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Neelakantanachari Velayudhanachari And Another v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation .

Kerala High Court
Aug 11, 1977
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Judgment Summary — Kochu Thommen, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal from the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge, Kottayam in O.S. No. 46 of 1971. The plaintiffs (now appellants) sued for damages arising from a motor accident on 24-1-1969 in which their two children, Vijayam (aged 12) and Vikraman (aged 11), were killed and both parents were seriously injured. The bus involved (No. K.L.T. 8764) belonged to the 1st defendant and was driven by the 2nd defendant. The trial court found negligence on the part of the driver (2nd defendant) and vicarious liability on the part of the owner (1st defendant), but awarded only part of the damages claimed by the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs originally claimed Rs. 28,880 under several heads (including claims under section 2 and section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act (XIII of 1855) and for personal injuries and loss). The trial court awarded damages only under some heads, reducing the total to Rs. 4,000. The appeal was filed in forma pauperis. The appellants subsequently amended the appeal (with leave of this Court) to limit their claim to Rs. 11,500, abandoning their claims under section 2 and pursuing amounts under section 1-A and for personal injuries/loss.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court correctly assessed and quantified damages under section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act (XIII of 1855) with respect to the deaths of the two minor children.
  2. Whether the trial court correctly assessed damages for the personal injuries sustained by the parents (quantum of compensation for shock and bodily injury).
  3. Whether the claim for loss of earnings of the husband (1st plaintiff) should have been allowed and, if so, to what extent.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Taff Vale Railway Company v. Jenkins, 1913 A.C. 1 Authority for the proposition that the fact a child did not earn money at the time of death does not necessarily disentitle parents from claiming full benefits under the Fatal Accidents Act; and that compensation under the Act is not a solatium for injured feelings. The court relied on this authority to support the view that both children, though not earning, could reasonably be expected to provide pecuniary benefit in the future, and thus the parents were entitled to damages under section 1-A.
Blake v. Midland Rly., 1852 18 Q.B. 93 Establishes that non-pecuniary loss (mental suffering, anguish, bereavement) is excluded from computation under the Fatal Accidents Act; damages must reflect pecuniary loss. The court reiterated this principle to emphasize that assessment under section 1-A must focus on pecuniary loss, not sentimental or bereavement damages.
Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd., 1942 A.C. 601 Statement that assessment under statutory wrongful-death provisions is a "hard matter of pounds, shillings and pence" — i.e., confined to quantifiable pecuniary loss and reasonable future probabilities. The court cited this passage to explain that while assessment is strictly pecuniary, it should account for reasonable future probabilities and contemporary circumstances (e.g., increased value attributed to life, changed social roles).
C.K. Subramania Iyer v. T. Kunhikuttan Nair A summarized statement of the law: damages under section 1-A are limited to pecuniary loss to beneficiaries; section 2 concerns economic loss to the estate; no exact uniform rule; life expectancy and reasonable probabilities are important; parents are generally entitled to present cash value of prospective service of deceased minor child. The court adopted this legal summary as a guiding framework for assessing pecuniary loss in the present case, applying its principles (life expectancy, exclusion of speculative possibilities, present cash value of prospective service) to the facts before it.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a sequence of legal and factual analyses, staying within the scope of established authorities:

  1. Characterisation of claims: The court identified which claimed items fell under the Fatal Accidents Act (XIII of 1855) — items corresponding to section 2 and section 1-A — and distinguished those from the plaintiffs' personal injury and loss claims.
  2. Legal principle on measure of damages: Quoting and relying on authorities (Blake, Taff Vale, Davies and C.K. Subramania Iyer), the court reiterated that compensation under section 1-A is limited to pecuniary loss reasonably expected by beneficiaries and excludes non-pecuniary elements such as bereavement and mental anguish. The court also acknowledged there is no rigid formula; assessment depends on facts and reasonable future probabilities.
  3. Application to factual matrix: The court examined the specific facts — ages and health of the children, family circumstances, parents' occupations and earnings (father a goldsmith earning not less than Rs.10/day; mother assisting by making sweet-meats with the daughter's help), the injuries to the parents, and the likelihood that the children would have provided pecuniary assistance in future — to determine reasonable pecuniary loss.
  4. Critique of trial court's quantification: The appellate court found the trial court's awards to be inadequate in several respects: (a) the award of Rs.1,000 for Vikraman's death was unreasonably small; (b) awarding nothing for Vijayam's death was unjustified because the trial court ignored evidence of the girl's assistance to her mother and failed to account for changed social realities that make future female earnings probable; and (c) unequal assessment of the parents' injury claims (wife awarded Rs.2,000, husband only Rs.1,000) lacked justification given comparable seriousness and hospitalisation.
  5. On loss of earnings: Although the trial court disallowed the husband's loss-of-earnings claim for lack of proof beyond his statement, the appellate court accepted the evidence that the husband earned not less than Rs.10 per day as a goldsmith and that he was unable to earn while hospitalised and for some time thereafter. On that basis the appellate court found a reasonable allowance should be made.
  6. Quantification and adjustment: Applying the above principles and facts, the court determined the specific additional sums to be awarded to the plaintiffs (see the holding below) as reasonable estimates of pecuniary loss and proper compensation for the personal injuries and temporary loss of earnings described in the record.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The decree of the court below was modified in part. The appellate court awarded additional sums to the plaintiffs, directing that these amounts be added to the awards already made by the trial court.

Specific additional awards ordered by the appellate court (in addition to amounts already awarded at trial):

  • Rs. 5,000 for the death of Vijayam;
  • Rs. 4,000 for the death of Vikraman;
  • Rs. 1,000 for shock and injuries sustained by the 1st plaintiff (husband); and
  • Rs. 500 for loss of earnings of the 1st plaintiff (husband).

The appellate court thus awarded a total additional sum of Rs. 10,500 under those heads and directed that the decree below be modified accordingly. The plaintiffs are entitled to realise their proportionate costs of the appeal from the 1st defendant. A copy of the decree will be sent to the District Collector for realisation of the court fees.

Implications: The decision directly affects the parties by increasing the quantum of damages payable to the plaintiffs and by ordering costs and administrative steps for recovery of court fees. The opinion applies established authorities on the measurement of pecuniary loss under section 1-A of the Fatal Accidents Act but does not purport to lay down any new legal principle beyond its application to the facts; no broader novel precedent is announced in the text.

Show all summary ...

Kochu Thommen, J.:— This appeal is from the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge, Kottaym, in O.S No. 46 of 1971. The appellants are the plaintiffs in a suit for damages arising on account of the death of their two children and their personal injuries and loss which were alleged to have been caused by the wrongful act of the defendants. The suit was decreed, but not in terms of the plaint as the court below awarded only part of the damages claimed. Hence the present appeal.

2. The 1st plaintiff is the husband of the 2nd plaintiff. On the night of 24-1-1969 the couple were walking back home along the Athirampuzha-Ettumanoor road with their daughter Vijayam (aged 12) and son Vikraman (aged 11) after seeing the fireworks at the Athirampuzha church. As they reached Uppupurakkal junction, bus No. K.L.T 8764 belonging to the 1st defendant and driven by the 2nd defendant suddenly hit them. Both the children died instantaneously and the parents were seriously injured. The learned trial Judge held that the accident was caused by the negligence of the 2nd defendant, and that the 1st defendant was vicariously liable in damages. The plaintiff's claimed a total sum of Rs. 28,880/- by way of damages from the 1st defendant under the following heads:

(a) Rs. 2,000/- on account of the shock and injuries sustained by Vijayam;

(b) Rs. 2,000/- on account of the shock and injuries sustained by Vikraman;

(c) Rs. 8,000/- on account of the death of Vijayam;

(d) Rs. 10,000/- on account of the death of Vikraman;

(e) Rs. 2,000/- on account of the shock and injuries sustained by the 1st plaintiff;

(f) Rs. 2,000/- on account of the shock and injuries sustained by the 2nd plaintiff; and

(g) Rs. 2,880/- on account of the loss of earnings of the 1st plaintiff.

3. Although it is not specifically so stated in the plaint, from the nature of the above claims, it appears to be clear that the first four items arise under the Fatal Accidents Act (XIII of 1855), for short the Act; (a) and (b) being under section 2, and (c) and (d) being under section 1A. The last three items are for personal injuries and loss suffered by the plaintiffs. The trial court awarded damages only in respect of items (d), (e) and (f) and limited the damages, under each of them, to Rs. 1,000/-, Rs. 1,000/- and Rs. 2,000/- respectively. The total sum thus awarded was only Rs. 4,000/-.

4. Both the suit and the appeal were filed in forma pauperis. Although in the appeal the plaintiffs claimed the entire balance of Rs. 24,880/- they have subsequently amended the appeal memorandum after obtaining the leave of this Court* and limited their claim to Rs. 11,500/-. As per the amendment the claimed on account of shock and injuries sustained by Vijayam and Vikraman are given up. The claims on account of the death of Vijayam and Vikraman are limited to Rs. 5,000/- each. Of the latter claim, a sum of Rs. 1,000/- was awarded by the lower court and the balance is now claimed. The claim for Rs. 2,000/.- on account of the shock and injuries sustained by the 1st plaintiff was allowed by the lower court only to the extent of Rs. 1,000/- and the balance is claimed in the appeal. The claim on account of the shock and injuries sustained by the 2nd plaintiff was allowed in full by the lower court. The claim for Rs. 2,880/- on account of the loss of earnings of the 1st plaintiff is now limited to Rs. 500/-. The plaintiffs have thus given up their claims under section 2 of the Act and are now pursuing their claim only under section 1-A and for personal injuries and loss.

5. The bus which was driven negligently by the 2nd defendant ran over the chest of Vijayam and the head of Vikraman. The children were instantaneously crushed to death. The bus hit the father (1st plaintiff) on the left side of his waist and he fell down unconscious. His stomach was operated upon in the Medical College Hospital, Kottayam, where he was hospitalised for several weeks. The bus hit the mother (2nd plaintiff) on her head and knocked her down, and then ran over her right arm. She lost half of her right thumb and she had to be operated upon twice in the Medical College Hospital, Kottayam, where she was hospitalised for a number of weeks. Flesh was cut off twice from her thigh and grafted on her injured arm. She has not yet completely recovered from the injury as she cannot even now bend her right arm or do any work with it. Both the children were extremely smart and healthy. The boy was studying in the III standard and the girl in the IV standard, and they were good in their studies. Both the parents were perfectly healthy and strong at the time of the accident. The grand-parents of the children had been blessed with long and happy life. The paternal grandfather died at the age of 75 and the paternal grandmother died at the age of 81. The maternal grandfather lived upto 89 years, and the maternal grandmother lived upto 79 years. The father is a goldsmith earning not less than Rs. 10/- a day the mother earned some income by making sweet-meats at home which she used to sell with the help of the daughter. In the normal course both the children would have lived long and healthy lives and brought happiness and prosperity to their home. In the normal circumstances, the parents could have looked up to the children in the furture for financial support.

6. The children were not earning members at the time of their death, although the girl used to render some help to the mother in selling sweet-meats. Yet it is likely that they both would have successfully completed their education and attained suitable positions in life. Although they belonged to the family of a goldsmith and were brought up in circumstances which were by no means affluent, it is quite probable that, on account of the special protection enjoyed by the community to which they belonged, they would have had various opportunities to rise in life socially, educationally and economically. The mere fact that the children were not earning any money or money's worth would not disentitle their parents from claiming the full benefits under the Act: per Viscount Haldane L.C in Taff Vale Railway Company v. Jenkins . 1913 A.C 1 at 4..

7. In estimating damages under section 1-A of the Act, the court has to ascertain the pecuniary loss suffered by the family of the deceased on account of his death which was caused by an actionable wrong. Non-pecuniary loss such as mental suffering and anguish for the loss of a spouse or a child will be excluded from the computation of damages: Blake v. Midland Rly . 1852 18 Q.B 93.. What is payable under the section is not a solatium for injured feelings: per Viscount Haldane L.C in Taff Vale Railway Company v. Jenkins (supra). It in an amount calculated on a reasonable expectation of the pecuniary benefit which the beneficiaries would have derived had not the death occurred. The beneficiaries have to prove that by the death of the person they lost a reasonable probability of pecuniary advantage.

“There is no question here of what may be called sentimental damage, bereavement or pain and suffering. It is a hard matter of pounds, shillings and pence, subject to the element of reasonable future probabilities.” per Lord Wright in Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries, Ltd. . 1942 A.C 601 at 617.

8. There is no hard and fast rule about assessment of damages under the Act. Each case depends upon its own facts and circumstances. In the absence of statutory guidelines, the Court has to make an estimate of the pecuniary loss suffered by the members of the family of the deceased. The observation of Lord Wright that it is a hard matter of pounds, shillings and pence may appear to be too severe. Circumstances and attitudes have changed. Greater value is attributed to life while the purchasing power of the rupee has considerably diminished. Sentiments indeed have no place, but the Court has to evaluate the pecuniary loss resulting from death on the basis of a proper appreciation of the relevant circumstances and hard realities. In doing so, the Court has to take into account all reasonable probabilities of future benefits, but exclude from its consideration all fancied or bare possibilities or speculative conjectures. In other words, the damages are to be based on the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit or benefit reducible to money value. In C.K Subramania Iyer v. T. Kunhikuttan Nair Hegde J. observed as follows:

“The law on the point arising for decision may be summed up thus: Compulsory damages under section 1-A of the Act for wrongful death must be limited strictly to the pecuniary loss to the beneficiaries and that under section 2, the measure of damages is the economic loss sustained by the estate. There can be no exact uniform rule for measuring the value of the human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise mathematical calculations but the amount recoverable depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. The life expectancy of the deceased or of the beneficiaries whichever is shorter is an important factor. Since the elements which go to make up the value of the life of the deceased to the designated beneficiaries are necessarily personal to each case, in the very nature of things, there can be no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of human life. In assessing damages, the Court must exclude all considerations of matter which rest in speculation or fancy though conjecture to some extent is inevitable. As a general rule parents are entitled to recover the present cash value of the prospective service of the deceased minor child. In addition they may receive compensation for loss of pecuniary benefits reasonably to be expected after child attains majority …”

9. Considering the circumstances in which Vijayam and Vikraman lost their lives and their parents suffered injuries, and the prospects of future benefits which the parents lost in the death of the children, we feel that the court below did not correctly estimate the damages. A sum of Rs. 1,000/- awarded on account of the death of Vikraman was unreasonably small. The boy was strong and healthy. Even if he did not choose a profession other than that of his forefathers', he would have, as an artisan, earned a reasonably good income for the family and, in all probability, supported his parents as they grew older. In the circumstances we feel that the entire sum claimed i.e, Rs. 5,000/- ought to have been awarded on account of Vikraman's death.

10. The court did not award any damages on account of the death of Vijayam. This in our view was wholly unjustified. The court failed to act on the right principle. The only reason stated by the court is that there was no material to indicate that there had been any earning female member of the family. In the first place the court ignored the fact that Vijayam had been helping her mother not only in the household work but also in preparing and selling sweet-meats. In the second place, the court failed to take note of the fact that women no longer remained cloistered in the kitchen, and in the modern society they earned as much income as the male members. Merely because no female member of the family had, in the past, earned, any income, it could not be concluded that there was no reasonable possibility of this bright young girl growing up into a healthy, vigorous, independent and earning member of the family. We therefore feel that a sum of Rs. 5,000/- ought to have been awarded on account of her death.

11. While the court awarded Rs. 2,000/- on account of the shock and injury sustained by the wife, it limited the damages under that head in respect of the husband to Rs. 1,000/-. We do not find any justification for doing so. The husband, like the wife, was seriously injured. He too was hospitalised for several weeks and underwent a serious operation. The court did not correctly estimate the damages under this head. We feel that in the circumstances it would have been just and proper if a sum of Rs. 2,000/- had been awarded on account of the shock and injuries sustained by him.

12. As regards the claim for damages on account of the loss of earnings of the husband, the court below stated “apart from the mere statement of the 1st plaintiff there is no proof that he was actually in a position to carry on his business till recently.” The claim on that count was therefore disallowed. The evidence is that the 1st plaintiff was earning not less than Rs. 10/- per day as a goldsmith. After the accident he was hospitalised and he could not earn any income while at the hospital and also for quite some time after his discharge. We are of the view that the present claim of Rs. 5,000/- on that account is absolutely reasonable.

13. In the circumstances we award to the plaintiffs, in addition to the amounts already awarded to them by the trial court, a sum of Rs. 10,500/- under the following heads:

(1) Rs. 5,000/- on account of the death of Vijayam;

(2) Rs. 4,000/- on account of the death of Vikraman;

(3) Rs. 1,000/- on account of shock and injuries sustained by the 1st plaintiff; and

(4) Rs. 500/- on account of the loss of earnings of the 1st plaintiff.

14. The decree of the court below is accordingly modified and the appeal to the extent indicated above. The plaintiffs are entitled to realise their proportionate costs of this appeal from the 1st defendant.

15. A copy of the decree will be sent to the District Collector for realisation of the court fees.