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Mrs. U.A Sumathy And Another v. Dig Vijay Chit Fund (P.) Ltd.

Kerala High Court
Jul 1, 1980
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Judgment Summary: M.P. Menon, J. — Petition under s. 237, Companies Act, 1956

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition was filed by two members of Dig Vijay Chit Fund (P.) Ltd. under s. 237 of the Companies Act, 1956 seeking a declaration that the affairs of the company require investigation by an inspector appointed by the Central Government.

The company’s principal business is in kuries and money-lending. The first petitioner, together with six other shareholders, had earlier sought winding-up of the company but that petition was dismissed on the ground that they had other remedies and that winding-up was unreasonable on the facts. The present petition is a resort to one of those other remedies under s. 237.

The petitioners alleged, broadly, that the chief agent and the directors were oppressing other shareholders and misusing their control: the chief agent and relatives held 72 shares, the directors another 122; in April 1972 the company allegedly fraudulently sold 64 shares belonging to seven non‑supporting members to relatives of the directors and chief agent; the management allegedly misappropriated company funds, destroyed records to cover misdeeds, caused loss by declining to proceed against debtors, and wrote off bad debts after privately collecting payments. Some particulars were furnished and petitioners alleged resultant losses to the company.

The company filed a counter-affidavit denying the allegations. Evidence was adduced on both sides: the second petitioner was examined as P.W.1 and Exhibits A‑1 to A‑6 were produced for petitioners; the company examined its managing director as R.W.1 and produced Exhibits B‑1 to B‑7.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the court can, under s. 237(a)(ii) of the Companies Act, order an investigation by the Central Government irrespective of the number (numerical strength) of members seeking the court's intervention, i.e., whether a prior application to the Central Government under s. 236 or the minimum member threshold under s. 235 is a condition precedent to the court exercising its power under s. 237(a)(ii).
  2. What standard of material or evidence must petitioners place before the court to justify an order under s. 237(a)(ii) — whether mere allegations suffice or whether prima facie materials are required showing that an investigation is desirable in the interests of the company (and possibly that proceedings under ss. 242–244 could follow).
  3. Whether, on the facts and evidence before the court in this petition, the petitioners have made out a case sufficient to warrant a direction for investigation under s. 237(a)(ii).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • They alleged oppression and mismanagement by the chief agent and directors, including misappropriation of funds, destruction of records, fraudulent sale/transfer of 64 shares, improper writing off of bad debts after private collection, and consequent losses to the company.
  • Counsel for the petitioners argued that it was not necessary for petitioners to prove their allegations before the court at this stage because the inspectors, if appointed, would conduct the detailed investigation and establish facts.
  • Implicit in the petition was the contention that those allegations, together with the exhibits and evidence put on file, justified a deeper probe by inspectors under s. 237.

Company / Respondent's Arguments

  • The company denied all allegations in its counter-affidavit and offered specific explanations for the matters relied on by the petitioners.
  • In respect of the alleged Rs. 3,000 misappropriation by a former managing director (Sri Chandrasekharan), the company stated that although he had drawn Rs. 3,000 when his balance showed Rs. 602.99, he subsequently made deposits of Rs. 1,534 and Rs. 2,300 in November and December 1971; that explanation was not disputed in the petitioners’ reply affidavit.
  • Regarding the compromise in O.S. 137/70 (Francis), the company produced documents showing that the managing director (P.W.1 at the relevant time) authorised compromise despite a false receipt having been produced, and that the compromise amount was credited to a suspense account and accounted for; the company’s secretary (R.W.1) explained that the purported receipt was false and the settlement was by way of payment that was duly credited.
  • On the writing off of large amounts as bad debts, the company contended these were arrears from many kuri collections and promissory-note advances from over 400 persons; these write-offs were done by Board resolution, the accounts were audited and filed, and particulars of hundreds of small debts were produced (Ex. B‑5, Ex. A‑4/A‑5, Ex. B‑4).
  • The company also put forward factual material to show that the petitioners were only two among 1,312 members, and suggested possible motives (the first petitioner related to a dismissed employee; the second petitioner was aggrieved by a demand for payment) — though the court did not need to decide on those aspects given its other findings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Raghunath Swamp Mathur v. Har Swamp Mathur, [1970] 40 Comp Cas 282 (Allahabad) That a court should grant a declaration (directing the Central Government) only where a party has first applied to the Central Government and failed despite sufficient grounds, or when the court finds that proceedings under ss. 397 or 398 cannot satisfactorily terminate without such an investigation. Cited as one judicial view limiting the circumstances in which a court may effectively direct the Government to investigate; the judgment was noted in contrast with another view from the Delhi High Court.
In re Delhi Flour Mills Co. Ltd., [1975] 45 Comp Cas 33 (Delhi) That a prior application to the Central Government under s. 236 or the pendency of ss. 397/398 proceedings are not conditions precedent for the court to exercise its power under s. 237(a)(ii); and that a single shareholder may move the court without meeting the numerical threshold in s. 235. Referred to as authority for the proposition that the numerical strength of members or prior application to the Government are not necessarily preconditions; the court noted this contrasting approach when considering the scope of its power under s. 237(a)(ii).
P. Sreenivasan v. Yoosuf Sagar Abdulla & Sons (P.) Ltd., [1983] 53 Comp Cas 485 (Ker) The court's discretion under s. 237 is to be exercised only when the minority has made out at least a prima facie case that the rule in Foss v. Harbottle requires relaxation in the interests of the company; circumstances in clause (b) of s. 237 are material to the exercise of the court's discretion; the discretion is judicial and must be exercised in the interests of the company as a whole. Adopted as the guiding standard: the court relied on this formulation to require that petitioners produce prima facie materials sufficient to justify an investigation rather than acting on bare allegations.
Foss v. Harbottle, [1843] 2 Hare 461 Established the general rule that internal affairs of a company are for the majority (the rule in Foss v. Harbottle); investigation by public authorities is a statutory exception to that rule. Used as the background principle to explain why investigations are exceptional and why the court should require adequate prima facie material before ordering an investigation under s. 237.
In re Patrakola Tea Co. Ltd., AIR 1967 Cal 406 That before the company court orders an investigation under s. 237(a)(ii), the petitioner should make out a strong case in relation to one or other of the matters referred to in clause (b) of s. 237. Cited as supporting authority for the proposition that circumstances enumerated in clause (b) of s. 237 are material to the court's exercise of discretion and that a strong case must be made out.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began with a statutory analysis of ss. 235–246 of the Companies Act, 1956: s. 235 empowers the Central Government to appoint inspectors (on members' application or Registrar's report under s. 234); s. 236 requires members applying under s. 235 to show “good reason”; s. 237(a) obliges the Central Government to arrange investigation where the company, by special resolution, or the court, by order, declares investigation necessary; s. 237(b) confers a discretion on the Government in enumerated circumstances. Sections 238–241 deal with inspectors and their report; ss. 242–244 set out possible follow-up measures; s. 245 concerns expenses and s. 246 makes inspectors' reports admissible in evidence.

From the statutory scheme, the court observed that appointment of inspectors is generally a matter of Governmental discretion under s. 236 and s. 237(b), but that s. 237(a) imposes a duty on the Government when the company or the court declares an investigation necessary. The court identified the central legal question whether the court, under s. 237(a)(ii), can order an investigation irrespective of the number of members seeking the court's intervention (i.e., without satisfying the minimum membership threshold applicable under s. 235 for Government action on members' application).

The court reviewed two lines of authority: the Allahabad decision in Raghunath Swamp Mathur suggesting limited circumstances for judicial direction to the Government, and the Delhi Flour Mills decision which held that a prior application to the Government or pendency of ss. 397/398 proceedings are not conditions precedent and that the numerical strength requirement of s. 235 is not necessarily applicable when members move the court under s. 237. The court accepted that the question of numerical strength was not contested before it but emphasized that whatever the procedural route, the court must act only on materials placed before it.

The court adopted the standard articulated in P. Sreenivasan's case: the court's discretion under s. 237 is judicial and must be exercised in the interests of the company; it should be invoked only where the minority has made out at least a prima facie case such that the rule in Foss v. Harbottle requires relaxation. Mere allegations are insufficient; the materials must satisfy the court that a deeper probe is desirable in the interests of the company and that investigation could lead to consequential proceedings (e.g., under ss. 242–244).

Applying that standard to the evidence before it, the court examined the specific allegations and materials:

  • Alleged Rs. 3,000 misappropriation by Sri Chandrasekharan (1971): the company produced evidence that although he had drawn Rs. 3,000 with a lower balance, he later deposited sums of Rs. 1,534 and Rs. 2,300 in November and December 1971; this explanation was not disputed. The court noted absence of account books, absence of testimony from the person who made the entry, lack of evidence of powers of the managing director to make such withdrawals, and that P.W.1 only made a bare reference without asserting misappropriation or loss. On these facts, the court found the evidence insufficient to establish even a prima facie case of misappropriation.
  • Alleged fraudulent receipt and compromise in O.S. 137/70: documentary material (Ex. B‑1, B‑3, A‑1, A‑2) showed that P.W.1 had authorised compromise despite the receipt being false, that Rs. 498 was credited to the suspense account and the compromise petition/decree were on record. The court found that the petitioners’ narrative (that the managing director received payment and concealed it) did not stand scrutiny in light of admitted facts that P.W.1 knew the receipt was false and the compromise was effected on that basis. The court concluded evidence insufficient to establish misappropriation.
  • Allegations of destruction of records and fraudulent transfer of 64 shares: these allegations were not pursued at hearing; P.W.1 did not testify to destruction and a suggestion about removal of records was denied by R.W.1. The allegation regarding the 64 shares was similarly not pressed. The court treated these matters as unsupported by evidence at the hearing.
  • Writing off of Rs. 22,074 and Rs. 14,476 as bad debts: although the profit and loss accounts showed write-offs (Exs. A‑4 and A‑5), the only assertion linking those write-offs to private collections by officers was P.W.1’s bare assertion. The company explained the write-offs as arrears of kuri collections and amounts due from over 400 persons, done by Board resolution (Ex. B‑4, B‑5) and approved by the general body, audited and filed. Particulars showed many small debts (446 debts in Ex. B‑5) and no clear evidence of large payments to officers. On this record, the court found the evidence totally insufficient to raise even serious suspicion of concealment or misappropriation.
  • Company losses: the petitioners pointed to year‑to‑year losses, but the court held that losses alone do not justify ordering an investigation unless linked to fraud, misfeasance, mismanagement or oppression. The court also noted that paid-up capital and membership had doubled between 1976 and 1978 and that petitioners were only two of 1,312 members.

Having considered statutory principles, precedent guidance and the evidence, the court concluded that the petitioners had not placed prima facie materials sufficient to justify directing an investigation under s. 237(a)(ii).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition under s. 237(a)(ii) was dismissed. The court specifically held that no case for the issue of a direction under s. 237(a)(ii) was made out on the materials before it, and the petition was dismissed without any order as to costs.

Implications:

  • Direct consequence: No inspector will be appointed and no formal investigation by the Central Government will be directed on the basis of this petition; the petitioners remain without the remedy sought in this proceeding.
  • On precedent and doctrine: The decision applies the principle that a court should exercise its discretion under s. 237 only when prima facie material demonstrates that the exception to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle is warranted for the protection of the company; mere allegations or speculative inferences are insufficient. The court reiterated that evidence adequate to justify an investigation must be placed before the court.
  • No broader precedent was announced beyond the application of the established standard to the facts before the court; the court made no new pronouncement expanding the circumstances in which investigation orders should issue beyond the principles discussed.

Source opinion excerpt: M.P. Menon, J., judgment on petition under s. 237, Companies Act, 1956 (full text provided in the analyzed opinion).

Show all summary ...

M.P Menon, J.:— This is a petition filed by the two members of the Dig Vijay Chit Fund (P.) Ltd. under s. 237 of the Companies Act, 1956, for a declaration that the affairs of the company require investigation by an inspector appointed by the Central Govt.

2. The main business of the company is in kuries and in money-lending. The first petitioner, along with six other shareholders, had earlier filed a petition for winding up it, but that was dismissed on the ground that they had other remedies, and that the prayer for winding-up was unreasonable in the circumstances disclosed. The present is a resort to one of the other remedies available. The allegations in the petition are broadly the following: The chief agent and the directors of the company are utilising their position to oppress the other shareholders. The chief agent and his relatives hold 72 shares and the directors control another 122. In April, 1972, the company fraudulently sold 64 shares, belonging to seven members, who were not supporting the directors; and these shares were purchased by the relatives of the directors and the chief agent. The group in management has been misappropriating the company's funds, destroying valuable records to cover up their misdeeds, causing loss to the company by declining to proceed against debtors, and writing off bad debts after privately collecting amounts from the concerned debtors. Some particulars relating to the alleged misappropriation, destruction of records, etc., are furnished, and there is also a general allegation that the company has been incurring losses as a result of all the above.

3. The company has denied all these allegations in its counter-affidavit. The 2nd petitioner has been examined as P.W 1 and Exs. A-1 to A-6 have been marked on the side of the petitioners. The company has examined its present managing director as R.W 1, and marked Exs. B-1 to B-7.

4. Sections 235 to 246 of the Companies Act, 1956, deal with the investigation of the affairs of a company. Under s. 235, the Central Govt. is given power to appoint inspectors for the purpose; and the power is to be exercised either on the application by members or on the basis of a report by the Registrar under s. 234. Section 236 provides that members applying under s. 235 should furnish evidence to show that they have “good reason for requiring the investigation”. Clause (a) of s. 237 obliges the Central Govt. to arrange for an investigation when the company, by special resolution, or the court, by order, declares that an investigation is called for, while cl. (b) confers a discretion on the Government to do so when the circumstances enumerated thereunder are found to exist. Sections 238 to 241 deal with inspectors, their powers and the report they have to make. Sections 242 to 244 specify the follow-up measures the government could take on the basis of the reports. Prosecution of persons found criminally liable, moving the court for winding-up or for relief from oppression, and initiation of misfeasance and other proceedings are some of the measures contemplated. Section 245 provides for the expenses of investigation, and s. 246 declares that the inspectors: reports shall be admissible as evidence in legal proceedings. An analysis of the above provisions indicates that appointment of inspectors is a matter in the discretion of the Govt. under s. 236, and also cl. (b) of s. 237; but in cases governed by s. 237(a), the Government has a duty to act. The machinery for inspection could be set in motion on the request of members under s. 236, only when a certain percentage of the total number of members apply; the Central Govt. cannot act when the strength of those who apply is below the minimum prescribed. But what about an application to the court under s. 237(a)(ii)? Can the court order an investigation irrespective of the number of members who seek to invoke its power?

5. Section 237 does not in terms speak of an application to be filed in court; but r; 11(a)(9) of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, conceives of such an application. In Raghunath Swamp Mathur v. Har Swamp Mathur, [1970] 40 Comp Cas 282, the Allahabad High Court observed thus (at p. 296):

“As the declaration sought amounts to a direction to the Central Government, it should only be granted either where a party, having applied to the Central Government for an investigation, has failed despite sufficient grounds shown for it, or, when the court finds that a proceeding before it, under either section 397 or section 398 of the Act, cannot satisfactorily terminate without such an investigation.”

6. But it appears from the decision of the Delhi High Court in Delhi Flour Mills Co. Ltd., In re, [1975] 45 Comp Cas 33, that a prior application to the Central Govt. under s. 236, or the pendency of proceedings under ss. 397 and 398, are not conditions precedent for exercising the court's power under s. 237(a)(ii). The Delhi case had arisen from an application filed by a single shareholder; and it is also not contended before me that the numerical strength of the members, who move the court under s. 237, should satisfy the minimum prescribed by s. 235.

7. The present proceedings are only for the purpose of deciding whether the affairs of the company should be looked into by the inspectors. And, according to counsel for the petitioners, it is not necessary for his clients to prove their allegations before this court; they could prove them before the inspectors. No doubt, cl. (a)(ii) of s. 237 does not lay down what circumstances are to be proved before the court and on what materials the court could act. But that does not mean that mere allegations are sufficient . A court can act only on the materials placed before it; and those materials should at least be such as to satisfy the court that a deeper probe into the company's affairs is desirable in the interests of the company itself. According to the Delhi High Court in Delhi Flour Mills Co. Ltd.'s case, [1975] 45 Comp Cas 33 (Delhi), noticed above, the materials should be such as would result in proceedings being taken under ss. 242 to 244; no investigation could be ordered merely because a shareholder feels aggrieved about the manner in which the company's business is being carried on. The scope of s. 237 was considered by me in C.P No. 22 of 1978 decided on 29-1-1980. [P. Sreenivasan v. Yoosuf Sagar Abdulla & Sons (P.) Ltd., [1983] 53 Comp Cas 485 (Ker)], in the following terms (at p. 489):

“The section conceives of three situations where the Central Government can appoint inspectors for investigation. The first is when the company itself declares that such an investigation is necessary. The second is when the court makes an order. And the third is when the Central Govt. forms an opinion that the circumstances enumerated in cl. (b) exist. The first is easy to understand; when the company itself wants an investigation, the Central Govt. need not stop to enquire why. The third can also be understood because when suo motu action is proposed to be taken by the Government, it shall not act arbitrarily, but only consistent with the guidelines laid down. But what about the second situation, where the court has to make an order? Mr. Ramanatha Pillai for the petitioner suggests that the power and the discretion of the court are uncontrolled; it can direct an investigation whenever it suspects that all is not well with the company. Whether the apprehensions of the court are true or not is a matter to be found by the investigating inspectors, and the court is not to insist on evidence. It appears to me that this is too broad a statement. Investigation of the company's affairs by the Department of Trade in England has always been understood as a statutory exception to the rule in Foss v. Harbottle, [1843] 2 Hare 461, that the internal affairs of a company is a matter for the majority, and a dissatisfied minority cannot seek outside interference. The Companies Act provides for the protection of minorities in three ways: (i) by giving them a right to complain against oppression, (ii) by permitting them to act on behalf of the company when it is wound up, as in the case of misfeasance proceedings, and (iii) by enabling them to obtain remedies indirectly through investigation. The court's discretion under section 237 is, therefore, to be exercised only when it is satisfied that the minority has made out at least a prima facie case that the rule in Foss v. Harbottle, [1843] 2 Hare 461, requires relaxation in the interests of the company. The Calcutta High Court has held in In re Patrakola Tea Co. Ltd., AIR 1967 Cal 406, that before the company court orders an investigation under section 237(a)(ii), the petitioner should make out a strong case in relation to one or other of the matters referred to in clause (b). In other words, the circumstances enumerated in clause (b) are material for the exercise of the court's discretion also. The discretion is certainly a judicial one and is to be exercised only when a minority acts in the interests of the company as a whole.”

8. It is in the above background that I propose to examine the allegations made and the evidence adduced herein.

9. As regards misappropriation, two specific instances are referred to in para. 5 of the petition. The first is that in 1971, the then managing dire-tor, Sri Chandrasekharan, had drawn an amount of Rs. 3,000 from the “Anamath account” when there was no deposit with the company in his name. The company's answer in para. 8 of its counter-affidavit is that Mr. Chandrasekharan had drawn an amount of Rs. 3,000 on September 23, 1971, when he had a credit balance of only Rs. 602.99, but that he had subsequently made deposits of Rs. 1,534 and Rs. 2,300 in November and December, 1971. The correctness of this statement is not disputed in the petitioners' reply affidavit. And a mere entry in the suspense account is not sufficient to establish misappropriation. The concerned account books have not been called for; and neither Mr. Chandrasekharan nor the person who made the entry has been cited to explain it. No attempt has also been made to bring out what the powers of the managing director were in matters of this kind. P.W 1, who was himself a managing director of the company for some time, made only a bare reference to the entry in the course of his evidence; he did not even say that the amount was misappropriated or lost to the company.

10. The second instance relates to the compromise effected in O.S 137/70, filed by the company against one Francis for the recovery of Rs. 680; and the allegation is that the party had produced a receipt showing that the amount had been paid personally to the managing director, Mr. Namboodiri-pad, and that the suit was compromised without crediting the amount in the company's accounts. But the documents produced tell a different tale. Exhibit B-1 dated November 16, 1970, discloses that P.W 1, who was then the managing director of the company, had authorised R.W 1, who was then its secretary, to compromise the suit, though the party had produced a “false receipt”. Exhibit B-3 shows that an amount of Rs. 498 was credited in P.W 1's suspense account with the company on the next day. According to R.W 1, the party had produced in court a false receipt and when he was threatened with criminal action, he offered to settle the matter by paying Rs. 500. The matter was settled with the concurrence of P.W 1 and the amount (less Rs. 2 for expenses) was credited in his suspense account as per Ex. B-3, pending filing of a compromise petition before the court. Exhibit A-2 is a certified copy of the compromise petition filed on November 6, 1971, and Ex. A-1 is a compromise decree. The petitioners' case that Sri Namboodiripad had received payment and issued a receipt and that the suit was compromised when this was brought to light, does not stand scrutiny in the light of the admitted circumstance that P.W 1 himself was aware that the receipt was a false one and that the compromise was effected on the footing that it was not genuine. Misappropriation is a serious matter, and the evidence available is insufficient to establish even a prima facie case.

11. The allegations relating to destruction of records and the fraudulent transfer of the 64 shares were not pursued at the time of hearing. P.W 1 did not in his evidence even make mention about the destruction of any records; and a suggestion thrown at R.W 1 during his cross-examination about “removal” of records was promptly denied. The same is the position regarding the 64 shares said to have been fraudulently transferred.

12. The next allegation relates to the writing off of Rs. 22,074 and Rs. 14,476, respectively, as bad debts, in the profit and loss account marked as Exs. A-4 and A-5; and the case attempted to be made out is that the directors and the chief agent had actually received payment of the amounts and had thereafter attempted to cover up the misappropriation by making it appear that they were bad debts. Exhibits A-4 and A-5 do show that the amounts were written off; but there is nothing but the assertion of P.W 1 to suggest that any officer of the company had actually received payments as alleged. P.W 1 stated in cross-examination that the amounts written off included Rs. 800 due from one Sachidanandan, Rs. 750 from Ummer, Rs. 600 from Ayyappan and Rs. 700 from Madhavan; but Sachidanandan alone had told him that he had paid the amount to the company. P.W 1 had no other knowledge or information about the alleged payments. The company's case, on the other hand, is that the amount written off in Ex. A-4 represents arrears of kuri collections and amounts due under promissory notes from over 400 persons, considered as irrecoverable. The company had conducted more than 100 chitties and made a large number of other advances; and some amounts were being written off from time to time. Exhibit B-4, the minutes book, indicates that the amount was written off as per Board's resolution dated November 9, 1973. Exhibit A-4, the audited accounts, must have been approved by the general body also. That apart, the list of bad debts referred to in the Board's resolution is Ex. B-5 and it contains particulars of 446 debts due from chit subscribers, the amounts varying from Rs. 2.50 to Rs. 118. Sachidanandan's name is not there, and no debt exceeding Rs. 118 is seen written off. The debts in Ex. A-5 were also written off by a Board's resolution, and, according to R.W 1, those were amounts due from employees (bill collectors), who were going about making collections. They had left the services of the company and they had no assets. It is usual for men in a business of this type to periodically write off irrecoverable debts. In the present case, it was done by resolutions duly passed by the Board, and obviously approved by the general body of members. The accounts were duly audited and filed with the Registrar. The evidence is totally insufficient to raise even a serious suspicion that anything else had been done.

13. The only other point raised is that the company has been incurring loss year after year; but no investigation could be ordered unless that result is linked with fraud, misfeasance, mismanagement, oppression and the like.

14. The loss might be an ordinary business risk. It may be noticed that the company's paid up capital and membership have risen by at least one hundred per cent. between 1976 and 1978. The petitioners are only two out of 1,312 members. The company has also a case that the first petitioner is the wife of a dismissed employee and that the 2nd is annoyed by a notice demanding payment of some amounts due from him. It is unnecessary to go into this aspect because, even otherwise, the attempt of the petitioners has only been to show that something suspicious had taken place between 1971 and 1975.

15. In my view, therefore, no case for the issue of a direction under s. 237(a)(ii) is made out, and the petition has to fail. It is accordingly dismissed, but without any order as to costs.