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Kavitha Movie House v. P.M Mary And Another
Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The writ petition challenges exhibit P15, an order passed by respondent 2, the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Ernakulam (the Appellate Authority), under S. 18(2) of the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act. The dispute arose after the management of the Kavitha Movie House (petitioner) dismissed respondent 1, a sweeper woman employee, by exhibit P10 relying on the domestic enquiry report (exhibit P7). The alleged misconduct was the theft of a packet of cashewnut costing 50 paise from the theatre's balcony canteen.
Respondent 1 appealed under S. 18(2). The Appellate Authority, in exhibit P15, held that the misconduct was not proved either in a proper domestic enquiry or before him and ordered the petitioner to pay Rs. 2,916 as back-wages and Rs. 324 as compensation in lieu of reinstatement; no reinstatement was directed. The petitioner filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking quashing of exhibit P15.
The petition has a long history (approaching nine years as noted in the opinion). The petitioner's counsel argued that the Appellate Authority acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in interfering with the dismissal. Respondent 1's counsel contended that, having found the misconduct not proved, the Appellate Authority should have reinstated respondent 1 rather than awarding a small sum in lieu of reinstatement.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Appellate Authority acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction by interfering with the management's dismissal order based on the domestic enquiry report (exhibit P7).
- Whether the Appellate Authority was permitted, under S. 18(2) of the Act, to reappraise evidence, take additional evidence or conduct a de novo enquiry in exercising its appellate jurisdiction.
- Whether the misconduct alleged against respondent 1 was properly proved in the domestic enquiry.
- Assuming the Appellate Authority's conclusion that misconduct was not proved is upheld, whether the High Court should interfere with the Appellate Authority's decision to award back-wages and compensation in lieu of reinstatement rather than ordering reinstatement.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments (Counsel: S.A. Nagendran)
- The Appellate Authority acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction by interfering with exhibit P10 (dismissal) which was based on exhibit P7 (domestic enquiry report).
- The finding in exhibit P7 could have been supported by evidence and was not a finding that should have been characterized as perverse on appellate review; therefore the Appellate Authority ought not to have reversed or interfered with it.
Respondent 1's Arguments (Counsel: Stanley Fernandez)
- The Appellate Authority rightly concluded that the misconduct was not proved in a proper domestic enquiry.
- Having reached that conclusion, the Appellate Authority should, as a natural corollary, have ordered reinstatement of respondent 1 rather than awarding only a small compensation (Rs. 324) in lieu of reinstatement.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Hari Vishnu v. Ahmad Ishaque [A.I.R 1955 S.C 233] | Scope of certiorari: certiorari corrects jurisdictional errors; supervisory (not appellate) jurisdiction; High Court will not re‑appreciate findings of fact reached by an inferior tribunal. | The Court relied on this to explain the limitations of its power under Article 226 and to emphasize that it should not re-evaluate findings of fact except to correct jurisdictional or legal errors. |
| State of Andhra Pradesh v. Chitra Venkata Rao [1976 — I L.L.N 45] | Where some evidence exists that can reasonably support a conclusion, the High Court will not review factual findings; adequacy/sufficiency of evidence is for the tribunal. | The Court cited this to support the proposition that an error of fact cannot be corrected by writ and that the tribunal's assessment of evidence is normally exclusive to it. |
| Remington Rand of India, Ltd. v. R. Jambulingam [1974 — II L.L.N 337] | Appellate authority under an identical statutory provision has wide appellate jurisdiction: competent to rehear, reappraise evidence and take additional evidence; may conduct de novo enquiry. | The Court used this authority to explain the breadth of the Appellate Authority's jurisdiction under S. 18(2) of the Act and to justify that the Commissioner could reappreciate evidence and entertain additional evidence. |
| Mak & Sons v. P. Kumara Pillai [1966 K.L.T 640] | Illustrative authority on appellate powers under the Act (grouped with other local precedents). | Included among local decisions relied on to show that the Appellate Authority may take additional evidence and hold de novo enquiries where warranted. |
| Ernakulam Co-operative Milk Supply Union v. K.C. Devassy [Original Petition No. 107 of 1973] | Local authority on the scope of appellate power under the Act. | Relied on as part of a set of decisions confirming the Appellate Authority's power to reappraise evidence and take additional evidence. |
| Valithan v. Additional Deputy Labour Commissioner and Appellate Authority [I.L.R (1975) 2 Ker. 304] | Local precedent concerning appellate reappraisal of domestic enquiry proceedings. | Used to support the proposition that the Appellate Authority can reassess whether the domestic enquiry complied with natural justice and whether misconduct was properly proved. |
| Chelur Agencies, Calicut v. Appellate Authority, Calicut [I.L.R (1976) 1 Ker. 590] | Local precedent on appellate powers under the relevant statute and rules. | Relied upon together with other Kerala decisions to demonstrate that the Appellate Authority can take additional evidence and even conduct a fresh enquiry where appropriate. |
| C.L. Subramaniam v. Collector of Customs, Cochin [(1972) 3 SCC 542 : A.I.R 1972 S.C 2178] | On representation at disciplinary enquiries (rule 15(5) CCS Rules): permissible to allow representation by another government servant or a legal practitioner in appropriate cases where livelihood is at stake. | The Court applied this precedent to hold that similar considerations apply to domestic enquiries in industrial/management contexts, particularly where the delinquent is an uneducated person and the consequences are grave. |
| Pett v. Greyhound Racing Association [(1968) 2 W.L.R 1471] | Common law support (Lord Denning) for allowing assistance by counsel where a person's ability to defend himself is limited and livelihood/reputation are at stake. | The Court quoted Lord Denning to reinforce the proposition that an uneducated person may require a lawyer's assistance to effectively cross-examine and present a defence, bolstering the conclusion that refusal to allow representation can deny a reasonable opportunity to defend. |
| Kalindi (N.) v. Tata Locomotive and Engineering Co., Ltd. [A.I.R 1960 S.C 914] | Authority cited by petitioner to suggest that a workman has no absolute right to be represented by a lawyer at a domestic enquiry. | The Court noted that the petitioner's reliance on this decision was out of context and that the Supreme Court in that case did not consider facts like those in the present case (an uneducated woman). The Court emphasized that management's discretion to allow a lawyer must be exercised in a spirit of fair play. |
| Brooke Bond India (Private), Ltd. v. Subba Raman (S.) [1961—II L.LJ 417] | Another authority cited by the petitioner on representation at domestic enquiries. | The Court held that such decisions do not support an absolute rule denying representation and reiterated that discretion to allow counsel must be exercised fairly, especially in cases like the present one. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court undertook a two-part analytical approach: (1) outline the limits of the High Court's jurisdiction in writ jurisdiction under Article 226, and (2) explain the scope of the Appellate Authority's jurisdiction under S. 18(2) of the Act.
On the High Court's jurisdiction, the Court relied on Hari Vishnu (AIR 1955 SC 233) to state that certiorari corrects jurisdictional or legal errors and that the High Court has supervisory, not appellate, jurisdiction; therefore it will not reappraise findings of fact reached by an inferior tribunal except on legal or jurisdictional grounds. The Court further cited State of Andhra Pradesh v. Chitra Venkata Rao to reinforce that the adequacy or sufficiency of evidence is for the tribunal and not for a writ court to reassess.
Concerning the Appellate Authority's powers, the Court referred to Remington Rand v. Jambulingam and a group of Kerala decisions to explain that an appeal under S. 18(2) confers a wide appellate jurisdiction on the Commissioner: he may rehear the matter, take additional evidence, and even hold a de novo enquiry where warranted. The Appellate Authority must satisfy itself whether the domestic enquiry complied with principles of natural justice and whether the misconduct was properly proved; if satisfied that the enquiry was fair and the misconduct proved, the authority need not dwell on additional evidence.
Applying these principles to the facts, the Court examined the record and the manner in which the domestic enquiry was conducted. Key factual findings influencing the Court's analysis included:
- Respondent 1 specifically requested permission to be assisted by a lawyer, stating that she was an "uneducated female" and not a union member; this request was summarily refused by the petitioner.
- Respondent 1 alleges she attended with her lawyer but was told to go alone and was sent away; she further alleges she was later informed the enquiry was over and she could not participate.
- The enquiry officer declared respondent 1 ex parte and proceeded, assuming that her absence meant she had no answer and was therefore guilty.
- All communications to respondent 1 were in English, without indication proceedings would be in a language she understood; the charge was vague (no date/time specified); there was an inordinate delay between the alleged incident and the management's communication; and material evidence (exhibit P1) was not proved at the enquiry.
On the basis of these circumstances, the Court concluded that the domestic enquiry was essentially a mechanical formality that deprived respondent 1 of a reasonable opportunity of defence: in particular, denial of the requested legal assistance and the language/formal defects effectively rendered cross-examination and presentation of defence meaningless for an uneducated person. These procedural infirmities supported the Appellate Authority's conclusion that the misconduct was not proved in a proper domestic enquiry.
The Court also emphasized that the Appellate Authority had discussed the evidence before it and reached an independent conclusion; given the Appellate Authority's wide appellate powers, a reappraisal by the High Court of the same evidence would be both uncalled for and unjustified. The Court noted that the Appellate Authority did not order reinstatement but only awarded modest back-wages (one-third of the period) and compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
Because the Appellate Authority's conclusion was supported by the record of procedural defects and because the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction does not permit it to substitute its own factual appraisal where the Appellate Authority has reappraised the evidence, the Court found no ground to interfere with exhibit P15.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ petition is dismissed. The Court refused to quash exhibit P15 and upheld the Appellate Authority's order awarding Rs. 2,916 as back-wages and Rs. 324 as compensation in lieu of reinstatement. The writ petition failed and was dismissed with costs; counsel's fee was fixed at Rs. 250.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: Exhibit P15 stands. The petitioner must comply with the monetary awards made by the Appellate Authority; respondent 1 was not reinstated but awarded the specified back-wages and compensation.
- Procedural/principled guidance from the opinion: The Court reaffirmed (a) the limited scope of writ review under Article 226 in relation to factual findings, (b) the wide appellate powers of the statutory Appellate Authority under S. 18(2) to reappraise evidence and take additional evidence, and (c) the importance of affording a reasonable opportunity to defend (which, in appropriate circumstances, may include permission to be represented by a lawyer) in domestic enquiries—particularly where the charged employee is uneducated and the consequences are grave.
- No new legal principle or binding precedent beyond the application of existing authorities was announced by the Court; the decision is an application of established principles to the facts of this case.
JUDGMENT
1. The legal battle in this writ petition is between two unequals, the management of the Kavitha Movie House (the petitioner) on the one hand, and sweeper (woman) employee (respondent 1) on the other; and they have remained locked up in dispute for well nigh nine years by now. Accepting the finding in exhibit P7 domestic enquiry report, the petitioner passed exhibit P10 order dismissing respondent 1 from service. On appeal by respondent 1 under S. 18(2) of the Kerala Shops and Commercial Establishments Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), respondent 2, the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Ernakulam, (the Appellate Authority), in and by exhibit P15 order held that the misconduct alleged against respondent 1 was not proved either in a proper domestic enquiry or before him, and in the result, ordered the petitioner to pay the respondent a sum of Rs. 2,916 as back-wages and a sum of Rs. 324 as compensation in lieu of reinstatement; no reinstatement, however, was ordered. It is for quashing exhibit P15 that this writ petition has been filed.
2. Sri S.A Nagendran, the counsel for the petitioner, argued that respondent 2 has acted either without jurisdiction, or in excess of the jurisdiction vested in him, by interfering with exhibit P10 order of dismissal based on the finding in exhibit P7 enquiry report, which according to him, could have been found to be one supported by evidence, and could not have been characterized as perverse on a review by the appellate authority of the evidence adduced at the domestic enquiry.
3. Sri Stanley Fernandez, the counsel for respondent 1, however, took the stand that his client really is the aggrieved party inasmuch as the appellate authority, after having rightly come to the conclusion that the misconduct alleged was not proved in a proper domestic enquiry has, instead of ordering, as a natural corollary, the reinstatement of respondent 1 into service, ordered only the payment of a paltry sum of Rs. 324 by way of compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
4. The origin of the episode lies in the alleged theft of a packet of cashewnut costing 50 paise by respondent 1 from the balcony canteen of the theatre.
5. Before we embark on a discussion as to the relative merits of the contentions raised in support of and against exhibit P15 order, it would be advantageous to bear in mind the limitations of this Court while exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution, and also the scope and extent of the jurisdiction of the Appellate Authority under the Act while dealing with an appeal final under S. 18(2) of the Act.
6. As far as the question relating to the jurisdiction of this Court is concerned, it cannot be better expressed than in the words of Venkatarama Ayyar, J., in Hari Vishnu v. Ahmad Ishaque [A.I.R 1955 S.C 233]:
“On these authorities, the following propositions may be taken as established:
(1) ‘Certiorari’ will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it.
(2) ‘Certiorari’ will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice.
(3) The Court issuing a writ of ‘certiorari’ acts in exercise of supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction.
One consequence of this is that the Court will not review finding of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal, even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence, and substitute its own findings in ‘certiorari’.”
7. It is also well settled that where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent is not guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however, grave it may appear to be. A finding of fact, recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal — State of Andhra Pradesh v. Chitra Venkata Rao [1976 — I L.L.N 45].
8. So far as the second question relating to the extent and scope of the jurisdiction of the appellate authority in dealing with an appeal filed under S. 18(2) of the Act is concerned guidance is available from the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Remington Rand of India, Ltd. v. R. Jambulingam [1974 — II L.L.N 337], wherein, in Para. 8, at page 339, construing identical provision contained in S. 41(2) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act (36 of 1947), (speaking for the Bench) Goswami, J., has observed as follows:
“Sri Natesan also submitted that the Commissioner should not have interfered with the order passed in the domestic enquiry since there was no violation of the principles of natural justice nor was the finding perverse. The jurisdiction of the Commissioner is an appellate jurisdiction and is of wider scope unlike that of the Tribunal in an application under S. 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Commissioner is competent to rehear the matter completely and come to its own conclusion after reappreciation of the evidence. There is no legal bar in entertaining additional evidence if that is necessary in the interest of justice ….”
9. The decision of this Court in Mak & Sons v. P. Kumara Pillai [1966 K.L.T 640], Ernakulam Co-operative Milk Supply Union v. K.C Devassy [Original Petition No. 107 of 1973], Valithan v. Additional Deputy Labour Commissioner and Appellate Authority [I.L.R (1975) 2 Ker. 304] and Chelur Agencies, Calicut v. Appellate Authority, Calicut [I.L.R (1976) 1 Ker. 590], and a few decisions of the Madras High Court referred to in the above decisions, have been cited before me. What emerges on a careful consideration of the ruling given in these decisions is that the appellate authority, by virtue of the provisions contained in S. 18 of the Act and rule 3(2) of the rules, has power to take additional evidence, and even to hold a de novo enquiry itself where circumstances warrant it; in such cases the appellate authority has to satisfy itself by a reappraisal and reassessment of the evidence as to whether the domestic enquiry was held in accordance with the principles of natural justice, and whether the charge of misconduct has been properly proved; if it is satisfied that the enquiry was held giving reasonable opportunity to the employee for his defence, and the misconduct alleged was properly proved at the domestic enquiry, the appellate authority need not necessarily advert to or discuss the additional evidence, if any, adduced before it; on the other hand if, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, it is satisfied that the domestic enquiry was held without observing the principles of natural justice, or the misconduct alleged was not properly proved, it is open to it to arrive at its own conclusion on an appraisal of the entire material placed before it.
10. Now in the background of the legal position discussed above we have to ask ourselves whether there were facts and circumstances, as disclosed by the records, to uphold the finding of the appellate authority that the misconduct alleged was not properly proved; and if the answer is in the affirmative, the further question that falls for decision is whether there are sufficient grounds for this Court to interfere with the order for payment of back-wages and compensation passed by the appellate authority.
11. In exhibit P4, letter, dated 4 December 1969, respondent 1 had clearly stated that she was not a member of a union, and being an “uneducated female” person her lawyer might be allowed to assist her at the time of enquiry so as to afford her a reasonable opportunity to defend her case. The petitioner by exhibit P5 letter, dated 16 December 1969, a copy of which was marked to the enquiry officer, informed respondent 1 that her request to have the assistance of an advocate could not be granted at the domestic enquiry. In that letter it was also mentioned that the petitioner intended to rely on exhibit P1 letter, dated 13 September 1969, sent by Oberoi Restaurant, the lessee of the canteen, to the petitioner complaining about the alleged act of stealing of the packet of cashewnut, and the alleged act of beating the canteen boy by respondent 1. Respondent 1 has a case that on 19 December 1969, it was with her lawyer that she went for the enquiry; but she was told that she should go alone, and she was sent away. She has also deposed before the appellate authority that on 29 December 1969, when she went there at 11 A.M, she was told that the enquiry was over and, therefore, she could not participate in it. No doubt, there is no reference in exhibit P7 enquiry report to respondent 1 having gone to the place of enquiry on the appointed day. The enquiry officer is seen to have declared her ex parte and proceeded with the enquiry. He assumed,
“if as a matter of fact she was innocent of the charges, she could have bees present at the enquiry and could have explained her position. Since she remained ex parte the only reasonable presumption is that she has no answer to the charges and she is guilty of the charges framed against her.” [Italics supplied.]
12. It is true, ordinarily in domestic enquiries conducted or caused to be conducted by the management, the delinquent is not entitled to, as a matter of right, to insist for permission to engage a lawyer, though the enquiry officer or the management in his or its discretion, in appropriate cases, can and may allow him to do so. Even in the case of a public servant, in whose case enquiries are held in accordance with statutory provisions, such right does not exist in an absolute sense. For instance, rule 15(5) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957, in terms, does not permit the Government servant to present his case with the assistance of a legal practitioner unless the person nominated by the disciplinary authority to present the case is a legal practitioner or unless the disciplinary authority having regard to the circumstances of the case gives permission in that behalf. Commenting on the scope and purpose of rule 15(5), the Supreme Court in C.L Subramaniam v. Collector Of Customs, Cochin, Cochin [(1972) 3 SCC 542 : A.I.R 1972 S.C 2178], stated as fellows:
“Government servants by and large have no legal training. At any rate, it is nobody's case that the appellant had legal training. Moreover when a man is charged with the breach of a rule entailing serious consequences, he is not likely to be in a position to present his case as best as it should be. The accusation against the appellant threatened his very livelihood. Any adverse verdict against him was bound to be disastrous to him, as it has proved to be. In such a situation he cannot be expected to act calmly and with deliberation. That is why rule 15(5) has provided for representation of a Government servant charged with dereliction of duty or with contravention of the rule by another Government servant or in appropriate cases by a legal practitioner.”
13. I am of the view that this principle should apply to domestic enquiries of the nature involved in the present case in order to make it meaningful and purposeful without reducing it to an empty formality or a mere farce, though it could not be considered as an absolute rule for general application to cases of disciplinary proceedings held under statutory rules or enquiries held in industrial concerns having standing orders. In this case, as mentioned at the outset, the fight was between two unequals — the management of a movie house on the one hand, and a poor widow, an uneducated sweeper, employed under it on the other. The petitioner summarily rejected her request for permission to present her case with the assistance of her lawyer in spite of her having specifically stated that she was not a member of any union and that she was an “uneducated female” person. The enquiry officer proceeded with the enquiry without bearing in mind this background and with the impression that there arose a presumption that she was guilty of the charge framed against her on the reasoning that
“If as a matter of fact she was innocent of the charges, she could have been present at the enquiry and could have explained her position.”
It is evident that the enquiry officer took the enquiry merely as a matter of formality.
14. In exhibit P3 notice, dated 27 November 1969, the petitioner, no doubt, had told respondent 1 that she would be given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. Neither the petitioner nor the enquiry officer appears to have seriously considered as to whether this offer in effect meant anything to her. Virtually it is like giving a weapon to a handicapped person who cannot make use of it. Cross-examination is an art by itself, wherein even trained persons often fail. In C.L Subramaniam [(1972) 3 SCC 542 : A.I.R 1972 S.C 2178], the appellant before the Supreme Court was a sufficiently educated person, though not legally trained; nevertheless, the Supreme Court, on an anxious consideration of the position, felt that in the given circumstances, where his livelihood appeared to be at peril, he could not have effectively cross-examined the witnessess out of nervousness. In this context I should also like to quote the words of Lord Denning, M.R, from a passage in Para. 10 in Pett v. Greyhound Racing Association [(1968) 2 W.L.R 1471]:
“It is not every man who has the ability to defend himself on his own. He cannot bring out the points in his own favour or the weaknesses in the other side. He may be tongue-tied or nervous, confused or wanting in intelligence. He cannot examine or cross-examine witnesses. We see it every day. A Magistrate says to a man: “You can ask question you like;” whereupon the man immediately starts to make a speech. If justice is to be done, He ought to have the help of someone to speak for him. And who better than a lawyer who has been trained for the task? I should have thought, therefore, that when a man's reputation or livelihood is at stake, he not only has a right to speak by his own mouth, he also has a right to speak by counsel or solicitor.”
It this was the case with C.L Subramaniam (vide supra) and Pett (vide supra), how much more pitiable is the case of Mary, the illiterate sweeper-woman. If what ultimately happened gives any clue, it is clear that the petitioner had intended to inflict the extreme punishment of dismissing respondent 1 from service if the charges against her were proved at the enquiry considering the seriousness of the consequences that would follow from the finding of the enquiry, the petitioner and the enquiry officer had the duty to ensure that respondent 1 was afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend herself which included the facility to effectively cross-examine the management's witnesses and place her case before the enquiry officer in an intelligent manner. Reasonable opportunity to defend oneself in the case of “uneducated female person” can have meaning only if she was allowed to have the cross-examination of the witnesses and presentation of the case done by or through her agent including a lawyer, as the task was beyond her comprehension. The counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Kalindi (N.) v. Tata Locomotive and Engineering Company, Ltd. Jamshedpur [A.I.R 1960 S.C 914] and Brooke Bond India (Private), Ltd. v. Subba Raman (S.) [1961—II L.LJ 417], to contend for the position that a workman against whom an enquiry is being held by the management has no right to be represented at such enquiry by a lawyer. I am afraid, the observations of the Supreme Court have been quoted out of context. The Supreme Court had no occasion to consider a case like the present one where an “uneducated female person” had to face an enquiry and defend herself. After all, the Supreme Court itself has indicated that the management has a discretion to allow the workman to engage the lawyer. That is a descretion the management has to exercise in a spirit of fair play, and by and large to be in consonance with the rules and principles of natural justice which may assume various forms and shapes depending upon the context in which it comes into play. The petitioner's refusal of the request of respondent 1 for permission to be represented by her agent, a lawyer, virtually amounted to depriving her of the reasonable opportunity to defend herself at the enquiry. In this background it is unfortunate that the enquiry officer jumped to the conclusion that if as a matter of fact, respondent 1 was innocent of the charges, she could have presented herself at the enquiry to explain her position; it is still more unfortunate that he proceeded with the assumption that arose a presumption that “she had no answer to the charges, and she was guilty of the charges levelled against her.” The enquiry proved to be a sheer mechanical process without the enquiry officer bothering to ascertain as to anything was to be done lest scale be weighed against her at the enquiry. [Italics supplied.]
15. All the communications to respondent 1 by the petitioner and the enquiry officer were in English. There was no indication that the enquiry proceedings would be in a language known to respondent 1. If not earlier, at least from exhibit P letter, dated 4 December 1969, the petitioner had known that respondent 1 was an uneducated woman. In this background the framing of the charge and the sending of the communications in English, in a ritualistic manner for apparent compliance of the formalities did not really serve any useful purpose as far as respondent 1 was concerned. The charge framed was vague; it did not state either the date or the time of the commission of the alleged acts of theft and beating. Exhibit P1 letter from the lessee of the canteen is, dated 13 September 1969, whereas from exhibit P2 it is seen that the alleged theft of the packet of cashew-nut took place on 25 August 1969, and till the sending of the petitioner's letter, dated 29 September 1969, no action is seen to have been taken, and no communication is seen to have been sent to respondent 1, by the petitioner. No explanation is offered to explain this indifference and inordinate delay. Exhibit P1 letter is conspicuous for the absence of any definite statement. Like the charge, it also does not mention the date or time of the alleged theft or beating. It does not mention either the name of respondent 1 or that of the particular canteen boy, Joseph. The person who sent exhibit P1 letter was not examined at the enquiry to prove it and to speak about the contents thereof, even though it was stated in exhibit P1 that he was present at the canteen at the time of the incident relating to the stealing of the packet of cashewnut. Nobody proved exhibit P1 at the enquiry. In fact, when examined before the appellate authority, the enquiry officer would go to the extent of saying that exhibit R1 (which is the same as exhibit P1 in the writ petition) was not brought to his notice at the time of the enquiry. The above facts and circumstances are sufficient to convince the judicial conscience of the Court to uphold the conclusion reached by the appellate authority that the misconduct levelled against respondent 1 was not proved in a proper domestic enquiry. The appellate authority has also discussed the whole evidence placed before it in order to come to its conclusion that the misconduct alleged was riot proved before that authority also. A reappraisal by his Court of the evidence which led to the conclusion reached by the appellate authority would be both uncalled for and unjustified. If these facts and circumstances would be seen from the records, even if it could be said that there was no detailed discussion of the evidence in a systematic and cogent manner, as could normally be expected in a judgment of the civil Court, by the appellate authority, that by itself would not justify interference by this Court on the plea that there was no proper review of the enquiry report by the appellate authority before rejecting the finding therein.
16. After all, no reinstatement has been ordered by the appellate authority; only payment of a very moderate sum by way of back-wages and compensation has been ordered by it. The back-wages awarded is only for one-third of the period involved.
17. Taking the entire circumstances of the case into account I am satisfied that the petitioner has not made out a case for interference with exhibit P15 order at this distance of time by this Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The result is that the writ petition fails, and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee is fixed at Rs. 250.
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