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M. Swaminathan v. C.K Jayalakshmi Amma And Others
Structured Summary of the Judgment delivered by Balakrishnan, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
These two appeals arise out of a common judgment passed in MAC Nos. 41 of 1981 and 42 of 1981. The appellant in these appeals had been impleaded in the original proceedings (he was respondent No. 13 in MAC No. 42 of 1981 and respondent No. 12 in MAC No. 41 of 1981).
The facts (as recorded in the opinion) are:
- In MAC No. 41 of 1981 the second petitioner was an injured minor (first petitioner was her mother). She was returning home in bus No. KLR-4980 after attending a tutorial college; the bus was said to be overcrowded (about 30 standing passengers) and driven at high speed.
- In MAC No. 42 of 1981 the petitioner was also a passenger of the same bus. As the bus passed a culvert at a place called Kokked, it collided with a lorry bearing registration No. BD6556 coming from the opposite direction. Both vehicles were alleged to have been driven negligently.
- As a result of the accident both the second petitioner in MAC No. 41 of 1981 and the petitioner in MAC No. 42 of 1981 sustained serious injuries.
- Claims: MAC No. 41 claimed Rs. 13,576.98 (Tribunal awarded Rs. 5,698, later enhanced by this Court); MAC No. 42 claimed Rs. 76,152 (Tribunal awarded Rs. 8,000, which this Court upheld).
- The appellant was said to be the owner of the lorry; originally not a party but impleaded subsequently. The appellant's principal contentions included that the bus (and its owner/insurer) was responsible because of rash driving, and alternatively that even if the lorry driver was negligent, statutory liability lay on the registered owner as there had been no transfer; he also contended the claim against him was time-barred.
- The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal found negligence on both sides and the Court, on reappraisal, fixed liability at 60% on the bus driver and 40% on the lorry driver.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the transfer of the vehicle in favour of the appellant by the original insured resulted in the lapse of the insurance policy (i.e., whether the insurance company was relieved of liability because the policy stood in the name of the registered owner and was not transferred).
- Whether the insurer of the lorry (which had the policy in the name of the prior registered owner) was liable to indemnify claims arising out of the accident when the vehicle had been transferred to the appellant and no formal transfer of the policy had been effected under the Motor Vehicles Act.
- (Factual-legal outcome addressed by the Court) The apportionment of liability between the bus and lorry drivers for the purpose of awarding compensation to claimants.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant maintained that the collision occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the bus and that the owner of the bus and its insurance company were liable for damages.
- Alternatively, the appellant contended that, even if the lorry driver was negligent, statutory liability rested on the registered owner because there was no transfer (or effective transfer affecting the insurance) in favour of the appellant.
- The appellant also argued that the compensation claim against him was time-barred.
- Generally, the appellant asserted that the vehicle was covered by a valid third-party insurance policy and that the compensation should be payable by the insurance company (i.e., the appellant sought to make the insurer liable to indemnify).
Insurer's Arguments (New India Assurance Company)
- The insurer contended that exhibit R-25 was a sale deed in favour of the appellant, and the policy of insurance stood in the name of the registered owner (the late husband of the eighth respondent), with whom the company had contracted; the company had no contract with the appellant and therefore no liability to indemnify him.
- The insurer further argued that the policy had lapsed upon transfer of the motor vehicle and that the transferee (appellant) had not applied for transfer of the policy into his name as required, so the insurer was not liable to pay any amount.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Panna Lal v. Chand Mal, [1980] ACJ 233 (SC) | Registration of the vehicle in the transferee’s name is not essential to pass title; payment and delivery complete the sale; provisions of the Sale of Goods Act apply. | Used to conclude that the appellant had purchased the lorry under exhibit R-25 and that title could pass without mutation of the registration certificate; thus the appellant obtained ownership rights by the sale document. |
| National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Thekkeyil Rajan, [1985] 58 Comp Cas 40 (Ker); [1982] KLT 700 | Insurance contract is personal indemnity; insured cannot transfer benefits while contingent; an insurance policy cannot be transferred by the insured without insurer's consent; policy lapses upon transfer unless insurer agrees to accept transferee. | Cited as an authoritative view supporting the proposition that transfer of ownership causes the policy to lapse unless insurer consents; used to reject appellant's contention that insurer remained liable. |
| New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. E.K. Muhammed, [1987] 61 Comp Cas 490 | Affirmed the view that the insurance policy lapses upon transfer of the vehicle. | Relied upon as corroborative authority for the conclusion that an unconsented transfer terminates the insurer’s contractual liability. |
| B.P. Venkatappa v. B.N. Lakshmiah, AIR 1973 Mys 350 | Held that an insurance policy is a personal contract that lapses upon transfer of the motor vehicle; benefit of the policy is not available to transferee without express agreement with insurer. | Applied as part of the consistent body of authority supporting lapse of policy upon transfer. |
| Gulab Bai Damodar Tapse v. Peter K. Sundar, [1975] ACJ 100 (Bom) | One of a series of decisions holding that insurance policy lapses on transfer of the vehicle. | Grouped with other decisions to demonstrate the substantial body of authority that supports the view that transfer terminates the policy. |
| Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. v. Vimal Roy, [1974] 44 Comp Cas 316 (Delhi) | Held policy lapses on transfer (cited among similar authorities). | Used to show consistent precedent to the same effect. |
| South India Insurance Co. v. Puran Chandra Misra, [1973] ACJ 46 (Orissa) | Another authority holding that policy lapses upon transfer. | Relied upon as part of the body of precedent supporting lapse on transfer. |
| Balwani Singh v. Jhannubai, [1980] ACJ 126 (MP) | Authority cited for the view that policy lapses on transfer. | Used to reinforce the court's conclusion on the effect of transfer. |
| Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co. v. Meena Sharma, [1975] ACJ 335 (P & H) | Cited among decisions holding that a policy lapses with transfer. | Counted in the "host of other decisions" supporting lapse of policy on transfer. |
| Madras Motor Insurance Co. v. Muhammed Mustafa, AIR 1941 Mad 208 | Earlier single-judge view: insurer's right to avoid liability limited to grounds in section 96(2); policy does not lapse by transfer and third party victims should remain protected. | Noted as a contrasting (earlier) position; the Court records that this view was later reversed by a Division Bench and therefore gives it less weight. |
| Hema Ramaswami v. K.M. Valarence Panjani, AIR 1981 Mad 174; [1983] 54 Comp Cas 600 (Mad) | Division Bench decision holding that transfer during the currency of the policy terminates the policy; section 31 does not keep the policy alive qua third parties. | Cited as an authority consistent with the majority view that transfer terminates the policy; used to justify rejecting the contention that section 31 keeps the policy alive. |
| Madineni R. Kondaiah v. Yaseen Fatima, [1986] 60 Comp Cas 762 (AP) (Full Bench) | Full Bench held that insurer cannot plead lapse of policy because of transfer to defeat third-party claim; third-party risk continues until statutory obligations (sections 29A and 31 read with section 94) are discharged. | Noted by the Court as a decision relied upon by the appellant, but the Court distinguished it on facts (in particular, timing of the transfer, the deceased registered owner, and lack of steps by the appellant to get policy transferred), and thus did not follow it in the present case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in two main strands of analysis: (A) the apportionment of fault and compensation; and (B) whether the insurer was liable given the transfer of the lorry before the accident.
A. Apportionment of Fault and Assessment of Compensation
- The Tribunal's factual findings were reviewed. Witness evidence indicated that the bus was overcrowded and being driven at high speed on the festival day; some witnesses said the bus came at a high speed and the accident occurred after the bus passed a culvert. The bus driver (RW 5) contended contrariwise that the lorry was at fault, but the Court found no independent evidence that the lorry was travelling at high speed beyond the bus driver's interested testimony.
- On a reappraisal of the evidence the Court concluded that both drivers were negligent but that the bus driver was more negligent. The Court therefore fixed liability at 60% on the bus driver and 40% on the lorry driver.
- As to compensation, the Court enhanced the Tribunal award in MAC No. 41 from Rs. 5,698 to Rs. 8,000, taking into account 22 days' hospitalization, burn injuries, pain and suffering and loss of an academic year for the injured student. In MAC No. 42 the award of Rs. 8,000 was considered reasonable and left undisturbed (the claimant there having been hospitalized for 12 days and re-employed by his employer).
B. Insurance-Liability Analysis (Effect of Transfer on Policy)
- The Court identified the pivotal legal question: whether the transfer of the vehicle in favour of the appellant by the original insured resulted in lapse of the insurance policy.
- Statutory background noted: section 103A of the Motor Vehicles Act (requiring application for transfer of certificate of insurance by the registered owner) was relevant, and the Court observed that in this case the registered owner was deceased at the time of exhibit R-25, which meant the normal application route under section 103A could not have been followed by the registered owner.
- The Court examined exhibit R-25 and concluded that all rights and liabilities in respect of the vehicle were transferred to the appellant; there was no claim by the appellant that consideration was unpaid or that he had not taken possession.
- Applying the principle from Panna Lal v. Chand Mal (Sale of Goods Act principles), the Court held that mutation of the registration certificate is not essential to transfer title; payment of the price and delivery suffice to pass title.
- On the essential point of insurance, the Court reviewed numerous authorities which, in the majority, hold that an insurance policy is a personal contract and lapses upon transfer of the insured vehicle unless the insurer consents to substitute the transferee as insured. The Court expressly cited and relied upon these decisions (including National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Thekkeyil Rajan and New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. E.K. Muhammed) to conclude that the insurance policy in the present case had terminated in consequence of the transfer.
- The Court noted minority or contrary authority (for example, an earlier Madras single-judge decision and the Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh in Madineni R. Kondaiah v. Yaseen Fatima) but distinguished those decisions or recorded that some contrary views had been reversed by subsequent benches. In particular, the Court found the facts of Madineni distinguishable: in the present case the transfer was effected about three months prior to the accident, the appellant had not taken steps to have the policy transferred, and the original insured was dead.
- Because no application for transfer of the policy was made by the appellant, and no notice was given to the insurer, the Court held there was “total absence of the policy” for purposes of the insurer's contractual obligations and thus the insurer could not be made liable to indemnify.
- On that basis the appellant’s contention that the insurance company remained liable despite the transfer was rejected.
Holding and Implications
Core Holding:
- The insurance policy had terminated upon transfer of the vehicle and the insurer was not liable to indemnify the appellant. The Court applied the prevailing line of authority that an insurance policy is a personal contract and lapses on transfer of the insured vehicle unless the insurer expressly consents to substitute the transferee as the insured.
- Apportionment and monetary awards: For MAC No. 41 of 1981 the compensation was fixed at Rs. 8,000. The Court apportioned liability as 60% on the bus driver/owner and 40% on the lorry owner (appellant). Accordingly, 60% (i.e., Rs. 4,800) shall be paid by the insurer of the bus (M/s. Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company) and the balance 40% (i.e., Rs. 3,200) shall be paid by the appellant. The principal amount shall carry interest at 6% per annum from 17th September, 1977, until realization.
- For MAC No. 42 of 1981, the insurer of the bus (M/s. Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company) shall pay Rs. 4,800 with interest at 6% per annum from 17th September, 1977, and the appellant shall pay the balance Rs. 3,200 with interest at 6% per annum from 17th September, 1977, until realization.
- The miscellaneous appeals (MFAs) and cross-objections were disposed of in accordance with the above orders; parties to bear their own costs.
Implications:
The direct legal consequence for the parties is that the appellant (as purchaser/transferee of the lorry) was held liable to pay 40% of the enhanced compensation awards (with interest), and the lorry's insurer was held not to be liable because the insurance policy had lapsed on transfer. The Court relied upon the established line of authorities holding that an insurance policy is a personal contract which cannot be transferred without the insurer's consent, and applied Sale of Goods Act principles to hold that title had passed to the appellant prior to the accident.
Broader legal implications: The Court followed existing precedents holding that unconsented transfer of a motor vehicle typically terminates the insurer's contractual liability; the opinion does not purport to lay down a novel rule or to overturn the cited authorities. No new precedent or departure from the cited line of authority was articulated in this judgment.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Balakrishnan, J.:— These two appeals arise out of a common judgment passed in MAC Nos. 41 of 1981 and 42 of 1981. The appellant herein was respondent No. 13 in MAC No. 42 of 1981 and respondent No. 12 in MAC No. 41 of 1981.
2. The second petitioner in MAC No. 41 of 1981 is the injured minor child and the first petitioner therein is her mother. The 2nd petitioner was studying in a tutorial college and was preparing for the SSLC examination. On the date of the incident, she was returning to her house in bus No. KLR-4980. The petitioner in MAC No. 42 of 1981 was also a passenger in the bus. According to the claimants, the bus was overcrowded and it was being driven at a very high speed. As the bus passed a culvert, a lorry bearing registration No. BD6556 came from the opposite direction and there was collision between the two vehicles. The incident happened at a place called Kokked. According to the petitioners, both the vehicles were driven negligently.
3. As a result of the accident, the second petitioner in MAC No. 41 of 1981 and the petitioner in MAC No. 42 of 1981 sustained serious injuries. Rs. 13,576.98 was claimed as compensation in MAC No. 41 of 1981 and Rs. 76,152 was claimed in MAC No. 42 of 1981. In MAC No. 41 of 1981 the Tribunal granted an award of Rs. 5,698 and in MAC No. 42 of 1981 a sum of Rs. 8,000 was awarded as compensation. The appellant is said to be the owner of the lorry. Originally, he was not a party to the proceedings and was impleaded subsequently. The main contention of the appellant is that the accident occurred on account of the rash and negligent driving of the bus and the owner of the bus and the insurance company are liable for damages. Secondly, it was contended that even if the driver of the lorry was negligent, the liability under the statute was on the registered owner as there was no transfer of the vehicle in favour of the appellant. It was also contended that the claim as against the appellant was time-barred.
4. The Tribunal found that the drivers of both the vehicles were negligent in driving their vehicles and that the accident occurred as a result of their negligent driving. Exhibits R-23 and R-24 are the sketch and report prepared sometime after the accident. Exhibit R-23 sketch showed that there was sufficient width of the road and the accident happened almost in the middle of the road. Learned counsel for the appellant also contended that the accident occurred as a result of the negligence of the driver of the bus. The Tribunal has found that there was negligence on the part of both the drivers. It has come in the evidence that the bus was fully crowded with passengers. There were about 30 standing passengers. The accident occurred on the day of Kodungallur Bharani and it being the festival season naturally the bus would have been driven at a high speed. P.W 3 was one of the passengers in the bus. He deposed that the bus came at a high speed and the accident occurred after the bus passed a culvert. P.W 2, the lorry driver said that seeing the bus coming at a high speed, he stopped the lorry about 10 to 15 feet to the east and the bus hit the right side of the lorry. RW 5 is the driver of the bus. According to him, the lorry was coming at a high speed and it hit the right side of the bus. The fact that the accident was on the day of Kodungallur Bharani and that the bus was fully packed with passengers is spoken of by several witnesses. Apart from the interested evidence of PW-5, there is no evidence to show that the lorry was coming at a high speed. On a reappraisal of the evidence on both sides, we feel that the driver of the bus was more negligent than the lorry driver. Therefore, we fix the liability of the bus driver at 60 per cent. and that of the driver of the lorry at 40 per cent.
5. According to the insurer of the lorry, namely, the New India Assurance Company, the lorry originally belonged to the late husband of the eighth respondent in MFA No. 415 of 1982 and this respondent executed an agreement in favour of the appellant Swaminathan on January 3, 1977 whereby the vehicle was transferred to the latter. As already stated, the accident occurred on March 22, 1977, i.e, about 2½ months after exhibit R-25. The main contention urged by the insurance company is that exhibit R-25 is a sale deed in favour of the appellant and the insurance of the vehicle stood in the name of the registered owner of the vehicle and the appellant was not the insured under the policy issued by the insurance company and therefore the company is not liable to indemnify the loss sustained by the appellant. The insurance company further contended that the policy has lapsed upon the transfer of the motor vehicle and the transferee had not applied for transfer of the policy in his name and therefore the insurance company is not liable to pay any amount.
6. The important question that arises for consideration is whether the transfer of the vehicle in favour of the appellant by the original insured has resulted in the lapse of the insurance policy. The question as to whether an insurance policy lapses when the vehicle insured thereby is transferred without informing the insurer in the prescribed form under section 103 A of the Motor Vehicles Act had come up for consideration before several High Courts. The general view appears to be that the policy lapses when the vehicle is transferred.
7. The main contention urged by the insurance company is that the registered owner was one Clement, the husband of the 8th respondent in MFA No. 415 of 1982 and the company had no contract with the appellant, and therefore there cannot be any liability arising out of the insurance policy. The appellant has contended that he has executed only an agreement in favour of the 8th respondent and the registered owner was somebody else. Exhibit R-25 dated January 3, 1977, is the document by which the appellant derived a right over the vehicle. In exhibit R-25, it has been stated that the 8th respondent in MFA No. 415 of 1982, viz., Sheela Albert, has ceased to have any right over the vehicle from the date of that agreement and that the transferee, Swaminathan, alone will have all rights and liabilities over the vehicle subsequent to that document. The registered owner, the late husband of Sheela Albert was no more alive at the time of exhibit R-25.
8. When a vehicle is transferred, the insured can transfer the certificate of insurance in favour of the transferee. As per section 103A of the Motor Vehicles Act, it is for the registered owner to apply for the transfer of the policy in favour of the person to whom the motor vehicle was transferred. In the instant case, the original registered owner was no longer alive and the transfer was effected by one of his legal representatives. So, there could not have been an application by the person in favour of whom the certificate of insurance had been issued. Here, no steps have been taken by the appellant also to get the policy transferred in his name.
9. From a reading of exhibit R-25 it can be seen that all rights and liabilities in respect of the vehicle were transferred in favour of the appellant. The appellant has no case that he has not paid the consideration under exhibit R-25 and that he did not obtain possession of the vehicle. The registration of the vehicle in the name of the transferee is not essential to pass the title in the vehicle. Payment of price and delivery of the vehicle make the transaction complete and the title will pass to the purchaser under the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act. For transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle, mutation of the certificate is not necessary. Obligation to register the vehicle is for controlling and regulating the movements of the vehicle by the authorities under the Act. The vehicle can be sold and purchased without following the procedure prescribed in section 31 of the Act. (See Panna Lal v. Chand Mal, [1980] ACJ 233 (SC)). Therefore, it is clear that the appellant purchased the lorry in question as per exhibit R-25 and the insurance policy stood in the name of the husband of the 8th respondent, who was the original owner of the vehicle.
10. The contract of insurance is basically governed by the rules which form part of the general law of contract. In a contract of insurance, one party agrees to indemnify the loss that would be sustained by another. The first party is bound to pay the money or provide its equivalent if any uncertain event occurs. The other party, namely, the insured must have an insurable interest in the property, life or liability which is the subject of the insurance.
“Insurable interest is a basic requirement of any contract of insurance unless it can be, and is, lawfully waived. At a general level, this means that the party to the insurance contract who is the insured or policy-holder must have a particular relationshsp with the subject-matter of the insurance, whether that be a life or property or a liability to which he might be exposed. The absence of the required relationship will render the contract illegal, void or simply unenforceable, depending on the type of insurance”. (See page 24 Chapter 3— “Modern Insurance Law” by John Birds).
11. The contention of the appellant is that the vehicle was covered by a valid third party insurance policy and as such the compensation amount is to be paid by the insurance company. The insurance company resists the claim on the ground that the policy was in the name of the registered owner and therefore the company is not liable to indemnify the loss arising out of the accident. A similar question came up for consideration before this court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Thekkeyil Rajan, [1985] 58 Comp Cas 40 (Ker); [1982] KLT 700. Vadakkal J., speaking for the Bench, held at p. 42.
“The contract of insurance is a contract of personal indemnity and therefore the insured cannot transfer the benefit under a policy so long as such benefits are contingent. In short, an insurance policy cannot be transferred by the insured without the consent of the insurer. On the insurer agreeing to such transfer, there is a novation of the contract by which the original assured is substituted by the new assured, the transferee to whom the policy has been transferred. The insurance policy lapses upon the transfer of the ownership of the motor vehicle unless the insurance company agrees to accept the transferee as the insured in relation to the vehicle either at the instance of the transferor or of the transferee”.
12. This question again came up for consideration in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. E.K Muhammed, [1987] 61 Comp Cas 490. This court held the same view. The Mysore High Court in B.P Venkatappa v. B.N Lakshmiah, AIR 1973 Mys 350, held as follows (headnote):
“An insurance policy is a personal contract between the parties for indemnifying the insured in case of an accident covered under the policy. Thus, where the motor vehicle is transferred by an insured to another person, the insurance policy lapses upon the transfer and in such a case the benefit of the policy is not available to the transferee without an express agreement with the insurance company.”
13. There is a host of other decisions holding the same view. (See Gulab Bai Damodar Tapse v. Peter K. Sundar, [1975] ACJ 100 (Bom), Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. v. Vimal Roy, [1974] 44 Comp Cas 316 (Delhi), South India Insurance Co. v. Puran Chandra Misra, [1973] ACJ 46 (Orissa), Balwani Singh v. Jhannubai, [1980] ACJ 126 (MP), Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co. v. Meena Sharma, [1975] ACJ 335 (P & H).
14. The Madras High Court in Madras Motor Insurance Co. v. Muhammed Mustafa, AIR 1941 Mad 208, took a different view and held that the right of the insurer to avoid his liability under the policy is confined to certain grounds specified in section 96(2) and the court cannot add to those grounds for reasons of hardship. Transfer of the vehicle during the currency of a policy is one of such grounds and the policy does not lapse by such transfer. The court was of the view that even if the insurer has some ground which would entitle him, as against the insured, to avoid the policy or to have it declared as void, that will not protect the insurer from liability to pay the victim of the accident to the extent covered by the insurance and that was the sole intention to have a compulsory insurance in respect of the third party risk. However, this view of the learned single judge was subsequently reversed by a Division Bench of Madras High Court in Hema Ramaswami v. K.M Valarence Panjani, AIR 1981 Mad 174; [1983] 54 Comp Cas 600 (Mad). The Division Bench held (at p. 605, 606):
“Section 96 does not warrant the view that a sale or transfer of an insured car by the insured during the currency of the policy does not terminate the policy. Section 31 of the Act could not have the effect of keeping the policy alive qua third parties, that change of registry under section 31 was not a condition precedent for the transfer of ownership of the vehicle, that the said section merely imposed an obligation both on the transferor and the transferee of the vehicle to notify the transfer and that the non-compliance there with will not invalidate the transfer as such which has already taken place”.
15. Learned counsel for the appellant drew our attention to a Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Madineni R. Kondaiah v. Yaseen Fatima, [1986] 60 Comp Cas 762 (AP) [FB]. In this case, the court held that the insurance company was not entitled to raise the plea that the policy had lapsed because of the transfer of the vehicle by the registered owner and that such a plea was not available in view of section 96(2) of the Act. The court was of the view that even if the policy had lapsed as against the insured, the liability of the insurer as against third parties still subsisted. The court held:
“So far as the third party risk is concerned, the proprietary interest in the vehicle is not necessary and the principal liability continues till the transferor discharges his statutory obligation under sections 29 A and 31 read with section 94 of the Act. Till he complies with the requirement of section 31 of the Act, the public liability will not cease and that constitutes the insurable interest to keep the policy alive in respect of third party risks. It must be deemed that the transferor allowed the purchaser to use the vehicle in a public place in the said transitional period and accordingly till the compliance with section 31, the liability of the transferor subsists and the policy is in operation so far as it relates to third party risks.
The insurance company cannot raise any defence not contemplated in section 96(2). Though the defence that the original policy was not issued by the company or that it is a forged one is not barred under section 96(2), the defence of the insurer that the policy has lapsed in view of the transfer of the vehicle touched the merits of the case and is barred under section 96(2) ot the Act”.
16. The facts of the case are slightly different from the case in hand. In the instant case, exhibit R-25 was executed about three months prior to the date of the accident. The appellant also knew that the registered owner of the vehicle was no more alive and therefore, no application could have been filed under section 103A of the Act for the transfer of the certificate of insurance, and it was up to the appellant to get a fresh policy of insurance for the vehicle. The appellant has also no case that he had intimated the sale of the vehicle to the insurance company. It is true that section 94 of the statute is enacted to give protection to a third party in respect of death or bodily injury or damage to their property while using the vehicle in a public place. Here, as already pointed out, the appellant has not taken any steps to get the insurance policy transferred in his name and he has no case that title to the vehicle has not passed. The original insured was dead and the policy was thereby terminated and even if the injured persons were third parties liable to be covered by third party insurance, the insurance company cannot have any liability as there is total absence of the policy. In view of the formidable array of authorities, we reject the contention of the appellant that the insurance company was liable to pay the compensation amount, despite the transfer of the vehicle by the registered owner in favour of the appellant.
17. The claimants in MAC No. 41 of 1981 filed a memorandum of cross objections for enhancement of the amount. The petitioners therein claimed a total compensation of Rs. 13,576.98. The Tribunal has granted Rs. 5,698.00. Learned counsel for these respondents contended that the injured Nirmala was a student of the SSLC class and because of this accident, she had lost one academic year. Apart from the medical and other incidental expenses, she was granted only Rs. 5,000. She had to be in the hospital for about 22 days. She had burn injuries on her body and naturally she would have suffered a lot of pain. Considering the entire facts and circumstances, we enhance the compensation from Rs. 5,698 to Rs. 8,000.
18. The claimant in MAC No. 42 of 1981 also has filed a memorandum of cross objections seeking enhancement of the amount of compensation. He was granted Rs. 8,000 as compensation. He was in the hospital for 12 days. He is a driver and it is contended that he would not be able to drive a vehicle since he sustained injury on his hand. It may be noted that his employer was kind enough to give him re-employment. Rs. 8,000 appears to be a reasonable amount and we see no reason to interfere with that.
19. In the result, in MAC No. 41 of 1981, the compensation amount is fixed at Rs. 8,000. 40 per cent of the same should be paid by the appellant.
20. Since 60 per cent is to be borne by the owner of the bus, the insurer of the bus viz., M/s. Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company shall pay the amount of Rs. 4,800 and the balance amount of Rs. 3,200 shall be paid by the appellant. The principal amount will carry interest at six per cent per annum from 17th September, 1977, till realisation.
21. In MAC No. 42 of 1981, the 5th respondent, M/s. Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company shall pay Rs. 4,800 with interest at six per cent per annum from 17th September, 1977, and the balance amount of Rs. 3,200 with interest at six per cent per annum from 17th September, 1977, till realisation shall be paid by the appellant.
22. The MFAs and cross objections are disposed of as above. The parties shall bear their costs.
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