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Commr. Of Income-Tax, Tamil Nadu-Iv v. Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal
Factual and Procedural Background
This writ petition was filed by the Commissioner of Income-tax, Tamil Nadu IV, Madras, challenging an order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT), Cochin Bench. For the assessment year 1969-1970, the Income-tax Officer, Calicut, taxed capital gains arising from the acquisition of property by the Government from the second respondent-assessee, who contended that the property was agricultural land and exempt from capital gains tax. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner allowed the assessee’s appeal, deleting the additions. The Income-tax Officer appealed to the ITAT, and the assessee filed a cross-objection supporting the lower appellate order. On the scheduled hearing date, the assessee and his representative were absent, and the ITAT passed an ex parte order allowing the Department’s appeal and dismissing the cross-objection on merits. The assessee filed a reference application and a miscellaneous petition for restoration of the appeal for rehearing, alleging confusion about the hearing date. The ITAT allowed the miscellaneous petition and restored the appeal for fresh hearing. The Commissioner challenged this restoration order as illegal and without jurisdiction, contending that the ITAT could not set aside an ex parte order passed on merits and rehear the appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has jurisdiction to set aside an ex parte order passed on merits and restore the appeal for fresh hearing.
- Whether the absence of a specific provision in the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963 empowering the ITAT to set aside an ex parte order precludes the exercise of such power.
- Whether the power to set aside an ex parte order is akin to a power of review, which the Tribunal lacks.
- Whether the principles of natural justice and the requirement of reasonable opportunity to be heard under sub-section (1) of Section 254 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, authorize the ITAT to reopen the matter.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner (Commissioner of Income-tax) Arguments
- The ITAT is a creature of statute and can exercise only those powers expressly conferred by the statute.
- Once the ITAT passes an ex parte order on merits, it becomes functus officio and cannot review or set aside that order.
- There is no provision in the Income-tax Act or the Rules empowering the ITAT to condone absence of the respondent or to rehear the appeal after an ex parte order.
- The cross-objection filed by the assessee was not a genuine cross-objection but a support for the Appellate Assistant Commissioner’s order, and thus should have been dismissed for default rather than decided on merits.
- Rule 25 of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963 allows the ITAT to hear ex parte but does not provide for setting aside an ex parte order, unlike rule 24 which allows restoration of appeals dismissed for default.
- Relied on precedents emphasizing the absence of review powers in the ITAT and the limited scope of powers exercisable by statutory tribunals.
Respondent (Second Respondent-Assessee) Arguments
- Sub-section (1) of Section 254 of the Income-tax Act mandates that the ITAT must give both parties a reasonable opportunity to be heard before passing an order on appeal.
- An ex parte order passed without affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing is liable to be set aside to ensure justice.
- The power to set aside an ex parte order is inherent in the ITAT’s jurisdiction and flows from its duty under Section 254(1) to hear both parties.
- The absence of an explicit provision in rule 25 for setting aside ex parte orders does not imply that the ITAT lacks such power, especially when rule 24’s invalidity on certain points has been recognized by the Supreme Court.
- Relied on Supreme Court and High Court decisions supporting the power of tribunals to reopen proceedings to prevent injustice and uphold the right of appeal.
- Distinguished review powers from the power to set aside ex parte orders, emphasizing that the latter is not a review but a reopening for fresh hearing.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Commissioner Of Income Tax, Madras v. S. Chenniappa Mudaliar, Madurai ((1969) 74 ITR 41) | Interpretation of Section 254(1) of the Income-tax Act regarding orders on appeals. | Confirmed that the Tribunal may pass orders as it thinks fit on appeals, including ex parte orders. |
| Jose T. Mooken v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1979 KLT 114) | Absence of power of review for the High Court under Income-tax Act references. | Held that review powers are not conferred on the High Court and, by analogy, such powers are not inherent in the ITAT. |
| Martin Burn Ltd. v. R. N. Bangerjee AIR 1958 SC 79 | Tribunal powers limited to those conferred by statute. | Emphasized that statutory tribunals can exercise only powers within the statute but also recognized implied powers necessary for effective exercise of jurisdiction. |
| P.C Poulose v. K.P Sukumaran Nair (1974 KLT 47) | Arbitrator’s lack of jurisdiction to set aside ex parte awards and reopen hearings. | Supported the proposition that tribunals generally lack review powers. |
| Shew Paper Exchange v. Income-tax Officer “C” Ward, Dist. V (i), Calcutta ((1974) 93 ITR 186) | Income-tax Appellate Tribunal’s lack of power to review its own orders. | Reinforced the principle that the ITAT cannot review orders once passed. |
| Income-tax Officer, Lucknow v. S.B Singar Singh & Sons ((1970) 75 ITR 646) | Inherent powers of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. | Recognized inherent powers but the Court noted that some views did not consider the binding Supreme Court precedent. |
| Income-tax Officer v. Murlidhar Sarda ((1975) 99 ITR 485) | Power of ITAT to set aside ex parte orders and rehear appeals. | Supported the view that the ITAT can set aside ex parte orders to ensure reasonable opportunity of hearing. |
| Income Tax Officer, Cannanore. v. M. K. Mohammed Kunhi ((1969) 71 ITR 815) | Power of the Appellate Tribunal to stay recovery proceedings despite no express statutory provision. | Held that wide powers under Section 254(1) carry necessary implied powers to make the grant effective. |
| Jaipur Mineral Development Syndicate v. Commissioner of Income-tax, New Delhi ((1977) 106 ITR 653) | High Court’s jurisdiction to rehear a reference after an order declining to answer was passed. | Held that the Court was not functus officio and could entertain rehearing applications; analogous to ITAT’s jurisdiction to reopen ex parte orders. |
| Khushalchand B. Daga v. T.K Surendran ((1972) 85 ITR 48) | ITAT should not allow a party to suffer for its own mistake. | Supported reopening proceedings to prevent injustice. |
| Sub-Divisional Officer (Compensation Officer) Mirzapur v. Raja Srinivasa Prasad Singh (AIR 1966 SC 1164) | Right to be heard and reopening proceedings where notice was not served. | Held that decisions taken without notice to a necessary party are not binding and may be reopened. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analyzed the statutory framework under Section 254(1) of the Income-tax Act, which mandates that the Appellate Tribunal must give both parties an opportunity of being heard before passing orders. The Court acknowledged the petitioner’s argument that the ITAT is a statutory body limited to powers expressly conferred but found that the power to set aside an ex parte order and rehear the appeal is inherent in the ITAT’s jurisdiction under Section 254(1). The Court distinguished the power to set aside ex parte orders from the power of review, emphasizing that the former is to afford a reasonable opportunity of hearing rather than to correct errors apparent on record.
The Court referred to precedents, including Supreme Court rulings, that recognize implied powers necessary to make statutory powers effective, such as staying recovery or reopening proceedings. It rejected the petitioner’s reliance on the absence of a specific provision in rule 25 of the Rules as determinative, noting that rule 24 was held ultra vires in part and that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction must be interpreted in light of the statute’s purpose.
The Court also considered the principle that tribunals should not allow parties to suffer for genuine mistakes or confusion about hearing dates. It held that the ITAT’s order restoring the appeal for rehearing was a valid exercise of jurisdiction to ensure justice and compliance with the statutory mandate of a reasonable opportunity to be heard.
Finally, the Court concluded that even if there was a technical irregularity in setting aside the ex parte order, it would not exercise its extraordinary writ jurisdiction to perpetuate an injustice.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED
The Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the Commissioner of Income-tax, upholding the ITAT’s order setting aside the ex parte order and restoring the appeal for fresh hearing. The direct effect is that the second respondent-assessee is entitled to a rehearing before the ITAT, ensuring a reasonable opportunity to be heard in accordance with the statutory mandate under Section 254(1) of the Income-tax Act. The Court did not set any new precedent beyond affirming the inherent jurisdiction of the ITAT to reopen ex parte orders to prevent injustice and uphold the right of appeal. No costs were awarded.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Bhaskaran, J.:— In this writ petition filed by the Commissioner of Income-tax, Tamil Nadu IV, Madras, an important question touching the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to set aside an ex parte order for rehearing the appeal disposed of on merits, arises for decision.
2. For the assessment year 1969-1970 the Income-tax Officer, Calicut, brought to tax certain amount representing the capital gain arising out of acquisition of an item of property belonging to the second respondent-assessee by the Government. The contention of the second respondent that the property sold being agricultural land, the resultant gain was not liable to be taxed as capital gain, rejected by the Income-tax Officer, however, found favour with the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who allowed the appeal and deleted the additions made. Aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, the Income-tax Officer preferred an appeal to the first respondent herein, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, Ernakulam. The second respondent filed a cross-objection also supporting the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The appeal and the cross-objection filed by the Department and the assessee respectively, after due notice to the parties, were listed for hearing on 28-10-1974 by the Tribunal. On the date appointed for the hearing neither the assessee (second respondent) nor his representative was present. The Tribunal as per Ext. P3. order allowed the appeal and dismissed the cross-objection. The decision was rendered on merits (presumably to conform to sub-section (1) of S. 254 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, hereinafter referred to as the Act, which enjoins that the Tribunal may “pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit” as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Commissioner Of Income Tax, Madras v. S. Chenniappa Mudaliar, Madurai ((1969) 74 ITR. 41), holding that the property was not agricultural in character and, as such, the resultant gain was liable to be taxed as capital gain. Against Ext. P3 order the second respondent filed before the first respondent a reference application under S. 256(1) of the Act, for obtaining an order stating the case for reference to this Court. He also filed a miscellaneous petition before the first respondent Tribunal praying for the restoration of the appeal and the cross-objection for fresh hearing and disposal alleging that there was confusion in the mind of the assessee and the advocate that the appeal which was fixed for hearing on 28-10-1974 had been refixed to 11-11-1974; and because of this confusion they had not put in appearance. By Ext. P4 order dated 8-1-1975 the Tribunal allowed the miscellaneous petition and reported the appeal for hearing. It is for quashing Ext. P4 order that this writ petition has been filed. It is urged on behalf of the petitioner that Ext. P4 order passed by the first respondent Tribunal is illegal and without jurisdiction, in as much as Ext. P3 appellate order having been passed on merits, it was not open to the Tribunal to set aside that order and restore the appeal to the file for fresh hearing. The contention is that there is no provision in the Act or in the Rules framed thereunder which empowers the Tribunal to condone the absence of the respondent assessee and to rehear the appeal on that ground. It is also contended that what was purported to be a cross-objectiou was not a cross-objection in the real sense in as much as, instead of objecting to the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who allowed the second respondent's appeal wholly, it was a cross-objection filed to support that order. In any event, it is urged, the first respondent Tribunal ought to have dismissed the cross-objection for default instead of disposing of that also on merits along with the appeal filed by the petitioner. It is pointed out that rule 25 of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963, hereinafter referred to as the Rules, specifically empowers the Tribunal to hear the matter on merits even in the absence of the respondent. It is also submitted that unlike the proviso to rule 24 of the rules which empowers the Tribunal to restore to file the appeal dismissed for default if sufficient cause for his non-appearance on the date appointed for hearing is shown by the appellant, there is no provision in rule 25 to set aside an ex parte order even if sufficient cause for his non-appearance is shown by the respondent. We may extract rules 24 and 25 of the Rules below:—
“24. Where on the day fixed for hearing or any other day to which the hearing may be adjourned, the appellant does not appear when the appeal is called on for hearing, the Tribunal may, in its discretion, either dismiss the appeal for default or may hear it ex parte:
Provided that where the appeal has been dismissed for default and the appellant appears afterwards and satisfies the Tribunal that there was sufficient cause for his non-appearance when the appeal was called on for hearing, the Tribunal shall make an order setting aside the dismissal and restoring the appeal.
25. Where on the day fixed for hearing or any other day to which the hearing may be adjourned, the appellant appears and the respondent does not appear when the appeal is called on for hearing, the Tribunal may hear the appeal ex parte.
Explanation:—In rules 24 and 25 ‘appear’ means appear in person or through an authorised representative.”
3. Sri Ravindranatha Menon, the standing counsel for the Revenue, submitted that the Appellate Tribunal being a creature of the statute, it can exercise only such powers as are conferred on it by the statute. In the absence of any specific provision in that behalf the Tribunal cannot review its own order as it becomes functus officio after rendering the ex parte order, whether on merits or not. He placed reliance on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Jose T. Mooken v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1979 KLT. 114) to which one of us (Bhaskaran, J.) was a party. In paragraph 9, at page 119, it was held as follows:—
“The power of review is not conferred on the High Court in the matter of a reference under the Income-tax Act. In the absence of specific conferment of power it is too much to say that High Court could exercise that power. Exercising of the review power cannot be in the exercise of an inherent power as Chief Justice Govindan Nair so clearly pointed out in K. Ahamad v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Kerala, Kerala (1974) 96 ITR. 29 (1974 KLT 627). The High Court exercising inherent power in a reference under the Indian Income-tax Act, acts there independent of the powers conferred under the Civil Procedure Code. We are in agreement with the view expressed by the Nagpur High Court as early as in 1940 in 8 ITR. 412 that the Court when acting under the powers conferred by S. 66 of the Income-Tax Act, 1922 (corresponding to present S. 256 of Act of 1961) was exercising a special jurisdiction and that its proceedings were not governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. In the present application for review what is sought to be corrected is not a mere clerical or accidental error. The petitioner is invoking the powers on a Civil Court under Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C In the jurisdiction conferred on it the High Court cannot exercise that power.”
4. The argument of the counsel is that if this Court cannot exercise the power of review, either by virtue of the inherent power or by the provisions contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, by no stretch of imagination could it be said that such powers not specifically conferred on it could be exercised by the Appellate Tribunal. Reliance was also placed by him on the decision of the Supreme Court in Martin Burn Ltd. v. R. N. Bangerjee (AIR. 1958 S.C 79) wherein, in paragraph 13, at page 82, dealing with the powers of the Labour Appellate Tripunal, Bhagavathi J. has stated as follows:—
“The Labour Appellate Tribunal is the creature of the statute and all its powers must be found within the four corners of the statute.”
5. He also relied on the decision of this Court in P.C Poulose v. K.P Sukumaran Nair (1974 KLT. 47). In that case Issac, J. held that an arbitrator has no jurisdiction to entertain an application to set aside an ex parte award and restore the case for hearing. We have also been shown the decision of Ghose, J. in Shew Paper Exchange v. Income-tax Officer “C” Ward, Dist. V (i), Calcutta ((1974) 93 ITR. 186) wherein the view taken is that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal has no power to review its own order. The counsel also submitted that though the Allahabad High Court in Income-tax Officer, Lucknow v. S.B Singar Singh & Sons ((1970) 75 ITR. 646) and the Calcutta High Court in Murlidhar Sarda v. Income-tax Apellate Tribunal, Calcutta ((1973) 92 ITR. 189) (confirmed by a Division Bench ruling in Income-tax Officer v. Murlidhar Sarda (1975) 99 ITR. 485) have spoken about the inherent power of the Tribunal, the view expressed by Bhagavathi, J. in Martin Burn's case (AIR. 1958 S.C 79), in paragraph 13, at page 82, does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the concerned learned Judge.
6. Sri T.L Viswanatha Iyer, counsel for the second respondent-assessee, submitted that by virtue of the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of S. 254 of the Act it is imperative that the Appellate Tribunal should give an opportunity of being heard to both parties before it passes an order on the appeal. According to him, an opportunity of being heard really means a reasonable opportunity of being heard, otherwise it will be illusory. Whether the aggrieved party was able to avail of the opportunity of being heard is essentially a question of fact depending on the satisfaction of the Tribunal on an objective consideration of the material before it. In a case where the Appellate Tribunal happened to pass an ex parte order, when the aggrieved party appeared before the Tribunal and showed sufficient cause for his non-appearance on the date appointed for hearing, and the Tribunal accepted the explanation, it amounts to the Tribunal having been satisfied that the aggrieved party could not by due exercise of diligence avail of the opportunity of being heard inspite of the fact that notice fixing the date of hearing was issued to and received by the party. It is out of the anxiety of the Tribunal to conform to the spirit of the provisions of sub-section (1) of S. 254 which require that an order on the appeal was to be passed after giving both parties an opportunity of being heard that the Tribunal on being satisfied that such opportunity could not be availed of by the aggrieved party it passes an order to set aside the ex parte order and to post the appeal for rehearing. In our view, this power to set aside ex parte order, in the interest of justice, is inherent in the Tribunal and could be traced to sub-section (1) of S. 254 of the Act. Giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard, as stated in sub-section (1) of S. 254 of the Act, is essentially part of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and when the Tribunal is satisfied that the ex parte order happened to be passed was without giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the aggrieved party, it has the jurisdiction to set aside that order and to proceed to pass a fresh order after hearing both sides as enjoined in that provision. We find similar view being expressed by the Calcutta High Court in Income-tax Officer v. Murlidhar Sarda ((1975) 99 ITR. 485) (confirming the decision in Murlidhar Sarda v. Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Calcutta (1973) 92 ITR. 189). In this context it would be profitable to notice that Bhagavathi, J. in paragraph 13, at page 82, of the decision Martin Burn Ltd. v. R. N. Bangerjee (AIR. 1958 SC. 79) after having observed that the Labour Appellate Tribunal being a creature of the statute, all its power must be found within the four corners of the statute, has also found in the very same judgment that though there is no express provision to that effect in the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, the Appellate Tribunal could also exercise the original jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal tracing such power to the provisions contained in Ss. 9 and 10 of the said Act which had provided that the Appellate Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court and that it shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed and subject to certain conditions mentioned therein.
7. The Supreme Court in Income Tax Officer, Cannanore. v. M. K. Mohammed Kunhi ((1969) 71 ITR. 815) (1968 KLT. 794) has held that the appellate authority has in appropriate cases the power to stay proceedings relating to the recovery of penalty or tax due from an assessee though by the provisions of the Act or the Rules powers have not been expressly conferred upon the Appellate Tribunal in that behalf. Grover, J. has in paragraph 6, at page 818, of the above said decision “has stated as follows:—
“The argument advanced on behalf of the appellant before us that, in the absence of any express provisions in Ss. 254 and 255 of the Act relating to stay of recovery during, the pendency of an appeal, it must be held that no such power can be exercised by the Tribunal, suffers from a fundamental infirmity in as much as it assumes and proceeds on the premise that the statute confers such a power on the Income-tax Officer who can give the necessary relief to an assessee. The right of appeal is a substantive right and the questions of fact and law are at large and are open to review by the Appellate Tribunal. Indeed, the Tribunal has been given very wide powers under S. 254(1), for it may pass such orders as thinks fit after giving full hearing to both the parties to the appeal. If the Income-tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner have made assessment or imposed penalties raising very large demands and if the Appellate Tribunal is entirely helpless in the matter of stay of recovery, the entire purpose of the appeal can be defeated if ultimately the orders of the departmental authorities are set aside. It is difficult to conceive that the legislature should have left the entire matter to the administrative authorities to make such orders as they choose to pass in exercise of unfettered discretion………It is a firmly established rule that an express grant of statutory power carries with it by necessary implication the authority to use all reasonable means to make such grant effective. (Sutherland's Statutory Construction, third edition, articles 5401 and 5402). The powers which have been conferred by S. 254 on the Appellate Tribunal with widest possible amplitude must carry with them by necessary implication all powers and duties incidental and necessary to make the exercise of those powers fully effective.”
8. The power under sub-section (1) of 254 of the Act which enables the Appellate Tribunal to stay proceedings for recovery of amounts due from the assessee, even in the absence of any other provision in the Act or the Rules expressly conferring such power on it, as, held by the Supreme Court in the above case should be deemed to be comprehensive enough to enable it to set aside the ex parte order in case it is satisfied that though there was notice to the respondent, in spite of the exercise of due diligence, the reasonable opportunity of being heard could not be availed of by him. We have also been referred to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Jaipur Mineral Development Syndicate v. Commissioner of Income-tax, New Delhi ((1977) 106, ITR. 653). The facts of the case were: Upon reference being made to the High Court at the instance of the appellant-firm, notice was sent to the appellant to file paper books within three months of the receipt thereof. The clerk of the firm received the notice on May 9, 1970, but he misplaced that notice and consequently the paper books were not filed. The reference came on for hearing on August 26, 1970, when no one appeared for the appellant-firm. The High Court passed an order declining to answer the reference because the appellant had not put in an appearance and had also not filed the paper books. On September 21, 1970, when handing over charge to another, the clerk discovered that the notice had been received from the High Court. Finding on enquiry that the matter had been disposed of on August, 26, 1970, the appellant filed an application for permission to file the paper books and for rehearing of the reference. The High Court dismissed that application observing that it had become functus officio to entertain the application because of its earlier order declining to answer the reference. The Supreme Court, on appeal, observed that the High Court was not functus officio in entertaining the application for rehearing the reference and disposing of the matter on merits. Sri Ravindranatha Menon, counsel for the Revenue, sought to distinguish the decision of the Supreme Court by pointing out that whereas in the Supreme Court case there was a total failure on the part of the High Court to answer the question referred to it, in the in the instant case an order on merit has already been passed. We find little merit in this reasoning. The question is one of jurisdiction. The order declining to answer the question referred to it is also an order of disposal just like Ext. P3 order passed by the first respondent in this case. If, after passing Ext. P3 order, the Appellate Tribunal was functus officio in entertaining the application for rehearing, it should be so with the High Court also after having passed an order declining to answer the questions referred to it. In Khushalchand B. Daga v. T.K Surendran, 4th Income-tax Officer, A-1 Ward ((1972) 85 ITR. 48) the Bombay High Court has held that the Tribunal should not allow a party to suffer for its own mistake. The decision in The Sub-Divisional Officer (Compensation Officer) Mirzapur v. Raja Srinivasa Prasad Singh (AIR. 1966 SC. 1164) also is relied on by Sri Viswanatha Iyer. In that case it was held that a decision reached behind the back of a necessary party to whom notice must be sent is not binding upon such a party, and the court may in such a case reopen the proceedings to give the party to state its case. No doubt, that was a case in which notice to the necessary party was not served, unlike-in the present case in which admittedly notice was served on the respondent. All the same, on the basis of the above ruling of the Supreme Court the 2nd respondent appears to be entitled to contest the correctness of the submission of the Revenue that after passing the ex parte order the Tribunal becomes functus officio. It may also be noticed that rule 24 of the Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1946, as amended-in 1948, in so far as it enables dismissal of an appeal before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal for default of appearance of the appellant was declared ultra vires by the Supreme Court, as it clearly came into conflict with S. 33(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1922, corresponding to S. 254(1) of the Act. We do not agree with the argument of Sri Ravindranatha Menon that the absence of a specific provision in rule 25 of the Rules for setting aside an ex parte order and posting it for rehearing, similar to the provision for restoration of an appeal dismissed for default under rule 24, is by itself indicative of the fact that the legislature really wanted to make a deliberate distinction between the dismissal of an appeal for default on the one hand and ex parte decisions on merit in the absence of the respondent on the other. We have already noticed the view expressed by the Supreme Court on the validity of rule 24 in so far as it enables the dismissal of an appeal before Income-tax Appellate Tribunal for default of appearance of the appellant. Apart from that, merely for the reason that there is no specific provision in rule 25 of the Rules enabling the Appellate Tribunal to set aside the ex parte order passed on merits, it cannot be said that the power of the Appellate Tribunal under S. 254(1) of the Act would not carry with it the power to make available reasonable opportunity of being heard to the aggrieved party when it has subsequently realised that the ex parte order happened to be passed virtually without the aggrieved party having had the benefit of being heard. No express provision prohibiting the Tribunal from exercising the power to set aside ex parte order has been shown to us, and that being the position it must be presumed that the power under S. 254(1) of the Act extends to the power for setting aside ex parte order in the interest of justice when the Tribunal is clear in its mind that the provision under the sub-section in its true spirit had not been complied with while passing the ex parte order.
9. In our opinion, the petitioner appears to be under a misconception that the power of setting aside an ex parte order to afford an opportunity of being heard to the aggrieved party is the same as the power of review. The question of review ordinarily arises where the order impugned is vitiated on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or where there was failure to consider the material on record. The purpose of setting aside an ex parte order is to consider the whole matter afresh affording an opportunity of being heard to the respondent. When this distinction is borne in mind, there is no scope for the argument for the position that because the Tribunal has no power to review its own order, it cannot also set aside the ex parte order for affording an opportunity of being heard to the respondent.
10. After all, the Tribunal has only set aside the ex parte order and reopened the matter to afford an opportunity of being heard to the aggrieved party. In the absence of any manifest injustice to any party, even assuming that the Tribunal had committed an irregularity on technical error in doing so, this Court will be slow to exercise the extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution to perpetuate an injustice. For the foregoing reasons the writ petition is dismissed; however, in the circumstances of the case, without any order as to costs.
11. Dismissed.
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