respectively representing the said circus.

24. It has to be noted with regret that the learned Judge has not taken care to refer to the correspondence at all. In fact we have observed that the learned Judge has approached the matter in a casual manner. We justify censure. It is because the correspondence has not at all been touched by the learned Judge. It would be necessary to refer to the correspondence, in view of the fact that if the said correspondence is taken into consideration at various stages there are acknowledgments. The relevant dates are:— October 17, 1979, January 6, 1980, June 21, 1980, Nov. 24, 1980 and April 20, 1981. This would be in the context of the fact that the suit was filed on March 21, 1983. If it can be shown that on all the dates referred to herein before there have been acknowledgments, the entire suit claim of the plaintiff would be within limitation on the basis of these acknowledgments creating fresh period of limitation. We will take up the correspondence for consideration, which has been placed before us by the learned Council appearing for the appellant/plaintiff.

25. The correspondence tendered on record starts from March 20, 1977 (Ext. A1) right up to March 25, 1983 which would show that the plaintiff was providing chairs on the demands of the defendants in the nature of letters, telegrams and at the same time the balance of the hire charges were tendered fit placing on record certain difficulties relating to the shows of the circus at various places. To consider the factual position, a detailed examination of the said correspondence is necessary.

26. We will consider the correspondence datawise, forming groups accordingly:

(i) There are four letters (Ext. A1, A2, A3 and A4) dated March 20, 23, 25 and 26, 1977 respectively. Ext. A1 refers to the necessity of dispatching 1500 chairs at camp Putharikandam which were wanted letters by evening of the next day Ext. A2 is the receipt for Rs. 115/- relating to 1200 chairs by way of an advance. Ext. A3 is a note to the Check Post Officer — Amaravila for permitting and allowing the chairs for the circus. Ext. A4 is a receipt for 300 chairs, received on March 26, 1977. These documents beyond doubt relate to the transaction under the agreement (Ext. A5).

(ii) The second group is a letter (Ext. A6) dated June 14, 1977. This is by K.S Mohan. In the said letter a difficulty is pleaded that the collection is poor and the circus is not in need of so many chairs and a consequent assurance of taking more chairs at Madras opening. Along with it Rs. 700/- is sent being the balance of Tirpur camp, and a receipt is demanded.

(iii) This group relates to the year 1979 and consist of letters Ext. A7, A8, A9 and A10 - dated 15-2-1979, 21-2-1979, 2-5-1979 and 25-6-1979. It is partinent to note that the demand in the suit is from October 17, 1979. Ext. A7 is a telegram to send chairs by lorry urgently, this is by K.S Mohan. Ext. A8 acknowledges 1000 chairs sent and remittance of Rs. 600/- as rent, coupled with hire charges at Ernakulam camp are being sent through one Sreekumaran Nair. The letter adds that chairs not required would be sent at Kottayam camp when lorry returns from Tirur. Ext. A9 encloses a cheque for Rs. 5908.20 and mentions that it contains Rs. 3435/- towards Tirur camp collection and Rs. 2473.20 towards Kunnamkulam camp collection. It mentions also that the next camp will be at Coimbatore. The letter ends with a record that due to various difficulties the sending of the amount was delayed which may not be misunderstood. Ext. A10 is written from Coimbatore camp. It records that Rs. 2473/- towards the balance of Perinthalmanna camp are being sent. It also records that 50 chairs are damaged and the amount will stand reduced to that extent. These letters make it clear that the transaction continued keeping a balance and mentioning of damaged chairs. At Ext. A12 dated October 17, 1979 also there is a letter from the cashier. It records that due to Deepavali season crowd would be less, coupled with an assurance of sending the maximum amount of balance before Kumbakonam camp ends. It is requested that there need not be any misunderstanding due to delay in payments.

iv) This group relates to three more letters of the year 1980. Ext. A16 dated June 20, 1980 records returning of 55 chairs mentioned earlier. Apart there from there are letters such as Ext. A12 dated October 17, 1979 pleading inability to be promt as regards payment. There is letter at Ext. A13 dated January 31, 1980 pleading that the business is dull, creating difficulties. It also contains an assurance that as far as money is concerned it would be sent as early as possible and everything needed would be pursued. Additionally there is a letter at Ext. A14 dated March 17, 1980, again pleading enability to send the amounts at the earliest, together with the letter Ext. A15 dated June 19, 1980 recording sending of a draft towards hire charges for chairs. It is in this context the letter Ext. A17 — dated June 21, 1980 needs to be looked into. It records the state of affairs of the business of the circus and expenses incurred. The letter also has a reference of sending Rs. 2,000/- from Nellore camp. It mentions the death of K.S Mohan. Then there is a letter Ext. A18 dated Nov. 7, 1980 containing the assurance that Rs. 1,000/- would be sent before Nov. 20, 1980 together with a further assurance of sending as early as possible. Added to this there is a letter at Ext. A19 dated Nov. 24, 1980 recording sending of Rs. 1,500/- by Demand Draft. Additionaly by letter Ext. A20 dated January 6, 1980 there is payment of Rs. 1,000/- by a draft with a pleading that payments are delayed due to various difficulties with an intimation that when the circus moves to Kerala as much amount as possible would be tendered. This correspodence naturally extends the period of limitation neately upto the year 1980.

v) For the year 1981 also there is correspondence: A/23, A/24, A/25, A/26, A/27 and A/28. If this is seen, it would show that even during the year 1981 the claim was acknowledged. In fact the suit having been filed on March 21, 1983, for the purpose of limitation and acknowledgment, these letters need not be referred. However, it is necessary to show that continuosuly parties were in correspondence with regard to the issue, balance of payments and dues for all these years. A/23 is dated May 25, 1981 from the Manager of Circus and reference of 250 chairs despatched acknowledging balance of 770 chairs. A/24 is the letter dated June 9, 1981 requesting sending of new 1500 chairs so as to reach before the Coimbatore camp. A/25 is dated June 18, 1981 acknowledges receipt of 1500 chairs together with the payment of lorry for the transport. A/26 dated June 26, 1981 records retention of old 770 chairs with a promise of return from Trichy camp. Similarly A/27 dated June 28, 1981 also refers to a promise payment of Rs. 2,500/- on 1-7-1981 with a further assurance of Rs. 2,500/- a week thereafter. Then there is a letter Ext. A/28 dated Sept. 11, 1981 with regard to assurance of payment. Right upto the year 1981, the correspondence shows acceptance of jural relationship, acknowledgment of payments and continuance of payments bit by bit.

vi) In the light of this, although there are letters thereafter, namely Ext. A29 dated March 24, 1982, Ext. A30 dated April 15, 1982, Ext. A31 dated April 27, 1982, Ext. A32 dated Sept. 17, 1982, Ext. A-33 dated Dec. 11, 1982 and Ext. A34 dated March 25, 1983 showing the transaction with regard to the supply of chairs and payment of money, it is unnecessary to refer to these Exts. in detail because obviously they are with regard to the period of limitation of three years prior to the date of filing of the suit which was filed on March 21, 1983.

27. The correspondence had to be referred to in details as was placed by the learned counsel for the appellant in view of the fact that the learned trial Judge has been more casual in throwing out the plaintiff of the Court without even referring to this above correspondence on record.

28. The above correspondence, starting from the years March 1977 clearly shows not only acknowledgments of relationship, not only demands for chairs from time to time and payments made towards the balance as specified but also clearly spell out what can be considered as acknowledgment on the factual situation presented thereby. If these correspondence cannot spell out acknowledgments from time to time, there can be no other appropriate case of acknowledgment on the basis of legal principles enunciated by the decided cases.

29. In view of the above discussion, referring to the above correspondence there is no doubt that the suit will have to be held as I having been filed within the statutory period of limitation of three years. The finding of the learned Judge in regard thereto will have to be quashed and set aside.

30. On merits, the learned Judge has clearly observed that it is true that if the defendants are in possession of the accounts relating to the trasanction they are bound to produce it; otherwise adverse inference can be drawn. The learned Judge has ignored that defendants' witness has categorically deposed that there is no dispute about the accounts produced, proved and tendered by the plaintiff. The accounts are in sufficient and great details and are not effectively challenged in the cross-examination. In the face of detailed accounts and in the teeth of failure to discharge the burden on the defendants the accounts would have to be accepted as true and correct.

31. The observation of the learned Judge that in the absence of evidence that the accounts were in possession of the defendants at the time of filing of the suit would have to be held as erroneous, in view of the clear admission of the witness that from 1966 up to 1982 the witness himself was the Accountant of the Bharat Circus.

32. Apart therefrom, even if independently the evidence on record is taken into consideration in the light of pleadings of bare and flat denials of the defendants, it will have to be recorded that even if much was expected from the defendants to discharge the burden of proof upon them, the same is not discharged in the least. The evidence of the plaintiff proves the jural relationship. It established and proved the statement of accounts. Added to it, the defendants' witness who was himself the Accountant of the Circus from 1966 to 1982 and has stated that the accounts are not disputed. Nothing more is required to accept the plaintiff's case in toto.

33. On a careful and cautious consideration of the record this judgment cannot end without a record that the learned Judge not only was more than casual in not considering the documents at all, but also ignored the legal consequences of pleadings of denials, not discharging the burden on them, and also ignoring that there is no dispute as regards the accounts as clearly admitted by the witness in the evidence, together with the fact that the witness himself was the Accountant of the Circus from 1966 upto 1982.

34. The result is that this Appeal stands allowed. Judgment and Decree in O.S No. 526 of 1983 of the Learned IInd Additional Sub Judge, Thiruvananthapuram get quashed and set aside and consequently it is ordered that the plaintiff's suit for claim of Rs. 1,00,520/- (Rupees One Lakhs Five Hundred Twenty only) with interest at 6 per annuam from the date of the suit till recovery thereof from defendants 1 and 2 and the assets of Thiru K.S Menon and K.S Mohan in the hands of the defendants is hereby decreed with costs throughout. Order accordingly.

Appeal allowed.