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Narayanankutty v. State Of Kerala & Others

Kerala High Court
Jul 20, 1982
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Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion arises from an original petition challenging Ext. P1, a Government Order appointing the second respondent (a senior member of the Palghat Bar) as Special Public Prosecutor to conduct Sessions Case No. 16 of 1980 on the file of the Sessions Court, Palghat. The accused in the Sessions Case objected to that appointment as contrary to law and mala fide. The third respondent (brother of the deceased in the Sessions Case) had applied to the Government for appointment of a Special Public Prosecutor, alleging that the then Public Prosecutor and the accused were sympathisers of a particular political party and that prosecutorial duties had been poorly discharged (including failure to oppose a bail application). The District Collector contacted the third respondent, who suggested the second respondent. The second respondent gave a consent letter stating he would not make any claim on the Government (i.e., would not seek remuneration from the State), and Ext. P1 was issued on that basis. Before the Court could decide on the validity of Ext. P1, the second respondent withdrew his consent, rendering Ext. P1 ineffective. The petition was therefore disposed of with directions to the State to appoint a replacement Special Public Prosecutor and with ancillary directions about the trial calendar.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Ext. P1 (the Government Order appointing the second respondent as Special Public Prosecutor) was valid in circumstances where the appointee had initially consented to serve without claim on the Government (i.e., without State remuneration).
  2. Whether the Government can appoint a Special Public Prosecutor on terms that require the prosecutor to look to a private individual for remuneration or to serve without remuneration, thereby abdicating the Government's financial responsibility.
  3. Whether appointment of a Special Public Prosecutor may be made to vindicate the private grievances of a relative of the deceased (rather than on the basis of public interest).

Arguments of the Parties

Accused's Arguments

  • The accused objected to the appointment under Ext. P1 as being contrary to law and mala fide.

Third Respondent's Position (relative of the deceased)

  • Applied to the Government for appointment of a Special Public Prosecutor on the ground that both the accused and the Public Prosecutor were sympathisers of a particular political party and that the Public Prosecutor did not discharge duties properly (specifically, by not opposing a bail application).
  • Suggested the second respondent to the District Collector as the person to be appointed.

Second Respondent's Conduct

  • Provided a consent letter to the District Collector stating that if appointed he would not make any claim on the Government (i.e., would not seek State remuneration).
  • Ultimately withdrew his consent for appointment, which the Court records as having relieved it from deciding on the validity of Ext. P1.

Government / State Position (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The Government, acting through the District Collector and on the third respondent's suggestion, issued Ext. P1 appointing the second respondent as Special Public Prosecutor, apparently on the basis that public interest justified such appointment.
  • The Government accepted the second respondent's consent to serve without making a claim on the State (i.e., the Government did not bear the financial burden in Ext. P1).

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded along the following lines, based strictly on the statements in the opinion:

  1. Withdrawal of consent: Because the second respondent withdrew his consent to the appointment, the Court declined to pronounce upon the substantive validity of Ext. P1; the withdrawal made Ext. P1 ineffective.
  2. Statutory framework: The Court explained the ordinary rule that Sessions Cases are to be conducted by Public Prosecutors appointed by the State under Section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and noted subsection (8) of Section 24 as the exception permitting the State to appoint, for any case or class of cases, a person in practice as an advocate for not less than ten years as a Special Public Prosecutor. The legislative policy of Section 24(8) was described as preserving State and public interests in appropriate cases.
  3. Public interest standard: The Court observed that appointment of a Special Public Prosecutor is justified when the Government is satisfied that public interest requires it. The Court noted that the necessity or desirability of such an appointment in this instance was not challenged in the petition.
  4. Independence and remuneration: The Court reasoned that a Prosecutor (including a Special Public Prosecutor) is effectively an officer of the Court, responsible both to prosecute cases vigorously and to safeguard the rights of the accused. For that role to be properly performed, the Prosecutor should look to the State for remuneration. If a Special Public Prosecutor is to be paid by a private individual or serve without remuneration, his capacity to perform his duties properly will be endangered, and the Government would be abdicating its responsibility.
  5. Impermissible purposes: The Court stated that a Special Public Prosecutor cannot be appointed to secure conviction at all costs or merely to vindicate private grievances (for example, those of a relative of the deceased); the appointment must be motivated by public interest.
  6. Administrative responsibility: The Court emphasized the State's broader responsibility to provide adequate prosecutorial infrastructure, including suitably qualified prosecutors and adequate pay, so as to preserve the dignity of the office and public confidence in the administration of criminal justice.
  7. Relief and directions: Given the Government's prior satisfaction that this was a fit case for a Special Public Prosecutor, and in view of the second respondent's withdrawal, the Court directed the State to appoint a suitable person in place of the second respondent and imposed a short delay in the trial calendar to allow the appointment to be made.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Court disposed of the original petition by issuing the following operative directions:

  • The appointment under Ext. P1 is ineffective as the second respondent withdrew his consent.
  • The first respondent (State) is directed to appoint a suitable person as Special Public Prosecutor in place of the second respondent to conduct Sessions Case No. 16 of 1980 on the file of the Sessions Court, Palghat, within two weeks from receipt of a copy of the judgment.
  • The Sessions Judge, Palghat shall not take up Sessions Case No. 16 of 1980 for trial for a period of three weeks from the date of the judgment.
  • The petition was disposed of without costs, and copies of the judgment were to be sent to the first respondent and the Sessions Judge, Palghat immediately.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The State must appoint a replacement Special Public Prosecutor within the stated time and the trial schedule is temporarily suspended for three weeks; Ext. P1 is ineffective by reason of withdrawal of consent.
  • Policy and practice guidance: The Court cautioned that the Government must not abdicate its financial responsibility for remunerating Special Public Prosecutors and emphasized that Special Public Prosecutors must be appointed only in the public interest, not to vindicate private grievances or to secure conviction at all costs.
  • Precedential impact: The opinion primarily disposes of the petition with directions and articulates principles regarding remuneration and purpose of Special Public Prosecutor appointments; the text does not purport to establish a novel legal precedent beyond these observations, and it records that the Court did not decide the substantive validity of Ext. P1 because of the withdrawal of consent.
Show all summary ...

1. A fine gesture by a senior member of the Palghat Bar, the second respondent herein, has relieved the Court of the duty of pronouncing upon the validity of his appointment under Ext. P1 Government Order as Special Public Prosecutor to conduct the prosecution in Sessions Case No. 16 of 1980 on the file of the Court of Session, Palghat. His appointment is objected to by the accused in the Sessions Case as contrary to law and mala fide. He has gracefully withdrawn his consent for appointment; hence Ext. P1 order has become ineffective.

2. Third respondent herein, the brother of the deceased involved in S.C No. 16 of 1980, moved the Government for appointment of Special Public Prosecutor to conduct the case on the ground that the accused as well as the Public Prosecutor are sympathisers of a particular political party and that the Public Prosecutor did not discharge her duties properly in as much as she did not even oppose the bail application. However, it was not the Public Prosecutor, who appeared for the State in the Bail application; but it was the Additional Public Prosecutor, who did so. Whatever it be, the bail application was not opposed and the accused was let out on bail. On a reference by the Government to the District Collector, Palghat regarding the choice of the person to be appointed Special Public Prosecutor, the District Collector contacted the 3rd respondent, who suggested the appointment of the second respondent, a leading member of the Palghat Bar, as Special Public Prosecutor.

3. It appears, second respondent gave a consent letter to the District Collector stating that if appointed as Prosecutor, he will not make any claim on the government. It was in acceptance of this letter that the Government came forward with Ext. P1 order appointing the second respondent as Special Public Prosecutor, without any financial commitment to the State. This original petition was filed challenging Ext. P1 order.

4. Normally, Sessions Cases before Sessions Courts are expected to be conducted by the Public Prosecutors appointed by the State Government under S. 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the ‘Code’). Sub-section (8) of Section 24 which spells out an exception to the general rule states that the Central Government or the State Government may appoint, for the purpose of any case or class of cases, a person, who has been in practice as an advocate for not less than 10 years, as Special Public Prosecutor. The legislative policy underlying sub-section (8) of Section 24 of the Code is to preserve the interests of the State and to protect public interest in individual cases or class of cases; for that purpose power is vested in the Government to appoint Special Public Prosecutors in appropriate cases, where Public interest demands such a course. The Government in the instant case were satisfied that public interest justified the appointment of Special Public Prosecutor. The necessity or desirability of such appointment is not challenged in this original petition. This is not to say that in every case where one of the parties involved is of a particular political persuasion, no Public Prosecutor, who shares the particular persuasion, should be allowed to conduct the prosecution. To accept such a state of affairs as an invariable rule would not only be contrary to sound practice, but would seriously offend the dignity of the Bar as such.

5. It is unfortunate that Public Prosecutors and Additional Public Prosecutors in the State are, so ill paid that the posts do not always attract talented lawyers. There is also a feeling—it is not for me to say to what extent it is justified—that merit, talent and experience are not always the criteria behind appointments made to these posts. The prosecutors, in the discharge of their duties, have to face talented and experienced members of the Bar. Complaints are not rare that at times the prosecutors suffer from serious handicap Public confidence in the institution may be shaken at times, confidence of the Government may also be shaken. Yet, earnestness in making these posts, which are sensitive posts in the field of administration of criminal justice, attractive or in making proper choice of personnel seems to be lacking. This has to some extent affected the dignity and status of the office of the Public Prosecutor.

6. The State has the responsibility of providing the infrastructure for prosecution of offenders. In cases of grave offences, the responsibility of the State is much more. It is the duty of the State to provide required number of courts, number of posts necessary to man the courts and also sufficient number of Prosecutors of calibre and experience to conduct prosecution in a befitting manner so to generate and sustain public confidence in the administration of criminal justice.

7. Whenever the Government are satisfied that in a particular case or class of cases, appointment of a Special Public Prosecutor is necessary, they must not only so appoint but also bear the financial burden involved in the appointment. The Government, either in the appointment of the Public Prosecutor or in the appointment of the Special Public Prosecutor, are not justified in abdicating their responsibility to meet the financial commitment. It is really surprising that the Government in this case agreed that the Special Public Prosecutor is to be paid not by the State, but by a private individual. This could have been done only by disregarding the rule which the Public Prosecutor, be he a Prosecutor appointed for a term or Special Public Prosecutor appointed for a case class of cases, has to perform in the conduct of the Sessions Casein. The Prosecutor is, so to say, an officer of the Court expected to assist court in arriving at the truth in a given case. The Prosecutor no doubt, has to vigorously and conscientiously prosecute the case so as to serve the high public interest of finding out the truth and in ensuring adequate punishment to the offender. At the same time, it is no part of his duty to secure, by fair means or foul, conviction in any case. He has to safeguard public interest in prosecuting the case; public interest also demands that the trial should be conducted in a fair manner, heedful of the rights granted to the accused under the laws of the country including the Code. The Prosecutor, while being fully aware of his duty to prosecute the case vigorously and conscientiously, must also be prepared to respect and protect the rights of the accused.

8. Special Public Prosecutor, it is needless to say, cannot be appointed with a view to secure conviction at all costs. Special Public Prosecutor could be appointed only when public interest demands it and not to vindicate the grievances of a private person, such as close relation of the deceased. In order that he discharges his duties properly, he should look to the State for remuneration for his services; if he looks to a private party for his remuneration, his capacity and ability to perform his rule as Public Prosecutor properly will be endangered. Government cannot appoint Special Public Prosecutor on such terms, abdicating their financial responsibility or directing him to receive his remuneration from any private individual or expecting him to work without remuneration.

9. Since the Government are already satisfied that this is a fit case for appointing Special Public Prosecutor, a direction is issued to the first respondent—State to appoint a suitable person as Special Public Prosecutor to the place of the second respondent to conduct Sessions Case No. 16 of 1980 on the file of the Sessions Court, Palghat within two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment by the first respondent. The Sessions Judge, Palghat will not take up the Sessions Case 16 of 1980 for trial during a period of three weeks from to-day. This original petition is disposed of in this manner, but without costs.

10. Copies of this judgment will be sent to the first respondent and the Sessions Judge, Palghat, immediately.