1. The petitioner is now working as chargehand in the Wood Workshop at Kollakkadavu, Mavelikkara, of the first respondent, the Kerala State Small Industries Development and Employees Corporation. He joined the corporation as a machine operator on 9 July, 1970. He was borne in the category of worker when he was promoted as chargehand by the proceedings exhibit P2, dated 11 September, 1978 (vide Para. 2 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the first respondent). He has been functioning as chargehand since 19 September, 1978. Respondents 2 and 3 are junior to him, as is evident from the seniority list exhibit P3. Petitioner is now borne in the revised pay-scale of Rs. 330-515, drawing a basic pay of Rs. 378.

2. Respondents 2 and 3 were promoted as chargehand in the years 1981 and 1982, long after the petitioner. Several other juniors of the petitioner have also been promoted as chargehand after his promotion as such. However and despite their later promotions, these juniors are drawing higher basic pay than the petitioner. Thus while the petitioner is getting a basic pay of Rs. 378 respondents 2 and 3, who were promoted three/four years after him, and working in the same category as chargehand, are drawing higher basic pay of Rs. 470 and 452 respectively. Petitioner brought this anomaly to the notice of the first respondent by his representations exhibits P4 and P5 with prayer for redress. But his prayer stood rejected by the proceedings exhibit P9, the first respondent taking the stand that respondents 2 and 3 were promoted from the category of workers for whom variable dearness allowance was paid and on their promotion as chargehand for which no variable dearness allowance was payable, their pay had to be protected. It was accordingly that they were given higher basic pay than the petitioner, despite their later promotion. Petitioner states that this is not a sufficient reason justifying refusal of his request for parity with his juniors and that it revolts against the concept of equal pay for equal work enshrined in Art. 39(d) of the Constitution.

3. What is contained in exhibit P9 has been subsequently reiterated, and amplified, in the counter-affidavit, where the first respondent points out that the amount of Pay drawn by respondents 2 and 3 stood enhanced because of a wage revision which took place with effect from 1 July, 1980. There was a steep (“remarkable” is the word used) raise in the total emolument of workers on account of the increase in variable dearness allowance after this wage revision. The emoluments payable to respondents 2 and 3 and others after 1 July, 1980, had to be protected when they were promoted as chargehand. It is accordingly that they are paid larger emoluments than the petitioner, Petitioner himself was promoted on 11 September, 1978, but that was before the wage revision, and his emoluments as chargehand were fixed accordingly.

4. It is the admitted case that the petitioner as well as respondents 2 and 3 and others all stood promoted from the category of workers, to the category of chargehand, in the regular establishment of the first respondent. All of them are at present engaged in the same type of work as chargehand. Petitioner was promoted on 11 September, 1978, while respondents 2 and 3 and others stood promoted in 1981, 1982 and later, after a wage revision with effect from 1 July, 1980, which resulted in benefits of a larger variable dearness allowance to the workers. Their emoluments were projected when they were promoted, and, therefore, respondents 2 and 3 are receiving larger basic pay in the category of chargehand. The question is whether the petitioner should be denied the benefit of parity with his juniors merely because he happened to be promoted earlier on 11 September, 1978.

5. The concept of equal pay for equal work is an aspect of the doctrine of equality enshrined in Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution and is deducible therefrom. The principle of equal pay for equal work is not declared to be a fundamental right, but it is certainly a constitutional goal. It is not an abstract doctrine but one with life and soul intended to be given effect to under Arts. 14 and 16. Where all things are equal, that is, where the relevant considerations are the same, persons holding identical posts cannot be treated differentially in the matter of pay. Randhir Singh v. Union of India [1982 — I L.L.N 327]. Any classification of employees in the same rank, but with differential pay, has to be founded on a rational basis, either on the basis of their functions, powers, duties or responsibilities, or otherwise. If there is a rational and intelligible differentia between the employees justifying their classification, the doctrine of equal pay for equal work will not be attracted and the Court will uphold differential scales of pay. The policy of the doctrine is to prevent exploitation of labour, and eradicate irrational and unscientific methods of payment of wages or pay to employees. The necessary consequence is that if the employees are engaged in similar work and there is identity between them in all respects, the differentiation resulting in inequality in the wages will not be upheld by the Court. (Vide Jaipal v. State of Haryana [1988 — II L.L.N 580], where the Supreme Court observed that if two classes of persons do the same work under the same employer with similar responsibilities under similar working conditions, the doctrine of equal pay for equal work will apply and it will not be open to the State to discriminate one class from the other in paying salary. The State is under a constitutional obligation to ensure that equal pay is paid for equal work).

6. There is no dispute that the petitioner and respondents 2 and 3 are borne in the same cadre and are doing the same kind of work. The only distinction sought to be made is that the petitioner was promoted before a wage revision on 1 July, 1980 which enured to the benefit of respondents 2 and 3 in the lower grade and the necessity to protect their wages. According to me, this is insufficient to warrant payment to the petitioner of a pay lower than that received by his juniors.

7. The question involved is a fundamental one, in that a senior in a category is made to draw basic pay less than that drawn by his junior for the simple fortuitous circumstance that he stood promoted earlier than his junior and the pay-revision for the junior was effected in the lower category in the interregnum. I should think that it is a fundamental principle of service law that when everything else is equal, a senior in service should receive a salary higher than, or at least equal to, that drawn by his junior. To relegate him to a lower pay is arbitrary and negation of the rule of equality enshrined in Art. 14 of the Constitution. It looks obnoxious and revolting to good sense that a senior should get lower pay merely because he was promoted earlier.

8. It is true that the principle adopted by the first respondent that the pay drawn in the lower category should be protected on promotion is valid, but then it is equally incumbent on them to see that the interests of the senior who was already in a higher category are protected by appropriate revision of his pay, so that he does not stand in a worse position than his junior in relation to the pay drawn by him. The payment of lesser salary for an admitted senior, who is similarly situated, than his junior, amounts to an unequal treatment meted out to equals, thereby violating Art. 14 of the Constitution. The fact that respondents 2 and 3 were promoted after the pay-revision on 1 July, 1980 does not put them in a separate or different category. Such a differentia between persons promoted before or after 1 July, 1980 has no rational basis in so far as it relates to fixation of salary.

9. Ordinarily grant of higher pay to a junior would be ex facie arbitrary, but if there are justifiable grounds for doing so, the seniors cannot invoke the equality doctrine. I agree that the pay of the juniors, respondents 2 and 3, had to be protected, but that by itself does not afford a rational basis for classifying employees when otherwise they are unclassifiable. Such a classification based on the date of a pay-revision appears to me to run counter to the fundamental principles laid down in Nakara (D.S) v. Union of India [1983 — I L.L.N 289]. The illustration given in State of Andhra Pradesh v. G. Sreenivasa Rao [1989 — II L.L.N 1], of protection of pay of a promotee from a lower cadre as an eventuality when a junior may be drawing higher pay than his seniors without violating the mandate of equal pay for equal work, has to be understood as referring to any individual case where the officer in the lower cadre had, for some reason or other peculiar to himself, been the recipient of benefits or increments in the lower grade, thereby resulting in a higher pay on promotion than his seniors. A general revision of pay, as in this case, is according to me, out of the pale of illustration given by the Supreme Court.

10. The first respondent which is “State” as defined in Art. 12 of the Constitution (about which there is no dispute) is bound to comply with the mandate of Art. 14 and to accord equal and nondiscriminatory treatment to its employees. Petitioner's pay has, therefore, to be enhanced so as to make it higher or at least equal to, that drawn by respondents 2 and 3 or the other juniors of the petitioner. Exhibit P9 in so far as it rejects this fundamental and elementary plea for justice made by the petitioner, has to be quashed.

11. The original petition is, therefore, allowed. Exhibit P9 is quashed. The first respondent is directed to refix the pay of the petitioner in the light of the observations contained hereinabove, taking into account the seniority of the petitioner over respondents 2 and 3 and others. The first respondent shall pass orders in the matter and pay the monetary benefits due to the petitioner on such refixation, within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.