- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Bhargavy P. Sumathykutty v. Janaki Sathyabhama And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
This Full Bench reference arises from C.R.P No. 1446/89. The underlying suit was a declaration action: the plaintiff alleged that a document executed by him in favour of his wife purporting to transfer the suit property was a sham transaction and that title always remained with the plaintiff; accordingly he sought a declaration of title. The wife contended that the transfer was genuine and, among other defences, relied on Section 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (the Benami Act) to assert that the suit was not maintainable. The trial court repelled the objection under Section 4 relying on the decision in Ouseph Chacko v. Raman Nair. A revision was filed against that order. While hearing arguments in the revision, Varghese Kalliath, J. noticed conflicting views of different single Judges on whether Section 4 applies to "sham transactions" and, by a reference order in C.R.P No. 1446/89, referred the question to a larger Bench; the Division Bench in turn referred it to the Full Bench. The central controversy for the Bench was whether Section 4 of the Benami Act applies to "sham transactions" (bipartite benami transactions).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Section 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 applies to "sham transactions" (the bipartite category of transactions where there is no operative transfer of title).
- Whether Sections 4 and 5 of the Benami Act (which do not use the expression "benami transaction" but refer to "property held benami") were intended to embrace both categories of benami transactions (tripartite and bipartite) or only the tripartite category defined in Section 2(a).
- Whether the definition of "benami transaction" in Section 2(a) (which appears to cover only tripartite transactions) limits the reach of other provisions (notably Sections 3, 4 and 5) or whether context and other indicators (such as repeal provisions and retrospective operation) justify a broader reading.
- Whether the repeal of certain provisions (including Section 81 of the Indian Trusts Act) when the Benami Act was enacted indicates a legislative intention to bring sham (bipartite) transactions within the scope of the Benami Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Counsel Arguing That the Benami Act Has an Expansive Scope (i.e., Sections 4 and 5 cover sham transactions)
- The definition clause's saving phrase "unless the context otherwise requires" allows the contours of "benami transaction" to be flexible, so Sections 4 and 5 could apply beyond the literal definition in Section 2(a).
- The legislature deliberately did not use the precise phrase "property held under a benami transaction" in Sections 4 and 5 but used "property held benami", indicating an intention to cover both tripartite and bipartite transactions; the change of expression signals a change in application.
- The Law Commission's 130th Report and the Statement of Objects and Reasons supporting the Bill indicate that Parliament intended to cover both types of benami transactions.
- The Ordinance retained Section 81 of the Indian Trusts Act; when the Benami Act was passed, Section 81 was repealed — this, it was argued, shows Parliament intended to take within the Benami Act cases covered by Section 81 (i.e., bipartite/sham transactions), so the Benami Act should be read to cover sham transactions at least for certain consequences (Sections 4 and 5).
Counsel Arguing That the Benami Act Does Not Cover Sham Transactions
- Section 2(a) expressly defines "benami transaction" to mean a transaction where property is transferred to one person for consideration paid or provided by another person — that definition unambiguously captures tripartite transactions and confines Section 3 (the prohibition and penal provisions) to tripartite cases.
- The use of the restrictive word "means" in the definition (rather than "includes") and the placement of the definition in Section 2 (applicable to "this Act") indicate Parliament intended the definition to be exhaustive for the Act, thereby excluding bipartite/sham transactions.
- The saving phrase "unless the context otherwise requires" is not sufficient to displace the ordinary effect of the definition in this statute; prima facie the definition governs whenever the term is used unless a repugnancy in the context compels otherwise.
- The retrospective operation of the definition back to the date of the Ordinance (19-5-1988) and the fact that the Ordinance itself used the phrase "property held benami" (and had no definition of "benami transaction") indicates Parliament intended to limit even the Ordinance's reach to tripartite transactions as defined in Section 2(a) of the Act.
- The repeal of Section 81 of the Trusts Act and other provisions does not mean the Benami Act was intended to cover sham transactions: Section 81 itself presupposes transfer of property and therefore fits the tripartite model; repeal expansion alone does not enlarge the definition-based boundaries of Sections 4 and 5.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ouseph Chacko v. Raman Nair ((1989) 1 Ker LT 767 : AIR 1989 Kerala 317) — Bhaskaran Nambiar, J. | Held that Section 4 of the Benami Act does not apply to sham transactions (supporting the narrower view). | The Full Bench agreed with the conclusion in Ouseph Chacko and expressly adopted that position as correct. |
| Mohanan v. Yesoda ((1989) 1 Ker LT 867 : AIR 1989 Kerala 286) — Balakrishnan, J. | Contains an observation treated as expressing a contrary view (i.e., suggesting a broader approach). | The Bench noted an arguable contrary observation in Mohanan v. Yesoda but did not accept it as overriding the reasoning in Ouseph Chacko. |
| Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Income-tax Commissioner (AIR 1957 SC 49) | Distinguished two categories: first (tripartite) usually termed 'benami'; second (sham/bipartite) only occasionally so termed and perhaps inaccurately. | Cited for the categorical distinction between tripartite (real benami) and bipartite (sham) transactions and for the observation that the latter may be loosely called benami. |
| Bhim Singh v. Kan Singh (AIR 1980 SC 727) | Reiterated that the first category is properly described as benami while the second is only "loosely" termed benami. | Used to support the textual distinction between the two categories of transactions (tripartite vs bipartite). |
| Handique v. Agricultural Land Board, Assam (AIR 1966 SC 1191) | Interpreted the word "hold" to mean actual possession invested with legal title. | Relied on to interpret "property held benami" as implying ostensible title/holding — relevant to whether sham transactions involve a "holding" benami. |
| Hari Ram v. Babu Gokul Prasad (AIR 1991 SC 427) | Also treated "hold" as implying actual possession with legal title. | Used alongside Handique to support the interpretation of "hold" in "property held benami". |
| Nagiprasad v. A.D. Divelkar (AIR 1957 SC 121) | Where an Act provides a dictionary (interpretation clause), the court must first look to that dictionary for statutory meaning. | Quoted to emphasize that the statute's own definition must be the starting point for interpretation of terms used in the Act. |
| Mutto v. T.K. Mandi ((1979) 1 SCC 361 : AIR 1979 SC 460) | Where words of a statute are precise and unambiguous, they declare the legislature's intention and should be given their ordinary sense. | Invoked to support a plain-meaning approach to the Benami Act's definition and wording. |
| Punjab Land Devt. & Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court ((1990) 3 SCC 682) | Reiterates that the court must determine intention as expressed by words used in the statute; quotes historic authority. | Used to buttress the approach of relying primarily on statutory text and definitions to deduce legislative intent. |
| Sales Tax Commissioner, Gujarat v. Union of Medical Agency (AIR 1981 SC 1) | Where a word is defined in an interpretation clause, that definition prima facie governs its use throughout the statute unless context makes it inapplicable. | Applied to reason that the Benami Act's definition of "benami transaction" should govern unless a clear contextual repugnancy exists. |
| State of T.N. v. Pyare Lal Malhotra (AIR 1976 SC 800) | Discusses how a definition using "means" is prima facie restrictive/exhaustive whereas "includes" indicates extensiveness. | Quoted to support the view that the Benami Act's use of "means" makes the definition restrictive. |
| Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. Ltd. v. Broje Nath (AIR 1986 SC 1571) | Approves the distinction between definitions using "means" and those using "includes" and relevant principles from Craies on Statute Law. | Used to reinforce the interpretive significance of the Benami Act's drafting choices (use of "means"). |
| Kathoon Bivi Ammal v. S. Mohamad ((1990) 1 Mad L.W 284) | Held that the Benami Act would apply to both categories of transactions (broader view). | The Full Bench considered this decision, criticized the reasoning (relying on repeal argument), and noted it was overruled by a Division Bench which followed Ouseph Chacko. |
| N. Govindrajan v. Indian Overseas Bank ((1991) 1 Mad L.W 649) | Division Bench of Madras overruled Kathoon Bivi Ammal and followed Ouseph Chacko (narrow view). | Noted as supporting the narrower interpretation adopted by the Full Bench in this opinion. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Full Bench conducted a primarily textual analysis, assisted by established principles of statutory interpretation and selective reference to external materials when the statutory language alone proved insufficient. The steps of the Court's reasoning, as reflected in the opinion, are set out below:
- Start with the statute: The Court emphasized that the primary task is to ascertain legislative intent from the words of the statute itself. When a statute provides a definition, the court must look to that definition first (citing Nagiprasad, Mutto and Punjab Land Dev. decisions).
- Definition in Section 2(a): The Benami Act defines "benami transaction" as "any transaction in which property is transferred to one person for a consideration paid or provided by another person." The Court observed this definition clearly describes tripartite transactions (where transfer and consideration exist) and does not encompass sham (bipartite) transactions where no operative transfer occurs.
- Effect on Section 3: Because Section 2(a) confines "benami transaction" to tripartite cases, Section 3 (the prohibition and penal provisions) logically applies only to that tripartite category. The Court noted there was no dispute on this point.
- Interpretation of Sections 4 and 5: Sections 4 and 5 do not use the phrase "benami transaction" but instead speak of "property held benami" and make such property liable to acquisition without payment. Counsel for an expansive reading argued that the change of words and the saving phrase "unless the context otherwise requires" permitted a broader sweep that would include sham transactions.
- Significance of drafting choices: The Court placed weight on the drafting choices — notably that the definition uses the restrictive word "means" (rather than "includes") and is placed in a general interpretation section ("In this Act") rather than tucked only into Section 3. The Court treated these features as indicative that Parliament intended the Act's definition to be operative throughout the Act unless context clearly required otherwise.
- Role of the saving phrase: The Court held that the phrase "unless the context otherwise requires" does not by itself displace an otherwise clear definition; it is a normal qualification and cannot be used to rewrite the statute when the ordinary meaning suffices.
- Meaning of "held benami": The Court examined the words "property held benami" and, relying on authorities (Handique and Hari Ram), interpreted "held" to connote possession invested with legal title or at least an ostensible legal title — a feature that exists in tripartite transactions but not in sham transactions where there is no operative transfer or ostensible title.
- Retrospective operation and the Ordinance: Section 1(3) made Sections 3, 5 and 8 come into force immediately, and other provisions (including the definition in Section 2(a)) were deemed to have come into force on 19-5-1988 (the date of the Ordinance). The Court reasoned that if Parliament wished the Ordinance to continue to cover bipartite/sham transactions, it would not have retrospectively introduced a restrictive definition; instead, retrospective effect of the definition suggests Parliament intended even the Ordinance's operative provision (which used "property held benami") to be read in light of the definition — i.e., limited to tripartite cases.
- Repeal of provisions (Trusts Act Sections): The Court considered arguments relying on repeal of Section 81 (and Section 82) of the Trusts Act. It observed Section 81 presupposes an actual transfer and is thus analogous to tripartite transactions; repeal of these sections does not demonstrate an intent to expand the Benami Act beyond the textual limits imposed by the definition. Mere expansion of the sweep of repeal does not indicate a contrary intention to enlarge Sections 4 and 5 beyond the definition.
- Concluding synthesis: Taking together the plain language of the definition, the significance of the word "means", the contextual use of "held benami", the retrospective operation to the Ordinance, and the lack of any compelling reason why Parliament would subject sham transactions to the penal and prospective prohibitions of Section 3 while confining them only to the acquisitory consequences of Section 5, the Court concluded Parliament intended the Benami Act to address tripartite benami transactions and not sham (bipartite) transactions.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The Full Bench concluded that sham (bipartite) transactions do not come within the purview of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988. The Court expressly agreed with the reasoning in Ouseph Chacko v. Raman Nair (Bhaskaran Nambiar, J.) to that effect.
Direct Consequences / Orders
- C.R.P No. 1446/89 is dismissed in view of the holding that sham transactions are not covered by the Benami Act.
- C.R.P No. 1188/87 was not pressed by the petitioner and is accordingly dismissed.
- A.S. No. 84/84 and A.S. No. 424/81 are to be heard and disposed of on their merits in light of the Full Bench decision; the registry was directed to board those appeals before the appropriate Bench without delay.
Broader Implications Noted by the Court
The Court's reasoning rests on textual and interpretive grounds and aligns with earlier decisions that confine the statutory notion of "benami transaction" (as defined) to tripartite transactions. The opinion explains why repeal provisions and other external materials do not justify expanding the Act's reach to sham transactions. The Court did not purport to create a new doctrine beyond its interpretation of the 1988 statute; it adopted an interpretation consistent with prior single-Judge decisions (specifically Ouseph Chacko) and disapproved the contrary reasoning that relied primarily on the repeal of Trusts Act provisions.
Order accordingly.
Thomas, J.:— The hub of the dispute, shorn of all its ramifications, is whether Sec. 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (for short ‘the Benami Act) applies to “sham transactions”. Bhaskaran Nambiar, J. has held in Ouseph Chacko v. Raman Nair, (1989) 1 Ker LT 767 : (AIR 1989 Kerala 317), that it does not but one of the observations made by Balakrishnan, J. in Mohanan v. Yesoda, (1989) 1 Ker LT 867 : (AIR 1989 Kerala 286) is treated as expression of contrary view. Though the decision of Balakrishnan, J. was rendered earlier in point of time, we don't think that Bhaskaran Nambiar, J. was aware of the said decision. Varghese Kalliath, J. while hearing arguments in C.R.P No. 1446/89 noticed the aforesaid conflict in views of two learned Judges mentioned above and hence through a fairly lengthy reference order referred the question to a Bench which in turn the Division Bench has referred to the Full Bench.
2. Shri Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, Advocate, has raised a contention that Balakrishnan, J. has not in fact adopted a contrary view in Mohanan v. Yesoda, (1989) 1 Ker LT 867 : (AIR 1989 Kerala 286) in conflict with the ratio involved in Ouseph Chacko v. Raman Nair, (1989) 1 Ker LT 767 : (AIR 1989 Kerala 317). Be that as it may, we will now examine the question whether sham transactions are included within the purview of the Benami Act at least partially.
3. For the sake of convenience we will set out the facts in C.R.P No. 1446/89 in which Varghese Kalliath, J. has passed the reference order. That revision arose out of a suit filed for a declaration that title of the suit property is that of the plaintiff in spite of a document executed by the plaintiff in favour of his wife purporting to transfer the property to the transferee. According to the plaintiff, it was a sham transaction and the property ever remained with him. Hence the suit for declaration of title. But the wife contended that it was a genuine transaction. She resisted the suit, inter alia, on the ground that the suit is not maintainable in view of S. 4 of the Benami Act. The contention was repelled by the trial court on the strength of the decision in Ouseph Chacko's case (AIR 1989 Kerala 317). So, the defendant filed the revision against the said order by which the objection regarding maintainability was repelled.
4. Before the Benami Act was passed, there existed an ordinance called “the Benami Transactions (Prohibition of the Right to Recover Property) Ordinance, 1988” (for convenience, we shall refer to it as ‘the Ordinance’). It came into force on 19-5-1988. It was replaced by the, Benami Act on 5-9-1988. In between the two, there was deliberation at the instance of the Law Commission of India which submitted its 130th Report which eventually paved the way for passing the Benami Act.
5. Before the Benami Act and even before the promulgation of the Ordinance, Courts in India have, by and large, recognised two distinct classes of transactions as Benami. The first type or class of Benami transaction was called the real benami transaction. A typical instance of it is when ‘A’ sells a property to ‘B’, but the sale-deed mentions ‘C’ as the purchaser. Here the real purchaser is ‘B’ and ‘C’ is only the benamidar. Such a transaction is described as the real benami transaction. The second class or category of benami transaction is the sham transaction in which one person purports to transfer his property to another without intending to pass the title to the transferee. This second type of transaction was “loosely” called benami transaction. (For convenience, the first type of transaction can be referred to hereinafter as tripartite benami transaction — as three persons are involved in it — or the first category of benami transactions. The second class of transaction can be referred to either as bipartite benami transaction — since only two persons are involved in it — or the second category of benami transaction).
6. The fundamental difference between the two categories of transactions is this. In the former, there is an operative transfer resulting in vesting of title in the transferee, whereas in the latter, there is no operative transfer and the transferor continues to retain title of the property notwithstanding execution of the document. The latter transaction is known as “sham transaction”.
7. In Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Income-tax Commissioner, AIR 1957 SC 49, Venkatarama Ayyar, J. has stated that the first category of transactions is ‘usually’ termed as ‘benami’, while the second category is ‘occasionally’ used as a benami transaction. His Lordship added that it is “perhaps not accurately so used”. In Bhim Singh v. Kan Singh, AIR 1980 SC 727, Venkataramiah, J. (as he then was) straightaway called the first category as benami, but has chosen to describe the second category as “loosely” termed benami.
8. By the Ordinance, a prohibition was imposed against enforcement of any right “in respect of any property held benami” and no defence based on any such right was permitted to be raised by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of such property. The Ordinance had only one operative provision and that was S. 2, the hub of which is mentioned above. Section 3 of the Ordinance cleared that nothing in it shall affect S. 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. The only remaining provision, S. 4 consisted of a repeal provision by which S. 82 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, S. 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure and S. 281-A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were repealed. It is contextually relevant to point out that the Ordinance did not contain any definition for benami transaction and hence it was thought that the Ordinance would have embraced both types of benami transactions.
9. The Benami Act received the assent of the President of India on 5-9-1988. It is a tiny statute consisting only of nine sections including all the formal and usual provisions necessary for a statute. It contains a definition for “benami transaction” under S. 2 as this: “In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, — (a) ‘benami transaction’ means any transaction in which property is transferred to one person for a consideration paid or provided by another person”. The aforesaid definition, apparently, takes in only the first category or the tripartite benami transactions. Section 3 of the Benami Act contains a prohibition against any person, entering into any “benami transaction”. It also contains a penal provision that whoever enters into any benami transaction shall be punishable with imprisonment………”. It was not contended that S. 3 of the Benami Act has any application to the second category or bipartite transactions. Section 4 of the Benami Act prohibited enforcement of any right “in respect of any property held benami”. Sub-section (2) imposed a ban against setting up of any defence based on any right “in respect of any property held benami”. It provided two exceptions to the prohibition contained in the section. (As they are not relevant, we omit them here). Section 5 of the Benami Act contained a new provision that “all properties held benami shall be subject to acquisition………” and it was declared that no amount shall be payable for such acquisition. In the repeal provision (S. 7) S. 81 of the Trusts Act was also included within the sweep of repeal in addition to the repeals made in the Ordinance.
10. As the expression “benami transaction” is not used in Ss. 4 and 5 of the Benami Act, it is contended that the sections would rope in both categories — tripartite and bipartite — of transactions. The further contention is that S. 3 of the Benami Act is intended to cover only the first category of benami transactions while Ss. 4 and 5 embrace both categories and as such sham transactions, though they are called benami only loosely, are nevertheless covered by the two sections.
11. Shri T.R.G Wariyar, senior counsel, led the main arguments. Shri Rajasekharan Nair supplemented to the same. Shri Thiottathil B. Radhakrishnan has addressed the main arguments on the opposite side which was supplemented by Shri V. Sivaswamy, Advocate.
12. The main points stressed by the counsel who argued in favour of the expensive scope of the Benami Act are the following: (1) The definition clause took care to caution that the contours of the definition are pliable in accordance with the context by employing the words in the definition portion “unless the context otherwise requires”. (2) In spite of using the expression “benami transaction” for definition purpose, the legislature has chosen not to use that expression in Ss. 4 and 5. Instead the legislature has cautiously adopted a different expression “property held benami,” though the legislature could have conveniently employed the words “property held under a benami transaction”, if it intended to have the first category or the tripartite transaction alone to be covered by those sections. Change of expression in different context must be treated as a legislative practice of emphasising a change in the application, contended the counsel by quoting Maxwell on “Interpretation of Laws” (at page 282 of the 12th edition). (3)A perusal of 130th Report of the Law Commission of India which paved the way for the present shape of the Benami Act would unerringly show that the idea was to cover both types of transactions. A Statement of Objects and Reasons for the Bill introduced in Lok Sabha for making Benami Act is yet another aid. (4) By the Ordinance Section 81 of the Trust Act was retained intact. Section 82 covers only the tripartite benami transactions. But when the Benami Act was passed Section 81 of the Trust Act was also repealed as the said section covers cases belonging to the second category or bipartite transactions. Parliament by repealing Section 81 of the Trust Act was certain about the superfluity of such a provision as the same was banned in the Benami Act, according to the counsel. Those are the main contentions.
13. We remind ourselves of the well established guidelines for interpretation of statutory provisions. The object of purpose of all constructions or interpretations is to ascertain the intention of the law-makers and make it effective. In Crawford's “Interpretation of Laws” learned authors quoting from a series of decisions, stated that “the basic principle has been announced time after time that if the statute is plain, certain and free from ambiguity a bare reading suffices and interpretation is unnecessary. It is only when the statute is ambiguous or its meaning is uncertain that interpretation is required in order to ascertain what the legislature meant”, (vide page 244). The caution in this regard is that in the endeavour to discover the intention of the law-maker court shall not rewrite a statute and shall not exercise a sort of legislative power which the court does not have. Even when Lord Coke reported Heydon' case “the mischief rule” laid down the standards to eschew the mischief which the statute wanted to undo and uphold the remedy adumbrated therein. (Maxwell on “Interpretation of Statutes” at page 40 of the 12th Edition.).
14. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has observed in Nagiprasad v. A.D Divelkar, AIR 1957 SC 121, like this: “There is no doubt that when the Act itself provides a dictionary for the words used, we must look into that dictionary first for an interpretation of the words used in the statute. We are not concerned with any presumed intention of the legislature, our task is to get at the intention as expressed in the statute.” Supreme Court has again stated in Mutto v. T.K Mandi, (1979) 1 SCC 361 : (AIR 1979 SC 460) that “the court has to determine the intention as expressed by the words used. If the words of a statute are themselves precise and unambiguous then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. The words themselves alone do in such a case best declare the intention of the lawgiver.” A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Punjab Land Devl, and Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, (1990) 3 SCC 682 has reiterated the principle and further quoted with approval the observations of Tindal, C.J in Sussex Peerage case (1844) SER 1034.
15. Shri T.R.G Wariyar has taken us though the relevant portions from the voluminous Report of the Law Commission (130th Report) and also the statement of Objects and Reasons for the Bill (which ultimately resulted in the passing of the Benami Act in replacement of the Ordinance). We are not able to discern from such materials any reason highlighted for truncating benami transaction to the first category — tripartite — alone. But such materials can at the most be used to-aid the court in finding out the intention of the legislature, when such intention cannot be gathered from the words of the statute itself. So, the primary effort which we have to endeavour at is to churn out the legislative intent from the words of the staute. Only in case of failure in the endeavour, would we be justified in resorting to external aids?
16. When it is not disputed that the definition contained in Section 2(a) of the Benami Act will take in only the first category of benami transaction, it can be said without any ambiguity that Section 3 will apply only to the first — tripartite — category. In fact, there was no dispute on that point. Section 3 prohibits future benami transactions. If the prohibition is confined to the first — tripartite — category of benami transactions, it means that the sham transcations are not prohibited by the Act. Sub-section (2) is an exception to the said prohibition and in spite of the prohibition a “purchase” made in the name of wife or daughter is made permissible with a rider that such a “purchase” shall be presumed for her benefit. It is to be noted that sub-section (2) refers only to a “purchase” and not a sale. Sub-section (3) makes it punishable offence of any one entering into the first category — tripartite — benami transactions. This means that whoever enters into the second category — bipartite — benami transaction has no penal consequence prescribed in the Benami Act. We are not told of any special legislative object in confining the prohibition and the penal provision to the first category — tripartitie — benami transactions. We could not disccern any jurisprudential idea in drawing a hiatus between the two categories just for the purpose of including only one among them within the amplitude of the prohibition and penal consequences prescribed in one section and to secure the other transaction from the tentacles of that provision, while at the same time to incorporate both categories of benami transactions to be subjected to the consequences envisaged in the next following two sections. Why should there be such a partisan treatment to one category of benami transaction if the legislature intended both transactions to be involved in the statute?
17. If the argument that the definition clause is not to be followed in regard to Sections 4 and 5 of the Benami Act gains acceptance then practically the definition clause has utility only for just one section in the Benami Act i.e, Section 3. Is it a legislative practice in delineating a definition clause with all its intents and purposes solely for using the same in regard to just one section in the statute? Had that been the idea, the draftsman would only have given the definition in Section 3 itself to the effect that benami transaction mentioned in the section would mean the first category. This is how normally enactments are framed up if the intention was that. Instead of adpoting such a convenient method of draftsmanship, the legislature included the definition in a separate section and in a specific clause.
18. Again, the definition provision contains the introductory paragraph like this: “In this Act, (a) benami transaction means…………..”. If the Parliament had an idea of confining the definition to Section 3 alone, why should it have said the defintion is intended for “this Act”. That apart, the idea of using the word means instead of the word “includes” must also be pointed out with a particular emphasis.
19. Beg, J. (as he then was) has observed in State of T.N v. Pyare Lal Malhotra, AIR 1976 SC 800 that a definition is expected to be exhaustive, but the terms may show that they are not meant to be so exhaustive. “For example, a purported definition may say that the term sought to be defined includes what it specifies, but in that case the definition by itself is not complete”. Craies on Statute Law (7th Edition — page 213) states that “where an interpretation clause defines a word to mean a particular thing, the definition is explanatory and prima facie restrictive, and whenever an interpretation clause defines a term to include something, the definition is extensive. The aforesaid, passage has been quoted by the Supreme Court with approval in Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. Ltd. v. Broje Nath, AIR 1986 SC 1571.
20. Hence, by expressing that the definition is intended for the Act and by employing the restrictive term “means” in preference to the word “includes”, Parliament has conveyed its intention that the word benami transaction is not to be confined to one section alone and also that the definition would contain only one category — tripartite — of benami transaction.
21. In this context we would point out that employment of the words “unless the context otherwise requires” has no special impact on the statute so far as benami transaction is concerned. Perhaps, those words may be useful in regard to the other terms included in the definition section. Those words are, no doubt, indicative of some play at the joints, but even without emloyment of such words a definition will be useful only subject to the inviolable rule that the meaning will remain like that unless the context otherwise requires.
22. The aforesaid position was considered in Sales Tax Commissioner, Gujarat v. Union of Medical Agency, AIR 1981 SC 1. In paragraph 14, their Lordships have pointed out that it is a well settled principle that when a word or phrase has been defined in the interpretation clause, prima facie that definition governs whenever that word or phrase is used in the body of the statute. But where the context makes the definition clause inappliable, a defined word when used in the body of the statute may have to be given a meaning different from that contained in the interpretation clause, all definitions given in an intepretation clause are, therefore, normally enacted subject to the usual qualification “unless there is anything repugnant in the subjecte or context” or “unless the context otherwise requires”. Even in the absence of an express qualification to that effect such a qualification is always implied.
(Emphasis supplied)
23. If Section 5 of the Benami Act has application to both categories of benami transactions, the consequence is that the property covered by the latter is also liable to be acquired without compensation or payment of any amount. The provision is enacted for the purpose of enabling the authority concerned to acquire the property held benami. If the property held under bipartite benami transaction is liable to be acquired without compensation, why the legislature has not declared it as opposed to public policy and prohibit the same prospectively? We fail to comprehend any reason whatsoever as to why the Parliament subjected only the tripartite transaction to prospective prohibition as well as penal consequences and saved the bipartitite transaction therefrom and subject to both to the consequences envisaged in Section 5 of the Benami Act. A reading of Section 5 would indicate that it is yet another form of penalty on the parties involved in a benami transaction as the property is made liable to acquisition without compensation. It is again difficult to think that Parliament would have intended to encompass the bipartite transaction within the tentacles of Section 5 of the Benami Act without making the position understandably clear.
24. Parliament must be presumed to be aware of the legal principles laid down by the Supreme Court and the High Court, at least those which have been settled. When the Act was enacted, Parliament must be aware that the Judge made law has covered both types of transactions — tripartite and bipartite transactions — within the ambit of benami transactions. Still the Parliament has chosen to confine the definition to one category alone. We feel, that the idea was to make the intention abundantly clear that Parliament did not want to encircle the second category.
25. In the above context it has to be pointed out that when the Ordiance has chosen to leave benami transaction without claiming it into any defined contours, the Parliament has chosen to set up boundaries for it in the Benami Act by creating a definition.
26. Section 1(3) of the Benami Act reads thus:
“The provisions of Sections 3, 5 and 8 shall come into force at once, and the remaining provisions of this Act shall be deemed to have come into force on the 19th day of May, 1988”.
Thus, the definition clause “benami transaction” in Section 2(a) took effect from 19-5-1988. What would have been the object of Parliament in giving retrospective application to the paid definition clause from the date which was the date of promulgation of the Ordinance? It must be remembered that except in the captain of the Ordinance the expression “benami transaction” has not been used in the Ordinance. Yet the definition ‘benami transaction” was declared to have come into operation from the date of Ordinance. To us the intention is manifest that Parliament wanted even the Ordinance to confine to the tripartite benami transaction and not the other.
27. We shall now consider the contention based on Parliament using the expression “property held benami” unstead of the expression “property held under a benami transaction” in Sections 4 and 5 of the Benami Act. Bhaskaran Nambiar, J. has endeavoured to explain it in Ouseph Chacko v. Raman Nair, (1989) 1 Ker LT 767 : (AIR 1989 Kerala 317). Learned Judge took the view that “in the context and setting of Section 4, the word held has to be understood as possessed or occupied, and if the possession or occupation is not benami Section 4 has no application.” No particular reason can be attributed as to why the Parliament did not use the expression “held under a benami transaction”, but restricted to “property held benami”. It can at best be attributed to frugality in draftmanship of legislative exercises. Having defined “benami transaction” it might be unnecessary to repeat “property held under benami transaction”. We bear in mind that the reference there is to the subject “property” and not to the transaction. The character of the subject is denoted by the words “held benami”.
28. In a sham transaction there is no “holding” of a property in benami. One person holds a property benami if he has at least ostensible title. In Handique v. Agrl. LT. Board, Assam, AIR 1966 SC 1191 and Hari Ram v. Babu Gokul Prasad, AIR 1991 SC 427 the expression “hold” is understood as the actual possession invested with legal title. In the first category — tripartite — in which the transaction took place, transferee can hold the property under a legal title though he is only an ostensible title holder. It cannot be thought that by using the expression “property held benami” the Parliament would have made a substantial departure from “property held under a benami transaction”.
29. That apart, a contention advanced by Shri. Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan in this context appears to us to provide a formidable support to the view that Benami Act applies only to the first category — tripartitle — transactions. It was pointed out earlier that the definition clause in Section 2 has been given retrospective operation from the date of promulgation of the Orinance. It would certainly mean that the Parliament wanted the meaning given to benami transaction as defined in Section 2(a) of the Benami Act to be applicable to the Ordinance. It is significant to note that in the Ordinance the only operative provision (Section 2) contained the expression “any property held benami” and not “property held under benami transaction.” It must also be noted that there is no other provision in the Ordinance where the expression “benami transaction” was used. Thus, if the meaning given to “benami transaction” in Section 2 of the Benami Act has to apply to any provision in the Ordinance, the only provision which can have the use is Section 2 of the Ordinance wherein also the expression employed is “property held benami”. We think that this aspect would really clinch the issue.
30. However, we shall now consider how for the inclusion of Section 81 of the Indian Trusts Act within the sweep of repeal in the Benami Act would have any impact on the provisions of the Benami Act for encircling the second category — bipartite — benami transaction at least partially.
31. The repeal provision in the Ordinance is Section 4(1) of the Ordinance which reads thus:
“4. Repeal of provisions of certain Acts, — (1) Section 82 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 (2 of 1882), Section 66 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) and Section 281A of the Act Income-tax Act, 1961 (43 of 1961), are hereby repealed.”
It is clear that the two additions brought in the repeal sweep under the Benami Act are Sections 81 and 94 of the Indian Trusts Act. There is no much difficulty to comprehend the principles involved in S. 82 of the Trust Act. It is analogous to the first category — tripartite — benami transaction since in both there is an operative transfer of property for consideration. The prominent feature of the second category benami transaction is that there is neither any transfer nor any passing of consideration. It is a sham transaction which is only a camouflage. The document is a facade behind which nothing took place in reality. But Section 81 of the Trusts Act contains transfer of the property concerned as sine qua non for its application. The said section is extracted below:
“81. Where it does not appear that transferor intended to dispose of beneficial interest — Where the owner of property transfers or bequeaths it; and it cannot be inferred, consistently with the attendant circumstances, that he intended to dispose of the benaficial interest therein, the transferee or legatee must hold such property for the benefit of the owner or his legal representative.”
By no stretch of imagination can it be said that Section 81 of the Trusts Act was intended to refer to the second category of benami transaction.
32. Even otherwise, mere expansion of the sphere of repeal is no indication that the Parliament wanted to spread the umbrella beyond the contours fixed in the defintion as to the application of Sections 4 and 5 of the Benami Act. It must be remembered that Section 94 of the Trusts Act was also repealed which is another improvement in the Benami Act from the Ordiannce. Nobody can possibly contend that Section 94 of the Trusts Act would cover any type of benami transaction.
33. We have no reason to think that neither Section 66 of the Code of Civil Prosecution or Section 281A of the Income-tax Act would ever have envisaged a sham transaction and hence the repeal of these two sections has no special implication on the question involved herein.
34. The scheme as well a the setting unfurled in the tiny piece of legislation — Benami Act would thus unmistakbly proclaim even though the frugality of words set forth therein that it is only the tripartite benami transaction (which is recognised by the case law as the real benami transaction) which the Parliament has sought to snuff out with its statutory forceps. The corollary is that Parliament would not have intended to make any foray into the sphere of sham transaction, perhaps because what is sham will ever remain sham though the case law happened to “loosely” or “inaccurately” call that also benami.
35. A learned Judge of the Madras High Court has held in Kathoon Bivi Ammal v. S. Mohamad, (1990) 1 Mad L.W 284 that Benami Act would apply to both categories of transactions. The reasoning adopted by the learned Judge is that inclusion of Sections 81 and 82 of the Trusts Act within the repeal provision is indicative that sham transaction also is brought within the purview of the Benami Act. We pointed out earlier that repeal of Sections 81 and 82 of the Trusts Act cannot have such an implication on the scope of the Benami Act. That apart, correctness of the decision in Kathoon Bivi Ammal's case was questioned and a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in N. Govindrajan v. Indian Overseas Bank, (1991) 1 Mad L.W 649 has overruled the same. Ratnam, J. (as he then was) quoted the decision of Ouseph Chacko v. Raman Nair (1989) 1 Ker LT 767 : (AIR 1989 Kerala 317) and followed the ratio in arriving at the said conclusion.
36. For the aforesaid reasons, we are in agreement with the conclusion arrived at by Bhaskaran Nambiar, J. in Ouseph Chacko v. Raman Nair, (1989) 1 Ker LT 767 : (AIR 1989 Kerala 317) that Sham transactions do not come within the purview of the Benami Act.
Accordingly, we dismiss C.R.P No. 1446/89. Counsel for the petitioner in C.R.P No. 1188/87 reported that the revision is not pressed and hence that revision is also dismissed. A.S No. 84/84 and A.S No. 424/81 have to be heard and disposed of on merits in view of the decision regarding the point referred to the Full Bench. Hence we direct the registry to board the said appeals before the appropriate Bench without delay.
Order accordingly.
Alert