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Neelakantan Kamalasanan v. Achuthan Vasudevan And Others

Kerala High Court
Feb 12, 1986
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The case arises from a private complaint (C.C. 47/81) filed in the Chief Judicial Magistrate's Court, Quilon, in which the complainant (a Government physical education teacher at Pattazhi) alleged that three accused printed and distributed a pamphlet (Ext. P-1) on 16-3-1981 that was per se defamatory of him. Accused 1 and 2 were office-bearers (President and Secretary) of Paramanandodayam S.N.D.P. Branch No. 676 at Maloor; accused 3 was the proprietor of Vijaya Press in Pathanapuram who printed the pamphlet at the instance of accused 1 and 2. The pamphlet addressed community members, alleging the complainant defaulted on branch subscriptions, bypassed his branch to obtain a Vivaha Pathrika, and engaged in conduct injurious to the branch and community; it also referred to the complainant's father and used terms described as per se defamatory (e.g., "Drill Master" and "Ignoramus" in vernacular).

At trial the complainant called P.W.s 1–8 and produced Exts. P-1 to P-7; the accused called D.W.s 1–3 and produced Exts. D-1 to D-10. The learned Magistrate acquitted all accused under S.255(1) Cr.P.C., concluding that the conduct of accused 1 and 2 fell within Exception (1) to S.499 IPC. The complainant appealed; in the appellate proceedings the court reviewed the evidence and law and reached its decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the publication of the pamphlet Ext. P-1 amounted to defamation punishable under S.500 read with S.34, I.P.C.
  2. Whether the defendants could properly invoke Exception (1) to S.499, I.P.C. (justification by truth for the public good) as a defence for the statements in Ext. P-1.
  3. Whether imputations made about the deceased father of the complainant could be justified by proving the truth of those imputations under Exception (1) to S.499, I.P.C.

Arguments of the Parties

Complainant's Arguments

  • The pamphlet Ext. P-1 was printed by accused 3 at the instance of accused 1 and 2 and was distributed in multiple parts of Quilon district including Quilon town.
  • The contents of Ext. P-1 are per se defamatory of the complainant and of his deceased father and thus constitute an offence under S.500 read with S.34, I.P.C.
  • Evidence was led through P.W.s 1–8 and Exts. P-1 to P-7 to establish the defamatory content and publication.

Accused's Arguments

  • Accused 1 and 2 admitted procuring and publishing Ext. P-1 but contended the General Body of the S.N.D.P. Branch had approved the draft and authorised printing and publication; the draft was prepared and funds allotted at the General Body meeting on 15-3-1981.
  • They pleaded justification under Exception (1) to S.499, I.P.C.: the allegations were true and their publication was for the public good.
  • The accused relied on documentary material (D.W. evidence and Exts. D-1 to D-10) to prove the truth of allegations relating to the complainant’s arrears, removal from membership, and conduct; specifically, they relied on Ext. D-10, a circular, to show that a member in arrears should not receive a Vivaha Pathrika from another branch, suggesting the complainant’s conduct was culpable.
  • D.W.1 sought to prove that the complainant's deceased father had acted against the interest of the community (an attempt to justify statements about the deceased), and D.W.1 and others gave evidence about the General Body decision and the facts surrounding the alleged defaults.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The appellate court proceeded through a fact-focused and statute-guided analysis. The court accepted that accused 1 and 2 admitted printing and publishing Ext. P-1 and that accused 3 printed it at their instance. The primary legal question was whether Exception (1) to S.499 I.P.C. — which permits imputations of truth if made for the public good — covered the impugned statements.

The court recalled the legal requirements of Exception (1): the imputation must be proved to be true and it must be shown that the publication was for the public good. The court emphasised that when truth is invoked as a defence it must extend to the entire matter published; partial truth is insufficient.

The court examined the content of Ext. P-1, which included allegations that the complainant defaulted on payments to the S.N.D.P. branch, bypassed his branch to obtain a Vivaha Pathrika from another branch, had been removed from primary membership, and engaged in conduct injurious to the branch; it also contained epithets ("ignoramus" in vernacular) and statements about the complainant's father being harmful to the community.

On the question of imputations relating to the deceased father, the court applied Explanation (1) to S.499 I.P.C. and observed that evidence cannot be admitted to prove the truth of an imputation about a deceased person if the imputation would harm the dead person's reputation; accordingly, the accused could not successfully plead Exception (1) to justify imputations regarding the deceased. The accused had attempted to prove the father's conduct through D.W.1, but the court found D.W.1 unreliable: the witness was closely related to accused 1, and his testimony, when compared with Ext. P-6 (an attested copy of a judgment referenced in his evidence), did not inspire confidence. The court disbelieved D.W.1 and concluded the accused failed to establish the truth of allegations about the deceased.

As to the allegations concerning the living complainant, the court found that the evidence did establish some factual points: the complainant was in arrears for subscriptions and dues, had been removed from the branch's primary membership, and the General Body minutes (15-3-1981) demonstrated a decision was taken to publish a pamphlet and allocate funds. However, the court held that publication of the pamphlet went beyond merely communicating branch grievances; Ext. P-1 also contained statements that were per se defamatory (for example, calling the complainant an "ignoramus"). The court rejected the learned Magistrate's characterization that the term "ignoramus" "may amount to an abuse, but is not a defamatory per se" and instead treated such language as per se defamatory.

The court further analysed the purpose and tone of Ext. P-1. It concluded that the pamphlet's object was not to advance public good but to warn and terrorise community members and chastise the complainant. The accused’s reliance on Ext. D-10 (a circular directing secretaries not to issue Vivaha Pathrika to defaulters) did not absolve them: the Athinadu branch had nonetheless issued the Vivaha Pathrika, and the complainant could not be held solely at fault for approaching another branch that supplied the document. The Maloor branch ought to have resolved the grievance with the Athinadu branch rather than publish defamatory matter.

On the legal standard for Exception (1), the court reiterated that truth must be shown as to the whole publication and that publication must be for the public good. Because (a) the accused failed to prove the truth of the imputations concerning the deceased, (b) the pamphlet contained per se defamatory language, and (c) the purpose of publication was to intimidate or chastise rather than serve the public good, the court concluded Exception (1) was not attracted.

Taking these conclusions together, the appellate court found the learned Magistrate erred in acquitting the accused and held that the accused were guilty of the offence punishable under S.500 read with S.34, I.P.C.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal was allowed. The three accused (respondents 1 to 3 in the appeal) were found guilty of the offence punishable under S.500 read with S.34, I.P.C., convicted, and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 200 each; in default of payment of the fine each was to undergo simple imprisonment for 15 days.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is the reversal of the trial court's acquittal and the conviction and sentencing of the three accused as stated above.
  • The court declined to permit justification by truth under Exception (1) to S.499 I.P.C. for imputations harming the reputation of a deceased person, holding that such imputations cannot be proved in justification; accordingly, statements about the deceased father could not be relied upon as a defence.
  • The court found that even where some factual grievances existed (arrears, removal from membership, and a General Body-authorised pamphlet), publication containing per se defamatory language and an objective of warning/terrorising the community is not covered by the "public good" requirement of Exception (1).
  • No broader precedent or novel legal principle was announced beyond the application of existing sections and exceptions of the Penal Code as recited and applied; the decision primarily applies the statutory tests (truth and public good) to the facts of this case.

Outcome stated in the opinion: "Appeal allowed. Accused, respondents 1 to 3 in this appeal, are found guilty of the offence punishable under S.500 read with S.34, I.P.C and are convicted thereunder. They are sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 200/- each for the said offence. In default of payment of fine they are directed to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 15 days."

Show all summary ...

1. Complainant in C.C 47/81 on the file of the Chief Judl. Magistrate's Court, Quilon is the appellant in this appeal. The private complaint filed against the accused 3 in number was one for offences punishable under S. 500 read with S. 34, I.P.C Complainant is a Physical Education Teacher employed in the Government High School at Pattazhi. Accused 1 and 2 are the President and Secretary respectively of the Paramanan-dodayam S.N.D.P Branch No. 676 at Maloor. The third accused is the Proprietor of Vijaya Press situated in Pathanapuram Town. The complainant's case is that on 16-3-1981 Ext. P-1 pamphlet was printed by the third accused in his press at the instance of accused 1 and 2 in pursuance of their common intention to defame the complainant, and the copies of the printed pamphlets were distributed by the accused in several parts of the Quilon District including Quilon town. The contents of Ext. P-1 are per se defamatory and that its publication is punishable under S. 500 read with S. 34, I.P.C The pamphlet is in the nature of an address to the members of the community, in order to bring to their notice the misdeeds of the complainant in his relationship with Maloor S.N.D.P branch. It is alleged therein that the complainant is a defaulter in the payment of subscriptions and dues to the S.N.D.P branch and that without clearing the arrears of subscriptions the complainant was adopting a short-cut method of approaching the Adinattu S.N.D.P Branch No. 1263 for getting Vivaha Pathrika for conducting his sister's marriage. The complainant's activities against the interest of Maloor S.N.D.P branch are narrated in Ext. P-1. It has been further stated that they are the acts of a teacher, who should set an example to other members of the society. Reference was also made to the complainant's father's activities of similar nature. The complainant has been described as a Drill Master and an Ignoramus (omitted as in vernacular).

2. On the side of the complainant P.Ws 1 to 8 were examined and Exts. P-1 to P-7 were marked. The accused got D.Ws 1 to 3 examined and Exts. D-1 to D-10 proved. After considering this evidence, the learned Magistrate came to the conclusion that the conduct of accused 1 and 2 would come within the First Exception to S. 499, I.P.C and hence they are not guilty of any offence. Accordingly all the accused were acquitted under S. 255(1) of the Cr. P.C Hence this appeal.

3. Accused 1 and 2 admit that they have got Ext. P-1 pamphlet printed at the press belonging to the third accused and that it was published by them. The third accused also admit that Ext. P-1 pamphlet was printed by him in his press at the instance of accused 1 and 2. The further contention of accused 1 and 2 who are the President and Secretary of the S.N.D.P Branch, Maloor is that the General Body of the branch approved the draft of Ext. P-1 and authorised them to get it printed and to publish the same. It was only on account of the authority given by the General Body that they published Ext. P-1 pamphlet and that it contains only statements which are true. The accused plead justification under Exception (1) to S. 499, I.P.C The said exception states that it is not defamation to impute anything which is true concerning any person if it be for the public good that the imputation should be made or published. Whether or not it for the public good is a question of fact. To come within this exception the imputation should not only be proved to be true, but it must also be proved that it was for the public good that it was published. In other words, no amount of truth will justify a libel unless its publication was for the good of the public. A subject may become one of public interest if the public or a section of the public become interested in it. When truth is set up as a defence it must extend to the entire matter published and it is not sufficient that only a portion of the statement is proved to be true.

4. Ext. P-1 contains statements regarding the activities of the complainant vis-a-vis the S.N.D.P Branch No. 676 of Maloor. It is stated that the complainant was trying to overreach the members of the community and was trying to make them fools. He was modulating his activities ignoring the interest of the S.N.D.P branch and was making it appear that the non-cooperation of the members of the community was not going to do any harm to him. Subscriptions and dues legally due to the branch were not paid by him. He secretly approached Branch No. 1263 to get Vivaha Pathrika for conducting his sister's marriage. Such were the heroic deeds of an educated man who should set an example to other members of the community. It proceeded to state that similar anti-social elements were in existence even in the past. In spite of their misdeeds the community progressed and developed. In case he was not possessed of means to pay the dues and had apprised the branch of his inability, the community, would have come to his rescue. Since the complainant had taken such a hostile attitude against the interest of the community he had been removed even from the primary membership. He should not consider the activities as cove table. No one can thrive against the wrath of the community. Temporary gains may be there but they will be black spots in your character which the coming generation may not be in a position to wash off. The actions done by your father against the interest of the community has now been brought to the notice of the present generation by your misdeeds. By the grace of ‘Gurudevan’ let wisdom dawn on you so that this heritage may be put an end to. The complainant has been described as ignoramus (omitted as in vernacular).

5. In Ext. P-1 the complainant's father has been described as a person, who had acted to the detriment of the community. Explanation (1) to S. 499, I.P.C states:

“It may amount to defamation to impute anything to a deceased person, if the imputation would harm the reputation of that person if living, and is intended to be hurtful to the feelings of his family or other near relatives.”

6. In the pamphlet Ext. P-1 the accused have described the deceased father of P.W 1 as a person who had done harm to the community and as a person who had acted against its interests. According to the accused, those injurious acts of the complainant's father were brought to the notice of the present generation by the repetition of the similar actions carried out by P.W 1. This statement in Ext. P-1 was also sought to be justified as true and hence falling within the first exception. No evidence can be let in to prove the truth of this statement. Acts of a deceased cannot be allowed to be proved as true if the imputation would harm the reputation of that person. Justification by truth under the first exception can be only in respect of the actions taken by a living person. If the imputation would harm the reputation of a deceased person, according to me, the accused cannot plead the first exception and disclaim liability.

7. D.W 1 has been examined on the side of the accused to prove that the father of the complainant had also acted against the interest of the community. According to him, when the S.N.D.P branch was constructing a building of its own in 1118 M.E, the complainant's father took a hostile attitude, obstructed the construction, tried to manhandle the mason who was doing the construction work and that he tried to pull down the door and the walls. D.W 1 is closely related to the first accused. Brother-in-law of the first accused married this witness's grand daughter. He had the audacity to say that his wife was not convicted in an offence punishable under S. 55(g) of the Abkari Act. Ext. P-6 is the attested copy of the judgment in C.C 1168/79 on the file of the Judl. IInd Class Magistrate's Court, Punalur. The accused therein Panchami Kochikka of Pooman-galathu Veedu, has been admitted by this witness as his wife. In re-examination he categorically stated that in Maloor there is no other house bearing the name Poomangalathu. The evidence of D.W 1 taken along with Ext. P-6 would go to show that he is not a reliable and trustworthy witness. The trial Court has described as D.W 1 as a venerable old man and that the sentence of Rs. 50/- imposed in Ext. P-6 was so paltry and that it was passed on the admission of the accused and in all probability D.W 1 might not have known about such a case and the conviction of his wife. I find it difficult to subscribe to this view. I disbelieve the evidence of this witness. It is thus seen that the accused have failed even in establishing the truth of the allegations made against the deceased. The imputation made against the deceased is such that it caused harm to his reputation. It therefore follows that the accused have published Ext. P-1 to defame the deceased father of P.W 1.

8. The evidence adduced in the case goes to show that the complainant was in arrears in paying the subscription and dues to the Maloor Branch of the S.N.D.P Union that he was removed from the Presidentship, that he had by-passed the Maloor S.N.D.P branch and approached the Adinattu S.N.D.P branch for the purpose of getting the Vivaha Pathrika for conducting his sister's marriage and that the conduct of the complainant was not conducive to the welfare of the Maloor Branch of the S.N.D.P Union. The minutes of the General Body held on 15-3-1981 would show that the General Body took a decision to remove the complainant from the primary membership of the branch for his activities against the interest of the branch. The General Body had taken a decision to print and publish a pamphlet, the draft of which was prepared at the meeting. The fund necessary for the printing of the pamphlet was also allotted at that meeting. This pamphlet Ext. P-1 not only contains statements regarding the activities of the complainant vis-a-vis the S.N.D.P branch but also statements which are per se defamatory. A person cannot be described as ignoramus even with the authority of the General Body of the S.N.D.P branch. It is per se defamatory. According to me the learned Magistrate went wrong in holding “the term may amount to an abuse, but is not a defamatory per se”. The evidence of D.Ws 2 and 3 who were parties to the resolution of the General Body would go to show that they will not tolerate their being described as ignoramus.

9. On account of the steps taken by the complainant in getting Vivaha Pathrika from another branch without clearing the outstanding arrears to the Maloor Branch the office bearers wanted to take the complainant to task. According to the accused no member is entitled to approach another branch of the S.N.D.P Union and get Vivaha Pathrika when arrears are due to the branch where he is a member. For this, reliance is placed on Ext. D-10 circular issued by the General Secretary to the Secretaries of various unions. This circular shows that the Secretaries of the units are not to issue Vivaha Pathrika when the member seeking to get it is a defaulter in paying the subscriptions to the local branch where he resides. This circular as noted earlier is a direction to the Secretaries of the various branches. The Secretaries are to comply with it. If the complainant was in arrears with the Maloor branch, no other branch should issue the required Vivaha Pathrika. But when the Athinadu branch issued the Pathrika without demur, on there quest of P.W 1's uncle, how can the complainant be found fault with. This incident cannot be taken as a violation of Ext. D-10 circular by the complainant, for him to be chastised. The Maloor Branch ought to have taken up the matter with the Athinadu branch and settled the matter between them. Even if the office bearers of the Maloor Branch wanted to express their displeasure on the steps taken by the complainant they should not have used words which are per se defamatory. A reading of Ext. P-1 would further show that the object of its publication was not only to criticize the action taken by the complainant but also to warn and terrorise the members of the community against similar activities and to let them know of the consequences. This attitude cannot be taken as one adopted for the public good.

10. Exception (1) to S. 499, I.P.C recognises the publication of truth as sufficient justification if it is made for the public good When truth is set up as a defence it must extend to the entire statement. It is not sufficient that only a part of the statement is proved to be true. From the foregoing discussions it can be seen that Ext. P-1 was published not for the public good but for warning the public of the consequence that will ensue in case they adopt the course taken by the complainant. The accused have not succeeded in proving that the entire statements contained in Ext. P-1 are true. They have published defamatory matters harming the reputation of a deceased person as well. In Ext. P-1 the accused have used words which are per se defamatory. In these circumstances, I have no hesitation in holding that the accused are guilty of the Offence punishable under S. 500 read with S. 34, I.P.C They are convicted for the said offence. In the result, the appeal is allowed Accused, respondents 1 to 3 in this appeal, are found guilty of the offence punishable under S. 500 read with S. 34, I.P.C and are convicted thereunder. They are sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 200/- each for the said offence. In default of payment of fine they are directed to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 15 days.

11. Appeal allowed.