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New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. K. Pathumma And Others

Kerala High Court
Mar 10, 1986
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Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from an appeal filed by the insurer under Section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, challenging an award made by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal under Section 110B of the Act. The appeal was posted for hearing on admission. At the admission stage the appellant (the insurer) raised a preliminary objection: that an appeal under Section 110D could not be scrutinised at the stage of admission because Rule 11 of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) was not applicable to such an appeal. The Court heard learned counsel for the appellant and other members of the Bar interested in the question.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an appeal under Section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, can be scrutinised by the High Court at the stage of admission.
  2. Whether Rules 11 and 11A of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to appeals filed under Section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act.
  3. Whether, irrespective of the applicability of Order XLI, the High Court has power at the threshold to refuse to issue notice and to dismiss an appeal if no prima facie case is made out.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant (insurer) objected preliminarily that an appeal under Section 110D could not be scrutinised at the admission stage because Rule 11 of Order XLI of the Code does not apply to such an appeal.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any respondent's legal arguments; it records only that other members of the Bar were heard on the question.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
National Telephone Company, Limited (In Liquidation) v. His Majesty's Postmaster-General, 1913 AC 546 Where matters are referred to an established Court without further provision, the ordinary incidents of that Court's procedure (including right of appeal) attach. Used to support the proposition that appeals referred to an established court import application of that court's ordinary procedural incidents and thus the High Court's procedures govern appeals under Section 110D.
Secretary of State v. Chellikani Rama Rao, AIR 1916 PC 21 When proceedings reach an ordinary District Court, the ordinary rules of Civil Procedure apply to that Court. Cited to reinforce that where statute refers matters to established courts, the ordinary procedural rules of those courts apply.
Kamaraju v. Secretary of State, (1888) ILR 11 Mad 309 Applied in Madras to show ordinary procedure applies when matters are referred to ordinary courts. Referenced in support of the general principle that appeals to established courts are governed by their ordinary procedural rules.
Rangoon Botatung Co. v. Collector, Rangoon, (1912) 39 Ind App 197 Distinguished on facts where special subject-matter (legal right to land) required specific limitation to exclude ordinary incidents. Distinguished to show that exclusion of ordinary procedural incidents requires specific limitation; not applicable to present statutory scheme.
R.M.A.R.A. Adaikappa Chettiar v. R. Chandrasekhara Thevar, AIR 1948 PC 12 Where ordinary Courts are seized of disputes over legal rights, ordinary rules of procedure govern and appeal lies if authorised by such rules. Used to support the rule that ordinary appellate procedure governs appeals to established courts even when rights arise under special statutes.
N.S. Thread Co. v. James Chadwick & Bros., AIR 1953 SC 357 An appeal to the High Court must be determined according to the High Court's rules of practice and procedure when the statute directs an appeal to an already established court. Relied on to hold that appeals under special statutes to the High Court are to be regulated by the High Court's practice and procedure (i.e., provisions of the Code apply).
Collector, Varanasi v. Gauri Shanker, AIR 1968 SC 384 Appeals to the High Court under statutory provisions that do not prescribe special procedure are to be disposed of in the same manner as ordinary appeals to the High Court. Applied to show that where statute is silent as to procedure, the High Court's ordinary appellate procedure governs.
Delhi Transport Undertaking v. Kumari Lalita, AIR 1972 Delhi 281 High Court view that cross-objections lie in appeals under the Motor Vehicles Act. Cited as part of a near-unanimous view of High Courts that cross-objections are permissible in Section 110D appeals.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Kuldip Lal Bhandari, AIR 1970 Delhi 37 Earlier Full Bench decision supporting the Delhi High Court's view on cross-objections. Used as foundation for the Delhi High Court's view that cross-objections lie in such appeals.
Manjula Devi Bhuta v. Manjusri Raha, 1968 Acc CJ 1 High Court (Madhya Pradesh) view supporting that cross-objections lie in Motor Vehicles Act appeals. Included among High Court decisions taking the view that cross-objections lie.
Madhusudan Rai v. Smt. Basanti Kumari Devi, 1973 Acc CJ 308; AIR 1974 Orissa 153 Orissa High Court view that cross-objections lie in appeals under the Motor Vehicles Act. Cited as another High Court decision supporting availability of cross-objections.
Union Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd., Madras v. Lazarammal Ravel, AIR 1974 Mad 379 Madras High Court decision supporting that cross-objections lie in Section 110D appeals. Referenced among multiple High Court authorities adopting the view that appeals are governed by ordinary appellate procedure and cross-objections lie.
Gurdev Kaur v. Rash Behari Das, 1979 Acc CJ 304; AIR 1978 Cal 547 Calcutta High Court decision supporting cross-objections in Motor Vehicles Act appeals. Included to show consistent High Court support for the view that ordinary appellate incidents apply.
U.P.S.R.T. Corpn. v. Janki Devi, AIR 1982 All 296 (Full Bench) Allahabad High Court Full Bench view that cross-objections lie (and overruling earlier contrary Division Bench decisions). Cited as a Full Bench authority supporting the availability of cross-objections and the application of ordinary appellate procedure.
K. Chandra Shekara Naik v. Narayana, AIR 1975 Kant 18 (Full Bench) Karnataka High Court Full Bench holding supporting that cross-objections lie in Motor Vehicles Act appeals. Relied on as Full Bench authority aligning with the view that appeals are governed by the High Court's ordinary appellate practice.
Sudhakaran v. Varghese, 1983 Ker LT 5; AIR 1983 NOC 111 Kerala High Court decision consistent with view that ordinary appellate procedure applies. Noted as supporting authority from this Court's own decisions.
Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nani Choudhury, 1974 Acc CJ 269 Single-Judge decision (Assam & Nagaland) taking the contrary view that the High Court acts only as a Tribunal and not a Court, and thus Order XLI would not apply. Noted by the Court as a contrary view which the present Court respectfully disagrees with.
Madras Motor and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Katanreddi Subbareddy, 1975 Acc CJ 95; AIR 1974 Andh Pra 310 Single-Judge Andhra Pradesh decision holding that because an award is not a decree and the Tribunal is not a Court, Order XLI would not apply. Recorded as a contrary single-judge authority which the present Court rejects in light of higher authority.
B.P. Venkatappa Setty v. B.N. Lakshmiah, 1973 Acc CJ 306; AIR 1973 Mys 350 Mysore High Court decision taking a contrary view (that Order XLI would not apply). Noted as contrary and recorded as having been subsequently overruled by a Karnataka Full Bench (K. Chandra Shekara Naik v. Narayana).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a textual and structural analysis of the Motor Vehicles Act (Sections 110–111A) and the Code of Civil Procedure. It observed:

  • The Act creates Claims Tribunals for adjudication under Sections 110–110F and prescribes some procedural matters for the Tribunal and rule-making powers for central and state governments (Sections 110A, 110B, 110C, 110D, 110F, 111, 111A).
  • While the Act and the subordinate rules prescribe the Tribunal's summary procedure and certain matters relating to appeals (for example, fees under the Kerala Rules), they do not prescribe the procedure to be followed by the High Court when entertaining appeals under Section 110D.
  • The Code contains provisions governing appeals to High Courts (Part VII and Part IX) and authorises High Courts to make rules of their own procedure (Sections 122–124; Order XLI deals with appeals from original decrees and its rules apply so far as may be to appeals or orders).
  • When a statute directs that an appeal shall lie to an already established court (here, the High Court), the appeal must be regulated by the appellate practice and procedure of that court. The Court relied on a line of authorities (House of Lords, Privy Council, Supreme Court) to affirm this principle.
  • Applying that principle, the Court concluded that appeals under Section 110D are to be disposed of by the High Court in the same manner as ordinary appeals, and therefore the provisions of Order XLI of the Code (specifically Rules 11 and 11A) apply.
  • The Court addressed contrary single-judge decisions that treated the Tribunal as something other than a matter referred to an established court and thus excluded Order XLI; it rejected those decisions as inconsistent with the higher authorities cited and with the ordinary-incident principle.
  • As an alternative basis, the Court reasoned that even if Order XLI were not strictly applicable, the High Court independently possesses the power at the threshold to refuse to issue notice and to dismiss an appeal when no prima facie case is made out. The Court emphasized the respondent's right to be notified and heard and that it would be futile and improper to call a respondent to answer a case that is prima facie unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court overruled the preliminary objection and held that Rules 11 and 11A of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to appeals under Section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act. The High Court is entitled to scrutinise such appeals at the stage of admission to determine whether a prima facie case exists and whether notice should be issued to the respondent; the High Court may dismiss the appeal at that threshold if no prima facie case is made out.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: An appellant who files an appeal under Section 110D can have the appeal examined at the admission stage by the High Court under Rules 11 and 11A of Order XLI; if no prima facie case is shown, the appeal can be dismissed without issuing notice to the respondent.
  • Respondent's position: The respondent retains the right to insist on being notified and to be heard where the High Court is satisfied that a prima facie case exists; the Court will not order notice to a respondent where the appeal is prima facie unsustainable.
  • Relationship to precedent: The Court aligned its decision with a long line of higher authority (House of Lords, Privy Council, Supreme Court) and noted that several High Court Full Bench decisions support this view while certain contrary single-judge decisions are rejected or regarded as overruled by subsequent Full Bench decisions.
  • Broader legal consequence: The opinion resolves the specific procedural controversy about admission-stage scrutiny of Section 110D appeals in favour of applying the High Court's ordinary appellate procedure; it also affirms that even absent explicit invocation of Order XLI, the High Court possesses threshold power to refuse notices and dismiss unsustainable appeals.

Disposition: Ordered accordingly — the preliminary objection raised by the appellant was overruled.

Show all summary ...

Bhat, J.:— This is an appeal filed by the insurer under Sec. 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short ‘the Act’) challenging the award passed by the Claims Tribunal under Sec. 110B of the Act. The appeal has been posted for hearing on admission. Learned counsel for the appellant has raised a preliminary objection to the effect that an appeal under Sec. 110D of the Act cannot be scrutinsed at the stage of admission since Rule 11 of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short ‘the Code’) is not applicable to such an appeal. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and other members of the Bar interested in the question.

2. Sections 110 to 110F were substituted for former Sec. 110 by Central Act 100 of 1956. Sec. 110 deals with power of the State Government to constitute Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both. Sec. 110A prescribes the particulars to be contained in an application for compensation. Sub-sec. (3) prescribes the period of limitation for filing an application, with power to entertain an application filed after the expiry of the period of limitation if the Tribunal is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. Sec. 110B prescribes the manner in which the Tribunal has to make an award. Sec. 110C lays down the procedure and power of the Tribunal. The Tribunal has to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. It shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and other matters enumerated in sub-sec. (2). Sec. 110-D deals with appeals. Any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of award, prefer an appeal to the High Court. However, the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time. No appeal shall lie against any award of a Tribunal, if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than Rs. 2,000/-. Sec. 110-F bars jurisdiction of civil courts in any area where Claims Tribunal has been constituted. Sec. 111 gives power to the Central Government to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the Chapter. Sec. 111-A gives power to the State Government to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Sections 110 to 110E, and in particular, such rules may provide for all or any of the matters enumerated therein. One of the matters so enumerated therein is the procedure to be followed by the Tribunal in holding an enquiry; another is the form and manner in which and the fees on payment of which an appeal may be preferred against an award of a Claims Tribunal. It is significant, to note that the enumerated matters do not take in the procedure to be adopted by the High Court.

3. Examination of the above provisions would indicate that an appeal against the award of the Claims Tribunal may be preferred to the High Court within the time limit prescribed, with power to the High Court to entertain an appeal even after the expiry of the period if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause in preferring the appeal in time. The enquiry before the Tribunal is to be conducted subject to rules, following such summary procedure as it thinks fit. The procedure to be followed by the High Court in disposing of the appeal is not prescribed in the statute. Rules framed by the Central Government or the State Government also do not deal with this aspect. The State Government has framed the kerala Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals Rules, 1977, dealing with various matters arising before the Tribunal. The only rule relating to appeals is Rule 23(3) which prescribes a fee of Rs. 100/-. Thus we see that neither the statute nor the statutory rules indicate the procedure to be followed by the High Court in entertaining or disposing of appeals.

4. We may also notice some relevant provisions of the Code. Part VII of the Code deals with appeals including appeals from original decrees, appellate decrees and orders. Part IX contains special provision relating to the High Courts. Sec. 116 states that the part applies to the High Courts. Sec. 117 states that save as provided in this part or in part X or in rules, the provisions of the Code shall apply to such High Courts. Sec. 120 states that sections 16, 17 and 20 do not apply to High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Part X deals with Rules. Sec. 122 relates, inter alia, to the power of High Courts to make rules regulating their own procedure and to annul, alter or add to all or any of the rules in the First Schedule. High Courts have to follow certain procedure and formalities, as prescribed in Sections 123 and 124. Rules are subject to the provisions in Sections 126, 127 and 131. Order XLI deals with appeals from original decrees while Order XLIII deals with appeals from orders. Rules of Order XLI shall apply so far as may be to appeals or orders.

5. Generally speaking, Claims Tribunals deal in matters arising from the law of Torts and also the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act. In the absence of constitution of a Tribunal, compensation has to be sought from the appropriate civil court and the procedure to be followed by such courts and appellate courts shall be regulated by the Code and any rules applicable to such courts.

6. When a statute creates or recognizes a right, it has further to provide for the constitution of an appropriate forum for the establishment of such right or direct an established court to adjudicate such rights. The statute may also create or recognize right of appeal against the decision of such forum or court and create an appellate forum or recognize an established court as the appellate court. In the latter case, this is in addition to the existing appellate jurisdiction of the established court. In all such cases, it is open to the statute (or the statutory rules, subject to the existence of rule-making power) to prescribe the procedure to be followed by the appellate forum or court. The absence of such statutory provisions would imply that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of, that court would be attracted. In other words, the incidents of its jurisdiction are maintained. If it is one of the ordinary courts of the land, the ordinary rules of procedure applicable to proceedings before such court would apply to the proceeding, unless there is anything in the statute to exclude the application of such rules or procedure. Where the appellate forum recognized is the High Court, it has the right to prescribe its own rules of procedure. Such an appeal must be entertained and disposed of by the High Court in the same manner as an ordinary appeal would be entertained and disposed of, and an ordinary appeal in a High Court would be governed by the provisions of the Code, as provided in Sec. 117 of the Code. If that be so, the provisions in Order XLI of the Code would govern appeals under Sec. 110-D of the Act.

7. What we have indicated above clearly emerges from a long line of decisions. In National Telephone Company, Limited (In Liquidation) v. His Majesty's Postmaster-General, 1913 AC 546, the House of Lords dealt with a question whether an appeal lay to the House from a decision of the Railway and Canal Commission under Sec. 17 of the Railway and Canal Traffic Act. Viscount Haldane L.C, after referring to the provisions of the Act observed:

“When a question is stated to be referred to an established Court without more, it, in my opinion, imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court are to attach, and also that any general right of appeal from its decisions likewise attaches.

Lord Parker of Waddington observed:

“Where by a statute matters are referred to the determination of a Court of record with no further provision, the necessary implication is, I think, that the Court will determine the matters, as a Court. Its jurisdiction is enlarged, but all the incidents of such jurisdiction, including the right of appeal from its decision, remain the same.”

8. In Secy, of State v. Chellikani Rama Rao, AIR 1916 PC 21, the Privy Council considered the provision in the Madras Forest Act laying down right of appeal to the District Court in respect of rejection of a claim put forward before the Forest Settlement Officer. The following observations are relevant:

“Their view is that when proceedings of this character reach the District Court, that Court is appealed to as one of the ordinary Courts of the country, with regard to whose procedure, orders, and decrees the ordinary rules of the Civil Procedure Code apply. This is in full accord with the decision of the Full Bench, Kamaraju v. Secretary of State, (1888) ILR 11 Mad 309 a decision which was given in 1888 and has been acted on in Madras ever since.”

Distinguishing an earlier decision of the Privy Council in Rangoon Botatung Co. v. Collector, Rangoon, (1912) 39 Ind App 197, it was observed:

“The merits of the present dispute are essentially different in character. The claim was the assertion of a legal right to possession of and property in land; and if the ordinary Courts of the country are seized of a dispute of that character, it would require, in the opinion of the Board, a specific limitation to exclude the ordinary incidents of litigation.”

9. In R.M.A.R.A Adaikappa Chettiar v. R. Chandrasekhara Thevar, AIR 1948 PC 12, the Board dealt with the provisions in Madras Act 4/1938 and their impact on the appellate jurisdiction. The Board observed:

“The true rule is that where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary Courts of the country are seized of such dispute the Courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto and an appeal lies, if authorised by such rules, notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a special statute which does not in terms confer a right of appeal.”

10. The above principles have been followed by the Supreme Court in N.S Thread Co. v. James Chadwick & Bros., AIR 1953 SC 357 wherein the provisions of the Trade Marks Act came up for interpretation. The Supreme Court held that the decision given by a single Judge of the High Court in an appeal preferred under Sec. 76 of the Trade Marks Act constitutes a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The statute provided for appeal to the High Court, with power to the High Court to make rules in the matter. The Supreme Court observed:

“Obviously after the appeal had reached the High Court it has to be determined according to the rules of practice and procedure of that Court and in accordance with the provisions of the charter under which that Court is constituted and which confers on it power in respect to the method and manner of exercising that jurisdiction. The rule is well settled that when a statute directs that an appeal shall lie to a Court already established, then that appeal must be regulated by the practice and procedure of that Court.”

Dealing further with the matter, the Court observed:

“The rights created by the Trade Marks Act are civil rights for the protection of persons carrying on trade under marks which have acquire reputation. The statute creates the Registrar a tribunal for safeguarding these rights and for giving effect to the rights created by the Act, and the High Court as such without more has been given appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of this tribunal. It is not easy to understand on what grounds it can be said that the High Court while exercising this appellate jurisdiction has to exercise it in a manner different from its other appellate jurisdiction. It seems to us that this is merely an addition of a new subject matter of appeal to the appellate jurisdiction already exercised by the High Court.”

11. In Collector, Varanasi v. Gauri Shanker, AIR 1968 SC 384, Supreme Court considered the question whether special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution could be granted against a decision rendered by the High Court under Sec. 19(1)(f) of the Defence of India Act, 1939 and answered the question in the affirmative. Supreme Court declined to countenance the plea that the High Court acting under the statutory provision is a persona designata and not a Court. The statutory provision was that an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an award of the Arbitrator appointed under Sec. 19(1)(f) of that Act. The Court observed:

“We were informed that neither the Act nor the rules framed thereunder, prescribe any special procedure for the disposal of appeals under Section 19(1)(f). Appeals under that provision have to be disposed of just in the same manner as other appeals to the High Court. Obviously after the appeal had reached the High Court, it had to be determined according to the rules of practice and procedure of that Court. The rule is well settled that when a statute directs that an appeal shall lie to a court already established, then that appeal must be regulated by the practice and procedure of that court.”

12. Courts in India have had occasion to consider this question in the light of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act also. The Act confers a right of appeal. It does not specifically confer a right to file cross objections. The question is whether the respondent in an appeal under Sec. 110-D of the Act could file cross objections and whether the High Court could entertain such cross objections. The near unanimous view of the High Courts in India is that cross objections would lie. That is the view taken by the Delhi High Court in Delhi Transport Undertaking v. Kumari Lalita, AIR 1972 Delhi 281 which is based on an earlier Full Bench decision of that court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Kuldip Lal Bhandari, AIR 1970 Delhi 37. The same view is taken by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Manjula Devi Bhuta v. Manjusri Raha, 1968 Acc CJ 1, by the Orissa High Court in Madhusudan Rai v. Smt. Basanti Kumari Devi, 1973 Acc CJ 308 : (AIR 1974 Orissa 153), by the Madras High Court in The Union Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd., Madras v. Lazarammal Ravel, AIR 1974 Mad 379, by the Calcutta High Court in Gurdev Kaur v. Rash Behari Das, 1979 Acc CJ 304 : (AIR 1978 Cal 547), by the Allahabad High Court in U.P.S.R.T Corpn. v. Janki Devi, AIR 1982 All 296 (FB), by the Karnataka High Court in K. Chandra Shekara Naik v. Narayana, AIR 1975 Kant 18 (FB) and by this Court in Sudhakaran v. Varghese, 1983 Ker LT 5 : (AIR 1983 NOC 111). We notice the contrary view taken by a learned single Judge of the Assam and Nagaland High Court in Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nani Choudhury, 1974 Acc CJ 269. This decision proceeds on the basis that the High Court disposing the appeal acts only as a Tribunal and not as a Court, a view with which we respectfully disagree. A learned single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court has taken the contrary view in Madras Motor and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Katanreddi Subbareddy, 1975 Acc CJ 95 : (AIR 1974 Andh Pra 310) holding that an-award not being a decree and the Tribunal not being a Court, the provisions of Order XLI would not apply. We do not think this decision can be supported in the light of the long line of decisions of the House of Lords, Privy Council and the Supreme Court already referred to. The decision of the Mysore High Court in B.P Venkatappa Setty v. B.N Lakshmiah, 1973 Acc CJ 306 : (AIR 1973 Mys 350) taking the contrary view has been overruled by a Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court in K. Chandra Shekara Naik v. Narayana, AIR 1975 Kant 18. The Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in U.P.S.R.T Corpn. v. Janaki Devi, AIR 1982 All 296 has overruled the earlier contrary decisions taken by Division Benches of that Court.

13. This view is consistent with what we have already indicated. The reasons urged that the Claims Tribunal is only a Tribunal and not a Court and the award is not a decree, in our opinion, are really no reasons to hold that the provisions of Order XLI of the Code would not apply. We are not dealing with the power of the Tribunal but with the procedure to be followed by the High Court, as the appellate court. For the reasons already indicated, we are of the opinion that an appeal has to be dealt with by the High Court in the same manner in which it would deal with an ordinary appeal which is governed by the provisions of Order XLI of the Code. In this view, we hold that Rules 11 and 11A of Order XLI of the Code would apply and the High Court is entitled to scrutinise the appeal at the stage of admission to see if there is a prima facie case for the appellant and whether it is a case where notice should be ordered to the respondent.

14. Even if the provisions of Order XLI of the Code cannot be invoked, in our opinion, that is of no consequence. A party aggrieved by the award has a right to prefer an appeal to the High Court; he has the right to have the appeal heard and disposed of on merits. Such a right cannot take in a right to insist that notice should be issued to the respondent or that the respondent should be heard before disposing the appeal. It is the right of the respondent to insist that he should be notified and given an opportunity of being heard before any decision adversely affecting his interests is taken. It will be a futile exercise for the High Court to order notice to the respondent in an appeal even when it is satisfied that the appellant has no prima facie case. Ordering notice in such an appeal would amount to calling upon the respondent to answer a case which is prima facie unsustainable. That cannot be and should not be done in the absence of any statutory provision or prescription which requires the High Court to do so. No such statutory provision or prescription is cited before us. We are, therefore, of the opinion that irrespective of the provisions of Rule 11 of Order XLI of the Code, High Court has the power to scrutinise an appeal filed under Sec. 110-D of the Act at the threshold to satisfy itself that there is a prima facie case which the respondent must be called upon to answer and to dismiss the appeal if no such prima facie case is made out.

We therefore overrule the preliminary objection raised by learned counsel for the appellant.

Ordered accordingly.