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Abad Fisheries v. Commissioner For Workmen'S Compensation
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Menon, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The appeal was brought by the employer against an order of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation directing the deposit of Rs. 16,800 for payment as compensation to the second respondent. The compensation related to the death of the second respondent's daughter, which resulted from an employment injury sustained in the course of her employment with the appellant (the employer).
The central procedural steps were: the second respondent first filed an application before the Insurance Court under Section 75 of the Employees' State Insurance (ESI) Act in January 1980; subsequently, an application was filed before the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner in March 1980. The ESI claim was rejected for reasons not stated in the opinion. The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner directed deposit of the award but took the view that the statutory bar under Section 53 of the ESI Act operated only if the dependant had actually received benefits under Section 52.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the bar contained in Section 53 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (and the related provision in Section 61) prevents an insured person or his dependants from claiming compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, even if the ESI benefits have not actually been received by the dependant.
- Whether the entitlement to dependants' benefit under Section 52 (i.e., being "receivable") suffices to invoke the statutory bars in Sections 53 and 61 of the ESI Act and thereby preclude recovery under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (Employer)
- The deceased was an "insured person" within the meaning of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, and therefore the remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act was barred.
Respondent's Arguments (Second Respondent / His Counsel)
- Counsel contended that Section 53 of the ESI Act applies only when benefits have actually been received or recovered under the ESI Act, and not when they are merely receivable; accordingly, the bar did not operate in the circumstances where the ESI claim had been preferred but benefits were not in fact received.
- Counsel further contended that the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act are more liberal than those of the ESI Act and that construing the ESI Act to deny the benefits available under the Workmen's Compensation Act to an insured person or his dependants should be avoided.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Lakshmi Oil Mills v. Thakur Dass, [41 F.J.R. 667] (Punjab High Court) | Interpreting purpose and object of Section 61 of the ESI Act: statutory compulsory insurance by employers should exclude liability under other enactments to avoid duplication of proceedings and double benefits; primary liability should rest on the ESI scheme. | The court relied on the reasoning in this decision to support the conclusion that Sections 53 and 61 of the ESI Act are intended to bar claims under the Workmen's Compensation Act for insured employees, to avoid duplication of liability and proceedings. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court conducted a close textual and contextual analysis of the Employees' State Insurance Act and its interaction with the Workmen's Compensation Act. The reasoning proceeded in the following steps, as reflected in the opinion:
-
Statutory reading: The court examined key provisions of the ESI Act:
- Section 2(8) defines "employment injury" as personal injury caused to an employed person by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.
- Section 46 sets out types of benefits an insured person or his dependants can claim, including "dependants' benefit".
- Section 52 provides that where an insured person dies as a result of an employment injury, dependants' benefit "shall become payable" in accordance with the First Schedule.
- Section 53 (quoted in the opinion) bars an insured person or his dependants from receiving or recovering compensation or damages under the Workmen's Compensation Act or any other law in respect of an employment injury sustained by the insured person.
- Section 61 provides that when a person is entitled to any of the benefits under the ESI Act, he shall not be entitled to receive any similar benefit under any other enactment.
- Textual interpretation: Reading these provisions together, the court rejected the Commissioner's view that the bar in Sections 53 and 61 is attracted only when benefits have actually been paid. Instead, the court held that the language of Sections 52, 53 and 61 demonstrates that the bar is not conditional upon actual receipt; entitlement to dependants' benefits suffices to trigger the exclusion.
- Addressing respondent's contention: Even accepting the narrower construction proposed by the second respondent's counsel (that Section 53 applies only to compensation in respect of employment injury and not to compensation for death), the court found Section 61 decisive. Because the second respondent was admittedly entitled to dependants' benefits under Section 52, Section 61 barred him from claiming a "similar benefit" under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
- Comparative assessment of benefits: The court examined features of the ESI scheme (including Para. 8 of the First Schedule) describing rates and durations of dependants' benefits (e.g., widow and minor children shares and durations; parents' entitlement). The court concluded there is no clear ground to hold that the Workmen's Compensation Act is categorically more liberal or beneficial in all cases, and highlighted practical advantages of the ESI scheme such as steady and prompt payments by a statutory corporation and statutory provisions (Sections 51A–51D) that mitigate procedural pitfalls in recovering benefits.
- Legislative history and purposive construction: The court traced the legislative evolution of the ESI Act. Initially the Act cross-referenced the Workmen's Compensation Act and allowed substitution of ESI benefits for compensation; subsequent amendments removed many references to the Workmen's Compensation Act and made the ESI Act a self-contained code for employment injuries. Section 53, as it then stood, imposed an express bar "in respect of an employment injury" including claims for damages "under any other law for the time being in force or otherwise." On this basis the court concluded that Parliament intended the ESI scheme to be the primary and exclusive remedy for insured employees.
- Reliance on precedent and policy: The opinion cites and adopts reasoning from the Punjab High Court decision in Lakshmi Oil Mills v. Thakur Dass, which emphasized that compulsory statutory insurance by employers is designed to eliminate duplicate employer liability and multiplicity of proceedings. The court endorsed this policy rationale in interpreting Sections 53 and 61.
- Conclusion of analysis: For these textual, historical and purposive reasons, the court held that where a workman is an "insured person" under the ESI scheme, no compensation can be claimed from his employer under the Workmen's Compensation Act in respect of employment injuries sustained by him.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED; ORDER OF THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSIONER SET ASIDE.
Implications and direct effects:
- The court held that entitlement to dependants' benefits under the Employees' State Insurance Act (Section 52) bars a dependant from claiming similar compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act by operation of Sections 53 and 61 of the ESI Act. Consequently, the second respondent could not maintain a claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act in respect of the insured employee's death.
- The appeal's outcome is directly adverse to the second respondent. The opinion notes that part of the amount awarded by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner had already been received or withdrawn by the second respondent; the court observed that fact without altering its statutory interpretation.
- The court made no order as to costs.
- The opinion explains and applies statutory text, legislative history and precedent to clarify that the ESI Act is intended to operate as a self-contained code for employment injuries with an express exclusion of claims under other enactments for insured persons. The decision therefore interprets the statutory scheme to exclude recovery under the Workmen's Compensation Act for insured employees as a matter of law in the circumstances described.
Note: All information in this summary is taken exclusively from the provided opinion text. Where the opinion left factual details unstated (for example, reasons for the rejection of the ESI claim), those details have not been supplied or inferred.
Menon, J.:— This is an appeal by the employer, against the order of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation directing deposit of Rs. 16,800 for payment as compensation to the second respondent, in connection with the death of his daughter consequent on an employment injury sustained by her in the course of employment under the appellant. The only point raised is that as the deceased was an “insured person” within the meaning of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, the remedy under the Wokmen's Compensation Act was barred. The second respondent had first filed an application before the Insurance Court, under S. 75 of the Act in January 1980; the application before the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner was filed only thereafter, in March 1980. The Employees' State Insurance claim was rejected for reasons unknown; and the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner took the view that the bar under S. 53 of the Employees' State Insurance Act could operate only if the dependant was actually in receipt of benefits under S. 52.
2. We are unable to support this view-Section 2(8) of the Employees' State Insurance Act defines “employment injury” as personal injury caused to an employed person by accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Section 46 enumerates the various types of benefits an insured person or his dependants can claim from the Corporation; and one such benefit is “dependants' benefit”. Section 52 provides that where an insured person dies as a result of an employment injury, dependants' benefit shall become payable in accordance with the provisions of the First Schedule. Section 53 imposes a bar against receipt or recovery of compensation or damages from the employer in respect of an insured person. The section reads:
“53. Bar against receiving or recovery of compensation o??? damages under any other law.— An insured person or his dependants shall not be entitled to receive or recover, whether from the employer of the insured person or from any other person, any compensation or damages under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923), or any other law for the time being in force, or otherwise, in respect of an employment injury sustained by the insured person as an employee under this Act.”
Section 61 is in the following terms:
“61. Bar of benefits under other enactments.— When a person is entitled to any of the benefits provided by this Act, he shall not be entitled to receive any similar benefit admissible under the provisions of any other enactment.”
If all the relevant provisions are read together, it is impossible to agree with the Commissioner that the bar under Ss. 53 and 61 are attracted only when benefits are actually received or recovered, and not when they are only receivable or recoverable. Section 52 positively provides that “dependants' benefit” shall be payable to the dependants of an insured person dying out of employment injury. Section 53 stipulates in unambiguous language that a dependant shall not be entitled to receive or recover any compensation from the employer under the Workmen's Compensation Act, in respect of an employment injury sustained by an insured person. The bar is unconditional; it does not depend on actual receipt of benefit by the dependant. Assuming, as counsel for the second respondent contended, that S. 53 applies only to receipt or recovery of compensation in respect of employment injury, and not to compensation in respect of death following an employment injury, one has still to reckon with S. 61 which provides that where a person is entitled to any benefits under the Act, he shall not be entitled to receive any similar benefit admissible under the provisions of any other enactment. The second respondent is admittedly entitled to dependants' benefits under S. 52 and that entitlement bars him from claiming compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, because the periodical payments referred to in Ss. 46 and 52 are “similar benefits.”
3. Dealing with the scheme of Employees' State Insurance Act and the object of S. 61 in particular, the Punjab High Court had observed, in Lakshmi Oil Mills v. Thakur Dass, [41 F.J.R 667]:
“The Act provides for statutory compulsory insurance in certain cases by the employers. They have to pay the insurance premia for the insured workmen working in their factories. It would be incongruous that such an employer should continue to be liable to the workman for the injury. On the general principles of insurance law, it is inapt that a person, who has insured himself against loss, should nevertheless remain liable for the same despite such insurance. The very object and purpose of the insurance and the premium paid by the employer would be lost if he were to continue to e???liable under other enactments for all those benefits which are available to the insured workmen under the Act. The object of S. 61 abovesaid is apparently to prevent such a contingency. Equally so, the bar appears to have been created to avoid a multiplicity of legal proceedings. If statutory insurance under the Act enures to the benefit of an insured workman, and the Corporation created under the Act is to be liable for the payment of disablement and dependants' benefits, then there appears no reason why a duplication of the proceedings would be allowed in allowing the insured workman o??? make similar or identical claims under other enactments also. The object can equally be to prevent a double benefit accruing to the workman as also a corresponding double liability falling upon the insured employer. The primary liability for the benefits available under the Act is provided under the relevant provisions of the same with the express exclusion of claiming similar ones under other enactments.”
4. Counsel for the second respondent would contend that the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act are more liberal than those of the Employees' State Insurance Act, and that a construction denying the benefits of the former to an insured person or his dependant should be avoi Jed. There is no scope for manoeuvre when the statutory language is plain. That apart, we are also not sure that the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act are more liberal or beneficial. Under Para. 8 of the First Schedule to the Employees' State Insurance Act, the widow and the minor children of a deceased employee are entitled to get dependants' benefits at three-fifths and two-fifths of the full rate respectively, the widow getting it for life or till remarriage, and the children getting it till attaining majority. The parent no doubt gets only at three-tenths of the full rate, and that too, only in the absence of other dependants. The liberality or otherwise of the whole scheme cannot be tested with reference to the rare instance whe???e the parent happens to be the only dependant. He too gets the periodical payments for life, though his life-expectancy may not be long. In the case of widows and minor children where a pension for life is assured for the former and a steady income till attainment of majority is assured for the latter, the Employees' State Insurance Scheme seems to be more beneficial. It is common knowledge that recovery of lump sums from employers is sometimes found impossible, either because of their genuine incapacity to pay, or for other reasons. The Employees' State Insurance Scheme, on the other hand, assures steady and prompt payments by a public statutory corporation. Sections 51A to 51D of the Employees' State Insurance Act remove many of the pitfalls usually associated with the establishment of a claim before the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner. Claims for compensation arising from industrial accidents were originally based on principles of fault liability. The progress achieved through workmen's compensation enactments consisted in the recognition of the rules of strict liability. In all advanced countries however, further progress has been made by way of social security legislations and insurance, as in the case of the Social Security Act of the United States and the National Insurance Act of the United Kingdom. The principle seems to be that the State, the employers and the employees should all participate in the cost of rehabilitating the family of the unfortunate victim, by making appropriate contributions to an insurance scheme. The movement from fault liability to strict liability, and from strict liability to social security cannot be stopped in a developing country like ours for the only reason that an aged parent fortuitously becoming entitled to claim compensation for the death of his daughter would prefer to get a lumpsum payment.
5. Legislative history also supports the view that the intention of Parliament has been to exclude the machinery of the Workmen's Compensation Act in respect of insured employees covered by the Employees' State Insurance Act. As the Act originally stood, “employment injury” was defined as personal injury
“which would entitle such employee to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, if he were a workman within the meaning of the said Act.”
Dependants' benefits under S. 52 were payable at the rates specified in the Second Schedule, and this schedule also referred to the rates prescribed under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Section 53 provided that where an insured person was entitled to receive compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, he could claim “in lieu of such compensation,” the periodical payments prescribed by the section. The scheme of the Employees' State Insurance Act at this stage was only to substitute insurance benefits for compensation claims and the Insurace Court for the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner. Subsequent amendments to the aforesaid sections, however, show that the reference to the Workmen's Compensation Act have been completely dropped and that the Employees' State Insurance Act, as it now stands, is designed to operate as a self-contained code in respect of employment injuries. Reference to the Workmen's Compensation Act is now to be found in S. 53 alone, and that is only for the purpose of imposing the “bar”. Section 3(5) of the Workmen's Compensation Act gives an option to the injured person either to claim compensation under the said enactment, or to go in for a civil suit for damages. Section 53 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, however, now bars even a claim for damages under “any other law for the time being in force or otherwise”. In the case of an insured person, therefore, there seems to be a clear intention to exclude every other type of claim. The amendments clearly indicate, as observed by the Punjab High Court in the decision noticed, that the primary liability, to meet compensation claim in respect of employment injuries is now on the Employees' State Insurance Corporation, in terms of the provisions of the Employees' State Insurance Act, with an express exclusion of claims under other enactments “or otherwise.”
6. We are, therefore, constrained to hold that where a workman is an “insured person” under the coverage of the Emeployees' State Insurance scheme, no compensation could be claimed from his employer under the Workmen's Compensation Act, in respect of employment injuries sustained by him. The result may be unfortunate for the second respondent in this case, who was ill-advised not to press the insurance claim preferred in January 1980. We were, however, told at the hearing that part of the amount awarded by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner has already been received or withdrawn; and that gives some satisfaction, if satisfaction has anything to do with interpretation of statutes. The appeal is accordingly allowed, and the order of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner is set aside, without any order as to costs.
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