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State Of Kerala v. Mundan
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion arises from the trial in the Court of Session, Manjeri Division, connected with the murder of Sankunni Kurup. Five persons — Velayudhan, Sankaran, Arumughan, Mundan and the respondent (the 4th accused) — were tried for various offences under the Indian Penal Code. The 4th accused faced charges under Sections 449 and 302 IPC. On conclusion of the trial the learned Sessions Judge acquitted all the accused.
The State appealed, challenging only the acquittal of the 4th accused. The factual narrative presented in the opinion recounts an altercation on 6 June 1978 near an illicit arrack-cum-toddy shop operated by Velayudhan and his wife, during which Sankunni Kurup and some of the accused were involved in a physical confrontation. Sankunni Kurup was later found with a bleeding leg injury inside Vettan's house, reportedly stating that he had been stabbed by the 4th accused. Sankunni Kurup subsequently died of the injury. An FIR (Ext. P1) was lodged the next morning, investigation undertaken, and the 4th accused was arrested on 13-6-1978; a dagger (M.O.1) and sheath (M.O.10) were recovered in pursuance of a statement by the 4th accused (mahazar Ext. P14).
At trial the 4th accused denied guilt and, under Section 313 Cr.P.C., gave a statement raising a plea of self-defence. The Sessions Judge, after discussing and evaluating prosecution evidence, held the testimony of key witnesses unreliable and described the prosecution story as improbable and unbelievable, leading to acquittal of the accused.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the learned Sessions Judge erred in law by acquitting the accused under Section 232 Cr.P.C. after evaluating the reliability and trustworthiness of the prosecution evidence at that stage.
- What is the correct legal interpretation of the phrase "no evidence" in Section 232 Cr.P.C. — whether it requires total absence of any evidence connecting the accused with the offence or merely absence of reliable/satisfactory evidence.
- Whether the order of acquittal should be set aside and the case remitted to the trial court to proceed from the appropriate stage (i.e., from S. 232 Cr.P.C.) in light of the correct interpretation of that section.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (State / Public Prosecutor)
- Contended that the Sessions Judge committed a serious illegality by appreciating and evaluating prosecution evidence at the stage of S. 232 Cr.P.C and then acquitting the accused.
- Relied on this Court's decision in State of Kerala v. Mohammedkutty to argue that S. 232 permits acquittal only where there is a total absence of evidence regarding the commission of the offence by the accused; this case did not present a total absence of evidence linking the 4th accused to the crime.
- Asked the court to set aside the order of acquittal and remit the matter to the Sessions Judge for disposal according to law from the stage of S. 232 Cr.P.C.
Respondent (4th Accused — Counsel for Respondent)
- Argued that a judge at the stage of S. 232 Cr.P.C is entitled to consider and appreciate the evidence to determine whether there is sufficient evidence for conviction; if not, the judge must acquit under S. 232.
- Submitted that the phrase "there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence" does not mean total absence of evidence connecting the accused to the crime, and stressed that the present Code introduced changes to enable expeditious trials.
- Contended that the decision of this Court (State of Kerala v. Mohammedkutty) should be reconsidered and sought a referral to a Full Bench to test that precedent.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State of Kerala v. Mohammedkutty (1979 KLT. S.N Case No. 74; 1979 K.L.N Case No. 34) | Interpreted S. 232 Cr.P.C. as permitting acquittal only in cases of total absence of evidence connecting the accused with the offence. | The Court expressed respectful agreement with this decision and relied upon it to support the proposition that S. 232 should not be used where some evidence, if believed, would warrant conviction. |
| Queen Empress v. Ramalingam (ILR. 20 Madras 445) | Principle that a Sessions Judge should not form a final opinion on the reliability or acceptability of evidence until the whole evidence is before the court. | The Court cited this as a salutary principle supporting the rule that evaluation of reliability should await later stages of trial. |
| Emperor v. Nawal Kishore Missir ((1929) 30 Crl. L.J 519 at 521) | Explained that "no evidence" means absence of evidence which, if believed, would warrant a conviction — not merely absence of satisfactory evidence. | The Court relied on this articulation to distinguish between "no evidence" and absence of conclusive or satisfactory evidence. |
| Rahamali Howladar v. Emperor (AIR. 1925 Cal 1055) | Held that even worthless evidence is not the same as no evidence; a judge should not direct acquittal on ground that there was no evidence worth the name. | The Court cited this decision to reinforce that "no evidence" must be understood strictly and does not equate to existence only of evidence of poor quality. |
| Kumar v. State of Karnataka (1976 Crl. L.J 925) | Held that under S. 232 a Sessions Judge must determine whether there is any evidence to show the accused committed the offence and should not evaluate reliability at that stage. | The Court cited this authority among several to support the proposition that evidence should not be finally assessed at the S. 232 stage. |
| Bombay High Court decision (1978 Crl. L.J 1168) | Similar proposition as above: under S. 232 the Judge must look for existence of evidence but not evaluate its reliability at that stage. | Used as supporting precedent showing consistent High Court practice on S. 232's scope. |
| Pari Ram v. State of U.P. ((1970) 3 SCC 703) | Under S. 289 of the previous Code, if there is evidence to show the accused committed the offence, the accused should be called upon to enter defence; the value of such evidence is not to be considered at that stage. | The Court applied this Supreme Court principle by analogy to S. 232 Cr.P.C, treating S. 232 as corresponding to S. 289 and endorsing the same approach. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court undertook a textual and contextual interpretation of Section 232 Cr.P.C., situating it within Chapter XVII (Sections 225–237) that governs trial procedure before the Court of Session. The key elements of the Court's reasoning are set out below, following the structure and language used in the opinion:
- Interpretation of "no evidence" in S. 232: The Court held that the words "no evidence" cannot be construed to mean absence of sufficient, satisfactory, trustworthy or conclusive evidence. Instead, the test is whether any legal evidence has been adduced on behalf of the prosecution connecting the accused with the commission of the offence.
- Quality and quantity are not to be assessed at S. 232 stage: The judge should not evaluate the reliability, sufficiency or trustworthiness of the evidence at this stage. If any evidence exists which, if believed, would amount to legal proof of the offence, the judge must proceed to the next stage (i.e., call the accused to enter defence).
- Relationship with previous Code (S. 289): The Court observed that S. 232 corresponds substantially to sub-sections (2) and (3) of S. 289 of the previous Code and there is no material change, so precedents interpreting S. 289 are instructive.
- Distinction among preliminary stages: The Court explained the roles of S. 227 and S. 228 (new sections) where the judge considers record and documents to decide whether to discharge or frame charges. In contrast, under S. 232 the judge must look for legal evidence on the record rather than assess its credibility.
- Application of precedents and salutary principle: The Court relied on multiple authorities (including Queen Empress v. Ramalingam and Pari Ram v. State of U.P.) to emphasize that no final opinion as to reliability should be formed until the whole evidence is before the court and parties have been heard after the prosecution case is complete.
- Conclusion on trial judge's conduct: Applying these principles to the present record, the Court found that the Sessions Judge had in fact evaluated the reliability and trustworthiness of the prosecution evidence at the S. 232 stage and acquitted the accused — a clear illegality under the correct interpretation of S. 232.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is allowed. The Court set aside the order of acquittal made under Section 232 Cr.P.C. and remitted the case to the trial court for fresh disposal according to law from the stage where the illegality was committed (i.e., from the S. 232 Cr.P.C. stage).
Implications:
- The immediate, direct effect is that the Sessions Judge's order of acquittal is vacated and the trial court must proceed afresh from the point at which the improper application of S. 232 occurred.
- The Court's reasoning clarifies that under S. 232 Cr.P.C. a judge must determine whether any legal evidence exists on the prosecution record which, if accepted, would warrant a conviction; the judge must not assess the credibility, reliability or sufficiency of that evidence at that preliminary stage.
- The decision directs trial courts to follow existing authorities construing the corresponding provision in the previous Code (S. 289) and to refrain from evaluating the quality of prosecution evidence when deciding whether to call the accused to enter defence under S. 232. The Court expressly declined to reconsider the earlier decision in State of Kerala v. Mohammedkutty, stating respectful agreement with it.
- Concerning broader precedent-making, the opinion establishes and reiterates the rule about S. 232's proper application in this jurisdiction as articulated in the opinion; the Court remitted the case without expressing findings on the merits of the underlying evidence.
Disposition: Appeal allowed; order of acquittal under S. 232 Cr.P.C. set aside; case remitted to trial court to proceed from the appropriate stage.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Kader, J.:— In connection with the murder of one Sankunni Kurup, Velayudhan, Sankaran, Arumughan and Mundan were tried by the Court of Session, Manjeri Division, for offences punishable under various sections of the IPC. The respondent herein, the 4th accused in the case, had to face a charge under Ss. 449 and 302 IPC. On the conclusion of the trial all the accused were acquitted.
2. The State has now come up in appeal challenging only the order of acquittal of the 4th accused. The accused persons are all Harijans and are mazdoors by profession. The occurrence was on June 6, 1978, sometime between 6 and 6:30 p.m from near an illicit arrack-cum-toddy shop and from inside the house of one Vettan, husband of Cheruneeli (Pw. 11) Devaki (Pw. 8) and her husband Velayudhan were conducting an illicit a arrack-cum-toddy shop in a small shed situated very close to their house. While Parameswaran Nair (Pw. 1) was engaged in collecting paddy seedlings from a seed bed nearby on the southern side of the house of Velayudhan alias Appunni, Kumaran Nair (Pw. 2) came there and was standing near Pw 1. On hearing a wordy altercation from the house of Velayudhan, both Pws. 1 and 2 went there, when they saw accused 1 to 3 in a drunken state making loud noise. Sankunni Kurup also came there at that time. The second accused then asked Sankunni Kurup to return back a cigarette lighter which Sankunni Kurup had taken from him some time back during the Bharani festival at Cranganore. Sankunni Kurup denied having taken any such cigarette lighter from the second accused. Following this there was exchange of words between the second accused and Sankunni Kurup. Pws. 1 and 2 intervened and asked them not to pick up quarrel on a silly matter. Thereafter, the accused persons went to the arrack shop while Sankunni Kurup proceeded towards east. The first accused then ran after Sankunni Kurup, overtook him and wrongfully restraining him from his front side struck him with an umbrella on his neck. Sankunni Kurup then turned back and ran westwards. When Sankunni Kurup reached on the northern side of the arrack shop, accused 1 to 3 surrounded him and attacked him by beating, fisting and kicking. Sankunni Kurup then drew out a dagger and waved it as a result, some of the accused sustained injuries. Sankunni Kurup then entered the house of Vettan and did himself there. At this time, the 4th accused, the elder brother of the first accused, came to the house of Velayudhan with a dagger in his hand asking him where Sankunni Kurup was. Pw 8, wife of Velayudhan prevented him from entering the house. The 4th accused from there went straight to the house of Vettan and entered his house. Pws. 1 and 2 then heard a cry from inside the house. The 4th accused came out of the house with the dagger and disappeared. Then Pws. 1 and 2 along with Velayudhan went to the house of Vettan with a lantern and saw Sankunni Kurup lying with a bleeding injury on his leg, inside Vettan's house. Sankunni Kurup told them that he was stabbed by the 4th accused. While arrangements were being made to take Sankunni Kurup to the hospital, he succumbed to the injury. On the next day morning, Pw. 1 went to the Kattiparathi Police Station and laid Ext. P1, first information statement, at 7 am and a case was registered on that basis Pw. 19, Circle Inspector of Police, taking up investigation into the case, held inquest, made recoveries and questioned witnesses. Pw. 10, doctor, held autopsy over the dead body. The 4th accused was arrested on 13-6-1978 and in pursuance of a statement given by him, M.O 1 dagger and M.O 10 sheath were recovered under mahazar Ext. P14.
3. While denying his guilt, when examined under S. 313 Cr. P.C the accused gave a detailed statement, raising a plea in the nature of self defence of person.
4. The learned Sessions Judge after a full discussion and evaluation of the prosecution evidence acquitted the accused holding that the evidence of Pws. 1, 2, 8, 11 and 12 is unreliable and cannot be acted upon and that the whole prosecution story is improbable and unbelievable.
5. After taking us through the evidence of the eye witnesses and other material evidence in the case, the learned Public Prosecutor strongly contended that the learned Sessions Judge-has committed a serious illegality in duly appreciating and evaluating the evidence of the prosecution witnesses at the stage of S. 232 Cr. P.C and acquitting the accused. It was placing reliance on a decision of this Court in State of Kerala v. Mohammedkutty (1979 KLT. S.N Case No. 74 at p. 37 : 1979 K.L.N Case No. 34 at p. 62) that the Public Prosecutor contended as above. It was argued that from the wording of S. 232 Cr. P.C as interpreted by this Court in the abovesaid decision, it is only in a case where the Presiding Officer considers that there is total absence of evidence in regard to the commission of the offence alleged, that an accused can be acquitted under S. 232 Cr. P.C, and that this is not a case where there was no legal evidence or there was total absence of evidence to connect the 4th accused with the commission of the offence alleged against him. The learned Public Prosecutor therefore wanted us to set aside the order of acquittal on this short ground and send back the case to the learned Sessions Judge for disposal according to law, from the stage of S. 232 Cr. P.C
6. The learned advocate appearing for the respondent, on the other hand, made a strong attempt to show that a judge is entitled at this stage to duly consider and appreciate the evidence for the purpose of finding out whether there was sufficient evidence for convicting the accused and if he finds there is no sufficient evidence to enter a conviction, he is bound to record an order of acquittal under S. 232 Cr. P.C The counsel submitted that the expression that “there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence” does not mean total absence of evidence connecting the accused with the commission of the crime; that there is substantial change between the present section and the corresponding section in the previous Code; that it was with a view to have an expeditious trial that these provisions were amended; that while interpreting the section that should be borne in mind and finally the learned counsel canvassed the correctness of the decision of this Court and wanted us to reconsider the same and refer the matter to a Full Bench.
7. After duly considering the arguments advanced on either side and carefully perusing all the relevant sections in Chapter XVII, we are of the view that the words “no evidence” in S. 232 Cr. P.C cannot be construed or interpreted to mean absence of sufficient evidence for conviction or absence of satisfactory or trustworthy or conclusive evidence in support of the charge. The judge has to see whether any evidence has been let in on behalf of the prosecution in support of their case that the accused committed the offence alleged, and whether that evidence is legal and relevant. It is not the quality or the quantity of the evidence that has to be considered at this stage. If there is any evidence to show that the accused has committed the offence, then the judge has to pass on to the next stage. It is not open to him to evaluate or consider the reliability of the evidence at this stage.
8. Ss. 225 to 237, appearing in Chapter XVIII of the Code, deal with procedures relating to trial of cases before the Court of Session. The object of section 232, no doubt, is to have a speedier conclusion of the trial and to avoid unnecessary harassment to the accused by calling upon him to enter on his defence and adduce evidence. This section substantially corresponds to sub-sections (2) and (3) of S. 289 of the previous Code and there is no material change. In a trial, before a Court of Session, an accused has a right to claim for a discharge under S. 227 of the Code. This is a new provision introduced in the present Code. Under this section if upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf, the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused after recording his reasons for so doing. Under S. 228, which is also a new section, if, after consideration of the record and documents referred to in S. 227 of the Code, and hearing both parties, the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which is exclusively triable by that court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused, and if the offence is not exclusively triable by that court, he may frame a charge against the accused, and, by order, transfer the case for trial to the Chief Judicial Magistrate Under the above sections, the Judge is not considering any evidence in the strict or legal sense, but it is only the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith which have to be considered by him. It is not necessary that at this stage these documents must have been proved. Under S. 232, what the Judge has to look into and consider is whether there is legal evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution connecting the accused with the commission of the crime and not its quality and quantity. He is not to consider at this stage the sufficiency, reliability or trustworthiness of that evidence. In other words, what the Judge has to see is whether there is any evidence on record which, if true, would amount to legal proof of the offence charged against the accused and not whether that evidence is satisfactory, trustworthy or reliable. Although direct decisions under S. 232 on the point are very few, there are a number of decisions under S. 289 of the previous Code, where various High Courts have considered what is meant by the expression “no evidence” in that section. It is a salutary principle in a sessions trial that no final opinion as to the reliability or acceptability of the evidence should be arrived at by the Judge until the whole evidence is before him and has been duly considered. (See Queen Empress v. Ramalingam : ILR. 20 Madras 445) It is only after the accused is called upon to enter his defence under S. 233 and after the evidence, if any, adduced on behalf of the accused and hearing the counsel appearing for both sides, the Judge hearing the case after a due consideration of the evidence decides whether the evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution is reliable and trustworthy. In cases solely depending upon the ocular account of the witnesses, it might sometimes happen that all those witnesses, one by one, might turn hostile to the prosecution without giving any evidence in support of the prosecution. There may be a case where the only legal evidence on record in support of the prosecution case is the confession of a co-accused or the evidence of witnesses examined on behalf of a co-accused. In cases where there are a number of accused, it might happen there may not be any evidence connecting one or more of them with the commission of the offence. There may also be cases where evidence connecting the accused with the crime is only rank hearsay. All these are cases where it can be said that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence and S. 232 can be invoked. But in a case where there is some evidence connecting the accused with the commission of the crime, it is the duty of the Judge to pass on to S. 233 and not to appreciate that evidence and find out whether it was reliable or not to pass an order under S. 232 Cr. P.C The expression “there is no evidence” under S. 289 does not mean absence of reliable or conclusive evidence but means absence of evidence which, if believed to be true, would warrant a conviction. (See Emperor v. Nawal Kishore Missir (1929) 30 Crl. L.J 519 at 521). It was held in Rahamali Howladar v. Emperor (AIR. 1925 Cal 1055) that if there is any evidence, although worthless, Judge should not direct jury to return verdict of not guilty; that no evidence worth the name is under the law very different from no evidence; that if a Judge directs the jury to return a verdict of not guilty, because he holds that there was no evidence worth the name against the accused, he commits an error of law. The question what is meant by “no evidence” under S. 232 came up for consideration before the Karnataka High Court in Kumar v. State of Karnataka (1976 Crl. L.J 925) and before the Bombay High Court in 1978 Crl. L.J 1168. In both these cases, it was held that under S. 232 the Sessions Judge has to look into the prosecution evidence and the materials brought out in the examination of the accused and after hearing the counsel for both sides decide whether there is any evidence or not, to show that the accused had committed the offence and that at that stage the Judge is not entitled to evaluate the evidence and find out whether the evidence is reliable and trustworthy. In Pari Ram v. State of U.P ((1970) 3 SCC 703) while considering a similar question arising under S. 289 of the previous Code, it was held by the Supreme Court that what S. 289 requires is that if the Sessions Judge comes to the conclusion that there is evidence to show that the accused had committed the offence, then the accused should be called upon to enter on his defence and that the value to be attached to that evidence was not to be considered at that stage. A Division Bench of this Court also, as pointed out earlier, took the same view in State of Kerala v. Mohamedkutty (1979 KLT. SN. Case No. 74 p. 37 : 1979 K.L.N Case No. 34 p. 62). We are in respectful agreement with this decision which, according to us, does not require any reconsideration. On looking into the materials on record in the light of the principles stated above, it cannot be said that this is a case where there is no evidence as contemplated under S. 232 Cr. P.C
9. It is clear from the above discussion and finding that the learned Sessions Judge has committed a clear illegality by appreciating and finding out whether the evidence was reliable and trustworthy and acquitting the accused under S. 232 Cr. P.C This being a serious illegality the order of acquittal under this section has to be set aside and the case has to be sent back to the court below, for fresh disposal. We therefore allow this appeal, set aside the order of acquittal, without going into the merits or demerits of the evidence on record, send back the case to the trial court for disposal afresh according to law, from the stage where the illegality was committed by that court.
10. Allowed.
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