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The National Starch And Chemicals v. Weikfield Products Co. (India) .
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff supplied goods to the defendant pursuant to a purchase order issued by the defendant. The defendant returned the goods on the ground that they were not supplied in time. Following return of the goods, the plaintiff filed a suit in the Trivandrum Sub Court. The defendant challenged the competence of the Trivandrum Sub Court to entertain the suit, relying on certain terms in the purchase order which, the defendant contended, ousted the jurisdiction of the Trivandrum Court and vested jurisdiction in the Courts at Poona. The lower courts held that the suit had to be instituted at Poona and that the Trivandrum Courts could not entertain the suit. This Civil Revision Petition contests those orders.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the clause in the purchase order stating "Jurisdiction — All transactions are subject to Poona jurisdiction" is sufficient to exclude (oust) the jurisdiction of the Trivandrum Sub Court which otherwise has jurisdiction to try the suit.
- What is the test or criteria for construing an ouster clause in a contract or purchase order—i.e., whether exclusion of jurisdiction must be expressed in clear and unequivocal terms or may be inferred by implication.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendant's Arguments
- The defendant contended that the Trivandrum Sub Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit by virtue of certain terms of the contract evidenced by the purchase order, namely the clause stating "Jurisdiction — All transactions are subject to Poona jurisdiction."
The opinion does not set out a detailed, point-by-point statement of the plaintiff's arguments in the record beyond the fact that the plaintiff instituted the suit in Trivandrum Sub Court.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd. v. A.P. Agencies, Salem, AIR 1989 SC 1239 | Explains that an ouster clause must be properly construed; fixing the situs of the contract does not ipso facto confer exclusive jurisdiction; the clause must be clear to exclude other Courts. | The Court relied on this decision as the leading statement of the correct approach to construing ouster clauses and adopted its criteria for deciding whether the Poona clause ousted Trivandrum jurisdiction. |
| Salem Chemical Industries v. Bird and Co., AIR 1979 Madras 16 | Illustrates that deeming a contract to be made at a particular place fixes the situs but does not necessarily confer exclusive jurisdiction on that place—especially where part of the cause of action arose elsewhere. | Used as an example within the Laminart exposition to show that a clause merely fixing the situs of the contract (e.g., Calcutta) does not ipso facto oust jurisdiction of other competent Courts (e.g., Salem). |
| Secretary, Vikalanga Sevaka Co-Op. Society Ltd. v. Sheth Brothers (1983) | Held that ouster of jurisdiction must be proved by express words or by necessary/inevitable implication; a mere possibility of implication is insufficient. | The Court cited this authority to emphasize that only definitive and unavoidable implications suffice to find ouster by implication; mere probability is inadequate. |
| Secretary of State v. Mask & Co., AIR 1940 PC 105 | Stated that exclusion of civil court jurisdiction is not to be readily inferred; such exclusion must be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. | Cited to reinforce the conservative approach: courts should not readily infer exclusion of jurisdiction and require explicit expression or a clear implication. |
| Economic Transport Organisation v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (1986) | Confirmed that parties may choose a forum where competent courts exist, but an agreement must clearly and plainly spell out exclusive forum by express words or necessary implication; courts disfavor ouster by implication and printed-form clauses require caution. | The Court relied on this decision to underscore that choice of forum is permissible but must be clearly and plainly manifest; unilateral statements or mere printed words without clear mutual assent are insufficient to confer exclusive jurisdiction. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court approached the matter by identifying the relevant legal proposition: while parties cannot confer subject-matter jurisdiction where none exists, they may choose among competent forums if more than one Court legitimately can entertain the suit. Such election is not invalidated by Sections 23 and 28 of the Contract Act (as noted in the opinion).
The core analytical task was to determine whether the clause in the purchase order ("Jurisdiction — All transactions are subject to Poona jurisdiction") amounted to an unequivocal exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Trivandrum Sub Court. The Court applied the test articulated in the Supreme Court's decision in A.B.C. Laminart and earlier authorities:
- An ouster clause must be construed according to the exact words used; ouster of jurisdiction will be found only if the clause is clear, plain, peremptory and unequivocal in confining jurisdiction solely to a named Court.
- Where words such as "only" or "alone" are used, it is easier to conclude exclusivity. In their absence, any claim of ouster must rest on an implication that is not merely probable but inevitable and unavoidable.
- Courts are generally disinclined to infer exclusion of jurisdiction by implication; exclusion must be either expressly stated or be the only reasonable construction of the clause.
- Special caution is required where the clause appears in a printed form or where there is no clear evidence of mutual assent (for example, absence of signatures), although acting upon a purchase order may convert the terms into a concluded contract.
Applying these principles, the Court analyzed the precise language of the clause. It observed that the clause did not use the word "Courts" nor did it employ express words of exclusivity such as "only" or "alone." The phrase "transactions are subject to Poona jurisdiction" required interpretation: while it implied that disputes could be settled in Courts in Poona, it did not, by clear and peremptory wording, exclude the jurisdiction of the Trivandrum Courts that otherwise had jurisdiction over the subject-matter.
The Court concluded that the clause did not demonstrate an inevitable implication of exclusive jurisdiction in Poona. Relying on the cited precedents, the Court held that the lower courts were incorrect to find an ouster of Trivandrum jurisdiction on the basis of the clause in question.
Holding and Implications
The Civil Revision Petition is allowed; the orders of the lower courts are set aside, and the suit is held to be entertainable by the Trivandrum Sub Court.
Consequences for the parties:
- The immediate practical effect is that the Trivandrum Sub Court retains jurisdiction to try the plaintiff's suit; the direction that the suit must be instituted at Poona is reversed.
- The Court ordered that the records be sent back immediately and recorded "Petition allowed."
Broader implications:
The opinion reiterates settled principles concerning ouster clauses—namely that exclusion of jurisdiction requires clear, express or inevitable implication—and applies those principles to the particular clause at issue. The judgment does not state that it creates a new legal principle beyond applying the existing authorities; its immediate effect is confined to the parties and the matter at hand.
1. This Civil Revision Petition concerns a question of ouster of jurisdiction. The short facts are these:— The plaintiff was directed to supply certain goods by the defendant. For the supply of goods, the defendant placed a purchase order. As per the purchase order, the plaintiff supplied the goods to the defendant. The defendant returned the goods stating that the goods have been supplied not in time. When the goods were returned, the plaintiff filed the present suit in Trivandrum Sub Court. The defendant contended that the Trivandrum Sub Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit by virtue of certain terms of the contract entered into between the parties evidenced by the purchase order.
2. Though the parties cannot confer jurisdiction on a Court which has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter, the parties have got the right to choose one of the Courts where a suit can be filed if the suit is entertainable in different Courts. This choosing of a Court by the agreement of parties is not hit by Secs. 23 and 28 of the Contract Act.
3. In short, the power to choose one of the forums where the suit has to be maintained is a matter for the parties to contract. Here the parties are not contracting out (of) a Court, which has got jurisdiction or to oust the jurisdiction of the Court in its true sense but electing one of the Courts having jurisdiction. When once the parties agree as to a particular Court which has got jurisdiction for settling the dispute the parties are bound by that agreement and the Court has to give effect to that agreement.
4. In this case, there is no difficulty to find the Courts at Trivandrum and Courts at Poona have got jurisdiction to try the suit. The Court below, which found that the suit has to be instituted at Poona and that Trivandrum Courts cannot entertain the suit also found that the Courts at Poona and Trivandrum have got jurisdiction. The Courts below found that the ouster of jurisdiction of Courts at Trivandrum happened because of the agreement between the parties. So the only question that has to be considered is whether there is a clear and unambiguous agreement whereby the parties agreed that the Courts at Poona alone can entertain the suit where by agreement the parties have excluded the jurisdiction of Courts at Trivandrum for the settlement of the dispute. As I said earlier, the parties are bound by the agreement, so the only question which this Court has to consider is what is the nature of the term of the agreement concerning the ouster of jurisdiction of a Court, which normally can entertain the suit by the terms of the agreement.
5. Now I turn to the term of the agreement relevant in this case. The term of the agreement reads thus:—
“Jurisdiction — All transactions are subject to Poona jurisdiction.”
I have to examine whether the above quoted condition is sufficient to exclude the jurisdiction of the Court, which has got jurisdiction to entertain the suit, in this case Trivandrum Sub Court. Ouster of jurisdiction is a matter on which the Courts must be too vigilant and careful when holding that a Court, which has got jurisdiction has lost its jurisdiction by virtue of an agreement. What is the criteria to be applied in deciding this matter has been plainly laid down by the recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1989 SC 1239 (A.B.C Laminart Pvt. Ltd. v. A.P Agencies, Salem). Saikia, J. speaking for the Court observed thus (at p. 1246):—
“When the Court has to decide the question of jurisdiction pursuant to an ouster clause it is necessary to construe the ousting expression or clause properly. Often the stipulation is that the contract shall be deemed to have been made at a particular place. This would provide the connecting factor for jurisdiction to the Courts of that place in the matter of any dispute on or arising out of that contract. It would not, however, ipso facto take away jurisdiction of other Courts. Thus, in Salem Chemical Industries v. Bird and Co., AIR 1979 Madras 16 where the terms and conditions attached to the quotation contained an arbitration clause provided that: “any order placed against this quotation shall be deemed to be a contract made in Calcutta and any dispute arising therefrom shall be settled by an Arbitrator to be jointly appointed by us”, it was held that it merely fixed the situs of the contract at Calcutta and it did not mean to confer an exclusive jurisdiction on the Court at Calcutta, and when a part of the cause of action had arisen at Salem, the Court there had also jurisdiction to entertain the suit under Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure.”
The enquiry that has to be made largely depends upon a correct and meaningful understanding of the clause in the agreement so as to find out whether the clause provides for exclusion of Courts having jurisdiction, that is to say whether there is exclusion of all other Courts having jurisdiction and confining solely and wholly the jurisdiction to a named Court, is finding, the Court cannot detract or extract by gleaning into the words used in the terms, but can conclude only if the words used in the term in question are clear and plain. If there is a plain and clear statement confining solely and entirely the jurisdiction in one Court then alone the Court can hold that there is ouster of jurisdiction of the other Court which has got normally the jurisdiction over the subject-matter in dispute. This I say because that the ouster of jurisdiction is to be found only if the Court finds that the terms excluding the jurisdiction of the Court in the agreement are unequivocal, total perfect straight and downright. It should be explicitly expressed and should be clear, peremptory definitive and decisive as to the point that the parties agreed that only in one Court and in that Court alone the dispute has to be settled. If the terms of the agreement manifest itself by using the word ‘only’ or ‘alone’ so as to spell out and explicate that the other Courts jurisdictions have been excluded and the jurisdiction is confined to a named Court, there will not be any difficulty for the Court to say that the term is plain and clear and unequivocal. The difficulty sally forth and check in when such expressive words are not used. Even in such cases the Court is not powerless to examine to certain extent to find out whether by clear implication there is exclusion of jurisdiction. When I say by implication there also the provision should imply definitely and decisively that the parties agreed for one named Court for settling the controversy. There the Courts function is to see whether the words used are definitive and decisive to draw a plain implication that the named Court alone has got the jurisdiction to try the suit. The question is how and to what extent a Court is bound to investigate the implied ouster of jurisdiction and is there any sure parameter? I say no positive stable and unfaltering parameters. But the Court is not powerless. The term of the agreement is a question always depending upon the circumstances involved in the case and the exact words used in the ouster clause.
6. Now I turn to the clause in question in this case. It has to be noted that the clause to be construed in this case is termed as one of the conditions attached to the purchase order. It is not an agreement as such, but it has to be presumed that both the parties have agreed as to the conditions attached to the purchase order even though one of the parties has not signed expressing his consent. But when the party, who has not given the consent by signing the purchase order has acted upon the purchase order, it is possible to determine the question on the purchase order as if it is a concluded contract between the parties. In the clause it is significant to note that the parties have not used the word ‘Courts’. What is stated is ‘transactions are subject to Poona jurisdiction’. An analysis of this clause would certainly imply that when the transaction is subject to Poona jurisdiction impliedly the parties agree that if there is any dispute and if it has to be settled by a Court of law, it can be a Court in Poona. This itself requires unravelling of the implication of the words ‘transactions are subject to Poona jurisdiction’. After finding that the clause implicits that ‘Poona jurisdiction’ means Courts in Poona, further it has to be found that for excluding the jurisdiction of Courts at Trivandrum, which have got jurisdiction over the subject-matter, have lost that jurisdiction because the parties have confined the jurisdiction to settle their dispute exclusively in the Courts in Poona.
7. In 1983 Secretary, Vikalanga Sevaka Co-Op. Society Ltd. v. Sheth Brothers) this Court said that ouster of jurisdiction must be proved by express words or by necessary or inevitable implications. By using the word ‘inevitable implications’ the Court is putting more emphasis on the fact that a probability or possibility of an implication is insufficient. Inevitable means a result that cannot be avoided, not admitting of escape or evasion; that cannot fail to occur. So it is said that there is no good in arguing with the inevitable — (Lowell). So the implication to oust the jurisdiction should be kismetic preordained and fatalistic. The implication itself must be definitive and decisive. The implication is inevitable only if the Court can come to one finding and one finding alone that the jurisdiction of other Courts have been excluded. Of course, the maxim expressiounius est exclusio alterius that is by expressing one thing there can be exclusion of other thing is not excluded in understanding the meaning of the ouster clause in an agreement. But it can be done only if the Court feels that it is compelled to do so. I say so because only if the implication is inevitable the Court can find ouster by applying the principle above stated. Generally the Courts are disinclined to find ouster of jurisdiction by implication. In AIR 1940 PC 105 (Secretary of State v. Mask & Co.) Lord Thankerton said that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil courts is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied.
8. Even in a case where the clause was subject to Bombay jurisdiction alone, a Division Bench of this Court has held that it is insufficient to oust the jurisdiction of the other Court, which has got jurisdiction. This, of course, the Court held on the ground that the note was sent only by an employee of the respondent though the note was handed over to the consignee and there was no indication that there was an agreement between the parties to confer exclusive jurisdiction to Bombay Court. In this case, the Court further said that the printed words by themselves and without anything more would not be sufficient to constitute an agreement to oust the jurisdiction of all Courts other than the Court specified.
9. Again in another Division Bench decision, 1986 Economic Transport Organisation v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.), after considering the question whether choosing of forum by the parties which has got jurisdiction in law to entertain the suit the provisions of Section 28 of the Contract Act is not attracted. The Court considered the requirements and the conditions to find ouster of jurisdiction. The Court said choice is for the parties. But the parties have to agree and that agreement must be for an exclusive forum for the settlement of their disputes. Further it is said that the agreement should be clearly and plainly spelled out either by express words or by necessary implication on the factum of exclusive jurisdiction. In this decision also the learned Judge observed that “ouster of jurisdiction of Courts cannot be lightly assumed or presumed. If there is such a concluded agreement, it will certainly operate as estoppel against the parties to the contract”. The learned Judge further elucidating the point said that “unilateral affirmation or statement made by one of the parties, as long as it is not shown that the statement has been accepted by the other party as a term or condition of the agreement, it cannot be held that there is an agreement to confer exclusive jurisdiction on any Court”. It is also pointed out that particularly caution has to be taken if the clause is one contained in a printed form. Importance is given to the fact where both the parties have given their consent for such a contract is evidenced by their acceptance of the contract in writing or under their signature.
10. In this case, as I said earlier, there is no specific word excluding the jurisdiction of Trivandrum Sub Court and it is difficult for me to agree with the Courts below that by implication there is exclusion of Trivandrum Courts.
In the result, I set aside the orders of the Courts below and I hold that the suit is entertainable by Trivandrum Court. Civil Revision Petition is allowed as above.
Send back the records immediately.
Petition allowed.
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