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Mohammed v. Central Board Of Direct Taxes
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner is an assessee assessed by the Income-tax Officer, A-Ward, Kannur (third respondent). While completing assessments for the years 1978-79 to 1981-82, interest was levied under Ss. 139(8) and 217. The petitioner applied under S. 273A to the Commissioner of Income-tax, Kochi (second respondent), and by Ext. P1 order dated 22-7-1985 the Commissioner waived the interest under both Sections, finding the assessee had voluntarily filed returns disclosing true income and had paid tax.
Subsequently the third respondent issued notices of proceedings for imposition of penalties under Ss. 271(1)(a) and 273(2)(b). The petitioner filed Ext. P2 (20-3-1986) seeking waiver of those penalties. Ext. P3 (3-8-1987) records the second respondent rejecting Ext. P2 on the ground he had already exercised the power under S. 273A(1) and could not pass a second order; the total penalty was Rs. 10,694.
The petitioner then filed a rectification application under S. 154 (Ext. P4 dated 4-5-1988) contending there was a mistake apparent on the record because sub-section (3) of S. 273A bars relief only in relation to other assessment years after an earlier order and does not prevent a further order in relation to the same assessment year(s). The second respondent refused rectification by Ext. P5 (2-6-1988), stating there was no apparent error and doubting whether he could modify his predecessor's order. The petitioner appealed to the Central Board of Direct Taxes (first respondent) by Ext. P6; the first respondent declined to interfere (relying on sub-section (5) of S. 273A(1) that such orders are final). The petitioner challenged Exts. P3, P5 and the first respondent's order by filing this Original Petition under Article 226.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an order (Ext. P1) passed by the Commissioner under S. 273A(1) waiving interest prevents the Commissioner from passing a subsequent order under S. 273A(1) to reduce or waive penalties later imposed in relation to the same assessment year(s).
- How sub-section (3) of S. 273A should be interpreted: whether it means the Commissioner’s power under S. 273A(1) can be exercised only once in respect of a given person (in all respects), or whether the power comprises distinct, severable powers that may be exercised separately in respect of different matters or clauses.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- Sub-section (3) should be strictly construed in a fiscal statute; it does not expressly prohibit claiming further relief in respect of the same assessment year(s) where a previous order was passed under S. 273A(1).
- By virtue of S. 14 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, a power conferred by statute is to be treated as exercisable from time to time unless a contrary intention is shown; there is nothing in S. 273A indicating a contrary intention.
- The power in S. 273A(1) is compendiously conferred for different matters (clauses (i)–(iii)) and the Commissioner does not exhaust the whole power by exercising it in respect of one matter only — a partial exercise does not preclude exercising it later in respect of other matters (for example, interest vs. penalties).
- At the time Ext. P1 was passed, penalties under Ss. 271(1)(a) and 273(2)(b) had not been imposed; the petitioner later sought relief when penalties were threatened or imposed, so rejection of Ext. P2 as a "second" exercise of power was unsustainable.
Respondent(s)' Arguments
- The second respondent (Commissioner) in his counter-affidavit contended that under S. 273A(1) only one order can be passed in favour of an assessee and no further order can be made — thus Ext. P3, P5 and related orders were justified.
- It was submitted that the court should not interfere under Article 226 because the statutory authorities' view was correct and there was no mistake apparent on the face of the record in the S.154 rejection.
- The counsel for the first respondent relied on the Division Bench decision in Ram Sarandas Har Swaroop Mal v. C.I.T. (All.) (1990) 186 ITR 503 in support of the proposition that sub-section (3) means the power shall be exercised only once for a given person and not more than once.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ram Sarandas Har Swaroop Mal v. C.I.T. (Allahabad), (1990) 186 ITR 503 | Express observation (by B.P. Jeevan Reddy, C.J.) that the true meaning of S. 273A(3) is that the power shall be exercised only once in the case of a given person and not more than once. | The court considered and distinguished this decision: it held that the cited case involved different facts (Commissioner granted relief for only one year though relief had been claimed for multiple years) and did not address whether a partial exercise of the power (in relation to one clause or matter) would exhaust power in relation to other clauses; the court therefore declined to treat the decision as authority for a broad rule that any single order under S. 273A(1) precludes later orders in respect of the same assessment year(s) for different matters. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court undertook a textual and structural interpretation of S. 273A(1) and (3). It observed that S. 273A(1) "in plain and unambiguous terms" confers a wide power on the Commissioner to act in his discretion in respect of a number of distinct matters set out in clauses (i)–(iii):
- Clause (i) authorizes reduction/waiver of penalty under S. 271(1)(a) (failure to furnish return).
- Clause (ii) authorizes reduction/waiver of penalty under clause (iii) of S. 271(1) (concealment/inaccuracy matters).
- Clause (iii) authorizes reduction/waiver of interest under S.139(8), S.215 or S.217 or penalty under S.273.
The court emphasized that the statutory scheme requires the Commissioner to be satisfied as to separate, distinct conditions in clauses (a)–(c) before exercising powers in respect of the corresponding clauses (i)–(iii). Based on this, the court characterized S. 273A(1) as a compendium of several distinct powers that may be exercised independently or jointly, subject to satisfaction of the respective conditions.
With respect to S. 273A(3), the court read that provision narrowly: it bars a person who has obtained an order under sub-section (1) from claiming relief under that section in relation to any other assessment year(s) after the making of such earlier order. It does not expressly prohibit further orders in relation to the same assessment year(s). Thus, the court concluded the positive bar in sub-section (3) is limited to relief for different assessment years, not to further or different reliefs for the same year(s).
The court examined the single precedent relied upon (Ram Sarandas) and noted that while that Division Bench had observed that sub-section (3) meant the power shall be exercised only once for a given person, the facts in that case concerned the Commissioner granting relief for one year while refusing relief for other years despite the assessee seeking relief for all years — an approach contrary to the Section's express words. The prior decision did not consider whether a partial exercise of power in relation to only one clause exhausts the Commissioner’s power in relation to other clauses; therefore that observation could not be treated as broadly authoritative for the proposition urged by respondents in this petition.
Synthesizing the statutory scheme, the court concluded:
- The power under S. 273A(1) consists of distinct powers applicable to different matters and is exercisable from time to time, subject to satisfaction of the separate conditions in clauses (a)–(c).
- A Commissioner’s exercise of the power in relation to one matter (for example, waiving interest) does not automatically exhaust the power in its entirety so as to preclude a later exercise in respect of other distinct matters (for example, penalties) relating to the same assessment year(s), provided the relief sought has not already been granted for the same matter more than once.
- Sub-section (3) prohibits claiming the same relief for another assessment year after one order has been made, and it disallows repeated claims of the same relief more than once, but it does not bar further, distinct reliefs in respect of the same year(s) when those distinct reliefs were not the subject of the earlier order.
- The court invoked the interpretive principle that, where two constructions of a fiscal provision are possible, the one favourable to the assessee (particularly when the provision confers relief) should be preferred; and it found nothing in the section to justify adopting the respondents' broad interpretation that a single exercise exhausts all powers for all matters.
On these grounds the court held the second respondent’s view (that Ext. P1 precluded Ext. P2) to be legally unsustainable. The refusal to rectify under S. 154 (Ext. P5) and the first respondent's refusal to intervene (Ext. P7) were also deemed illegal in consequence of that incorrect view.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Original Petition is allowed. Exts. P3, P5 and P7 are set aside. The second respondent (Commissioner) is directed to consider and dispose of Ext. P2 on its merits in accordance with law and in the light of the findings and observations contained in the judgment. No costs.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The administrative orders rejecting the petition for waiver of penalty and subsequent refusals to rectify or to intervene (Exts. P3, P5, P7) were quashed and the Commissioner must reconsider the petition for waiver of penalties (Ext. P2) on its merits.
- Interpretive clarification: The court construed S. 273A(1) as conferring several distinct powers (clauses (i)–(iii)) which may be exercised independently when their respective statutory conditions are satisfied; S. 273A(3) prevents relief being claimed again for other assessment years after an earlier order and prevents repeated grant of the same relief more than once, but does not preclude further distinct reliefs in respect of the same assessment year(s) that were not previously granted.
- Scope of precedent: The court limited the scope of the cited Allahabad Division Bench decision, holding that it did not decide the specific question whether a partial exercise of power exhausts the entire compendious power under S. 273A(1).
- No broader precedent beyond this opinion was held to govern; the judgment applies its textual and purposive analysis to the facts and directs reconsideration rather than prescribing a general procedural rule beyond the statutory interpretation expressed.
1. An important question regarding the scope of the power to reduce or waive penalty etc. in certain cases conferred on the Commissioner of Income Tax under S. 273 A(1) of the Income-Tax Act, 1961 (for short “the Act”) and interpretation of sub-section (3) of that Section falls for consideration in this Original Petition. The facts relevant are not in dispute and can be stated thus: Petitioner is an assessee on the file of the 3rd respondent, the Income-tax Officer, A-Ward, Kannur. While completing regular assessment for the assessment years 1978-79 to 81-82, the 3rd respondent levied interest under Ss. 139(8) and 217 of the Act. The petitioner filed a petition under S. 273A of the Act before the Second respondent, the Commissioner of Income-tax, Kochi for waiver of the interest levied for the above 4 assessment years. Second respondent as per Ext. P1 order dated 22-7-1985 waived the interest under both Sections finding that the assessee has before issue of a notice voluntarily filed returns of income disclosing true income and has paid tax and as such is entitled to waiver of interest imposed under the above sections in full. Subsequently, the third respondent issued notice of proceedings for the imposition of penally under Ss. 271(1)(a) and 273(2)(b) of the Act. On receipt of notice, petitioner submitted Ext. P2 petition dated 20-3-1986 praying for waiver of penally imposable under Ss. 271(1)(a) and 273(2)(b) of the Act. That petition was rejected by the second respondent by Ext. P3 order dated 3-8-1987 on the ground that he had already exercised the power conferred on him under S. 273 A(1) of the Act and as such he has no power to pass a second order in exercise of the said power. The total penalty imposed under the 2 Sections was Rs. 10,694/-. On receipt of Ext. P3 order, the petitioner filed Ext. P4 petition dated 4-5-1988 under S. 154 of the Act before the Second respondent alleging that there are certain mistakes apparent in the record. It was alleged that while taking the view that there is no power to pass a second order in favour of the petitioner under S. 273A(1) of the Act, the second respondent has overlooked the scope and effect of the provisions contained in sub-section (3) of S. 273A of the Act and that it constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record. The said sub-section only prohibits the second respondent from granting relief under sub-section (1) in favour of a person in relation to any other assessment, year or years after granting relief under that sub-section once in respect of any one or more years by an earlier order. The relevant provision in sub-section (3) never prevents a further order being passed in relation to the same assessment year or years for which he has already been granted one of the benefits conferred under S. 273A(1) of the Act. On a consideration of the petition, the second respondent, however, rejected the petition as per Ext. P5 order dated 2-6-1988 stating that there is no mistake apparent on the face of the record and that it is doubtful whether he can modify his predecessor's order dated 3-8-1987 on merits. Against Ext. P5 order, the petitioner submitted Ext. P6 petition dated 7-6-1988 to the first respondent, the Central Board of Direct Taxes (Income-tax). In Ext. P6 petition, the petitioner prayed that the first respon ??? may either rectify the order dated 3-8-1987 or set aside the above order and direct fresh consideration of the case by the second respondent. First respondent has also declined to interfere with the matter taking the veiw that an order passed under S. 273A(1) of the Act is final and cannot be called into question before any court or authority in view of sub-section (5) of S. 273 A(1) of the Act and as such no interference is called for. Aggrieved by the orders passed by the statutory authorities, the petitionerhas preferred this O.P challenging the sustainability of the above orders.
2. Second respondent has filed a counter affidavit taking up the contention that under S. 273A(1) of the Act only one order can be passed in favour of an assessee and no further order can be passed under the said sub-section in favour of the same assessee. On the above basis, it was submitted that the orders passed by the authorities are perfectly justifiable and no interference is called for in this O.P in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction vested in this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. It was also contended that the view taken by the second respondent while disposing of the petition filed under S. 154 of the Act to the effect that there is no apparent error on the record is also justifiable in the circumstances of the case.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that being a provision in a fiscal statute, the provision contained in sub-section (3) should be construed strictly and in the absence of any express prohibition from claiming further relief in respect of the assessment year or years in relation to which already an order has been passed by the second respondent under sub-section (1) of S. 273A of the Act; the provision should be-interpreted in such a manner as to enable the beneficiary of the provision from claiming the reliefs conferred by the Section from time to time. When a power is conferred on an authority by a statute it must be considered as one exercisable from time to time as occasion requires as provided under S. 14 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 unless a, different intention appears from the statute which conferred the power on the concerned authority. There is nothing in the Section which either expressly or impliedly indicates a different intention. Secondly it was submitted that the view taken by the second respondent that he could pass only one order under sub-section (1) of S. 273A and on passing an order the power in its entirety is exhausted once and for all can be held to be true only in cases where the second respondent while passing the first order has actually or impliedly exercised his powers under sub-section (1) in regard to all the matters mentioned in clauses (i) to (iii) of that sub-section. The fact that power to reduce or waive interest and penalties imposed or imposable under various Sections have been given compendiously in one sub-section of the Section may hot be a sufficient reason to hold that when once the power conferred in relation to one matter is exercised, that may preclude the second respondent from exercising the powers in relation to rest of the matters in respect of which he has not exercised his power and was not even called upon to exercise his power. So long as the second respondent has not purported to exercise the power in relation to all the matters mentioned in the sub-section he cannot be considered to have exhausted all the powers vested in him by such partial exercise of power. With reference to the facts of the case, the learned counsel submitted that in the first instance, the second respondent was called upon to exercise his power only in the matter of reducing or waiving the interest imposed under Ss. 139(8) and 217 of the Act and not in relation to any of the other matters mentioned in clauses (ii) and (iii) of the sub-section. Atthe time when Ext. P1 orderwas passed, the penalties under Ss. 271(1)(a) and 273(2)(b) were not imposed. It was when the petitioner came to know about the penalty proceedings and the possibility of imposition of penalty the petitioner has filed Ext. P2 petition for necessary relief. In the circumstances, it was submitted that the rejection of the petition taking the view that the second respondent has no power to give relief in respect of the penalty imposed and requested to be waived is unsustainable.
4. In support of the contention that the power conferred on the second respondent under S. 273A(1) can be exercised only once and no second order can be passed in exercise of the power conferred by the said Section, the learned counsel for the first respondent has strongly relied upon the Division Bench decision of Allahabad High Court reported in Ram Sarandas Har Swaroop Mal v. C.I.T (All), (1990) 186 ITR 503.
5. In the light of the contentions so raised, the question arising for consideration is whether Ext. P1 order passed in favour of the petitioner waiving interest imposed under Ss. 139(8) and 217 of the Act would preclude the second respondent from passing an order on Ext. P2 petition exercising once again his power under S. 273A(1) of the Act.
6. Section 273A(1) and (3) read thus:
“273A(1): Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Commissioner may, in his discretion, whether on his own motion or otherwise;—
(i) reduce or waive the amount of penalty imposed or imposable on a person under clause (i) of sub-section (1) of S. 271 for failure, without reasonable cause, to furnish the return of total income which he was required to furnish under sub-section (1) of S. 139; or
(ii) reduce or waive the amount of penalty imposed or imposable on a person under clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of S. 271; or
(iii) reduce or waive the amount of interest paid or payable under sub-section (8) of S. 139 or S. 215 or S. 217 or the penalty imposed or imposable under S. 273,
if he is satisfied that such person—
(a) in the case referred to in clause (i), has, prior to the issue of a notice to him under sub-section (2) of S. 139, voluntarily and in good faith made full and true disclosure of his income;
(b) in the case referred to in clause (ii), has, prior to the detection by the Income-tax Officer, of the concealment of particulars of income or of the inaccuracy of particulars furnished in respect of such income, voluntarily and in good faith, made full and true disclosure of such particulars;
(c) in the cases referred to in clause (iii), has, prior to the issue of notice to him under sub-section (2) of S. 139; or where such notice has been issued and the period for the issue of such notice has expired, prior to the issue of notice to him under S. 148, voluntarily and in good faith made full and true disclosure of his income and has paid the tax on the income so disclosed,
and also has, in all the cases referred to in clauses (a), (b) and (c), co-operated in any inquiry relating to the assessment of his income and has either paid or made satisfactory arrangements for the payment of any tax or interest payable in consequence of an order passed under this Act in respect of the relevant assessment year.
Explanation.— For the purposes of this sub-section, a person shall be deemed to have made full and true disclosure of his income or of the particulars relating thereto in any case where the excess of income assessed over the income returned is such a nature as not to attract the provisions of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of S. 271.
273A(3): Where an order has been made under sub-section (1) in favour of any person, whether such order relates to one or more assessment years, he shall not be entitled to any relief under this section in relation to any other asssessment year at any time after the making of such order.”
7. Sub-section (1) in plain and unambiguous terms confers a very wide power on the second respondent to pass orders in his discretion regarding a number of distinct matters provided in clauses (i) to (iii) of that sub-section. Clause (i) empowers the second respondent to reduce or waive the amount of penalty imposed or imposable on person under S. 271(1) of the Act. Clause (ii) similarly empowers the second respondent in his discretion to reduce or waive the amount of penalty imposed or imposable on a person under S. 271(1)(b) of the Act. Clause (iii) in terms empowers the second respondent in his discretion to reduce orwaive the amount of interest paid or payable under sub-section (8) of S. 139 or S. 215 or S. 217 or the penalty imposed or imposable under S. 273 of the Act. Further said sub-section provides that the second respondent can pass orders in respect of matters enumerated in clauses (i) to (iii) only after satisfying himself about the fact that a person who claims benefit under S. 273A(1) of the Act fulfills the conditions mentioned respectively in clauses (a) to (c) of the same sub-section. The conditions mentioned in clauses (a) to (c) are conditions prescribed for the exercise of the power conferred on the commissioner respectively under clauses (i) to (iii) and they are also distinct and separate. Thus before passing orders in respect of the different matters provided under clauses (i) to (iii), the second respondent is bound statutorily to satisfy himself as to whether the different conditions mentioned in clauses (a) to (c) of that sub-section are duly satisfied by the beneficiary or not. The above scheme of the provisions in sub-section (1) of S. 273A of the Act would indicate that the power conferred under the said sub-section actually comprises of serveral distinct powers and is a collection of powers compendiously conferred by one and the same sub-section. Though the powers conferred are in relation to inter connected matters, they are distinct and are to be exercised only after satisfying oneself about the fulfillment of the conditions separately indicated in clauses (a) to (c) of the said sub-section.
8. Regarding sub-section (3) of S. 273A of the Act, it will be advantageous to take note of the fact that it only bars a person who has already obtained an order under sub-section (1) in his favour from claiming any relief under the said sub-section in relation to any other assessment year or years at any time after the making of such earlier order. In other words, the positive bar is only in the matter of claiming relief under sub-section (1) of S. 273 A of the Act in relation to any other assessment year or years other than the one or more years in respect of which a person has already obtained an order under sub-section (1) of that Section. The Section as such does not expressly prohibit a person who has already obtained an order in relation to a particular assessment year or years from claiming any other or further relief under the said sub-section in respect of the same assessment yearor years. In other words, the provision in sub-section (3) only disentitles a person from claiming once again the various reliefs provided under clauses (i) to (iii) of sub-section (1) of S. 273A of the Act, if he had already enforced his remedies under sub-section (1) and obtained an order or different orders passed by the second respondent under sub-section (1) of S. 273A. Sub-section (3) only prohibits a person from claiming the relief or reliefs conferred by that sub-section repeatedly on more occasions than one.
9. Before going into the merits of the above contentions raised by the counsel on both sides, I may observe that except for the decision referred to by the counsel for the first respondent, no other authority was relied upon by either side in support of their contentions. Being the only decision referred to as having relevance in the matter, I may first consider how far the decision is helpful to decide the issue raised in the O.P It is true that while construing the provisions in sub-section (3) of S. 273A of the Act, B.P Jeevan Reddy, C.J (as His Lordship then was) on behalf of the Division Bench has observed that ‘the true meaning of sub-section (3) is that the power shall be exercised only once in the case of a given person and not more than once.’ The above observation apparently supports fully the contention of the first respondent and as such deserve detailed consideration in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case and the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The relevant observations were made in a case where the Income-tax Officer had levied the interest under S. 139(8) on the assessee for late filing of returns and also imposed penalties under S. 271(1)(a) of the Act for the assessment years commencing from 1978-79 ending with 1981-82. The assessee in that case filed an application before the Commissioner for waiver of interest and penalties under S. 273A(1). The Commissioner waived the penalty only for the assessment year 1977-78 and dismissed the application in all other respects on the ground that under sub-section (3) of S. 273A the indulg granted once was not available for any other assessment year nor for a second time for the same assessment year. The Division Bench found that the view takenby the Commissioneris unsustainable and set aside the order and remanded the matter for fresh consideration in accordance with law and in the light of the observations and directions contained in the judgment. From the facts of the case, it is clear that it is a case where the court was not called upon to consider the question of maintainability of the application for the exercise of the powers conferred under S. 273A(1) of the Act for a second time. There was also no specific contention raised regarding the exact scope of the power conferred under S. 273 A(1) of the Act. The question whether the exercise of power in relation to only one of the several matters mentioned in the three cluses with reference to which power was conferred by the sub-section would amount to an exercise of power in relation to all the matters provided under all the clauses and would exhaust the entire power vested under the sub-section was not am alter specifically considered in the said decision. It was a case where the Commissioner exercised his power only with reference to one year even though the assessee has claimed even at the first instance relief inrespect of 4 years. That was obviously against the express words contained in the Section and was clearly illegal. It was in this context that the Division Bench has made the above observation. Even assuming that the power can be exercised only once whether the power exercised in relation to one of the matters provided in the various clauses would amount to an actual or implied exercise of the power conferred in respect of the other matters mentioned in the clauses was not at all considered in the said decision. In the circumstances, I do not think that the observations can be taken as an authority for contending that any order passed under sub-section (1) would preclude any further or other relief or reliefs being claimed and granted in appropriate cases in respect of the same year or years with reference to which an order has alredy been passed by the Commissioner in exercise of his power under sub-section (1) of S. 273A of the Act.
10. On a consideration of the scheme of the provisions contained in sub-sections (1) and (3) of S. 273A of the Act as indicated above and the rival contentions raised by the counsel on both sides, I am inclined to take the view that the power conferred under S. 273A(1) is a power conferred with reference to different matters which is liable to be exercised from time to time by the second respondent on being satisfied that the conditions mentioned in clauses (a) to (c) of that sub-section are fulfilled by the beneficiary subject to the further condition that the reliefs in respect of all or any of the matters can be claimed and granted only once in favour of one and the same person and not for a second time. Though conferred compendiously under one sub-section it is a power exercisable in relation to various matters either independently or jointly and that the exercise of power in relation to one of the matters mentioned in the different clauses of sub-section (1) may not preclude the beneficiary from claiming reliefs in respect of other matter or matters and the second respondent from exercising power in relation to such other matter or matters in respect of which the beneficiary has not actually obtained an earlier order from the Commissioner. The exercise of power with reference to any one or more years in relation to one or more matters in clauses (i) to (iii) but not in relation to all matters mentioned in clauses (i) to (iii) may not exhaust the power in its entirety. Such orders passed in relation to one or more matters but not in relation to all the matters, can be considered only as orders passed in exercise of part of the power conferred compendiously under the sub-section and cannot be treated as an order which would exhaust the power conferred by the sub-section in its entirety. The intention of the legislature in enacting sub-sections (1) and (3) of S. 273A of the Act is obviously to confer certain reliefs in respect of the various consequences of certain defaults com mitted by the assessees in complying with the provisions of the Act for once whether it is for one year or for number of years. It was with the object of relieving persons of the various consequences of their default in complying with certain requirements of the provisions of the Act subject to certain conditions contained in the section itself that S. 273A of the Act was enacted. If that is the object of the provision and the intendment of the legislature, the view which I take in this matter may not go against the said object and intendment. In fact it will only be in accordance with the said object of the legislation. Moreover it is a well accepted principle that if two interpretations are possible of a provision in a fiscal statute, as the one in question, the interpretation which is favourable to the assessee is to be preferred especially when the provision is one intended to confer certain reliefs or exemptions in favour of the assessee. There is nothing in the Section which would justify the adoption of the interpretation canvassed for by the respondent in an unqualified manner. If such an interpretation is adopted it will go against the very object for which it was enacted. In the circumstances, I would hold that the view taken by the second respondent that in view of Ext. P1 order, no second order in exercise of the power under S. 273 A(1) of the Act can be passed is unsustainable in law.
11. Regarding the interpretation of sub-section (3) also, I am inclined to take the view that the said sub-section expressly prohibits only the exercise of power to grant the same relief or reliefs under clauses (i) to (iii) for a second, time and that too for a different period from the period for which the relief or reliefs under these clauses have already been sought for and either refused or granted by an earlier order passed by the second respondent Once an order is passed in relation to oneof the matters specified in any of the clauses of sub-section (1) so far the power would stand exhaust and no further disposing of Ext. P2 petition is unsustainable in law. While taking the above view and dismissing the application, the second respondent has failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in him illegally. In this view the rejection of the rectification petition filed under S. 154 of the Act by the second respondent as per EXT.P5 order and Ext. P7 order passed by the first respondent is illegal and as such the said orders are liable to be set aside. Accordingly Exts. P3, P5 and P7 are set aside. Second respondentis directed to consider and disposeof Ext. P2 petition on its merits in accordance with law and in the light of the findings and observations contained in this judgment. O.P is accordingly allowed. No costs.
12. Allowed.
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