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E. Balanandan v. State Of Kerala
Judgment Summary — Public Property (Prevention of Destruction and Loss) Ordinance, 1978
Factual and Procedural Background
The constitutional validity of the Public Property (Prevention of Destruction and Loss) Ordinance, 1978 (Ordinance No. 15 of 1978), promulgated by the Governor of Kerala, was challenged in a writ petition by two petitioners. The first petitioner was the President of the Kerala State Electricity Board Workers Association (a registered trade union) and the second was an employee of the Board. The Union had called a general strike to enforce its demands, which was followed by an employees' strike. The petitioners alleged that the Ordinance formed part of repressive measures taken against the strike and the strikers and sought relief on the ground that the Ordinance was constitutionally invalid.
The Ordinance consisted of two sections: a short title/commencement section and a substantive section increasing punishment for mischief (as defined by S.425 IPC) when committed in respect of "public property," making such punishment greater (six months to five years' imprisonment and fine up to Rs. 2,000). The petition argued that the Ordinance could not validly be promulgated by the Governor without prior instruction from the President because, if enacted by the State Legislature, it would have required Presidential assent (i.e., would be invalid without it) under the proviso to Article 213(1) read with clause (c) thereof and Article 254.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Governor of Kerala could validly promulgate the Public Property (Prevention of Destruction and Loss) Ordinance, 1978 without prior instruction from the President under the proviso to Article 213(1) of the Constitution.
- Whether the Ordinance, which creates enhanced punishment for mischief to "public property" (as defined) and alters cognizability and bailability, is repugnant to the existing law (the Indian Penal Code) in respect of a matter in the Concurrent List and therefore void under Article 254.
- Whether the Ordinance can lawfully operate side-by-side with the Indian Penal Code as a "special" or "local" law saved by Section 5 of the Penal Code, or whether it is in conflict and thus constitutionally invalid without Presidential assent.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The Ordinance was a repressive measure aimed at the strike and the strikers called by the Union.
- The Ordinance dealt with the offence of mischief already covered by Section 425 of the Indian Penal Code and, by creating a separate, enhanced category for mischief to "public property," it would be repugnant to the existing law (the Penal Code) on a matter in the Concurrent List.
- Because a State enactment on the same subject would be invalid unless it had received Presidential assent, the Governor should not have promulgated the Ordinance without previous instruction from the President (proviso to Article 213(1), read with clause (c)).
Respondent / Additional Advocate-General's Arguments
- The Ordinance does not supplant or alter the Indian Penal Code: it leaves the Penal Code provisions untouched and operates as a supplemental statute dealing specifically with mischief to public property to operate side-by-side with the Penal Code.
- Relying on Section 5 of the Penal Code, it was argued that the Ordinance is a "special" or "local" law (per Sections 41 and 42 of the Penal Code), and therefore saved from being overridden by the general provisions of the Penal Code.
- Reference was made to Section 29(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code (regarding joinder of charges and when offences are of the same kind) to support the contention that the Ordinance's offence could be regarded as of the same kind; and there was an attempt to argue that the definition of "mischief" in the Penal Code had been incorporated into the Ordinance.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Saverbhai Amaidas v. State of Bombay (AIR 1954 SC 752) | Principle that where Centre and State legislate on the same matter both being competent, the law of the Centre should prevail; question whether later legislation deals with the "same matter" for repugnancy under Article 254(2). | The court cited this decision as apposite for judging repugnancy between the Ordinance and the Penal Code and used its principle to conclude that the Ordinance fell within the same field already occupied by existing Central law (the IPC) and was therefore repugnant absent Presidential assent. |
| State of Jammu and Kashmir v. M.S. Farooqi ((1972) 1 SCC 872 : AIR 1972 SC 1738) | Surveyed decisions on repugnancy and applied Article 254 principles to hold a State enactment repugnant where Parliament had occupied the field; illustrated that State provisions creating additional punishment conflicting with central discipline rules were repugnant. | The court relied on the reasoning in Farooqi to support the view that where State provisions introduce additional punishment or alter the scheme already dealt with by central enactments, they cannot coexist; the Ordinance similarly provided enhanced punishment and altered cognizability and bailability, so it was treated as repugnant. |
| Public Prosecutor v. Annamalai (AIR 1954 Madras 321) | Authority suggesting that a State enactment (or ordinance) might be treated as a "local law" for purposes of the Penal Code. | The court noted this decision as one of the authorities indicating that the Ordinance might be considered a "local law," but observed conflicting authority on that point and declined to decide the question, instead assuming (without deciding) that the Ordinance could possibly be a special or local law and proceeding to decide validity under the Constitution. |
| In re Arunagirinatha (AIR 1939 Madras 21) | Authority indicating that similar State enactments might be regarded as "special law." | The court mentioned this decision as representing the contrary view (to the Annamalai case) on classification as "special law," but expressly stated it did not need to examine these decisions in depth and proceeded on an assumption without deciding. |
| Ukha Kolhe v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1963 SC 1531) | Upheld validity of a State Act (Bombay Prohibition Act) as against certain provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code on the ground that the State Act had received Presidential assent. | The court cited this decision to illustrate that where a State law had received Presidential assent, repugnancy could be cured; by contrast the Ordinance before the court had not received such assent and therefore could not rely on that protection. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in a step-by-step manner grounded in the text of the Ordinance, the Indian Penal Code (IPC), and the constitutional division of legislative powers (Articles 245, 246, 254 and Article 213 governing Ordinances).
-
Textual analysis of the Ordinance:
- The Ordinance dealt expressly with the offence of "mischief" as defined by Section 425 IPC, but limited the offence to mischief in respect of "public property" (as defined in the Ordinance's explanation) and prescribed an enhanced sentence (six months to five years) and a larger fine.
- The Ordinance thus singled out a subset of the mischief offence and altered punishment and other consequences (cognizability, bailability as discussed in the opinion).
-
Examination of the Indian Penal Code and related sections:
- Section 425 IPC defines mischief generally (covering both public and private property); Section 426 prescribes punishment (up to three months rigorous imprisonment), and related sections cover aggravated forms.
- Under the schedules to the Criminal Procedure Code and Section 2(a), mischief was a bailable and non-cognizable offence as per the existing law.
- Sections 2 and 40 IPC were analysed to explain the exclusivity principle: ordinarily, liability under the Penal Code is exclusive for offences made punishable by it, and the term "offence" in certain sections may include special or local laws but the chapters dealing with mischief fall under the first paragraph (offences punishable by the Code itself), not the paragraphs that import special/local law.
-
Constitutional framework:
- Article 213(1) allows a Governor to promulgate an ordinance when the legislature is not in session, but the proviso bars promulgation without instruction from the President where a Bill containing the same provisions would, under the Constitution, have required the previous assent of the President, or where an Act containing the same provisions would have been invalid unless it had received Presidential assent (clause (c)).
- Article 254 provides that a State law repugnant to a parliamentary law or an existing law on a Concurrent List matter is void unless the State law is reserved and receives the President's assent (Art. 254(2)). The relevant concurrent entry is Entry 1 of List III: "Criminal law, including all matters included in the Indian Penal Code..."
-
Assessment of repugnancy:
- The court considered whether the Ordinance was repugnant to the IPC. It found that the Ordinance segregated mischief to public property and enacted enhanced punishment and altered aspects such as cognizability and bailability—matters already covered by the IPC.
- The court rejected the submission that the Ordinance merely supplemented the IPC and could operate side-by-side without repugnancy. It found the legislative action to be "trespassing into forbidden field" in light of Articles 245, 246 and 254 and the entries in the Seventh Schedule.
-
Consideration of the "special/local law" argument:
- The Additional Advocate-General relied on Section 5 IPC (saving provisions of any special or local law) and definitions of "special law" and "local law" in Sections 41 and 42 IPC to argue that the Ordinance could be a special/local law. The court acknowledged conflicting authorities on whether such an Ordinance could be so classified but expressly did not decide that classification.
- Even assuming, without deciding, that the Ordinance could be a special or local law, the court held that constitutional provisions (Article 254 and Article 213's proviso) governed and that, absent Presidential assent, the Ordinance remained invalid if repugnant to an existing law (the IPC).
-
Use of authorities:
- The court relied on decisions such as Saverbhai Amaidas and State of Jammu & Kashmir v. M.S. Farooqi to explain and apply the principle that where Parliament or an existing central law has occupied the field on a matter in the Concurrent List, a State enactment providing inconsistent or additional punishment will be repugnant and invalid unless it receives Presidential assent.
-
Conclusion of analysis:
- Because the Ordinance changed the nature and character of the offence (segregation of public property mischief, enhanced punishment, changed cognizability and bailability), it was repugnant to the existing law (the IPC) on a matter in the Concurrent List, and the Governor could not validly promulgate it without prior instructions from the President under the proviso to Article 213(1).
- Accordingly, the court allowed the writ petition and declared the Ordinance void.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ petition was allowed and the Public Property (Prevention of Destruction and Loss) Ordinance, 1978 was declared void.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The Ordinance is invalid and of no legal effect; the State's attempt to impose enhanced punishment and alter the nature of the offence of mischief in respect of public property by the impugned Ordinance fails.
- Constitutional consequence: Because the Ordinance dealt with a matter covered by the Indian Penal Code (an existing law on a Concurrent List entry) and would have been repugnant to that existing law, Presidential instruction/assent was required before the Governor could promulgate such an Ordinance under Article 213(1) of the Constitution; that instruction/assent was not obtained here.
- Broader precedent: The court decided the validity of this Ordinance by applying existing constitutional principles and earlier decisions on repugnancy; the opinion does not assert the creation of a new legal principle beyond applying Articles 213 and 254 and relevant case law. (The judgment does not purport to set a novel precedent beyond these applications.)
- Costs: There was no order as to costs in the judgment.
This summary is strictly confined to the information and reasoning contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or legal conclusions beyond the text of the opinion.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Gopalan Nambiyar, C.J:— The constitutionally of the Public Property (Prevention of Destruction and Loss) Ordinance, 1978 (Ordinance No. 15 of 1978) promulgated by the Governor of Kerala is assailed in this writ petition by the two petitioners, the first of them, the President of the Kerala State Electricity Board Workers Association, a Trade Union registered under the Trade Union Act, and the second, an employee of the Board. The Union had called a general strike to enforce its demands made to the Board. This was followed by a strike of the employees. It is the petitioners' case that the Ordinance is part of the repressive measures taken against the strike and the strikers.
2. The Ordinance is short, and consists only of two Sections. For the sake of convenience, the Sections may be reproduced:
“1. Short title and commencement.—(1) This Ordinance may be called the Public Property (Prevention of Destruction and Loss) Ordinance, 1978.
(2) It shall come into force at once
2. Punishment for committing mischief in respect of public property.— Whoever attempts to commit or commits or instigates, incites or otherwise abets the commission of, mischief within the meaning of S. 425 of the Indian Penal Code (Central Act 45 of 1860), in respect of public property shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to five years and with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees.
Explanation.— For the purposes of this section, “public property” means any property owned or controlled by the Government or by the Kerala State Electricity Board or by the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation or by any other corporation owned or controlled by the Government.”
3. On a plain reading of the provisions, it seems to us plain that the Ordinance is dealing only with the offence of ‘mischief’ as known to S. 425 of the Indian Penal Code, taking out the offence in respect of public property and subjecting the same to a higher term of imprisonment ranging from six months to five years and a higher amount of fine extending to Rs. 2000/-. The explanation to S. 2 provides a sort of definition to the term ‘public property’.
4. S. 425 of the Indian Penal Code defines ‘mischief’. In substance, it consists in causing destruction of any property or any such change in such property as destroys or diminishes to value or utility. Both public and private property are included within the ambit of the offence. S. 426 provides for punishment for the offence which may extend to three months rigorous imprisonment. Ss. 427, 428, 429, 430 etc. deal with aggravated forms of the offence of mischief, depending on the extent or damage to property, the kind of property to which mischief is caused, the mode of causing damage, the object of committing mischief, and so on. Under the First Schedule to the Criminal Procedure Code read with S. 2(a) of the said Code, the offence of mischief is a bailable and non-cognizable offence. The object of the Ordinance, it is stated, is to provide enhanced punishment for the offence of mischief to public property and to make the offence a non-bailable one. We are not really concerned with the legislative intent in passing the Ordinance. The attack against the Ordinance has been squarely that the subject-matter of the Ordinance is such that a legislation by the State would have been invalid unless it had received the assent of the President; and therefore the Ordinance could not have been promulgated by the Governor without previous instructions from the President. This is the combined effect of the proviso to Article 213(1) of the Constitution read with clause (c) of the said proviso. For the sake of convenience, we shall quote the relevant portion of Article 213.
“213. (1) If at any time, except when the Legislative Assembly of a State is in session, or were there is a Legislative Council in a State, except when both Houses of the Legislature are in session, the Governor is satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action, he may promulgate such Ordinances as the circumstances appear to him require:
Provided that the Governor shall not, without instruction from the President promulgate any such Ordinance if—
(a) a Bill containing the same provisions would under this Constitution have required the previous sanction of the President for the introduction thereof into the Legislature; or
(b) he would have deemed it necessary to reserve a Bill containing the same provisions for the consideration of the President; or
(c) an Act of the Legislature of the State containing the same provisions would under this Constitution have been invalid unless, having been reserved the consideration of the President, it had received the assent of the President.
(3) If and so far as an Ordinance under this article makes any provision which would not be valid if enacted in an Act of the Legislature of the State assented to by the Governor, it shall be void:
Provided that, for the purposes of the provisions of this Constitution relating to the effect of an Act of the Legislature of a State which is repugnant to an Act of Parliament or an existing law with respect to a matter enumerated in the Concurrent List, an Ordinance promulgated under this article in pursuance of instructions from the President shall be deemed to be an Act of the Legislature of the State which has been reserved for the consideration of the President and asserted to by him.
5. From clause (3) of Article 213, it would be seen that the Ordinance making power of the Governor is co-extensive with the legislative power of the State. The previous instruction of the President in promulgating the Ordinance is necessary if the legislation would have been invalid, if enacted by the State unless it had received the assent of the President. It is admitted that the previous instruction of the President has not been obtained. The contention is that, ware the Legislature of the State to enact a law on the same subject-matter as the one covered by the Ordinance, it would have been invalid for want of Presidential assent, and therefore, the Ordinance cannot be saved without the previous instruction of the President. The Indian Penal Code, it is pointed out, is an existing law with respect to a matter enumerated in the Concurrent List; and the provisions of the Ordinance, if enacted by the State Legislature would be repugnant to the provisions of the Penal Code. In that view, the Parliamentary enactment is to prevail and the State enactment must yield. This is the result of Article 254(1) and (2). We may now extract them:
“254. (1) If any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of an existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2), the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of such State, or, as the case may be the existing law, shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void.
(2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State:
Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the Legislature of the State.”
6. The argument is that as the offence of mischief has been dealt with and covered by the Indian Penal Code, it would be quite repugnant to its provisions to segregate mischief to Public Property, and deal with it in a special way by providing an enhanced punishment for the said offence. This was said to be the result of the Ordinance. Despite the attempt made the learned Additional Advocate-General to get out of the difficulty, we think that the contention raised by counsel for the petition's is well-founded and must be accepted. The argument of the learned Additional Advocate General was that the provisions of the Penal Code and the offences created by it are left untouched, and these supplemental provisions dealing with mischief to public property alone have been enacted by the impugned Ordinance, to operate side-by-side with the provisions of the Penal Code. The learned Additional Advocate-General drew our attention to S. 5 of the Penal Code which in acts,
“5. Nothing in this Act shall affect the provisions of any Act for punishing mutiny and desertion of officers, soldiers, sailors, or airmen in the service of the Government of India or the provisions of any special or local law.”;
7. and contended that the provisions of the Ordinance are a ‘special law’ as defined in S. 42 of the Penal Code. It was contended that the Ordinance would also constitute a ‘local law’ as defined in S. 41 of the Code. These Sections may well be noticed.
“41. A ‘special law’ is a law applicable to a particular subject.
42. A ‘local law’ is a law applicable only to a particular part of India.”
8. These may be noticed along with Ss. 2 and 40 of the Code which are as follows:
“2. Every person shall be liable to punishment under this Code and not otherwise for every act or omission contrary to the provisions thereof, of which he shall be guilty within India.”
“40. Except in the Chapters and Sections mentioned in clauses 2 and 3 of this section, the word ‘offence’ denotes a thing made punishable by this Code.
In Chapter IV, Chapter VA and in the following sections, namely, Ss. 64, 65, 66, 67, 71, 109, 110, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 187, 194, 195, 203, 211, 213, 214, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 347, 348, 388, 389 and 445, the word ‘offence’ denotes a thing punishable under this Code, or under any special or local law as hereinafter defined.
And in sections 141, 176, 177, 201, 202, 212, 216 and 441, the word ‘offence’ has the same meaning when the thing punishable under the special or local law is punishable under such law with imprisonment for a term of six months or upwards, whether with or without fine”
9. Under S. 2, liability to punishment is exclusively under the provisions of the Penal Code, in respect of offences made punishable by it. The concept of the term ‘offence’ is explained in S. 40. In brief, under the first paragraph, it means anything punishable by the Code; under the second paragraph, for certain specified Chapters and Sections, it means a thing punishable under the Code or under any special or local law; and under the third paragraph, for certain sepecified Sections, the term means anything punishable under the special or local law with imprisonment for six months or upwards. The offence of mischief and the Chapter under which it occurs are not within paragraphs two and three of S. 40. They fall under paragraph one
10. It is a nice and debatable question as to whether the offence of mischief is governed by the rule of exclusiveness sanctioned by S. 2, or by the non-obstante clause in S. 5 which saves the provisions of any ‘special’ or ‘local’ law. That would raise the question whether the Ordinance can be regarded at all as a special or local law. The question again is not altogether free from difficulty. While on the principle of some decisions it can pass as ‘local law’ (vide Public Prosecutor v. Annamalai (AIR. 1954 Madras 321), on the strength of certain other decisions it can be regarded only as ‘special law’ (vide In re Arunagirinatha (AIR. 1939 Madras 21). We need not pause to consider or to examine these decisions. Let us assume, without deciding, that it is possible for the Ordinance to co-exist as a ‘special’ or a ‘local law’ side-by-side with the Penal Code. That would not however clinch the question of its constitutional validity or efficacy. These must be decided on the provisions of the Constitution.
11. Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution deal with the Legislative powers of Parliament and the States. These are as follows:
“245. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India and the Legislature of a State may make laws for the whole or any part of the State.
(2) No law made by Parliament shall be deemed to be invalid on the ground that it would have extra-territoria operation
246. (1) Notwithstanding anything in clauses (2) and (3), Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule (m this Constitution referred to as the ‘Union List’).
(2) Notwithstanding anything in clause (3), Parliament, and, subject to clause (1), the Legislature of any Sta'e also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the ‘Concurrent List”).
(3) Subject to clauses (1) and (2), the Legislature of any State has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the ‘State List’).
(4) Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any matter for any part of the territory of India not included in a State notwithstanding that such matter is a matter enumerated in the State List.’
12. It would be seen that the power of a Legislature of a State to make laws even in respect of a matter covered by the Concurrent List is subject to the power of the Parliament to legislate on an entry in the said List. The entry with which we are concerned in this case is entry I of List III of the VIIth Schedule to the Constitution which is as follows:
“1. Criminal law, including all matters included in the Indian Penal Code at the commencement of this Constitution but excluding offences against laws with respect to any of the matters specified in List I or List II and excluding the use of naval, military or air forces or any other armed forces of the Union in aid of the civil power.”
13. If we now turn again to Article 254 (already extracted) we would be able to see that if a law made by the Legislature of a State with respect to any of the matters in the Concurrent List, contains a provision repugnant to an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law the State law shall prevail, only if it had received the Presidential assent. Despite the strenuous argument of the learned Additional Advocate-General, we are not satisfied that there was no repugnancy between the provisions of the Penal Code and the provisions of the Ordinance. The provisions of S. 425 of the Code deal with mischief to both public and private property. The Ordinance takes out only mischief relating to public property as defined by the explanation and treats the same different from the way in which the Penal Code has dealt with them. The nature and character of the offences, their cognizability, their bailable nature—all these have been changed. We are unable to say in the circumstances that there is no pug nance to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Additional Advocate-General invited our attention to S. 29(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code which enacts:
xxxxxx
(2) Offences are of the same kind when they are punishable with the same amount of punishment under the same section of the Indian Penal Code or of any special or local law:
Provided that, for the purposes of this section, an offence punishable under S. 379 of the Indian Penal Cods shall be deemed to be an offence of the same kind as an offence punishable under S. 380 of the said Code, and that an offence punishable under any section of the said Code, or of any special or local law, shall be deemed to be an offence of the same kind as an attempt to commit such offence, when such an attempt is an offence.”
14. But this Section is one among the fasciculus of Sections dealing with joinder of charges. It would be inappropriate to draw from this provision a principle of general application as to when offences can be regarded as being of the same, or of a different kind.
15. We may refer to a few of the decisions cited In Saverbhai Amaidas v. State Of Bombay (AIR 1954 SC 752) the question arose regarding the repugnancy of the Bombay Act 36 of 1947 to the provisions of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 as amended by Central Act 52 of 1950. Under S. 7(1) of the Central Act the punishment provided was for three years or with fine or with both. The Bombay amendment enhanced the punishment to seven years. This change would at once oust the jurisdiction of the Magistrate and make the offence exclusively triable by the Court of Session. The Bombay Act was passed with the assent of the Governor-General on the footing that the subject-matter fell within the Concurrent List. The contention advanced on behalf of the State was that subsequent to the Bombay Act of 1947 there was Central legislation in 1948 and 1949 and again in 1950, and that as a result of these legislations, the Bombay enactment had become inoperative. The question with respect to the earlier two Central enactments fell to be decided with reference to S. 107(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935; and with respect to the amendment of 1950, with reference to Article 254(2) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court observed:
“The important thing to consider with reference to this provision is whether the legislation is ‘in respect of the same matter’. If the later legislation deals not with the matters which formed the subject of the earlier legislation but with other and distinct matters though of a cognate and allied character, then Art. 254(2) will have no application The principle embodied in S. 107(2) and Art. 254(2) is that when there is legislation covering the same ground both by the Centre and by the Province, both of them being competent to enact the same, the law of the Centre should prevail over that of the State.” (page 757)
16. Considering the matter from the above point of view and analysing the provisions of the Act, the Court observed:
“S. 7 is thus a comprehensive code covering the entire field of punishment for offences under the Act, gladed according to the commodities and to the character of the offence. The subject of enhanced punishment that is dealt with in Act No. 36 of 1947 is also comprised in Act No. 52 of 1950, the same being limited to the case of hoarding of foodgrain. We are, therefore, entirely in agreement with the opinion of Chagla, C.J and Chainani, J. that Act No. 52 of 1950 is a legislation in respect of the same matter as Act No. 36 of 1947.” (page 757)
17. The decision is apposite in judging the question of repugnancy as between the provisions of the Ordinance and the provisions of the Penal Code. So again is also the decision in State of Jammu and Kashmir v. M.S Faroogi ((1972) 1 SCC 872 : AIR 1972 SC. 1738). The actual decision in this case as to whether the Jammu & Kashmir Government Servants Prevention of Corruption Act was repugnant to the provisions of the All India Services Act and the Discipline and Appeal Rules, should not cause much of a difficulty as the same had to be given in the light of Article 254 as applicable to the State of Kashmir at the relevant time as notified by the President under Article 370 of the Constitution. But the relevant decisions on the question of repugnancy were all surveyed, and it was held that the State enactment had to yield before the All India Service. Act and the Discipline Rules. The conclusion was expressed thus:
“37. From the perusal of the provisions of the two statutory laws, namely, the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955, and the Jammu and Kashmir Government Servants' (Prevention of Corruption) (Commission) Act, 1962, it is impossible to escape from the conclusion that the two cannot go together. The impugned Act provides for additional punishment not provided in the Discipline and Appeal Rules. It also provides for suspension and infliction of some punishments. It seems to us that in so far as the Commission Act deals with the infliction of disciplinary punishments it is repugnant to the Discipline and Appeal Rules. Parliament has occupied the field and given clear indication that this was the only manner in which any disciplinary action should be taken against the members of the All India Service. In so far as the Commission Act deals with a preliminary enquiry for the purposes of enabling any prosecution to be launched it may be within the legislative competence of the Jammu and Kashmir State and not repugnant to the provisions of the Discipline and Appeal Rules. But as the provisions dealing with investigation for possible criminal prosecution are inextricably intertwined with the provisions dealing with infliction of disciplinary punishment the whole Act must be read down so as to leave the members of the All India Services outside its purview.”
18. We may then refer to Ukha Kolhe v. State Of Maharashtra (AIR 1963 SC. 1531) which upheld the validity of the Bombay Prohibition Act as against certain provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. But that was because the Bombay Act bad received the Presidential assent.
19. Some attempt was made by the learned Additional Advocate-General to contend that the definition of ‘mischief’ as given in the Indian Penal Code has been incorporated into the Ordinance on the scheme and the language of the provisions of the Ordinance. We are unable to hold that there has been any incorporation of the provisions of the Penal Code regarding mischief into the provisions of the Ordinance What the Ordinance plainly and simply purports to do is to deal with the offence of mischief as defined by the Penal Code, and to erect mischief in respect of public property into a special category punishable with an enhanced term of imprisonment and a larger amount of fine. These clearly appear to us to be trespassing into forbidden field having regard to Articles 245 and 246 and 254 of the Constitution which we have referred to earlier, and to Lists I and III of the VII Schedule, that the State's legislative power under the entries in the Concurrent List is only subject to the power of Parliament to legislate over the same, and, in he absence of Presidential assent, must held to any existing law with respect to said matter. There was an existing law—the Indian Penal Code—on the subject. Legislative action taken by the State should be regarded as repugnant to the provision of the ‘existing law’ viz. the Penal Code under Article 254 of the Constitution, in the light of the principle of the decisions noticed, viz. Saverbhai Amaidas v. State Of Bombay (AIR 1954 SC. 752) and State of Jammu and Kashmir v. M.S Farooqi ((1972) 1 SCC 872 : AIR. 1972 SC. 1738). Ss. 2 and 40 of the Penal Code only reinforce that conclusion. Having regard to Article 254(1) of the Constitution a law made by the Legislature of a State in regard to the subject-matter of the Ordinance would be void, unless it has received Presidential assent. The same infirmity would at fact the Ordinance, as the Ordinance making power of the Governor is co-terminus with the State's Legislative power. It so, the previous instruction of the President would have been necessary under the proviso to Article 213(1) read with clause (c) of the said proviso. The same not having been obtained, the Ordinance should fail. We accordingly allow this writ petition and declare the Ordinance void. There will be no order as to costs.
20. Allowed.
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