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Hydru And Another v. Govindankutty Nair .
Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The dispute concerned a report from an expert relating to handwriting and fingerprint evidence that had already been furnished. The central procedural event was an application made by the plaintiff (who is the respondent in the petition) under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code for the Court to obtain a second expert report after receiving an adverse report from the first handwriting expert. The trial Court allowed that application on the ground that there was no legal bar. The petitioners challenged the allowance of the second reference, contending the Court had no jurisdiction to make a second reference without setting aside the earlier proceedings. The matter reached the court issuing the present opinion, which examined statutory provisions (Order 26 R.10 and R.10-A of the Civil Procedure Code, and Section 45 and related provisions of the Evidence Act), relevant case law, and the circumstances under which a second expert reference may be made.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a Court, without setting aside an earlier expert's report, can refer the matter to a second expert (particularly in handwriting and fingerprint disputes).
- Whether the report of an expert (especially a handwriting expert) can be treated as evidence without examining the expert personally in Court, and whether commissions under Order 26 (including R.10-A for scientific investigation) permit treating such reports as evidence.
- Whether Rule 10(3) of Order 26 (which allows the Court to direct further inquiry if it is “dissatisfied with the proceedings of the Commissioner”) precludes issuing a second commission without setting aside the earlier commissioner's report, and whether R.10-A(2) brings scientific investigations within the scope of R.10(3).
- How Sections 45 and 46 of the Evidence Act (relevancy of expert opinion) and related evidence provisions (Sections 59–67) affect the mode and admissibility of expert opinion evidence.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The Court has no jurisdiction to make a second reference without wiping out or setting aside the earlier proceedings and report.
- Counsel for the petitioners relied on Order 26 (particularly Rules 9 and 10-A, and Rule 10) to argue that the reference amounted to the issue of a commission under Rule 10-A and that, once a commission for scientific investigation had produced a report, that report could be treated as evidence without further examination in Court (relying on sub-rule (2) of Rule 10-A and Rule 10(2)).
- Mr. Venkitakrishnan for the petitioners urged authorities (Madras decisions and others) asserting that successive commissions covering the same ground are improper and that the Court should not ordinarily appoint a second Commissioner without applying its mind to the proceedings of the first.
Respondent's Arguments
- The respondent submitted that an expert's report is only a piece of evidence, and the Evidence Act does not restrict the parties or the Court to a single expert opinion.
- The respondent relied on the view that expert opinions (under Section 45) are relevant but their mode of proof must be considered with reference to the Evidence Act; experts may be examined like other witnesses, and multiple experts may be called.
- Representations cited by respondent's counsel (including Narayana Kekunnaya v. Derinjathaya and Koragan v. Koran) were invoked to show that courts can permit multiple expert opinions and that the weight of expert evidence depends upon the reasons and the data given by the expert rather than upon the mere existence of a prior report.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court in This Opinion |
|---|---|---|
| Ambi v. Kunhikavamma (AIR 1929 Mad 661) | Condemnation of practice of issuing successive commissions covering same ground; interpretation of O.26 R.10(3) as contemplating further enquiry by the same Commissioner rather than appointment of another. | The court treated Ambi as supporting the view that R.10(3) contemplates remission to the same Commissioner and does not necessarily authorize appointing a second Commissioner to cover the same ground; but it also observed that Ambi's dicta do not fully resolve the statutory construction issue and afford limited guidance. |
| Thottamma v. Subramaniayyan (AIR 1922 Mad 219) | Critique of the successive-commission practice (cited within Ambi). | Cited as part of the Madras line of authority condemning issuance of successive commissions; used in tracing the Madras viewpoint which the court examined but did not accept uncritically. |
| Kunhikutty Ali v. Mohammed Haji (AIR 1931 Mad 73) | Followed Ambi's approach; statement that first Commissioner's report should be “wiped out altogether” where a second commission is called for. | Noted as part of the Madras authorities; court observed that such statements equate to treating the first report as if never made, but questioned whether that construction fits the Code. |
| Panangat Blahayil Karnavan v. Achuta Menon (AIR 1932 Mad 482) | Part of Madras decisions endorsing limitation on successive commissions. | Noted as part of the Madras cluster of authority; the court surveyed it as background but analyzed statutory language instead of treating these precedents as conclusively binding. |
| Seetharamacharyalu v. Ranganayakamma (AIR 1958 Andh Pra 304) | Referenced with approval in subsequent decisions discussing commissions. | Referred to as part of the body of cases that had considered the issue; used in the overview of jurisprudence but not treated as determinative. |
| Moidu v. Lekshmi Amma (1968 Ker LT 699) | Comment that appointing a second Commissioner without setting aside the first may be an irregularity but need not be committed in every case. | Noted as indicating judicial caution about routine appointment of second commissioners; court regarded it as a measured endorsement of discretion. |
| Shib Charan Sahu v. Sarada Prasad (AIR 1937 Pat 670) | Patna High Court decision refusing to accept Madras view that first Commissioner's report should be wiped out before issuing a second commission; held that Court may issue second commission and that first report remains evidence. | The opinion found the Patna view persuasive and cited Courtney Terrell, C.J.'s reasoning that first reports are evidence and cannot be treated as wiped out; this view influenced the court's conclusion that reports cannot be automatically expunged. |
| B.C. Ghose v. T.P. Ghose ((1966) 70 Cal WN 266) | Considered the Madras view but expressed reservations; held that commission reports are evidence and cannot simply be wiped out. | Used to support the position that commission reports are pieces of evidence with no sanctity beyond their evidentiary value and cannot be summarily expunged; the court associated with its reservations about Madras approach. |
| Satyanarayana v. Sarbeswar (ILR (1966) Cut 412) | Considered the issue of wiping out a first report in the context of a second report. | Recorded as preferring the Patna view over Madras, and thus cited in the court's survey to show judicial support for preserving the evidentiary character of the first report. |
| Chottu v. Gurbhajan (AIR 1972 Punj & Har 265) | Preferred the Patna view over the Madras view on the issue of second commissions and treatment of the first report. | Noted as another decision aligning with Patna reasoning; contributed to the court's conclusion that first reports remain evidence and need not be set aside as a precondition to issuing a second commission. |
| Narayana Guptan v. Madhava Menon & Others (AIR 1965 Ker 95) | Discussion of Madras view understood in light of Patna decisions. | Cited to show that some judges were prepared to read the Madras view in a limited sense consistent with Patna; court used it to show judicial attempts to reconcile authorities. |
| Narayana Kekunnaya v. Derinjathaya (1961 Ker LT 960) | Held that expert's report without personal examination deserves little weight; experts are like other witnesses and may be called in any number. | The court relied on this line to support the proposition that multiple experts may be called and that the weight of expert evidence depends on the reasons and data offered, reinforcing the discretionary power to call further experts. |
| Koragan v. Koran (1978 Ker LT 872) | Followed the view in Narayana Kekunnaya that multiple experts may be permitted. | Cited as an authority endorsing the approach that experts can be called in any number; used to buttress the court's conclusion about discretion in calling experts. |
| Ramalingam v. Ramanathan (AIR 1978 Kant 65) | Applied the usual rule against issue of a second commission in context of O.26 R.9 (local inspection). | Noted by the court as an example where the rule against successive commissions was applied, but the court observed the distinction that that commission was under R.9 and not under R.10-A. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in a structured way, grounded primarily in statutory language and then guided by precedent:
- Statutory framing under the Evidence Act: The court examined Sections 45 and 46 of the Evidence Act and concluded these provisions deal only with relevancy — Section 45 makes an expert's opinion relevant where the Court has to form an opinion as to handwriting identity, and Section 46 makes otherwise irrelevant facts relevant where they support or rebut the expert's opinion. These provisions do not prescribe the mode of making expert opinion evidence.
- Evidence Act and mode of proof: The court noted Sections 59–67 governing proof of facts and documents. In particular, Section 59 allows oral evidence for facts, and Section 60 requires oral evidence to be direct. The court observed that an expert's opinion is not an exception to the requirement of oral direct evidence unless specifically covered by statute. For documents, Sections 61–66 and Section 67 are relevant when genuineness is disputed. Thus, the opinion concluded that ordinarily an expert's opinion under Section 45 should be given orally before the Court; a mere report or certificate, standing alone, is not normally evidence.
- Procedure under the Civil Procedure Code: The court analysed Order 26, especially Rules 9, 10 and 10-A. It reproduced Rule 10 (procedure for commissioners under R.9) which states the commissioner’s report and evidence taken shall be evidence in the suit and that the Court may examine the commissioner personally; sub-rule (3) allows the Court to direct further enquiry if dissatisfied with the proceedings of the commissioner. Rule 10-A permits commissions for scientific investigation where the investigation cannot conveniently be conducted before the Court, and Rule 10 applies "as far as may be".
- Meaning of "proceedings" in R.10(3) and whether it includes the report: The court compared the language of Rule 10(3) with Rule 12(2) (which refers to "proceedings and report" separately) and inferred that "proceedings" in R.10(3) cannot reasonably be taken to include the “report.” Therefore, R.10(3) contemplates directing further enquiry (typically to the same commissioner) about proceedings rather than a statutory mechanism to set aside a report.
- Whether the Court can "wipe out" a report that is part of the record: Because R.10(2) prescribes that the report and evidence taken by the commissioner shall be evidence in the suit and part of the record, the court considered whether it could expunge that report absent specific statutory power. The court concluded sub-rule (3) does not provide power to wipe out evidence already part of the record; it contemplates a further enquiry resulting in another report which also becomes evidence by operation of sub-rule (2).
- Distinction with Rule 14 and partition reports: Rule 14 (commissions for partition) explicitly provides for confirmation, variation or setting aside of reports and for issuing a new commission; R.10 does not contain corresponding language. Hence, the court concluded the power to issue another commission in matters other than partition cannot be read as contingent upon setting aside the first report; rather, the general principle that the power to issue a commission is not exhausted by the first exercise supports courts issuing further commissions in appropriate circumstances.
- Survey of authorities and choice among views: The court undertook a detailed survey of precedents. It acknowledged the Madras line of decisions (beginning with Ambi and followed in several cases) condemning the practice of successive commissions as a matter of practice, and observed these decisions emphasize R.10(3) contemplates further inquiry by the same commissioner. The court contrasted this with the Patna view (Shib Charan Sahu), which refused to accept that a first commissioner's report could be wiped out and held that a trial court could appoint additional commissions and still consider the first report as evidence. Other decisions (e.g., B.C. Ghose v. T.P. Ghose, Satyanarayana, Chottu) expressed reservations about wiping out first reports and tended toward the Patna approach. The court treated the precedent survey as illustrating two approaches and found the Patna-inclined view persuasive on the specific question whether statutory language permits wiping out first reports.
- Specific considerations for scientific investigation under R.10-A: The court noted Rules 10A–10C were introduced after amendment and observed that R.10-A(2) applies Rule 10 “as far as may be,” which the court read as a legislative recognition that scientific investigations may require greater flexibility (because experts may differ). This was used to support a view that Rule 10-A does not rigidly limit courts to a single expert opinion.
- Handwriting experts and commissions under Rule 9: The court acknowledged authorities applying the usual rule against second commissions in local inspection cases under R.9 (e.g., Ramalingam v. Ramanathan) but also noted other decisions (e.g., Narayana Kekunnaya, Koragan) that permitted multiple experts and emphasized the need to examine expert witnesses in Court if their opinion is to carry weight. The court observed that much of the earlier litigation arose under R.9 and that the distinct context of R.10-A (scientific investigation) had not always been considered.
- Synthesis and final statutory-construction conclusion: The court concluded that neither Order 26 nor Section 45 of the Evidence Act contains an absolute prohibition against a second reference to a handwriting expert without setting aside the earlier report. Rather, the court held there is a judicial discretion to order a second reference in appropriate circumstances; that discretion must be exercised cautiously and circumspectly.
- Application to the case at hand: The plaintiff (respondent) sought a second handwriting report under Section 151 after an adverse first report; the trial court allowed the application solely on the ground there was no "legal bar" and did not advert to sufficient reasons. The court in the present opinion cautioned that mere absence of a statutory bar is not sufficient alone to exercise discretion, but nonetheless allowed the impugned order to stand subject to the condition that the plaintiff-respondent bear the entire expenses of the second report irrespective of the result of the suit.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court held that there is no absolute statutory prohibition against a Court making a second reference to a handwriting (or scientific) expert without setting aside the earlier report; the Court possesses a discretion to do so. The impugned order allowing the second reference was allowed to stand, but on the condition that the plaintiff-respondent would bear the entire expenses related to the second report regardless of the outcome of the suit. The court ordered "No costs."
Implications
- Direct effect on the parties: The trial Court's order permitting a second expert report is upheld; the plaintiff-respondent must pay the entire expenses for the second report irrespective of the suit's result.
- Scope for trial courts: The opinion recognises a judicial discretion to appoint further expert inquiries (including under R.10-A for scientific investigations), but emphasizes that this discretion must be exercised with caution and is not a carte blanche to order multiple commissions routinely.
- On precedent and novelty: The court surveyed conflicting precedents (Madras vs. Patna lines) and preferred an approach that preserves first reports as evidence while allowing further enquiries where justified. The opinion does not purport to create an absolute new doctrine; it frames a discretionary rule and stresses circumspection. The court noted R.10-A's relative novelty and indicated that its views on its scope are not necessarily the last word.
Order: The impugned order is allowed to stand subject to the condition that the plaintiff-respondent shall bear the entire expenses connected with the second report; no costs were awarded.
1. Where an expert has already furnished a report about the handwriting and fingerprint in dispute, can the Court, without setting it aside, refer the matter to a second expert? This is the question raised. While the petitioners contend that the Court has no jurisdiction to make a second reference without wiping out the earlier proceedings, in view of Order 26, R. 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, the respondent would urge that a report is only a piece of evidence and that the Evidence Act does not restrict the choice to one only.
2. Section 45 of the Evidence Act makes the opinion of an expert relevant when the Court has to form an opinion as to the identity of handwriting; and under S. 46 facts otherwise irrelevant become relevant if they support or rebut the experts opinion. These two provisions only deal with relevancy, and not with the mode of making expert opinion evidence before the Court. Section 59 provides that all facts except the contents of documents may be proved by oral evidence. Section 60 requires oral evidence to be direct. The opinion of an expert is not an exception to the latter requirement, unless covered by other statutory provisions. Even as regards the contents of documents, they require proof under the provisions of Sections 61 to 66; and when the genuineness of the document itself is disputed, proof under Section 67 is necessary. Normally, therefore, the expert's opinion under Section 45 should be given orally before Court and a mere report or certificate from him cannot be evidence. Any witness can be examined on commission under the provisions of O. 26, Rr. 1 to 8 of the C.P.C, and conceivably an expert can also be so examined. Rules 1 and 4, however, use the words “may issue” and the preponderance of judicial opinion is that the Court has a discretion in the matter. In the case of handwriting experts the trend of case law seems to be against issue of commission to examine an expert as witness.
3. Counsel for the petitioners referred to Rr. 9 and 10-A of Order 26 to contend that the reference in this case amounted to issue of a commission under R. 10-A, and that the report of a hand-writing expert can be treated as evidence without examining him in Court. Rule 9 deals with commission for local inspection and does not directly apply. Rule 10(2) however provides that the Commissioner's report and the evidence taken by him shall be treated as evidence in the suit even if he is not examined in Court, and sub-rule (2) of Rule 10-A extends the application of the above principle to reports of Commissioners appointed for “scientific investigation”. Assuming that the reference made to the handwriting expert in this case amounts to the issue of a commission for scientific investigation and that his report becomes evidence before the Court as contended for, the further question still remains whether a Court is powerless to issue a second commission without setting aside the report of a Commissioner appointed earlier for the same purpose.
4. Rule 10 of Order 26 which relates to the procedure of commissions appointed for local investigation under R. 9, reads:—
“(1) The Commissioner, after such local inspection as he deems necessary and after reducing to writing the evidence taken by him, shall return such evidence, together with his report in writing signed by him to the Court.
(2) Report and depositions to be evidence in suit— Commissioner may be examined in persons.— The report of the Commissioner and the evidence taken by him (but not the evidence without the report) shall be evidence in the suit and shall form part of the record; but the Court or, with the permission of the Court, any of the parties to the suit may examine the Commissioner personally in open Court touching any of the matters referred to him or mentioned in his report, or as to his report or as to the manner in which he has made the investigation.
(3) Where the Court is for any reason dissatisfied with the proceedings of the Commissioner, it may direct such further inquiry to be made as it shall think fit.”
Rule 10-A provides:—
“(1) Where any question arising in a suit involves any scientific investigation which cannot, in the opinion of the Court, be conveniently conducted before the Court the Court may, if it thinks it necessary or expedient in the interests of justice so to do, issue a commission to such person as it thinks fit directing him to inquire into such question and report thereon to the Court.
(2) The provisions of R. 10 of this Order shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to a Commissioner appointed under this rule as they apply in relation to a Commissioner appointed under R. 9.”
5. The argument is that R. 10(3) contains a statutory bar against issue of a second commission without setting aside the report of the first, and that this prohibition applies to scientific investigations also, in view of R. 10-A(2). Rule 10(3) speaks of the Court getting “dissatisfied with the proceedings of the commissioner”. Does the word “proceedings” mean or include the report of the commissioner? Rule 12(2) dealing with commissioners appointed for examining accounts refers separately to “proceedings and report” of the Commissioner so that it may be reasonable to infer that “proceedings” alone in R. 10(3) cannot include the “report” of the commissioner. The dissatisfaction of the Court under this sub-rule must therefore be about the proceedings and not the report; and if that be so, the sub-rule does not touch the report at all so as to read into it an implied power in the Court to set it aside. Again, what the Court is to do when its dissatisfaction clouds the proceedings of the commissioner is “to direct such further enquiry” i.e to direct the same commissioner to continue the “investigation” or “enquiry” (under R. 9 or R. 10-A, as the case may be) for which he is appointed.
6. Rule 10(2) prescribes that the report of the commissioner and the evidence taken by him shall be evidence in the suit and shall form part of the record. When it is so pre-scribed, can the Court efface it from record by what is often called setting aside the report, in the absence of specific power conferred therefor by the statute itself? Sub-rule (3) does not specifically provide for wiping out evidence which is already part of the record; it only contemplates a further enquiry and therefore a further report, which will also become evidence and part of the record by virtue of sub-rule (2). If the Court is dissatisfied about the proceedings of the first commissioner, it may not attach much probative value to his report in deciding the issue before it; but that is a different thing from saying that the Court can totally ignore the evidence or even delete the report from the record. Rule 14 prescribing the procedure for commissioners appointed to make partition obliges the Court to confirm, vary or set aside their reports; and when the reports are set aside, a “new commission” can be issued. The language of R. 10(3) is different; it does not provide for setting aside a report and issuing a new or second commission. It is not the repository of the Court's power to issue a second commission. That power in matters other than partition has therefore to be traced to the well-known principle that the power to issue a commission is not exhausted with the first exercise thereof. And in the absence of statutory prescriptions like those in R. 14, setting aside the first report cannot be a condition precedent for exercise of the power to call for another.
7. Mr. Venkitakrishnan for the petitioners politely reminded me that the above approach is almost blasphemous, tested in the light of the weighty authorities cited by him, authorities which according to him, have stood the test of time. I shall therefore proceed to examine them, if only for the reason that no Judge would like to be a lone crusader, though it is not unknown in the annals of law also that what was once considered heresy came to be recognised in course of time as right and rational. Antiquity and inveteracy call for respect, but subject only to reason, where the precedent is persuasive.
8. Ambi v. Kunhikavamma (AIR 1929 Mad 661), the first decision cited, and decided by Odgers and Wallace, JJ-, started with the observation:—
“The practice of the issue of a succession of commissions covering the same ground (incidentally, at a ruinous expense to the parties) has been, we are aware, in vogue with Courts in Malabar for many years, but was condemned strongly by a Bench of this Court in “Thottamma v. Subramaniayyan, AIR 1922 Mad 219”. It is no doubt a simple method by which the Court may evade coming to grips with the case and postpone the trial as long as possible, but we are satisfied that there is no justification for it in the Code of Civil Procedure.”
Assuming that what was said about the Courts and the practice in “Malabar” in the beginning of this century continues to be valid to this day, that appears to me, with great respect, to afford little clue for construing the provisions of the Code. And as to these provisions their Lordships referred to Rr. 9 and 10 of Order 26, saying:
“……… it was not open to the lower Court to run both the commissions at the same time, both covering exactly the same ground. The rule is R. 10(3) and lays down that the further enquiry may be ordered when the Court is for any reason dissatisfied with the proceedings of the Commissioner. It may be noted that there is here no provision corresponding to that in R. 14(3) under which the Courts may issue a new commission. What is contemplated under R. 10(3) obviously is a further enquiry by the Commissioner already appointed or by the Court itself. It may be that where the Court is so dissatisfied with the whole proceedings of the Commissioner that it thinks it better to discard the whole record and start afresh, such a procedure would not be contrary to the Code.”
Pausing here for a minute, the view that I have expressed earlier that R. 10(3) contemplates only a remittance to the same Commissioner and not the appointment of another, finds support in the above dicta. If Rule 14(3) alone provides for the setting aside of a report and the appointment of a second Commissioner, and if R. 10(3) is to be understood differently, what is meant by saying that under the latter rule the court can “discard” the first commissioner's report? ‘Discard’ does not mean setting aside; and “start afresh” cannot mean issue of a second commission, if the distinction between Rr. 10(3) and 14(3) is not overlooked. The further observation (in the succeeding paragraph of the decision) that if the first Commissioner's report is wholly useless, the Court can proceed as if it had never been made, does not appear to do full justice to the aforesaid distinction.
9. It is true that Ambi (AIR 1929 Mad 661) was followed by the same Court in Kunhikutty Ali v. Mohammed Haji (AIR 1931 Mad 73) and Panangat Blahayil Karnavan v. Achuta Menon (AIR 1932 Mad 482) and that some of these were referred to with approval in Seetharamacharyalu v. Ranganayakamma (AIR 1958 Andh Pra 304), Moidu v. Lekshmi Amma (1968 Ker LT 699) and a few other decisions, to form a formidable array of authorities. In Kunhikutty's case it was even observed that the report of the first Commissioner should be “wiped out altogether” and that the Court could look into the second report only, when one is called for, which is the same thing as saying that the Court should proceed as if the first report had never been made, as was said in Ambi. But in Shib Charan Sahu v. Sarada Prasad (AIR 1937 Pat 670) a Division Bench of the Patna High Court refused to recognise the Madras view as authority for the proposition that the first Commissioner's report should or could be wiped out and treated as non est before a second commission was issued. Courtney Terrel, C.J said:—
“In those judgments, the Madras High Court was endeavouring to correct a very bad tendency on the part of the Munsifs of the Malabar districts who appeared to have got into the habit of sending out simultaneous commissions to investigate the same issue of fact and then taking all the Commissioner's reports into consideration and deciding as between these various reports which of them was preferable; and this habit of sending out commissions whether simultaneous or consecutive had become a nuisance which the Madras High Court very properly desired to check and put an end to. I can find in those judgments no statement of a principle such as is contended for in this appeal. There is nothing in O. 26, R. 10, Civil P.C to justify such a contention. It is in the power of the trial Court to send out a second or even a third commission, and when all the materials are before the Court it may at the time of delivering judgment attach very little or no weight to the first Commissioner's report, but this is very far from saying that this amounts to requiring the first report to be wiped out of the record and not considered as evidence. That the argument is entirely unsound is seen on considering what, if it were true, would be the position in the case of an Appellate Court. The first Court's decision on the matter of fact is not final and if the contention were to be accepted, it would prevent an Appellate Court from taking into consideration the first Commissioner's report: this consideration alone is sufficient to demonstrate the fallacy of the argument.”
10. The question whether the first Commissioner's report could be looked into in a case where a second report was called for, directly arose for decision in B.C Ghose v. T.P Ghose ((1966) 70 Cal WN 266). P.B Mukharji, J. approved the Madras view that the Court should not ordinarily appoint a second Commissioner without applying its mind to the satisfactory nature of the proceedings of the first; but beyond that, his Lordship had “some reservations”. It was observed that the first report was also evidence and could not be wiped out; commission reports had no sanctity except as pieces of evidence for elucidating any matter in dispute. The Patna view in Shib Charan Sahu's case (AIR 1937 Pat 670) was referred to and his Lordship said:—
“I respectfully associate myself with the observations of Courtney-Terrell, C.J on the interpretation of the Madras decision.”
On the question of wiping out the first report in the context of a second report by another Commissioner, Satyanarayana v. Sarbeswar, ILR (1966) Cut 412 and Chottu v. Gurbhajan (AIR 1972 Punj & Har 265) also preferred the Patna view to that of Madras.
11. In Narayana Guptan…* v. Madhava Menon & Others… 453) : (AIR 1965 Ker 95), Velu Pillai, J. was prepared to understand the Madras view only in the manner explained by Patna. And in Moidu v. Lekshmi Amma (1968 Ker LT 699) this Court only said that even if the appointment of a second Commissioner without setting aside the report of the first is an irregularity only, that need not be committed in every case. These two decisions of this Court seem to have made only a passing reference to the Madras and Patna views, without attempting any independent discussion. In fact, most of the decisions noticed above had arisen from cases where commissions were issued under Rule 9 for local investigations. Whether a scientific investigation under Rule 10A or the opinion of exprerts under Section 45 of the Evidence Act would stand on the same footing or not was not considered.
12. Rules 10A to 10C of Order 26 were introduced into the Code when Section 75 was amended by Act 104/76. In the case of Commissions under Rules 10B and 10C (for performing ministerial acts and for selling movables), the provisions of sub-rule (2) insist, in each case, that Rule 10 shall apply to such commissions also; but when it comes to Rule 10A, the relevant sub-rule (2) makes such application only “as far as may be”. This relaxation may be indicative of an awareness on the part of the legislature itself that the procedure relating to scientific experts requires flexibility, as they do not often agree on all matters. Very recently we have been hearing such experts speaking in different voices as to the possible effect on ecology if a hydroelectric project is to be set up in the Silent Valley. Divergent views were expressed by engineers about the possible methods for strengthening the Mullapperiyer Dam. Why should anyone insist that the court can have the assistance of only one scientific expert at a time? The proceedings of one expert may not be wholly useless; still the Court may consider another report helpful. Of course, R. 10A is new, and mine cannot be the last word on its scope; but the matter is at least not in the region of binding precedents.
13. Turning to the question of handwriting experts, reference was made to the Ramalingam v. Ramanathan (AIR 1978 Kant 65) where the Court applied the usual rule against issue of a second commission. The commission there was under O. 26, R. 9, and not under R. 10A; and the scope of R. 10(3) was also not discussed with reference to its language or decided cases. Mr. N. Subramonian for the respondent, on the other hand, cited Narayana Kekunnaya v. Derinjathaya (1961 Ker LT 960) where a calligraphic expert of New Delhi had given a report favourable to the plaintiff and the defendant wanted another expert at Madras to look into the matter again. This request was objected to on the ground that the first report had not been set aside. Madhavan Nair J. did not uphold the objection. His Lordship said:—
“The weight of such evidence tendered by an expert depends upon the soundness of the reasons given in support of it. If he gives no data in support of his opinion, the opinion deserves only to be rejected. It then follows that the report of an expert as to his opinion is not legal evidence unless he appears in Court as a witness and is examined by both parties in respect of his opinion. In an enquiry as to the identity of a handwriting, the Court has to be told the peculiar prevailing character of the handwriting concerned which distinguishes it from the handwriting of every other person, the correctness of which will have to be tested by cross-examination by the opposing party. It is possible then to weigh the opinions of experts who may appear to testify to the same on the strength of the data and the reasons that each expert witness may give in support of his opinion. Suffice it to say for the present that experts are just like other witnesses and may be called in any number by the parties concerned.”
And the above view was followed by Janaki Amma, J. in Koragan v. Koran (1978 Ker LT 872).
14. The above discussion leads to the conclusion that whether it be under O. 26 of the Code or under S. 45 of the Evidence Act, there is no prohibition as such against making a second reference to a handwriting expert without setting aside the report of the first; the Court has a discretion in the matter. To say so is not to handover to the alcoholic the key of the distillery and to permit the trial Courts to issue commissions galore, but only to distinguish a matter of practice from a matter of law. The discretion is there, of course, to be used with circumspection.
15. And now to the case on hand. Faced with an adverse report from one handwriting expert, the plaintiff (respondent herein) applied under S. 151 of the Code for getting a report from another expert; and the Court allowed the application on the only ground that there was no “legal bar”. It does not appear that the plaintiff had set out sufficient reasons in support of his application; and even if he had, the Court did not advert to any. This is not an instance like the one considered by Madhavan Nair J. in Narayana Kekunnaya (1961 Ker LT 960) where the second reference was made at the instance of the defendant for rebutting the expert opinion tendered in favour of the plaintiff. Under the circumstances, while cautioning the Court below that the mere absence of a ‘legal bar’ is no ground for exercising its discretion in every case, I would allow the impugned order to stand, but on condition that irrespective of the result of the suit, the plaintiff-respondent would bear the entire expenses in connection with the second report.
Ordered as above. No costs.
Order accordingly.
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