Bhaskaran Nambiar, J.:— Three enactments, within a span of three years. The Esso (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act, 1974, Act No. 4 of 1974, the Burmah Shell (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act, 1976, Act No. 2 of 1976, and the Caltex (Acquisition of Shares of Caltex Oil Refining (India) Limited and of the Undertakings in India of Caltex (India) Limited) Act, 1977, Act No. 17 of 1977, nationalised three foreign Companies, Esso Eastern Incorporated, the Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of (India) Ltd. and Caltex Oil Refining (India) Ltd., which carried on in India the business of distributing, marketing or refining and producing petroleum products having places of business in several parts of the country. The right, title and interest of these undertakings stood transferred to and were statutorily vested in the Central Government. The acquisitions of these Companies are now Complete and they are no longer in challenge and those foreign companies are also not before court.

2. The assets which thus vested in the Central Government include leases and tenancy rights held by these three companies. The petitioners in these writ petitions are persons who had granted leases of their premises to the Burmah Shell or to the Esso standard companies. The rights of these landlords are regulated by two provisions, S. 5(2) and S. 7(3), identically worded in the two enactments, Act 4 of 1974 and Act 2 of 1976. These Acts provide that where any property is held in India by the two companies under any lease or under any right of tenancy, the Central Government shall be deemed to have become the lessee or tenant on and from the appointed day “as if the lease or tenancy in relation to such property had been granted to the Central Government” and thereupon “all the rights under such lease or tenancy shall be deemed to have been transferred to and vested in the Central Government”. Section 5(2), then, provided thus:—

“5. Central Government to be lessee or tenant under certain circumstances.—

(1) xxxxxxxxxxxxxx

(2) On the expiry of the term of any lease or tenancy referred to in sub-sec. (1), such lease or tenancy shall, if so desired by the Central Government, be renewed on the same terms and conditions on which the lease or tenancy was held by Burmah Shell immediately before the appointed day”.

3. Section 7(1) empowered the Government to direct the vesting of the undertakings, in Government company, by appropriate notifications and, S. 7(2) stated that the Government company, shall, on and from the date of such vesting, be deemed to have become the owner, tenant or lessee, as the case may be, in relation to the undertakings and all the fights and liabilities of the Central Government shall be deemed to have become the rights and liabilities of the Government company. The provisions of sub-sec. (2) of S. 5 regarding the right to renew the original lease available to the Central Government are extended to the Government company as S. 7(3) enacts thus:—

“The provisions of sub-sec. (2) of S. 5 shall apply to a lease or tenancy, which vests in a Government company, as they apply to a lease or tenancy vested-in the Central Government and reference therein to the “Central Government” shall be construed as a reference to the Government company.”

4. Notifications have been issued u/S. 7(1). The Government companies, impleaded in these proceedings, are at present the tenants of the premises held by the undertaking earlier under various landlords. These companies as tenants, sought to exercise their right of renewal conferred on them u/S. 5(2) and requested the petitioners to execute the renewal deeds or attempted to take other steps for obtaining renewal. Sections 5(2) and 7(3) thus prevent the landlords from terminating the leases on the expiry of the period, from enhancement of rent or from taking possession of the leased premises when the leasehold right has come to an end under the contracts. The petitioners are some of those landlords. They therefore challenge the constitutionality of both Ss. 5(2) and 7(3) in the two enactments. It is said, and not without force, that a lease entered into in 1962 for thirty years, terminating in 1992, can be continued, at the sweet will and pleasure of the Government Company, for another thirty years till 2022 A.D on the same rent that was fixed as early as 1962, which was reasonable rent in 1962 cannot be the reasonable rent in 1992 or 2022 A.D In the process of acquisition of the foreign companies, it is the innocent landlords who leased their premises to those companies who are made to suffer and while their rights have been considerably affected, they are not paid any compensation. The challenge to the validity of the provision, therefore, is their only remedy.

5. The petitioners challenge the constitutionality of S. 5(2) and S. 7(3) in the Esso (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act, 1974, Act No. 4 of 1974 and the Burmah Shell (Requisition of Undertakings in India) Act, 1976, Act No. 2 of 1976 on two grounds:— (i) Legislative competence and (ii) violation of Arts. 14 & 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

Legislative competence:

6. The contention is that though the Act provides for acquisition of undertakings, there is no acquisition of the landlord's rights in respect of the leases and tenancies which have vested in the Government companies and the landlord tenant relationship is sought to be continued u/s. 5(2) and S. 7(3) of the relevant Acts. These provisions, dealing separately with the landlords rights are, it is said, legislations with respect to land, and the rights over land including the relation of landlord and tenant and thus squarely fall under item 18 in List II of the Seventh Schedule reading thus:—

“Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; colonization”.

It is, therefore, submitted that the State legislature alone and not the Parliament, has power to enact these provisions and these provisions severable as they are, are beyond the powers conferred on the Parliament and thus have to be declared as ultra vires of the Constitution.

7. On behalf of the Central Government and the Government companies, it is contended that Parliament has legislative competence to enact this law either under Entry 42 in List III, which reads thus:— “Acquisition and requisitioning of property” or under Entry 6 also in List III, “Transfer of property other than agricultural land; registration of deeds and documents” or under Entry 53 in List I, “Regulation and development of oilfields and mineral oil resources; petroleum and petroleum products; other liquids and substances declared by Parliament by law to be dangerously inflammable”. It is submitted that the impugned provisions are only ancillary or incidental to the main purpose of the legislation, namely acquisition of foreign companies and thus within the competence of Parliament. According to the Senior Central Government Pleader and the counsel for the Government companies, the two legislations in their entirety and the provisions in S. 5(2) and S. 7(3) are not matters falling within Entry 18 in List II. It is, therefore, submitted that when the impugned law does not fall under any of the enumerated entries in List II, it is unnecessary to consider whether it falls under any specific entry for, the residuary power is vested in Parliament under Entry 97 in List I which reads thus:—

“Any other matter not enumerated in List II or List III including any tax not mentioned in either of those Lists”.

8. In the light of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court, and the well settled position of law, we have no hesitation in holding that the Esso (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act, 1974, Act 4 of 1974, and the Burmah Shell (Acquisition of Undertakings in India) Act, 1976, Act 2 of 1976, are not legislations with respect to “land” covered by Entry 18 in List II. The State legislature did not have competence to enact this law and if so, Parliament alone had the necessary legislative competence. There is thus no further enquiry to be made on this aspect. In Union Of India v. Shri Harbhajan Singh Dhillon., (1972) 2 SCR 33 : (AIR 1972 SC 1061), the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held thus (Para 59 of AIR):—

“………Be that as it may, we have the three lists and a residuary power and therefore it seems to us that in this context if a Central Act is challenged as being beyond the legislative competence of Parliament, it is enough to enquire if it is a law with respect to matters or taxes enumerated in List II. If it is not, no further question arises.”

9. We shall now state our reasons why the impugned provisions, Section 5(2) and S. 7(3) do not fall under Entry 18 in List II. It is admitted that the leases or tenancies created in favour of the foreign companies and which are statutorily allowed to continue under these provisions are in respect of non-agricultural lands. Land in item 18 refers to agricultural lands and not to non-agricultural lands or buildings therein.

10. This question is no more res integra as it is already settled by several decisions of the Supreme Court. In the recent decision of the Supreme Court in A & S. Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 1708, surveying all previous decisions, it is held thus (at p. 1725):—

“The more harmonious interpretation would be that any subject-matter that involves the element of transfer or alienation of any property (other than agricultural lands) or of devolution (on testamentary or intestate succession) of any property or contract (other than one in relation to agricultural land) will fall in the Concurrent List and not in the State List even though it may relate to land or buildings”.

11. Entries in the List delineate the legislative fields. The entries in these various Lists cannot be understood in any “narrow or pedantic” manner and have to be given “the widest meaning possible”. Even then, it is necessary to remember that the entries in the various Lists have to be harmoniously interpreted so as to give content and meaning to all the entries, so that no entry becomes otiose.

12. The Constitution uses the word ‘property’ in entries 87 and 88 in List I. Property includes land and these entries expressly exclude agricultural lands. The corresponding provisions in List II are entries 48 and 47 which specifically refer to agricultural lands. Entry 6 in List III relates to “Transfer of property other than agricultural land”. Entry 7 in List III applies to contracts other than “contracts relating to agricultural lands”. The transfer of property and contracts relating to agricultural lands therefore are covered under Entry 18 in List II where there is also reference to “transfer and alienation of agricultural land” and “agricultural loans”. Entries 35 and 49 in List II speak of lands and buildings whereas entry 18 mentions only “lands”. It is in the context of these entries and in the light of earlier Supreme Court decision, it has been held that land in entry 18 in List II applies only to agricultural lands and not to non-agricultural lands or buildings, which are all appropriately covered by the concurrent list, so that the State's power to legislate on those topics is still maintained subject of course to the limitation in Art. 254.

13. There is reason for placing “land” in the State List. “Land” is primarily the State's concern with its special features, peculiar land tenures, the wide and varying local customs and practices differing from State to State. There may be cases where legislation in respect of land may affect lands in several States. Land legislation is thus an appropriate subject in the concurrent list as well. The entries in List III also admit of a wider connotation. When two interpretations are possible on the width and content of the entries in the various lists in the three lists in the Seventh Schedule, the interpretation that gives life and meaning to all the entries has to be accepted. It is for this reason that the Supreme Court in A & S. Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 1708 (at p. 1724) held thus:—

“In other words, the subject is appropriate for an entry in the Concurrent List. Such a need for a uniform legislation by the Centre was felt even in respect of vacant urban land, (where unlike agricultural land, there are no special features which need varying provincial treatment) despite its being on the State List. It is all the more imperative in respect of public premises, i.e, buildings belonging to the Union or to public sector corporations which have all-India operations. It is, therefore, only appropriate that ‘buildings’ should be an item in the Concurrent Legislative List.”

14. There is yet another reason for holding that Act 4 of 1974 and Act 2 of 1976 are not legislations relating to “land” under entry 18 in List II. These two enactments made provision for acquisition, vesting of the undertakings in the Central Government, transfer of the right, title and interest of the two foreign companies to Government companies, payment of compensation for acquisition and for all incidental matters. These two enactments therefore, squarely fall under entry 42 in List III, “Acquisition and requisitioning of property”. When acquisition is a distinct specified entry in List III, any legislation relating to acquisition cannot be treated as legislation in respect of land, in which case, entry 42 will become wholly redundant. Acquisition of land is not covered by entry 18 in List II and cannot be treated as a power inherent in a legislation with respect to land. Even though legislation with respect to land can provide for ancillary or incidental matters, the width of that power does not include a power to acquire also and that power has to be exercised with reference to the express entry regarding acquisition in the Concurrent list. This matter also is settled by the decisions of the supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh, AIR 1952 SC 252 and R.E.S Corporation v. State of Andhra, AIR 1954 SC 251.

15. The counsel for the petitioners do not contend that the two enactments are not legislations regarding acquisition. But their contention is that the impugned provisions, Section 5(2) and S. 7(3) have nothing to do with the acquisition of those companies, they are unnecessary for achieving the object of the legislation, namely acquisition and these provisions deal with a different topic, namely, the relationship of landlord and tenant. This argument does not help the petitioners, for, we have already found that landlord tenant relationship in respect of non-agricultural land is not a subject within the exclusive legislative field of the State. Even otherwise, we have no hesitation in holding that the provision in S. 5(2) and S. 7(3) are ancillary and incidental provisions required to effectuate the policy and purpose of the Act to acquire the foreign companies and are meant to aid the main legislation and thus within entry 42 of the Concurrent List.

16. It is relevant to note that the Central Government acquired running business undertakings dealing in distribution and marketing of petroleum products. These Acts nationalised petroleum undertakings and contemplated State ownership and control of petroleum products in public interest for ensuring co-ordinated distribution and utilisation of those products marketed in India. It is necessary, therefore, that the leases or premises for outlets are continued so that there is no let or hindrance to distribute these products from established retail outlets. The nationalisation cannot operate to cause dislocation in the distribution of petroleum products and provisions have to be made for alternate arrangements or for continuing the existing arrangement. These provisions are thus meant to aid the avowed object of the enactments that the ownership and control of petroleum products distributed and marketed in India are vested in the State and “thereby so distributed as best to subserve the common good”.

17. Even if these provisions, S. 5(2) and S. 7(3) cannot be treated as ancillary to the power of acquisition, the sections, construed as independent provisions unrelated to the acquisition of the undertakings, could still be the subject matter of legislation under entry 42 of the Concurrent List, which comprehends “Requisitioning” also. Acquisition and Requisition are two different concepts. In acquisition title is transferred to the acquiring authority. In requisition, title remains with the owner, but the possession alone is transferred to the requisitioning authority. Acquisition relates to title and Requisition relates only to possession (vide Jiwani Kumar Paraki v. First Land Acquisition Collector, AIR 1984 SC 1707 : (1984) 4 SCC 612). The landlord's title is not affected; his right to resume possession alone is affected. There is a requisition of his rights for a limited period as provided in these sections. Thus, it is impossible to accept the contention of the petitioners that Ss. 5(2) and 7(3) of Acts 4 of 1974 and 2 of 1976, are ultra vires of the Parliament. We shall summarise out conclusions thus:—

18. The two enactments in general and the provision in S. 5(2) and S. 7(3) in particular are not legislations in respect of “land” under entry 18 in List II of the State list. Firstly, because entry 18 applies only to agricultural lands and the subject-matter of the two legislations is non-agricultural land. If entry 18 is ruled out, and there is no exclusive legislative domain for the State, Parliament has the necessary powers, even in the absence of any express entry, under the residuary power conferred under entry 97 in List I. Secondly because, the pith and substance of the two legislations is acquisition and acquisition is not implicit in the expression “land” in entry 18, the legislative field of acquisition has to be found in the entry relating to acquisition and not in the entry relating to land. There is a specific entry for acquisition in entry 42 of List III. Parliament has powers to enact this law under this entry. Section 5(2) and S. 7(3) are part of the scheme of statutory acquisition, thus are ancillary and incidental provision to achieve the main purpose of the Acts in question. Even if these sections are construed as independent provisions, unrelated to the acquisition of undertakings, these provisions are in effect, requisitioning of the landlord's rights and thus again within the Parliamentary field under entry 42 in List III. Parliament was, therefore, competent to enact these laws and insert S. 5(2) and S. 7(3) in the two enactments.

19. It was then contended, without any foundation in the pleadings that by the operation of S. 7(3), the option to renew the lease has to be exercised by the Government company, and not by the Central Government. According to counsel, requisition can only be an act of the Government and not the function of a Government company. Under the Act, the leasehold right is already vested in the Government and this right, so vested is transferred statutorily to the Government Company. The statute can direct requisition by the Government or through its officers or through its own instrumentalities, functioning within clear, specific guidelines. With the expanding Governmental functions, and with the formation of Government companies to take over nationalised undertakings and industries, it may be necessary that the power of requisition is exercised by the Governmental company on behalf of the Government. Requisition in such circumstances, under a valid law, legally possible and permissible.

Violation of Articles 14 & 19(1)(g) of the Constitution:

20. It is necessary to note at the outset that S. 5(2) operates only on the expiry of the term of the lease or tenancy on the same terms and conditions on which the lease or tenancy was held by the undertakings before the appointed day. This sub-section says that the option to renewal shall be exercised “if so desired” by the Central Government. Considering the scheme of acquisition under the Act and the provision in S. 7(3) also, it is the Government company that is authorised to renew, because it is the company which knows whether a renewal is necessary for ensuring co-ordinated distribution and marketing of petroleum products. A mere desire in the context may not be enough; but there should be an element of need for renewing the leases. The expression “if so desired” in S. 5(2) has to be understood as “if so needed”, for, that alone will aid the statutory purpose of acquisition. It is thus not incumbent on the Government company to compel renewal of the lease in all cases. It may renew; or it may not renew. But, if there is need to renew the lease, Section 5(2) enables the Government company to obtain renewal on the existing terms and conditions. The landlord is thus bound to grant renewal. We are in respectful agreement with the views expressed by the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Manoharsingh v. Caltex Oil Refining (India) Ltd., Bombay, AIR 1981 Madh Pra 123, on the construction of S. 5(2).

21. There remains the question whether Ss. 5(2) and 7(3) violate Art. 14 and Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. If the two enactments as a whole and these provisions, as integral parts of the same legislation, are protected under Article 31C, there can be no challenge under Arts. 14 and 19. The scope and content of Art. 31C are now very well settled in the light of the Supreme Court decisions in Minerva Mills case, AIR 1980 SC 1789, Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., (1983) 1 SCR 1000 : (AIR 1983 SC 239), State of Tamil Nadu v. L. Abu, (1984) 1 SCR 725 : (AIR 1984 SC 326), H.S Srinivas Raghavachar v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1987 SC 1518 and Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, (1989) 2 JT 217 (SC). We have recently followed these decisions in our judgment in O.P No. 3496 of 1981, upholding the validity of certain amendments to the Kerala Land Reforms Act.

22. Under Art. 31C, no law giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the objects mentioned in Art. 39(b) and (c) shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, takes away, or abridges any of the rights conferred by Art. 14 or 19. Article 31C protects only that law, which has a direct nexus to the objects sought to be achieved under Art. 39(b) and (c). The protection of Art. 31C can extend to the entire law, or only to those provisions of the law which have a direct impact on the objectives to be attained under Art. 39(b) and (c).

23. Nationalisation of the petroleum industry, embracing the material resources of the country, declaring that the ownership and control of these material resources are to be so distributed as best to subserve the common good and providing for an effective machinery to divest private ownership and vest them in the State and put them under State control through Government companies, ensuring co-ordinated distribution and utilisation of petroleum products achieves the objects to be secured under Art. 39(b). The entire scheme of acquisition and distribution of the undertakings and petroleum products under the statutory provisions constituting an integral part of the whole scheme have thus direct nexus to these objects and the two statutes are fully protected under Art. 31C. These Acts and the provisions, Sections 5(2) and 7(3), are thus immune from challenge as offending Art. 14 or 19.

24. When Article 31C insulates any challenge under Art. 14 of the Constitution, there can be no attack on the further ground that any provision is not “just, fair and right”. As we understand the decisions of the Supreme Court, this principle that a provision shall be “just, fair and right” is a concept within the four corners of Art. 14 and not outside Art. 14. If Art. 14 has no application, there can be no reliance to any principle of “just, fair and right” to challenge any statutory provision. If a direct challenge under Art. 14 cannot be made, there cannot be an indirect challenge on the ground that the provision is not “just, fair and right”. The effect of a constitutional guarantee under Art. 31C cannot be nullified by importing any principle based on the theory that a provision is not “just, fair and right”.

25. In conclusion, it has to be remembered that any Central or State enactment can be challenged only on three grounds; (a) lack of legislative competence; (b) infraction of fundamental rights and (c) violation of any express provisions in the Constitution. These legislations are not amenable to challenge on the “slippery slope” of the spirit of the Constitution or on the varying phases of any basic structure of the Constitution, or any concept based on any principle of fair, just and reasonable. It is on this ground that, following the decisions of the Supreme Court, we held in O.P No. 3496 of 1981 that the principle of ‘eminent domain’, not expressly provided for in the Constitution cannot be a ground to challenge any law which authorised deprivation of property under Art. 300A.

26. The challenge to the constitutionality thus fails. The petitioner in O.P No. 5310 of 1982, has prayed that even if the Government company is entitled to a renewal of the lease till 1992, a writ of mandamus may be issued directing the 2nd respondent to surrender to the petitioner the premises in 1992 without any further objections. This is too tall a prayer to be allowed now.

In the result, all the original petitions are dismissed, but without costs.

Sri K.V Kuriakose, learned counsel for the petitioner in O.P No. 1798 of 1982 sought leave of the court to appeal to the Supreme Court invoking Art. 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. We are not satisfied that the case involves any substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court, for the reason that the decision which we have rendered rests entirely on the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in several decisions. Hence certificate to leave prayed for is refused and the request for leave is rejected.

Petitions dismissed.