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Mohanan Nair & 3 Others v. State Of Kerala

Kerala High Court
Feb 27, 1989
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion delivered by Padmanabhan, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Four appellants were on pilgrimage to Sabarimala. On the night of 7-12-1985 at Erumeli, accused 3 and 4 quarrelled with other pilgrims in front of the tea shop of PW 2 and received some beatings. When the fourth accused fell, the third went and fetched accused 1 and 2. Suspecting PW 2 to be one of the assailants, all four allegedly jointly assaulted him. Rajan (the deceased), an adjacent shop owner, came to the scene—apparently to prevent the attack. The first accused is alleged to have taken out a knife (MO 1) and stabbed Rajan twice causing injuries. When PW 2 escaped, the other three are said to have joined in attacking Rajan, pulled him down, and the first accused inflicted a fatal stab to Rajan’s right chest as he attempted to rise. Rajan walked to his shop and then died.

On these allegations the four appellants were tried in Sessions Case No. 22 of 1986 before the Sessions Judge, Kottayam for offences punishable under Sections 323 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code with the aid of Section 34 IPC. The trial court found common murderous intention, convicted each accused, and sentenced each to imprisonment for life (for murder) and rigorous imprisonment for one year; the sentences were to run concurrently.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the identity of the assailants was satisfactorily established—i.e., whether identification evidence (including the test identification parade and in-court identification) could support convictions.
  2. What is the evidentiary value of a test identification parade when there are criticisms of how it was conducted, and how should such parade evidence be used—only as substantive proof or as corroboration?
  3. Whether the prosecution proved common murderous intention (Section 34 IPC) such that accused 2, 3 and 4 could be held vicariously liable for the murder (Section 302 IPC) committed by the first accused.
  4. Whether failing to examine a certain witness (CW 5 Kumaran Nair) amounted to suppression of evidence requiring adverse consequences to the prosecution.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The prosecution failed to establish the identity of the assailants; identification was defective or lacking.
  • The incident allegedly occurred in a different manner involving other persons, and injuries to the accused suggested an alternative sequence.
  • Test identification parade was irregular — criticism was levelled at PW 8 for not providing identical non-suspects and for not pasting paper slips (particularly given the first accused's scar).
  • Proof of common intention to commit murder was disputed; the appellants argued they did not share a murderous common intention.
  • Non-examination of CW 5 (Kumaran Nair), who reportedly saw the incident and identified all assailants, was urged to be suppression of evidence.

Prosecution's Position (as reflected in the opinion)

  • Occurrence witnesses (PWs 1, 2, 3 and 5) identified the accused (with varying degrees of specificity); a test identification parade had been conducted under the Magistrate (PW 8) and recorded as Ext. P4.
  • PWs 2 and 5 identified the first accused (and others in part); the evidence together with medical documents (Ext. P5 post-mortem and Ext. P6 wound certificate) established that Rajan sustained fatal injuries intentionally inflicted by the accused.
  • The prosecution relied on the test identification parade as corroborative material to the substantive in-court identifications and presented evidence to show that injuries to the accused arose from a later mob attack, not showing a different version of the main incident.
  • The prosecution exercised the right to select witnesses and omitted CW 5 (suspecting he might turn hostile), which it justified within prosecutorial discretion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Anwar v. State (A.I.R. 1961 Allahabad 50) Sets out the crucial requirement that the court must be satisfied as to the acceptability of identification; provides touchstones for assessing identification evidence (opportunity of observation, time, reliability, credibility, chance to identify after arrest). The court invoked Anwar to list guiding factors to assess identification evidence and to emphasise that the court must be satisfied before accepting identification.
Yeshwant v. State of Maharashtra ((1972) 3 SCC 639 : A.I.R. 1973 SC 337) Holds that if an identification parade is not properly and regularly conducted it cannot operate as reliable corroboration of identification in court. The court relied on Yeshwant to assess the consequences of alleged defects in the test identification parade, concluding that because a parade was conducted the issue became how far it could corroborate in-court identification.
Asharfi v. State (A.I.R. 1961 Allahabad 153) Explains preference for Magistrates to conduct identification parades because of assurance of regularity. The court cited Asharfi to justify the value of a Magistrate-conducted parade and to explain admissibility considerations for the Magistrate's identification memo.
Satya Narain v. State (A.I.R. 1953 Allahabad 385); Vaikuntam Chandrappa v. State of Andhra Pradesh (A.I.R. 1960 SC 1340); Chander Singh v. State of U.P ((1973) 3 SCC 55 : A.I.R. 1973 SC 1200) Collectively cited for standards and guidelines about the manner and methods for conducting identification parades — number and similarity of non-suspects, precautions to prevent mistakes/fraud, and practical suggestions (e.g., covering prominent marks). The court used these authorities to articulate practical guidelines and cautionary principles for conducting identification parades and to explain that such guidelines are not rigid technical grounds for rejection but are aids to court satisfaction.
Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana ((1978) 4 SCC 440 : A.I.R. 1978 SC 1492) Requires that development of a common intention to commit a graver offence (during execution of an original plan) must appear clearly and cogently from conduct or other incriminating evidence before vicarious liability can be fastened. The court applied Dharam Pal to conclude that there was no clear and cogent evidence that accused 2–4 shared a murderous common intention with accused 1, and therefore vicarious liability for murder could not be sustained against them.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined identification evidence, the test identification parade, the sequence of events, witness presence at different stages, medical evidence, and the legal standard for common intention. The analysis proceeded in distinct strands:

  1. Identification and test identification parade:
    • The court accepted that substantive in-court identification is the substantive evidence; identification parade is corroborative and not substantive in itself.
    • Because a test identification parade was conducted (Ext. P4 under Magistrate PW 8), the court treated the parade as material for corroboration but acknowledged it had been subject to serious comments.
    • Applying the touchstones derived from Anwar (opportunity to observe, reasonable time to identify, reliability of observation, credibility, opportunity to identify after arrest), the court assessed each witness's opportunity and power of observation: PW 2 had seen the incident from the start and identified all four in the parade and in court; PW 5 identified accused 1, 3 and 4; PW 1 and PW 3 had more limited observation and could only identify some accused.
    • Minor contradictions among occurrence witnesses (sequence details, omissions) were noted but found not to affect the core prosecution version of a joint attack on PW 2 and the first accused's murderous stabbing of Rajan. Differences were explained by differing moments of arrival and presence at the scene.
    • The court addressed the criticism that the first accused's forehead scar may have been the basis of identification and found no evidence that identification relied on that mark rather than contemporaneous observation; the court accepted the identifications by PW 2 and PW 5 as correct and reliable with respect to the first accused.
    • The court reiterated statutory and evidentiary considerations — referencing Sections 3, 9 and 157 of the Evidence Act and Sections 162 and 164 of the CrPC — to explain admissibility and corroborative value of identification memos and parades when properly conducted.
  2. On the non-examination of CW 5 (Kumaran Nair):
    • The court held that the prosecution has a discretion to select witnesses and that non-examination did not amount to suppression requiring adverse inference, particularly where CW 5 had accompanied the appellants and might be hostile.
  3. Common intention and vicarious liability:
    • The court emphasized the principle that to fasten vicarious liability for an act (here, murder) done by one accused upon his companions, there must be evidence of a prior meeting of minds or a clear development of common intention to commit the graver offence during execution of the original plan.
    • Relying on Dharam Pal, the court required clear and cogent materials showing development of murderous intention by all. Mere accompaniment or presence, without overt acts showing shared murderous intention, could not support conviction for murder with Section 34 for the companions.
    • On the facts, accused 2–4 were unarmed; PWs did not provide evidence that they participated in the fatal stabbing beyond pulling the deceased down (a point the court found unconvincing in the particular). PW 1 and PW 5 did not implicate them in the fatal act; PWs 2 and 3 did not conclusively show that accused 2–4 engaged in acts that would demonstrate a developed common murderous intention.
    • Consequently, the court concluded that while the prosecution proved the assault in furtherance of common intention (Section 323 read with 34) by all four, it did not prove that the murder was in furtherance of a common murderous intention shared by accused 2–4.

Holding and Implications

Disposition: The criminal appeal was allowed in part.

Specific holdings:

  • The convictions and sentences of accused 2, 3 and 4 for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC were set aside; they were acquitted of that charge.
  • The convictions of accused 2, 3 and 4 for the offence under Section 323 read with Section 34 IPC and the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year imposed on each of them were upheld.
  • The criminal appeal as against the first accused was dismissed in toto: the convictions and sentences for both offences (murder under Section 302 and the offence under Section 323, read with Section 34) as imposed by the trial court were confirmed.
  • If accused 2, 3 and 4 had already completed serving their sentence, they were to be set at liberty immediately.

Implications: The decision:

  • Affirms that properly assessed identification evidence (including corroborative use of a test identification parade) can sustain conviction where the court is satisfied on acceptability.
  • Reiterates the stringent requirement for proving a development of common murderous intention before ascribing vicarious liability for a graver offence to accomplices; in absence of clear and cogent evidence, companions cannot be held guilty of murder committed solely by the principal offender.
  • Has direct operative effect on the parties only (acquittal of accused 2–4 on the murder charge and confirmation of the first accused's convictions); the opinion does not state that it creates any new legal precedent beyond its application of existing authorities and principles referenced in the judgment.

This summary is based exclusively on the text of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond those contained in that opinion.

Show all summary ...

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Padmanabhan, J.:— Along with others, the four appellants were on pilgrimage to Sabarimala. At Erumeli, two of them (accused 3 and 4) picked up quarrels with some other pilgrims in front of the tea shop of PW 2 about midnight on 7-12-1985 and received some beatings. When the fourth accused fell down, the third accused went and brought accused 1 and 2. Suspecting PW 2 to be one of the assailants, all the four jointly assaulted him. Deceased Rajan, an adjacent shop owner, rushed to the scene, probably on a peaceful errand to prevent the attack. First accused took out MO 1 knife from his loins and stabbed Rajan twice resulting in injuries. When PW 2 escaped and ran away, the other three also joined hands in attacking Rajan. He was pulled down. Then the first accused inflicted the fatal stab on his right chest when he attempted to rise up. He walked to his shop and then fell dead. On these allegations, the four appellants were tried in Sessions Case No. 22 of, 1986 before the Sessions Judge, Kottayam for offences punishable under Sections 323 and 302 with the aid of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Common murderous intention was found. Each one was sentenced to imprisonment for life and rigorous imprisonment for one year, permitting the sentences to be suffered concurrently.

2. P.Ws 1, 2, 3 and 5 are the occurrence witnesses. Appellants were utter strangers to them. A test identification parade was conducted under the supervision of the Magistrate, examined as PW 8 Ext. P4 is the proceeding. Though PW 2 identified all the accused in the parade and PW 5 identified accused 1, 3 and 4. PW 1 could identify only accused 3 and 4 and PW 3 identified accused 2 and 3 alone lack of identification or defect in identification was the main contention. The incident, is also alleged to have taken place in a different manner involving other persons and injuries to the accused also. Proof of common intention was also disputed. The fact that PW 2 and Rajan sustained injuries at the time and place alleged by the prosecution and Rajan succumbed to the injuries, is beyond dispute. Evidence of P.Ws 1, 2, 3 and 5 when taken along with Ext. P5 Post-mortem certificate and Ext. P6 wound certificate prepared by PW 9, amply prove these facts. The injury sustained by the deceased is fatal involving the heart and lungs. It is evidently an intentional and forcible stab on a vital part of the body and the intention was nothing short of murder.

3. We were not impressed by the argument that prosecution did not succeed in establishing the identity of the assailants. It is true that the assailants were not previously known to the occurrence witnesses. But we need not go into the controversy whether in such cases the substantive evidence of identification before court could be accepted only if it was proceeded by identification in a test identification parade during investigation. The matter is covered by decisions. In this case, a test identification was already conducted. The question therefore is only how far the test identification parade and the identification therein could be used for corroborative purposes or as aid in the appreciation of the substantive evidence of identification before court. We said so because the test identification parade itself was the subject of serious comments.

4. It is true that there is some little positive contradictions on minor details including sequence of events and also contradictions by omissions on such minor details between the occurrence witnesses. But those contradictions and discrepancies have not in any way affected the basic prosecution version regarding the joint attack by all the four accused against PW 2 and the murderous attack by the first accused against deceased Rajan. If at all it has affected anything it is only regarding the murderous common intention. Further the witnesses have only Been different portions of the attack. PW 2 alone has seen the incident from the inception. He had no occasion to see the last fatal stab because before that he ran away. He identified all the four in the test identification parade as well as in court. PW 1 came only on hearing the cry. Even thereafter he was absent for a moment when he went away to call the brother of PW 2. PW 3 also came only after hearing the cry. Thereafter she was present throughout. PW 5 was there only just before the arrival of the deceased because he went away to telephone the police. Therefore, for that reason also, their evidence cannot be alike in all respects and discrepancies and contradictions cannot affect their veracity. So also, the injuries sustained by the accused will not indicate that the incident took place in a different manner. The evidence is that they sustained injuries and their jeep was damaged in a mob attack after the incident by pelting stones. For that a case was registered and investigated, but it was closed as undetected.

5. The objects and purposes of test identification parade are mainly two fold. (1) For the investigating officer to satisfy himself that investigation against previously not known and unidentified persons is moving in the correct line and to assure him that the prosecution witnesses are honest; and (ii) To furnish material to corroborate the substantive evidence of identification before court and to act as an aid in the assessment of that evidence. Identification in test identification parade is not substantive evidence. Substantive evidence is only the identification before court. When the witness, who identified the accused in the test identification parade, is not examined before court, no purpose will be served by examining the Magistrate or somebody else to prove that there was identification.

6. Although in assessing the evidence of identification it is not possible or desirable to lay down any hard and fast rules, certain guiding principles could be stated. One is the basic principle of criminal law that a fact or circumstances should be proved before it is relied on against an accused. The evidence of identification is no exception to the definition of the word “proved” in Section 3 of the Evidence Act. The court should approach the evidence of identification with the reasonable doubts of an intelligent person and accept it only if those doubts are removed. In order to remove those doubts, the touch stones to be adopted could be (i) fair, if not good opportunity of the witness for observation, (ii) reasonable time within which the identification was made, (iii) reliable power of observation of the witness, (iv) his credibility, and (v) the fact whether the witness got any opportunity to identify the accused after arrest. The crucial requirement is the satisfaction of the court on the acceptability of the identification (Anwar v. State A.I.R 1961 Allahabad 50).

7. If identification parade was not properly and regularly conducted, it cannot operate as reliable corroboration regarding identify cation in court Yeshwant v. State of Maharashtra - (1972) 3 SCC 639 : A.I.R 1973 Supreme Court 337). Though any person can conduct a test identification parade, Magistrates are preferred because of the assurance of regularity (Asharfi v. State A.I.R 1961 Allahabad 153). His identification memo is a record of the statement which the identifier expressly or impliedly made before him. It is a former statement of the identifier. In court it is usable not only for contradiction under Sections 145 or 155, but also for corroboration under Section 157 of the Evidence Act. It is subject to the exception that if it was before the police it would be hit by Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and therefore inadmissible for corroboration. If the person holding the identification is a competent Magistrate, Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applies and his identification merino is admissible under Section 80 of the Evidence Act without proof for what it is worth.

8. Relevancy of identification is under Section 9 of the Evidence Act. Conduct of the parade is not governed by any statutory provision or guideline. Several judicial pronouncements have laid down various standards regarding the manner and method of observing formalities in the conduct of the identification parade (Satya Narain v. State - A.I.R 1953 Allahabad 385, Vaikuntam Chandrappa v. State of Andhra Pradesh - A.I.R 1960 Supreme Court 1340, Anwar's case - A.I.R 1961 Allahabad 50, Asharfi's case - A.I.R 1961 Allahabad 153, Yeshwant's case - (1972) 3 SCC 639 : A.I.R 1973 Supreme Court 337 and Chander Singh v. State of U.P (1973) 3 SCC 55 : A.I.R 1973 Supreme Court 1200 are some of them). Those decisions also dealt with the number of suspects and non suspects to be mixed up and the other precaution to be taken to ensure correctness of identification. Even though it may not be possible to fix any definite standard or pattern in all these aspects it may be always safer to have more number of non suspects of identical description mixed up with the suspects to the extent possible in order to avoid mistakes and frauds. It may be advisable to have similar persons. If a suspect is having any prominent or noteworthy marks, on the basis of which be could be identified by a verbal description even by a person who has not seen him earlier, it may be desirable to cover those marks by slips of paper without detriment to himself being recognised by other general features. In such a case, it may also be desirable to have non suspects also with identical slips of paper so that by the slips of paper, identification is not made possible. It may not be proper to accept the identification of a witness who makes many mistakes. All these guidelines are subject to the satisfaction of the court on the facts of each case. They are not technical grounds to reject identification. Identification should not turn out to be mere farce. It has to be remembered that it is a process which aids in the real culprit being found out. The possibility of any extraneous help reacting the witness to make an identification which is not otherwise possible of him will have to be ruled out.

9. We said so because an argument came that the first accused had a scar on his forehead with which he could have been easily identified. PW 8, who conducted the test identification parade, was, therefore, found fault with for not providing identical non suspects and for not pasting paper slips for all. We are not very much convinced of this argument. There is absolutely no evidence or circumstance indicating that identification of the first accused was on the basis of any such identification mark and not by the observation at the time of occurrence. P.Ws 2 and 5 are thepersons who identified him. We are fully convinced of the correctness of their identification. Though P.Ws 1 to 3 did not identify him in the test identification parade and for that reason their identification of him in court cannot be accepted, when considered in the light of the evidence of P.Ws 2 and 5, the identity of the person mentioned by them as the one who inflicted the stab injuries could be safely fixed up as the first accused. The evidence of all these witnesses when considered together, unequivocally indicate that stabs were inflicted by the first accused alone and nobody else. The identification of the Mother accused was in our opinion rightly, not seriously disputed.

10. We were not able to find any merit in the argument that non examination of CW 5 Kumaran Nair, who saw the incident and identified all the assailants, will amount to suppression of evidence which must meet with adverse consequences. Prosecution has the right to pick and choose witnesses. All occurrence witnesses need not be examined. Especially when CW 5 was one who went on pilgrimage to Sabarimala in the company of the appellants, there is nothing wrong in giving him up suspecting that he may turn hostile. Commission of an offence punishable under Section 323 in furtherance of the common intention and with the presence and participation of all the four accused and commission of murder by the first accused are thus proved beyond doubt.

11. The only remaining question is whether murder was also in furtherance of the common intention of all. It can happen that when some persons act in concert to commit a minor offence, they may during the commission come to an understanding to commit a major offence as well. But development of such an understanding must appear from their conduct or from some other incriminating evidence. The conduct or other evidence must be such as not to leave any room for doubt regarding the developed common intention. Before fastening vicarious liability, the criminal court must satisfy itself as to the prior meeting of minds of the principal culprit and his companions who are sought to be constructively made liable in respect of every act committed by the former. Mere accompanying cannot infer common intention. Existence or otherwise of common intention depends upon facts and circumstances of each case. The intention of the principal offender and his companions to deal with any person who might intervene to stop the quarrel must be apparent from the conduct of the persons accompanying the principal culprit. Otherwise, there must be some other clear and cogent incriminating piece of evidence. When such materials sire absent, the companions cannot be justifiably held guilty of every offence committed by the principal offender. Evidence regarding development of the common intention to commit an offence graver than the one originally designed, during execution of the original plan, should be clear and cogent (Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana - (1978) 4 SCC 440 : A.I.R 1978 Supreme Court 1492). Even the common intention to assault PW 2 was entertained only on the spot just before the attack. By no stretch of imagination, it could be thought they anticipated the arrival of Rajan and concerted to murder him. Accused 2 to 4 were unarmed. PW 1 is silent regarding anything done by them against the deceased though he was present when the deceased was done to death. PW 5 also did not implicate them. P.Ws 2 and 3 also had no case that accused 2 to 4 did anything against the deceased till PW 2 escaped from their grip and ran away. While the overt acts attributed by PW 2 against them are beating and fisting the deceased, what PW 3 said was only that they pulled him down enabling the first accused to inflict the third stab. We are not convinced of this part of the evidence and we do not think it safe to attribute murderous common intention. Therefore, interference in appeal need be only against the conviction and sentence against accused 2 to 4 for murder with the aid of Sect on 34.

12. Criminal appeal is, therefore, allowed in part. For the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, the conviction enticed by the Sessions Judge against accused 2, 3 and 4 and the sentence of imprisonment for life awarded to them are set aside and they are acquitted of that charge. But the conviction of accused 2, 3 and 4 for the offence under Section 323 read with Section 34 and the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year awarded to each of them will stand. The criminal appeal as against the first accused is dismissed in toto confirming the convictions and sentences for both the offences. If accused 2, 3 and 4 have served out their term of imprisonment, they will immediately be set at liberty.