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Peter John v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax

Kerala High Court
Jul 3, 1985
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Factual and Procedural Background

Certain lands of the assessee were compulsorily acquired and possession was taken by the Government during 1961 and 1962. After settlement of initial compensation the assessee referred the question of quantum to the civil court; during the financial year ended 31 March 1968 (relevant to assessment year 1968-69) the civil court passed decrees awarding higher compensation and interest under the Kerala Land Acquisition Act (interest corresponding to section 28 of the central Act). The total interest on the excess compensation from date of possession to 31 March 1968 amounted to Rs. 80,253. The excess compensation and interest were actually paid much later; assessments are made on accrual basis.

The assessee's position was that interest accrued day-to-day (de die in diem) from the date of dispossession and had been offered for assessment in the relevant earlier years (the assessee offered amounts of Rs. 12,682 for 1967-68 and Rs. 12,626 for 1968-69). The Income-tax Officer treated the interest as accruing for the first time only on the date of the decree and assessed the aggregate sum of Rs. 80,253 for 1968-69, making a protective assessment for 1967-68 in respect of the amount the assessee had offered.

The assessee appealed. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner confirmed the assessment for 1968-69 and deleted the interest from the protective assessment for 1967-68. The assessee appealed to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (Tribunal) contending that only Rs. 12,626 should have been brought to tax for 1968-69. The Tribunal upheld the Income-tax Officer's view and sustained assessment for 1968-69, dismissing both the departmental appeal and the assessee's cross-objection for 1967-68. The matter was referred to a Full Bench of the High Court by the Division Bench under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, to decide the point of law raised by the Tribunal's reference.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case and applying the ratio of the Supreme Court decisions (notably Shamlal Narula v. CIT and Ramanathan Chettiar v. CIT), the land-acquisition interest of Rs. 80,253 (included by the Income-tax Officer under section 5(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in the total income for 1968-69) accrued de die in diem from the date of taking possession of the lands during 1961 and 1962 up to 31 March 1968 inclusive, so that only the portion accruing in the previous year (1 April 1967 to 31 March 1968) should have been included in 1968-69 and the balance spread on accrual basis over the earlier assessment years (1962-63 to 1967-68) as the Income-tax Officer had attempted to do by earlier orders?

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue's Arguments (as represented by Sri P.K. Ravindranatha Menon)

  • It was suggested (as understood by the court) that interest on compensation is not necessarily payable from the date of award or decree but from the date of dispossession; however, a distinction was drawn between interest under section 34 (award by the Land Acquisition Officer/Collector) and interest under section 28 (interest awarded by the court on enhanced compensation).
  • The Revenue's position sought to treat interest under a Collector's award (section 34) as running automatically (no discretion) while asserting the court has an element of discretion under section 28; the result sought by Revenue was that interest granted by court might be treated differently in accrual timing compared to section 34 interest.
  • Relying on authorities (including Raghubans Narain's case), it was argued that section 28 confers discretion on the court ("may direct"), so the timing and the nature of interest may be treated differently from section 34 for taxation/accrual purposes.

Assessee's Arguments (as represented by Shri Gopalakrishna Warriyar)

  • The assessee argued interest on enhanced compensation accrues day-to-day from the date of dispossession (de die in diem) and thus must be apportioned annually on accrual basis; the court decree merely quantifies the amount but does not create a new right to interest starting on the decree date.
  • The assessee contended that the word "may" in section 28 does not imply a genuine discretion to deny interest but is comparable in effect to "shall" in section 34 in the statutory context; the court had no meaningful discretion to refuse interest once the additional compensation was declared.
  • Assessee relied on Supreme Court authority (including Mrs. Khorshed Shapoor Chenai and Satinder Singh) to support the proposition that the right to compensation (and interest thereon) is a single right arising on dispossession and that implication of an obligation to pay interest arises from dispossession.
  • Counsel urged that some High Court decisions favouring the Revenue should not be followed where they conflict with Supreme Court decisions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shamlal Narula v. CIT, [1964] 53 ITR 151 (SC) Defines interest as separate from compensation; interest compensates loss of use of money representing compensation. The court relied on this principle to treat interest as distinct from compensation and to reason that interest is payable for deprivation of use from the date the debt (compensation) was incurred.
Ramanathan Chettiar v. CIT, [1967] 63 ITR 458 (SC) Listed among Supreme Court decisions forming part of the legal backdrop in the reference question. Referred to as part of authoritative background in framing the issue; the opinion does not set out a separate, detailed application of this case beyond its citation.
Joginder Singh's case, (1985) 1 SCC 231; AIR 1985 SC 382 Holds the right to compensation arises when the land vests in the State (date of possession); quantification may be later but the right refers back to date of acquisition; interest should run from date possession was taken. Quotations and reliance: used as a central Supreme Court authority to show the right to compensation (and therefore the right to interest) arises on dispossession and that interest is to be applied from the date possession was taken.
Mrs. Khorshed Shapoor Chenai v. Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, [1980] 122 ITR 21 Holds there are not two separate rights (one to compensation and another to further/additional compensation); claimant has a single right to receive compensation for the land valued on the date of notification. Applied to support the proposition that compensation is an integrated right and confusion over multiple rights is misplaced; used to argue interest relates back to date of dispossession on the whole compensation.
Raghubans Narain's case, AIR 1967 SC 465 Interprets section 28: the court has discretion whether to award interest ('may direct'); but once discretion exercised, the rate and payment are fixed by statute. The court accepted this authority as binding under article 141 and proceeded on the basis that the court has discretion whether to grant interest under section 28, but once granted the nature and timing of interest is not different for taxation purposes from interest under section 34.
Satinder Singh's case, [1961] 3 SCR 676; AIR 1961 SC 908 Cited for the proposition that when owner is dispossessed an agreement to pay interest on the amount of compensation may be implied (as part of legal consequences of dispossession). Relied upon in submissions by the assessee; the court referenced the case as supporting the implied obligation to pay interest from date of dispossession.
Madhav Rao Scindia's case, (1971) 1 SCC 85 Judicial caution that words or clauses in a judgment divorced from their context should not be treated as full exposition of law where the question did not fall to be answered in that judgment. Quoted by the assessee to urge caution in treating obiter observations in other decisions as binding; court cited the principle but nonetheless followed binding Supreme Court authorities on the central point.
Collector v. Habib-Ullah-Din, AIR 1967 J & K 44 (Full Bench) Full Bench decision cited in submissions about statutory interpretation of 'may' (suggesting 'may' can be mandatory in context). Cited by the assessee's counsel on the interpretative point; the court acknowledged but held Raghubans Narain (Supreme Court) binding under article 141.
Sassoon's case, [1954] 26 ITR 27 (SC) Earlier case on accrual of remuneration/commission where right accrued on completion and ascertainment of results, not day-to-day. The court distinguished Sassoon on its facts and context, explaining it concerned accrual of a different kind of right (remuneration) and was not analogous to land-acquisition compensation interest.
Alladin's case (Khan Bahadur Ahmed Alladin & Sons v. CIT), [1969] 74 ITR 651 (AP) Applied in some High Court reasoning that additional compensation decreed by courts accrued only on the dates of those decrees/orders. The court noted this principle as adopted by some decisions but held it not to represent the correct law in light of Supreme Court authority; Alladin's approach was not followed where inconsistent with higher authority.
Sankari Manickyamma's case, [1976] 105 ITR 172 (AP) Extended the principle (from Alladin) regarding accrual of additional compensation to the question of accrual of interest. The Division Bench found that reasoning tempting, but the High Court concluded the approach conflicts with binding Supreme Court decisions and is therefore incorrect as to accrual of interest.
Govindarajulu Chetty (T.N.K), [1973] 87 ITR 22 (Mad) Listed among authorities relied on in the controversy over accrual. The Division Bench considered the reasoning but the present court found the contrary Supreme Court authorities determinative and did not follow the Division Bench's disagreement with Govindarajulu Chetty.
Thiagaraja Chetty's case, [1953] 24 ITR 525 (SC) Earlier Supreme Court principle underlying some High Court reasoning on accrual/valuation. Cited in relation to Madras High Court decisions; the present court did not consider those lines of reasoning convincing against the later Supreme Court pronouncements relied upon.
Jairam v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, [1979] 117 ITR 638 (Ker) Kerala Division Bench decision holding that interest on compensation awarded by the court under section 28 accrues only on date of such decree (as understood by this court). The High Court explicitly held Jairam to be clearly wrong to the extent it conflicts with binding Supreme Court authority and therefore rejected its approach on accrual of interest.
George Paul Puthuran v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Kerala, [1980] 126 ITR 168 (Ker) Decision of Kerala High Court which follows Jairam and takes a similar view on accrual. The court observed this decision merely follows Jairam and therefore does not represent correct law where it conflicts with Supreme Court authority; no detailed discussion was required beyond noting the alignment with Jairam.
Commissioner of Income-tax v. A.B.V Gowda, [1986] 157 ITR 697 (Kar) High Court of Karnataka decision noted the Division Bench in Jairam may have misunderstood the import of an earlier Mysore High Court decision. The present court observed the Karnataka court's comments but limited further engagement, reiterating that where High Court decisions conflict with clear Supreme Court authority they must yield to the latter.
CIT v. Sampangiramaiah (V.), [1968] 69 ITR 159 (Mys) One of the authorities referenced by the Division Bench in Jairam's case. Mentioned as part of the matrix of High Court decisions; the present court did not adopt the Division Bench's reliance where it conflicted with Supreme Court rulings.
CIT v. Sham Lal Narula (Dr.), [1972] 84 ITR 625 (P&H) Listed among decisions cited before the court. Cited by parties; the opinion does not elaborate a specific application beyond inclusion in the list of authorities.
Joyanarayan Panigrahi v. CIT, [1974] 93 ITR 102 (Orissa) Listed among authorities cited. Included in the list of cases cited to the court; no detailed separate treatment in the opinion.
Addl. CIT v. Virendra Singh, [1979] 118 ITR 923 (All) Allahabad High Court decision taking a contrary view to some Kerala decisions. The present court noted that a Kerala decision dissents from the Allahabad High Court in Virendra Singh; the High Court preferred to follow Supreme Court authority rather than the Kerala divergence.
CIT v. Sri Ram Gopal, [1980] 123 ITR 388 (Raj) Listed among authorities cited. Cited; the opinion does not set out a distinct role other than being among the cases referred to.
CIT v. Santi Dm, [1983] 139 ITR 489 (Cal) Listed among authorities cited. Included in the list of cases cited before the court; no further application described in the excerpt.
CIT v. Deoki Nandan & Sons, [1982] 138 ITR 225 (Delhi) Listed among authorities cited. Included among cited decisions; no distinct application elaborated in the opinion excerpt.
Fazilka Electric Supply Co. v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, [1983] 143 ITR 551 (Delhi) Listed among authorities cited. Mentioned in the compendium of cases cited; the opinion does not extract a specific principle from it in the excerpt.
Sadasiva Krishna Rao v. CIT, [1983] 144 ITR 270 (AP) Listed among authorities cited. Referred to in the list of authorities; no specific application described in the excerpt.
CIT v. Janardhan Reddy (F.), [1984] 145 ITR 303 (AP) Listed among authorities cited. Included in the list of cases cited; the opinion does not set out a discrete application in the excerpt.
CIT v. Muthukaruppan Chettiar (M.K Kr.), [1984] 145 ITR 175 (Mad) Listed among authorities cited. Mentioned among cited decisions; no separate application discussed in the excerpt.
CIT v. Raja S.N. Bhanja Deo, [1977] 106 ITR 748 (Orissa) Listed among authorities cited. Included in the cited list; the opinion does not discuss its particular application in the excerpt.
Topandas Kundanmal v. CIT, [1978] 114 ITR 237 (Guj) Listed among authorities cited. Part of the compendium of authorities cited by the parties; no detailed treatment in the excerpt.
CIT v. Yashwant Rao Pawar (Maharaja) (H.H.), [1981] 127 ITR 650 (MP) Listed among authorities cited. Referenced in the list of cases cited before the court; the excerpt does not narrate a distinct application.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a stepwise analytical fashion, construing the statutory scheme and the concepts of "compensation" and "interest" under the Land Acquisition Act and applying controlling Supreme Court authority:

  1. The court first clarified the legal nature of compensation under the Act: compensation is a statutory right (a right debitum in praesenti) that arises when the Government takes possession of the land; quantification of that right by the Collector or by a court does not create the right but only computes its amount.
  2. The court then treated interest as conceptually separate from compensation. Citing Shamlal Narula, the court explained that interest compensates for the loss of use of the money representing the compensation and therefore is payable on the amount of compensation from the date the debt (compensation) became payable until actual payment.
  3. Relying particularly on the Supreme Court decision in Joginder Singh, the court held that the right to compensation (and therefore the right to interest on it) arises on dispossession / when the land vests in the State, and that quantification at later stages merely determines the true value but does not postpone the date from which the right existed.
  4. Confronting the textual difference between "may" in section 28 (court-awarded interest) and "shall" in section 34 (Collector-awarded interest), the court considered the submissions that "may" conferred discretion. It accepted, following Raghubans Narain (a binding Supreme Court authority), that section 28 confers discretion on the court to award interest. However, the court held that even if the court has discretion whether to award interest, once the court grants interest, it must be treated in substance the same for taxation purposes as interest under section 34: the right to interest (when granted) relates back to the date of dispossession and accrues day-to-day.
  5. The court rejected the Revenue's contention that the right to interest arises only on the date of the decree. It explained that even when the court grants interest, the decree itself typically states interest to be calculated from the date of dispossession; moreover, Supreme Court authority establishes that both compensation and interest relate back to the date of acquisition/possession.
  6. The court reviewed conflicting High Court decisions (for example, Jairam and George Paul Puthuran from Kerala) that held interest on court-awarded additional compensation accrues only on the date of decree; the court found those decisions inconsistent with Supreme Court authority (particularly Joginder Singh and Mrs. Khorshed Shapoor Chenai) and concluded those decisions were clearly wrong to the extent they conflicted.
  7. The court therefore concluded that interest on compensation awarded under the Land Acquisition Act runs day-to-day from the date the Government took possession of the land, accruing annually for taxation purposes in each year intervening between dispossession and actual payment.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court answered the reference in the affirmative — in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue — holding that interest on compensation awarded with respect to land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act accrues de die in diem from the date on which the Government took possession of the land.

Implications and immediate effects:

  • The interest of Rs. 80,253 should be treated as accruing day-by-day from the date of dispossession; consequently the portion of interest that accrued in each previous year must be accounted for in those years (i.e., interest is to be apportioned on an accrual basis across the relevant assessment years), rather than all being taxable in the year of the court decree.
  • The court expressly held that earlier High Court decisions to the contrary (for example, Jairam and George Paul Puthuran) are incorrect to the extent that they treat interest as accruing only on the date of decree; the present decision aligns with and follows controlling Supreme Court authority.
  • The direct consequence is favourable to the assessee (the assessee's position on accrual and apportionment was accepted). The opinion directs that a copy of the judgment be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench; no further appellate disposition is recited in the excerpt beyond answering the reference in favour of the assessee.
  • The court's conclusion is drawn from binding Supreme Court precedent and statutory construction; the opinion does not purport to create novel principle beyond applying and reconciling existing authorities, but it does repudiate conflicting High Court precedents to the extent inconsistent with higher authority.

A copy of the judgment under the Registrar's signature and seal was ordered to be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, as recorded at the end of the opinion.

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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Bhaskaran, C.J:— The counsel for the assessee having canvassed the correctness of the decision of this court in Jairam v. CIT, [1979] 117 ITR 638 and George Paul Puthuran v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Kerala., [1980] 126 ITR 168 (Ker), the question of law arising from the decision of the Appellate Tribunal has been referred to a Full Bench by the Division Bench, before which the matter came up for hearing at the first instance. The question of law referred to this court by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, pursuant to the direction by this court in the judgment dated February 28, 1978, in O.P Nos. 4770 and 4772 of 1975, reads as follows:

“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, as per the ratio of the Supreme Court decisions in Shamlal Narula v. CIT, [1964] 53 ITR 151 (SC) and Ramanathan Chettiar v. CIT, [1967] 63 ITR 458 (SC), the land acquisition interest of Rs. 80,253 included by the Income-tax Officer under section 5(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in the total income for 1968-69 assessment, accrued de die in diem from the date of taking possession of the lands during the years 1961 and 1962 up to March 31, 1968, inclusive and, therefore, only Rs. 12,626 which accrued de die in diem during the concerned previous year of 366 calendar dates from April 1, 1967, to March 31, 1968, inclusive should have been included in the total income for 1968-69 assessment and the balance interest of Rs. 67,627 should be similarly included on accrual basis under section 5(1)(b) of the I.T Act, 1961, in the income for the six assessment years from 1962-63 to 1967-68 inclusive, as had already been done by the Income-tax Officer by his orders dated June 6, 1972, for the 1967-68 and 1969-70 assessments?”

2. The accounting years for the assessment years 1967-68 and 1968-69 are the years ended March 31, 1967, and March 31, 1968, respectively. Certain lands of the assessee were compulsorily acquired and after settlement of compensation, taken possession of somewhere in 1961 and 1962. Dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation, the assessee got the matter was referred to the civil court which during the financial year ended March 31, 1968, relevant to the assessment year 1968-69, passed decrees awarding higher compensation and also interest under section 30 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961 (corresponding to section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act I of 1894 (Central Act) (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), on such excess compensation and ending with the date of payment by the Government of such excess compensation. The total interest on such excess compensation from the date of taking over possession to March 31, 1968, came to Rs. 80,253. This excess compensation as well as interest on such excess compensation was actually paid by the Government to the assessee only much later. The assessment being on accrual basis, the dates of payment are not material. The case of the assessee is that such interest on such excess compensation accrues immediately after the date of dispossession and from year to year and that what the civil court did was only to quantify such interest and that it is not a case where the interest accrues only on the date on which the court decrees it. So, according to the assessee, for the assessment year 1967-68, the interest that accrued will be Rs. 12,682 and for the assessment year 1968-69 a sum of Rs. 12,626. The assessee offered these amounts for assessment in those two assessment years. But the Income-tax Officer took the view that interest on such excess compensation accrues for the first time only with the decree awarding excess compensation, that is, on the date of the decree and so the total interest from such excess compensation for the period commencing from the date of taking over possession to the date of the decree has to be assessed in the assessment year relevant to the date of the decree. In that view of the matter, the aggregate sum of Rs. 80,253 was assessed for the assessment year 1968-69. The assessee having voluntarily offered Rs. 12,682 as interest income for the assessment year 1967-68, the Income-tax Officer made a protective assessment of that amount for the assessment year 1967-68 also.

3. The assessee appealed against the assessment for both the years. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner confirmed the assessment for 1968-69. So he deleted the interest from the protective assessment for the assessment year 1967-68. The assessee appealed to the Tribunal for the assessment year 1968-69, contending that only Rs. 12,626 should be brought to tax for the assessment for 1968-69. The Department as a protective measure appealed to the Tribunal for the year 1967-68. The assessee presented a cross-objection for the assessment year 1967-68 pleading that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner should not have deleted the interest amount in that assessment year. The Tribunal for reasons stated in its order upheld the view of the Income-tax Officer and sustained the assessment for the assessment year 1968-69. It, therefore, dismissed the departmental appeal as well as the cross-objection of the assessee for the assessment year 1967-68. Annexure A is a copy of the order of the Tribunal. In the reference order, it has been pointed out by the Tribunal that assessment for the assessment year 1969-70 was never the subject-matter of appeal before the Tribunal.

4. Before proceeding to examine the two Kerala decisions, the correctness of which was canvassed by the counsel for the assessee, let us try to have a clear idea as to what the expressions “compensation” and “interest” in the context of the Land Acquisition Act represent and at what point of time compensation interest accrues or is deemed to accrue. In the scheme of the Act, compensation represents what is paid to the rightful owner for his having been dispossessed of the land which the Government took possession on acquisition. It is the equivalent of the market value of the property taken possession of by the Government, determined in accordance with the provisions of sections 23 and 24 of the Act. Compensation is awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer (Collector) under section 11 of the Act; in the event of the land owner not being satisfied with the quantum awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer, he takes up the matter to the civil court on reference under section 18 of the Act. The civil court dealing with such reference in exercise of the power under section 26 of the Act goes into the question as to whether the Land Acquisition Officer (Collector) had correctly determined the compensation, guided by the facts and standards mentioned in sections 23 and 24 and if it is found that there was any shortage in what was awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer, directs him to pay the balance compensation. The right to receive compensation is a statutory right; and that comes into being the moment the Government takes possession of the property acquired. It is a right debitum in praesenti, not inchoate or dependent on the quantification of the compensation, either by the Land Acquisition Officer under section 11 of the Act or by the court under section 26 of the Act.

5. Interest is separate from compensation. In the words of the Supreme Court in Shamlal Narula's case, [1964] 53 ITR 151, interest, whether it is statutory or contractual, represents “the profit the creditor might have made if he had the use of the money or the loss he suffered because he had not that use. It is something in addition to the capital amount though it arises out of it The statutory interest payable under section 34 is not compensation paid to the owner for depriving him of his right to possession of the land acquired, but that given to him for deprivation of the use of the money representing the compensation for the land acquired”. To the owner of the property who is deprived of it on it being acquired and taken possession of by the Government, interest is paid to compensate him for the deprival of the use of the amount awarded by way of compensation on account of delay in payment of compensation. In other words, interest payable is on the amount of compensation awarded or decreed from the date on which it was payable by the Government till the date of actual payment. This is on the analogy of certain amount belonging to the land owner being lent to the Government and the Government being liable to pay interest on such debt from the date of the debt till the discharge thereof. In other words, it has to be treated as a debt on which interest is due from the date on which the debt was incurred.

6. When does the compensation accrue or when is it deemed to accrue? It is well settled that the owner of the property is entitled to compensation from the date on which he is dispossessed of the property on acquisition. This is because what the Land Acquisition Officer does is to offer to purchase the property for the market value and when in the process he takes possession of the property at whatever stage it might be, the owner of the property is deprived of the income and enjoyment of the property from that time. Whether the offer in regard to the quantum of compensation is accepted by the land owner straightaway or finally settled by the court is a different question touching on the quantum of compensation, not of the right to receive compensation. We are here on the question as to from which date the land owner is entitled to receive it. There could be absolutely no doubt that both statutorily and in equity, the land owner has a right to receive compensation on the day on which he is dispossessed of the property. That right arises immediately on dispossession and does not await quantification of the compensation by the Land Acquisition Officer or by the court. The position is so clear that we do not consider it necessary to lengthen the judgment by citing decisions of the various High Courts. We would, however, set at rest doubts, if any, by extracting the relevant passages from the very recent decision of the Supreme Court in Joginder Singh's case, (1985) 1 SCC 231 : AIR 1985 SC 382, 383; [1985] 1 SCWR 110 by Pathak & Thakkar JJ:

“The High Court seems to have proceeded on the view that the right to this amount of Rs. 17,919·30 as compensation arose to the appellants only from the date of its judgment.

We are of opinion that the High Court has erred The right to compensation arises when the land vests in the State while its quantification may be concluded much later. Although the process of quantification may pass through several stages, from the Land Acquisition Officer to the District Judge and thereafter to the High Court, the process of quantification is merely one of computing the value of the land on the principles enacted in the Land Acquisition Act. All along, however, the right to the compensation so quantified refers back to the date of acquisition. The additional amount of compensation awarded by the District Judge or by the High Court represents the difference between the true value of the land on the one hand and the actual amount awarded on the other which fell short of the true value. The owner of the land is entitled to be paid the true value of the land on the date of taking over of possession. Since, however, the true value is usually determined only after it is computed through a multi-tiered process passing through different levels of a hierarchical judicial structure, by the very nature of things, it takes some time before the true value can be finally determined. The fact that it is determined later does not mean that the right to the amount comes into existence at a later date. And if, as the High Court has held, interest at 6% per annum rules from the date possession was taken in the case of compensation determined by the learned District Judge, there is no reason why the same rate should not be applied from the date possession was taken in the case of the enhancement effected by the High Court.”

7. By the decision of the Supreme Court in Mrs. Khorshed Shapoor Chenai v. Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, [1980] 122 ITR 21, it is well-settled that there are no separate rights, one a right to receive compensation and the other, a right to receive extra or further compensation. Upon acquisition of his lands, under the Land Acquisition Act, the claimant has only one right, which is to receive compensation for the lands at their market value on the date of the relevant notification and it is this right which is quantified by the Collector under section 11 and by the civil court under section 26 of the Land Acquisition Act. It is true that under section 11, the Collector after holding the necessary inquiry determines the quantum of compensation by fixing the market value of the land, and in doing so is guided by the provisions contained in sections 23 and 24 of the Act, the very provisions by reference to which the civil court fixes the valuation. It is also true that the Collector's award is, under section 12, declared to be, except as otherwise provided, final and conclusive evidence as between him and persons interested. Even so, it is well-settled that in law the Collector's award under section 11 is nothing more than an offer of compensation made by the Government to the claimants whose property is acquired.

8. Now, the question is, when does the right to receive interest accrue or is deemed to accrue; could it be at a point of time other than the date on which the right to receive compensation accrues? It could not be, as we have already noticed that the right to receive compensation accrues on dispossession of the land owner from the property on acquisition. He has a right in praesenti to receive compensation, though it might actually be quantified or paid at a later stage. If the entire compensation or true compensation as the Supreme Court would have it in Joginder Singh's case, (1985) 1 SCC 231 : AIR 1985 SC 382; [1985] 1 SCWR 110, to which the land owner was entitled, on a correct evaluation on the basis of the standards and guidance under sections 23 and 24, was paid the moment he was dispossessed of the property, no question of right to interest would survive. It is only where the compensation payable is not paid on the date when it was actually due, in order to compensate the loss arising out of the deprival of the use of the amount, that interest is paid till the date of actual payment. That the right to receive interest arises on the date of dispossession on which date the land owner is entitled to receive compensation, admits of no doubt. In fact, the position is placed beyond the pale of controversy when the Supreme Court said in Joginder Singh's case, (1985) 1 SCC 231 : AIR 1985 SC 382, 383; [1985] 1 SCWR 110:

“And if, as the High Court has held, interest at 6% per annum rules from the date possession was taken in the case of compensation determined by the learned District Judge, there is no reason why the same rate should not be applied from the date possession was taken in the case of the enhancement effected by the High Court.”

9. If we have correctly understood Sri P.K Ravindranatha Menon, the counsel for the Revenue, it is not the case of the Revenue that interest is payable in terms of an award under section 11 or of a decree under section 26 of the Act, from the date of the award or from the date of the decree, but from the date of dispossession. The impression we have gained is that in the case of the interest on compensation under an award, the Revenue concedes that it has to be spread over the years between the date of dispossession and that of actual payment. A difference, however, is sought to be drawn between the interest granted on compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer under section 34 on the one hand and interest granted by the decree of the court under section 28 of the Act, on the other. In the former case, it is submitted, the interest runs automatically, the Land Acquisition Officer having no option in the matter, whereas there is an element of discretion vested in the court in granting the interest on the additional compensation under section 28 of the Act. Shri Gopalakrishna Warriyar, the counsel for the assessee, submitted that this approach suggested by the Revenue is both illogical and unreasonable. He would submit that really the court had no discretion in the matter, it being a statutory right vested in the land owner to receive compensation and also interest thereon from the moment he is dispossessed of the property till the compensation is actually paid to him. According to him, much confusion in thinking has been caused by the expression “may” in section 28 in contrast to the word “shall” in section 34 of the Act in regard to the grant of interest. To appreciate the argument of Sri Warriyar, we would extract sections 28 and 34 of the Act:

“28.Collector may be directed to pay interest on excess compensation.— If the sum which, in the opinion of the court, the Collector ought to have awarded as compensation is in excess of the sum which the, Collector did award as compensation, the award of the court may direct that the Collector shall pay interest on such excess at the rate of nine per centum per annum from the date on which he took possession of the land to the date of payment of such excess into court:

Provided that the award of the Court may also direct that where such excess or any part thereof is paid into court after the date of expiry of a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per centum per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of such excess or part thereof which has not been paid into court before the date of such expiry.

34. Payment of interest.—When the amount of such compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate of nine per centum per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited:

Provided that if such compensation or any part thereof is not paid or deposited within a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per centum per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of compensation or part thereof which has not been paid or deposited before the date of such expiry.”

10. According to Sri Warriyar, the expression “may” used in section 28 of the Act has the same force as that of “shall” in the context; and in effect and substance, no discretion is vested in the court to deny interest once the additional or enhanced compensation which really means the balance compensation due to the land owner (assessee) (which ought to have been awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer himself) has been declared by that court. Citing the decision of the Supreme Court in Mrs. Khorshed Shapoor Chenai's case, [1980] 122 ITR 21, he submitted that the entire compensation awarded has to be treated as an integrated whole and the right to interest accrues on the entire amount from the date of dispossession, irrespective of the date or stages when the quantification takes place or is completed. Placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Satinder Singh's case, [1961] 3 SCR 676; AIR 1961 SC 908, he submitted that when the owner of the property was dispossessed pursuant to the order of compulsory acquisition, an agreement with the acquiring authority to pay interest on the amount of compensation was implied. Confronted with the observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 7 at page 469 of the report in Raghubans Narain's case, AIR 1967 SC 465, 469 wherein, construing the provisions in section 28 of the Act, it was stated as follows:

“In its plain language the discretion that is conferred on the court is whether, in the given circumstances of a particular case, the court should award interest or not. The words ‘may direct’ mean that it is discretionary on the part of the court to grant or refuse to grant interest. But the words following those words, viz., ‘the Collector shall pay interest on such excess at the rate of six per centum per annum’ would mean that once the discretion to grant interest is exercised, there is no further discretion and the interest, if awarded, has to be at the rate of six per centum per annum. This also appears to be the construction of section 28 so far understood”

11. Shri Warriyar submitted that the question whether direction to pay interest was not directly and substantially in issue in the case the Supreme Court considered and, therefore, the observations extracted above, need not be taken as those binding on the High Court under article 141 of the Constitution. For this purpose, he cited the decision of the Supreme Court in Madhav Rao Scindia's case, (1971) 1 SCC 85, wherein in paragraph 141, at page 164, occurs the following observations of the Supreme Court:

“The court was not called upon to decide and did not decide that article 366(22) was a provision relating to a covenant within the meaning of article 363. It is difficult to regard a word or a clause occurring in a judgment of this court, divorced from its context, as containing a full exposition of the law on a question when the question did not fall to be answered in that judgment.”

12. Quoting passages from Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, Shri Warriyar also submitted that it was well-settled that the use of the word “may” in a statutory provision would not by itself show that the provision was discretionary. It might be used as a conventional courtesy and yet intended to be mandatory in nature. A decision of the Full Bench of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court in Collector v. Habib-Ullah-Din, AIR 1967 J & K 44, was also cited. We are not, however, persuaded to take a view that the observations contained in Raghubans Narain's case, AIR 1967 SC 465, is not binding on us under article 141 of the Constitution. We would, therefore, proceed on the basis that on the question, to grant or not to grant interest under section 28 of the Act, the court has a discretion, whereas it is not so with the Collector (Land Acquisition Officer) under section 34 of the Act. For the reasons we have already stated in the foregoing paragraphs, we would, however, hold that in spite of the court having a discretion in the matter, once it grants interest, it does not assume a quality different from that of interest allowed under section 34 of the Act for taxation purposes. The whole argument in regard to different points of time at which interest accrues appears to proceed from a basic error in the understanding that right to compensation is not one but several, whereas it is not so, as clearly laid down by the Supreme Court in Mrs. Khorshed Shapoor Chenai's case, [1980] 122 ITR 21.

13. We find little force in the contention of Shri Menon that until and unless in the decree, a provision for the grant of interest is made by the court, right to receive interest does not arise or accrue in favour of the land owner (assessee). We have already noticed that the settled legal position is that the interest relates back to the date of dispossession of the property on which date compensation becomes payable whatever be the time taken to finally settle the quantum of compensation. Even assuming that the court had the discretion not to grant interest, once it is granted, the right to receive interest relates back to the date of dispossession as is the case in the case of interest awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer (Collector) under section 34. It has also to be borne in mind that a perusal of the contents of the decree would invariably go to show that the interest granted and to be worked out by the court is not from the date of the decree but from the date of dispossession of the property and actually interest runs from day to day and accrues for the purpose of taxation in every year intervening the date of dispossession and the date of actual, payment of compensation.

14. A large number of decisions had been cited by Sri Menon and Sri Warriyar. The legal position which we are concerned with appears to be so well-settled by the decision of the Supreme Court to which we have already made a reference, that we do not consider it necessary to examine each one of them in detail. The decisions cited before us include CIT v. Sampangiramaiah (V.), [1968] 69 ITR 159 (Mys); CIT v. Sham Lal Narula (Dr.), [1972] 84 ITR 625 (P&H); Govindarajulu Chetty (T.N.K), [1973] 87 ITR 22 (Mad); Joyanarayan Panigrahi v. CIT, [1974] 93 ITR 102 (Orissa); Addl. CIT v. Virendra Singh, [1979] 118 ITR 923 (All); CIT v. Sri Ram Gopal, [1980] 123 ITR 388 (Raj); CIT v. Santi Dm, [1983] 139 ITR 489 (Cal); CIT v. Deoki Nandan & Sons, [1982] 138 ITR 225 (Delhi); Fazilka Electric Supply Co.…Applicant v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax…, [1983] 143 ITR 551 (Delhi); Sadasiva Krishna Rao v. CIT, [1983] 144 ITR 270 (AP); CIT v. Janardhan Reddy (F.), [1984] 145 ITR 303 (AP); Khan Bahadur Ahmed Alladin & Sons v. CIT, [1969] 74 ITR 651 (AP); CIT v. Muthukaruppan Chettiar (M.K Kr.), [1984] 145 ITR 175 (Mad); CIT v. Raja S.N Bhanja Deo, [1977] 106 ITR 748 (Orissa); Jairam v. Commr. Of Income-Tax, [1979] 117 ITR 638 (Ker); George Paul Puthuran v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Kerala., [1980] 126 ITR 168 (Ker); Topandas Kundanmal v. CIT, [1978] 114 ITR 237 (Guj) and CIT v. Yashwant Rao Pawar (Maharaja) (H.H), [1981] 127 ITR 650 (MP).

15. In the light of the foregoing discussions, our conclusion is that interest on compensation awarded with respect to the land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act runs from day to day, accruing from the date on which the Government took possession of the land, that being the date on which the land owner's right to receive the entire compensation arises, though determined and paid later. In this view, the contrary view expressed in Jairam's case, [1979] 117 ITR 638 (Ker), that interest on compensation awarded by the court under section 28 of the Act accrues only on the date of such decree is clearly wrong. The decision in Sassoon's case, [1954] 26 ITR 27 (SC) can be clearly distinguished, it being a case in which the right to receive the remuneration or commission accrued in favour of the managing agents on the completion of the year when the balance-sheet and profit and loss account were drawn up and trade results ascertained, not from the beginning of the financial year, day by day, or month by month. Our Division Bench has stated that it found tempting the logic of reasoning in Sankari Manickyamma's case, [1976] 105 ITR 172 (AP) extending to the question of accrual of interest, the principle enunciated in Alladin's case, [1969] 74 ITR 651 (AP) that the (additional) compensation decreed by the District Court, High Court and the Supreme Court accrued only on the dates on which the decrees or orders were passed by the respective courts. It is not necessary to discuss in detail to establish that these decisions, relied on by the Division Bench, do not represent the correct law on the question in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court which we have already adverted to.

16. The Karnataka High Court in paragraphs 15 and 16 at pages 707 in the decision reported in Commissioner of Income-tax v. A.B.V Gowda, [1986] 157 ITR 697 (Kar), has observed that the Division Bench of this court which decided Jairam's case, [1979] 117 ITR 638 (Ker) while relying on the judgment in Sampangiramaiah's case, [1968] 69 ITR 159 (Mys) did not appear to have understood the true import of the decision of that High Court (Mysore High Court). We do not feel persuaded to go further into this controversy, except to state that to the extent it runs counter to the decision of the Supreme Court, to which reference has already been made, it is clearly wrong. The reasons advanced by the Division Bench for not agreeing with the reasonings in Govindarajulu Chetty's case, [1973] 87 ITR 22 (Mad) which is based on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Thiagaraja Chetty's case, [1953] 24 ITR 525 (SC) are not convincing. A detailed discussion about the other decision of our High Court in George Paul Puthuran's case, [1980] 126 ITR 168 (Ker) referred to in the reference order does not call for any consideration in depth, inasmuch as that merely follows the decision in Jairam's case, [1979] 117 ITR 638 (Ker) and dissents from the contrary view expressed by the Allahabad High Court in Virendra Singh's case, [1979] 118 ITR 923. The result, therefore, is that we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

17. A copy of this judgment under the signature of the Registrar and seal of the High Court would be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.