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Suri Films v. S.N Govinda Prabhu And Brother .
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a Civil Revision Petition filed by the defendant (the revision petitioner) challenging an order of the trial Court which permitted amendment of the plaint. The original suit was filed by the proprietor of a cinema theatre seeking an injunction to restrain the defendant film distributor from exhibiting films in the locality other than the plaintiff's theatre, on the basis of an agreement.
Key procedural steps recorded in the opinion:
- An application for temporary injunction by the plaintiff was dismissed; that order became final on dismissal of the appeal.
- An application by the plaintiff to withdraw the suit with permission to file a fresh suit was dismissed for lack of grounds under Order XXIII, Rule 1; that order became final.
- The plaintiff then applied to amend the plaint to incorporate the terms of the agreement and to add a prayer for specific performance.
- The revision petitioner opposed the amendment on multiple grounds (see Arguments section); the trial Court rejected those objections and allowed the amendment. The present revision is directed against that amendment order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a Court before which a suit, which it is competent to entertain and dispose of, is pending, can order an amendment of the plaint that would have the effect of ousting its own jurisdiction.
Arguments of the Parties
Revision Petitioner's Arguments
- The opinion records that the revision petitioner advanced several objections before the trial Court; the objections are enumerated as: lack of maintainability, lack of bona fides, change of character of the suit, substitution of cause of action, and that the amendment would oust the jurisdiction of the Court.
- Before the High Court the only ground pressed by the revision petitioner (through Shri T.P. Kelu Nambiar) was that allowing the amendment would oust the jurisdiction of the Court.
- The revision petitioner sought a reference to a larger Bench, submitting that prior Single Bench decisions (notably T.K. Sreedharan v. P.S. Job and another in Ponnumani v. Narayanan Nair) required reconsideration and that there was divergence of opinion between various High Courts on the question.
Applicant / Plaintiff (seeking amendment)
- The plaintiff applied to amend the plaint to incorporate the terms of the agreement relied upon and to include a prayer for specific performance; the trial Court allowed that amendment. The opinion does not set out further detailed submissions made by the plaintiff in support of the amendment.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court in This Opinion |
|---|---|---|
| T.K. Sreedharan v. P.S. Job, AIR 1969 Ker 75 (1968 Ker LT 479) | Held that if after allowing an amendment the Court concludes it has no jurisdiction, the plaint should be returned for presentation before the proper Court; considered the merits of prior authorities. | The Court followed Sreedharan's case and explicitly declined to refer the matter to a larger Bench. The opinion aligns with the principles in Sreedharan. |
| Ponnumani v. Narayanan Nair, 1985 Ker LJ 459 | Followed the approach that where amendment, if allowed, results in want of jurisdiction, the plaint should be returned to the proper Court after amendment is allowed and jurisdiction is found wanting. | The Court followed Ponnumani and treated it as consistent with Sreedharan and the line of authorities it preferred. |
| Singara v. Govindaswami, AIR 1928 Mad 400 | Observed that no Court will permit a plaint to be amended so as to oust its own jurisdiction (Single Bench Madras). | The Court expressed respectful disagreement with this decision and those that took the same view, finding them not persuasive in the present context. |
| Nagutha Mohammed Nainan v. Vedavalli Ammal, (1959) 1 Mad LJ 307 | Followed Singara’s approach that amendment ousting jurisdiction should not be permitted. | The Court disagreed with this authority and did not follow it. |
| E.R.R.M.H.S Committee v. P. Atchayya, AIR 1957 Andh Pra 10 | Adopted the view in Singara’s case that amendment ousting jurisdiction should not be permitted. | The Court declined to follow this authority, placing it with the earlier line of cases it disagreed with. |
| Lalji v. Narottam, AIR 1953 Nag 273 | Held that where an amendment together with original claim exceeds pecuniary jurisdiction, the plaint and amendment should be returned to proper Court; noted that allowing such amendment amounts to trying a suit beyond pecuniary jurisdiction. | The Court referenced this view among authorities it respectfully disagreed with. |
| Rachhya Singh v. R.R.B.P. Singh, AIR 1973 Pat 179 | Also took the view that such an amendment cannot be allowed. | The Court recorded disagreement with this authority. |
| Nandula Bhavani v. Saladi Mangamma, AIR 1949 Mad 208 | Stated that if a claim originally within jurisdiction falls outside it as a result of amendment, the Court should, if amendment is allowed, return the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. | The Court endorsed this view and cited it amongst the authorities supporting the approach it prefers. |
| Kundan Mal v. Thikana Siryari, AIR 1959 Raj 146 | Adopted the position that if amendment removes the claim from the Court’s jurisdiction, the plaint should be returned to the proper Court. | The Court agreed with this authority and cited it in support of its reasoning. |
| Goverdhan v. Govt. of Union of India, AIR 1953 Hyd 212 | Held that allowance or rejection of amendment is on merits and if after allowing it the Court finds it has no jurisdiction, the plaint must be returned to the proper Court. | The Court followed and relied on this authority as part of the consistent line it favored. |
| Simadri Panda v. Durgasi China, AIR 1982 Orissa 25 | Supported the approach that a plaint may be returned to the proper Court after amendment if jurisdiction is ousted. | The Court cited and followed this authority. |
| Patel Construction & Co. v. S.R. Amulakh, AIR 1973 Guj 283 | Stated that rejecting an application for amendment on the sole ground that it would take the suit out of pecuniary jurisdiction is not consonant with Order VI, Rule 17; also held plaint should not be returned with the amendment application to be filed in the proper Court. | The Court adopted and relied on this authority to support the position that refusal solely on ouster grounds is not correct. |
| Peres and Sons v. Puravath, 1960 Ker LT 731 | Identified the two main considerations for allowing amendment under Order VI, Rule 17: it should not work injustice to the opposite side and it must be necessary to determine the real question in controversy; merits of claim should not be gone into while deciding amendment. | The Court applied these guiding considerations and reiterated that the Court should not delve into merits when deciding the amendment application. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court framed the central legal question as whether a Court, before which a competent suit is pending, could permit an amendment of the plaint that would oust its jurisdiction. The opinion proceeds by examining two lines of authority and then synthesizing a practical principle consistent with the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) rules referenced in the text.
Principal steps in the Court's analysis (as stated in the opinion):
- The Court acknowledged a line of earlier decisions (e.g., Singara v. Govindaswami and several follow-ons) holding that a plaint should not be amended so as to oust the Court's own jurisdiction. The opinion records these authorities but states respectful disagreement with them.
- The Court identified another line of decisions (including Nandula Bhavani, Kundan Mal, Goverdhan, Simadri Panda, Patel Construction, and the Single Bench decision in T.K. Sreedharan) that advised allowing amendment and, if after allowing it the Court finds it has no jurisdiction, returning the plaint for presentation to the proper Court under Order VII, Rule 10(1). The Court embraced this approach.
- The Court reiterated the two main considerations for permitting amendments under Order VI, Rule 17 (as stated in Peres and Sons v. Puravath): (a) the amendment must not work injustice to the opposite side; and (b) it must be necessary for determining the real question in controversy. The Court also noted that the Court deciding the application should not go into the merits of the case.
- The opinion analyzed the notional legal effect that an amendment "relates back" to the date of presentation of the plaint. The Court explained that although the relation-back is a notional concept, it becomes practically relevant only after the amendment is permitted and carried out. Until the amendment is permitted, the Court seized of the matter should consider the amendment application; otherwise a vacuum would result and parties could be made to shuttle the plaint from Court to Court.
- The Court held that rejecting an application for amendment solely because it "would oust the jurisdiction" is inconsistent with the spirit of Order VI, Rule 17 and is not conducive to justice. The proper course, if the amendment is allowed and then the Court finds it lacks jurisdiction, is to return the amended plaint for presentation before the proper Court under Order VII, Rule 10(1) (and consider applicability of Rule 10A), but only after amendment is carried out by Court order.
- The Court therefore concluded that the trial Court was the competent forum to decide whether the amendment should be permitted. The effect of the amendment on jurisdiction and any subsequent return of the plaint are matters for determination after the amendment is implemented, not grounds to refuse the amendment out of hand.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
The Civil Revision Petition is dismissed.
The opinion states that the trial Court's order allowing the amendment is "perfectly correct" and finds "no error of jurisdiction, illegality or material irregularity." The petition is dismissed without costs, and the formal note in the opinion reads: "Petition dismissed."
Implications (as explained in the opinion):
- The Court endorses the principle that the Court before which a suit is pending is the proper forum to decide an application to amend the plaint, even if the proposed amendment may have the effect of ousting that Court's jurisdiction.
- The Court cautions that the relation-back effect of an amendment is a notional legal concept which becomes practically operative only after the amendment is actually made by Court order; only then can provisions like Order VII, Rule 10(1) and Rule 10A be invoked to return the plaint to a Court of competent jurisdiction.
- The Court holds that it is not appropriate to reject an amendment application solely on the ground that the amendment would oust jurisdiction — such a rejection is not consonant with Order VI, Rule 17 and defeats the object of resolving the real controversy between the parties.
- The Court explicitly declines to refer the question to a larger Bench and aligns itself with the line of authorities (including T.K. Sreedharan and Ponnumani) that permit amendment and post-amendment return to the proper Court if jurisdiction is ultimately found lacking.
- The direct practical consequence for the parties in this matter is that the trial Court's allowance of the amendment stands; the revision petitioner’s challenge is dismissed and no costs are awarded.
Petition dismissed.
This summary is confined strictly to matters and language set out in the provided opinion. No material beyond the opinion has been added.
1. The short question that poses for consideration in this Civil Revision Petition filed by the defendant is whether a court, before which a suit which it is competent to entertain, and dispose of is pending, could order an amendment of the plaint involving ouster of its jurisdiction.
2. The suit is one for injunction filed by the proprietor of a cinema theatre to restrain the defendant a film distributor, from exhibiting his films in the locality other than the theatre of the plaintiff on the basis of an agreement. The application for temporary injunction filed by him was dismissed and the order has become final by dismissal of the appeal. The application then filed by him for withdrawal of suit with permission to file a fresh one was also dismissed in the absence of grounds under O. 23, R. 1. That order has also become final. Then he filed an application for amendment of the plaint incorporating the terms of the agreement and including a prayer for specific performance of the agreement. That was opposed by the revision petitioner on grounds of maintainability, lack of bona fides, change of character of suit, substitution of cause of action and ouster of jurisdiction of the Court by amendment. Rejecting all these contentions the prayer for amendment was allowed and the revision is directed against that order.
3. Though several objections were taken by the revision petitioner before the trial Court the only ground urged before me on his behalf by Shri T.P Kelu Nambiar was the one based on ouster of jurisdiction of the Court by allowing the amendment. The decision of a Single Bench of this Court in T.K Sreedharan,… v. P.S Job,…., AIR 1969 Ker 75 : 1968 Ker LT 479 followed by another Single Judge in Ponnumani v. Narayanan Nair, 1985 Ker LJ 459, is against his contention and therefore his request was that the matter may be referred to a larger bench since he is of the view that those decisions require reconsideration. The learned Advocate pointed out that this is a legal question on which there is sharp divergence of opinion between various High Courts in India.
4. A Single Bench of the Madras High Court in Singara v. Govindaswami, AIR 1928 Mad 400, observed that no Court will permit a plaint to be so amended as to oust its own jurisdiction to try the suit. That decision was followed by another single Judge of the same Court in Nagutha Mohammed Nainan v. Vedavalli Ammal, (1959) 1 Mad LJ 307. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in E.R.R.M.H.S Committee v. P. Atchayya, AIR 1957 Andh Pra 10 (Single Bench) followed the decision in Singara's case, AIR 1928 Mad 400. A Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Lalji v. Narottam, AIR 1953 Nag 273, also took the same view and said when the court is faced with the question of allowing an amendment which taken together with the original claim exceeds its pecuniary jurisdiction, it should return the plaint together with the application for amendment for the consideration of the court having jurisdiction to consider the original claim and the claim sought by the amendment not taken separately but together. That decision also held the view that if the amendment ousting jurisdiction is allowed, it is in effect trying a suit beyond its pecuniary jurisdiction. The learned Judge also said:
“By adding the new relief which the plaintiff claims, the Court in effect amends the plaint as presented, because it is also well settled that all amendments relate back to the presentation of the plaint. This clears the difficulty because the Court is thereby rendered incompetent to entertain the claim for amendment at all.”
Rachhya Singh v. R.R.B.P Singh, AIR 1973 Pat 179, also took the view that such an amendment cannot be allowed.
5. Another decision of the Madras High Court in Nandula Bhavani v. Saladi Mangamma, AIR 1949 Mad 208, took the view that where the claim was originally within the jurisdiction of the Court but falls outside it as a result of the amendment, the Court should, if the amendment is allowed, return the plaint for presentation to the proper Court. The same view was taken by a Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court in Kundan Mal v. Thikana Siryari, AIR 1959 Raj 146. In Goverdhan v. Govt. of Union of India, AIR 1953 Hyd 212, also the view taken was that the question of allowing or rejecting the amendment should be on the merits and if after allowing the amendment the Court comes to the conclusion that it has no jurisdiction, the plaint has to be returned for presentation before the proper Court. The same view was taken in Simadri Panda v. Durgasi China, AIR 1982 Orissa 25 and Patel Construction and Co. v. S.R Amulakh, AIR 1973 Guj 283. The latter decision also said that to reject an application for amendment on the ground that it would take the suit out of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court is not in consonance with the spirit of O. 6, R. 17 nor is it open to the Court to return the plaint along with the application for amendment to be filed in the proper Court. Almost all the prior decisions were considered by a Single Judge of this Court in Sreedharan's case, AIR 1969 Ker 75 and the view taken was that if after allowing the amendment the Court comes to the conclusion that it has no jurisdiction the plaint has to be returned for presentation before the proper Court. That view was followed in Ponnumani v. Narayanan Nair, 1985 Ker LJ 459. I am in perfect agreement with that view and as requested by the counsel I do not think that there is any necessity for referring the matter to a larger Bench for reconsideration.
6. As held in Peres and Sons v. Puravath, 1960 Ker LT 731, the only two main considerations necessary for allowing amendment, under O. 6, R. 17 are that it should not work injustice to the opposite side and it must be necessary for determining the real question in controversy between the parties. Depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case some other subsidiary considerations also may weigh with the Court. In allowing or rejecting the application for amendment the Court should not go into the merits of the case or the rival claims.
7. It is true that the amendment when allowed relates back to the date of the suit and if the suit as framed is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court it would have no jurisdiction to allow the amendment for want of jurisdiction to entertain the suit itself. Entertaining and trying a suit which, when presented is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court, is definitely not permissible. But the fact that the amendment relates back to the date of presentation of the plaint is notional. Even such a notional conception will come into play only when the plaint is amended. Without amendment if the Court is having jurisdiction it can very well entertain and try the suit even though a superior or some other Court is also having the same jurisdiction. The normal rule is that the lowest Court having jurisdiction should entertain and try the suit. Then only the remedies like appeal and revision will be effective. When the lowest Court having jurisdiction is seized of the matter it can be returned for presentation before another Court on the ground of want of jurisdiction only if its jurisdiction is ousted. The question of ousting the jurisdiction in such a case would normally arise only if the claim is amended unless there is ouster by some statutory change. When a Court having jurisdiction is seized of a matter the question whether the amendment has to be allowed or not could be considered only by that Court. The question of ouster of jurisdiction and incompetency to decide anything in the suit will come into play only when that effect is achieved by amendment. There must be some authority to decide whether the amendment is to be allowed or not. Before that is done the Court seized of the matter and having jurisdiction alone will have to deal with it. Otherwise there will be a vaccum. Whether the amendment is allowable or not is a matter to be decided by the Court. Which is the Court that has to decide the matter if such a move comes when the suit is pending before a Court of competent jurisdiction? Is the jurisdiction to be decided on the assumption that each and every move for amendment capable of ousting jurisdiction has to be allowed? If on that assumption the plaint is returned for presentation before the competent Court and ultimately the amendment application is dismissed, what will happen?
8. There the suit may have to be returned for representation to the original Court itself. A plaintiff who is so inclined can repeat this process and have the case shuttled from Court to Court frequently. That is not the correct legal position. The question of ouster of jurisdiction will come only when the plaint is amended and the claim brought beyond the reach of the Court before which it is pending. That process does not involve trying a suit beyond its jurisdiction. The Court before which the case is pending alone is the Court competent to deal with the amendment and in that process the merit of the claim and the question whether the effect will be ouster of jurisdiction are extraneous considerations which are not in consonance with the spirit of O. 6, R. 17. Rejecting an application for amendment on the only ground that the amendment will oust the jurisdiction of the Court is also not in consonance with O. 6, R. 17, nor is it conducive to the ends of justice. The jurisdiction of the Court is ousted only when the plaint is amended and it will be possible to invoice the provision of O. 7, R. 10(1), C.P.C only after amendment of the plaint, the effect of which alone will oust the jurisdiction of the Court. Before that stage no question of applicability of O. 7, R. 10(1) for return of the plaint could arise. The provisions of O. XXIII also cannot be invoked for that purpose.
9. Even though the amendment notionally relates back to the date of presentation of the plaint, the amended plaint will be deemed to have been wrongly presented before the Court not having jurisdiction to entertain the same only when the amendment is carried out as per orders of Court and then alone the question of passing an order for return of plaint for presentation before the proper Court under O. 7, R. 10(1) and the applicability of R. 10A could arise. Under these circumstances and legal position, I could only express my respectful disagreement with the views expressed in Singara v. Govindswami, AIR 1928 Mad 400, Nagutha Mohemmed Nainan v. Vedavalli Ammal, (1959) 1 Mad LJ 307, E.R.R.M.H.S Committee v. P. Atchayya, AIR 1957 Andh Pra 10, Lalji v. Narottam, AIR 1953 Nag 273 and Rachhya Singh v. R.R.B.P Singh, AIR 1973 Pat 179 and agree with the principles laid down in Nandula Bhavani v. Saladi Mangamma, AIR 1949 Mad 208, Kundan Mal v. Thikana Siryari, AIR 1959 Raj 146, Goverdhan v. Govt. of Union of India, AIR 1953 Hyd 212, Simadri Panda v. Durgasi China, AIR 1982 Orissa 25, Patel Construction and Co. v. S.R Amulakh, AIR 1973 Guj 283, T.K Sreedharan,… v. P.S Job,…., AIR 1969 Ker 75 and Ponnumani v. Narayanan Nair, 1985 Ker LJ 459. I do not feel inclined to accept the contention that Sreedharan's case, AIR 1969 Ker 75, requires reconsideration by a larger Bench.
The order of the trial Court is perfectly correct. There is no error of jurisdiction, illegality or material irregularity. The Civil Revision Petition is dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs.
Petition dismissed.
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