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A. Kochudevassy And Others v. The State Of Kerala .

Kerala High Court
Jan 25, 1977
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Gopalan Nambiyar, A.C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

These petitions were heard together by a Full Bench because they raised the question of the correctness of a Division Bench ruling in K.J. Sahadevan v. State of Kerala (1976 KLT 134). The central procedural issue was whether the Special Judge at Trichur, appointed under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952, had jurisdiction to try the offences charged in several criminal cases.

The petitions and related criminal complaints included:

  • Crl. M.P. No. 862 of 1976 — arising from C.C. No. 76 of 1976: the 10th accused (a member of the Executive Committee of Co-operative Society No. R. 192, Chalakudy) was charged under Ss. 120-B, 408, 465, 467, 477 and 477-A of the I.P.C. and Sections 5(1)(c) and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
  • Crl. M.P. No. 1096 of 1976 — arising from C.C. No. 32 of 1975: two petitioners (Secretary and Head-clerk of Arimbur Service Co-operative Society) were charged under Ss. 408 and 477-A I.P.C. and Sections 5(1)(c) and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act for alleged misappropriation.
  • Crl. M.P. No. 1093 of 1976 — a sole accused (Secretary of Arimbur Service Co-operative Society) charged under Ss. 408, 465, 471 and 477-A I.P.C. and Sections 5(1)(c) and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.
  • Crl. M.P. Nos. 910 and 1076 of 1976 — charges (not argued before the Full Bench) involved similar offences against secretaries of other co-operative societies and included Ss. 408 and 477-A I.P.C. and Sections 5(1)(c) and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Special Judge at Trichur, appointed under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952, had jurisdiction to try the offences charged in the cases before the Court.
  2. Whether the reasoning and conclusion of the Division Bench ruling in K.J. Sahadevan v. State of Kerala (1976 KLT 134) regarding the jurisdictional and definitional questions could be said to be correct.

Arguments of the Parties

Counsel for the Petitioners

  • Counsel argued that Section 2 of the Kerala State Amendment Act, 1962 (which expands the description of "public servant" in the Explanation to Section 161 of the I.P.C. by items (i)–(viii)) was intended to be limited in application to the specified sections of the Penal Code (Ss. 161–165A) only.
  • On that narrow reading, when Section 3 of the State Amendment says the term "public servant" in the Prevention of Corruption Act shall have the meaning assigned in the Explanation to Section 161, the asserted effect, according to petitioners' counsel, was limited: the expanded definition would apply only for the purpose of Chap. IX offences of the I.P.C. and would not enlarge the definition for the whole Prevention of Corruption Act.
  • Therefore, for offences charged in these petitions (which, according to counsel, do not involve Chap. IX offences of the I.P.C.), the persons such as Directors, Executive Committee Members, officers, servants or employees of co-operative societies would not be "public servants" and the Special Judge would have no jurisdiction.
  • Counsel expressly disclaimed any argument regarding the validity of the State Amendment Act itself.

Advocate General / State (as summarized in the opinion)

  • The Advocate General argued that the definition of "public servant" given by Section 2 of the State Amendment Act of 1962 is an incorporated definition; as such, subsequent amendments to the incorporated (source) Act would be available to the incorporating statute — i.e., the enlarged definition should apply for the purposes of the Prevention of Corruption Act as intended by Section 3 of the State Amendment.
  • The Advocate General relied on the principle explained in State of Madhya Pradesh v. M.V. Narasimhan ((1975) 2 SCC 377 : AIR 1975 SC 1835) to support the position that incorporation operates to make such definitions available to the incorporating Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
K.J. Sahadevan v. State of Kerala (1976 Ker LT 134) (1977 Cri LJ 637) Held that under the amended provisions the expression "public servant" in the Prevention of Corruption Act should be given the same meaning as in the Explanation to S.161 of the Penal Code as amended by the State Amendment of 1962; officers and servants of co-operative societies are deemed public servants. The Full Bench agreed with the Division Bench's conclusion and treated that ruling as correct and persuasive for the present cases: officers and servants of co-operative societies are public servants and the Special Judge had jurisdiction.
Arunachalam v. State of Kerala (1974 Ker LT 7) A single Judge held that the Secretary of a Co-operative Society could not be said to be a public servant because he did not fall within the listed categories of S.21 IPC (as then read). The Division Bench in Sahadevan's case did not consider that 1974 decision authoritative because it did not notice the 1962 State Amendment. The Full Bench in the present opinion agrees that the 1974 decision cannot be regarded as authority that co-operative society employees are not public servants for the purpose of Chap. IX.
Gill's case (AIR 1948 P.C. 128) (49 Cri LJ 503) Held that prior sanction under Section 197 CrPC and Section 270 Government of India Act, 1935, was not necessary before criminal prosecution for bribery (S.161 IPC), because bribery was not an act a public servant was required or expected to commit in the discharge of his duties; the sanction provisions apply only to acts connected with such duties. Referenced as background on the law concerning sanction for prosecution of public servants for bribery-related offences; not directly determinative of the jurisdictional question in these petitions but part of context regarding public servant offences.
Phanindra Chandra v. The King (AIR 1949 P.C. 117) (50 Cri LJ 395) Same proposition as Gill's case: sanction under the cited provisions was not necessary for prosecutions for bribery in the particular circumstances. Referenced together with Gill's case for the historical approach to sanctions in bribery cases; used in background exposition.
Zahoor Ahmed v. State of Rajasthan (1975 Crl LJ 978) (Raj) Held that where the police report did not make out a case under Section 5(2) of Act 2 of 1947 and S.161 IPC, and cognizance was taken only under S.409 IPC by a Special Judge constituted to try specified offences, the Special Judge had no jurisdiction. Cited by the Full Bench: the opinion acknowledged the correctness of that decision in its facts but distinguished it from the present cases because the present cases involved a different factual and jurisdictional foundation (i.e., presence of offences under the Anti-Corruption Act / S.5(2)).
Ramautar Mahton v. State (AIR 1961 Pat 203) (1961-1 Cri LJ 694) Proceedings held to be without jurisdiction for want of sanction under Section 6 of Act 2 of 1947. Cited to illustrate that proceedings may be without jurisdiction where statutory sanction is absent; the Full Bench affirmed that such holdings are correct in their contexts but observed that the present cases raise a different point.
Sahabhan Umerkhan v. State (1963) 2 Crl. L.J. 556 (Guj) Proceedings held to be without jurisdiction on similar reasoning relating to sanction and statutory requirements. Cited alongside Ramautar Mahton to demonstrate established decisions where lack of required sanction rendered proceedings without jurisdiction; distinguished from present facts.
State of Madhya Pradesh v. M.V. Narasimhan ((1975) 2 SCC 377 : AIR 1975 SC 1835) (1975 Cri LJ 1639) Explains the principle concerning incorporation: an incorporated definition or provision in one statute may make subsequent amendments to the incorporated (source) Act available to the incorporating statute under specified conditions. The Advocate General relied on this decision to argue that the expanded definition of "public servant" (introduced by the State Amendment) operates as an incorporated definition available to the Prevention of Corruption Act; the Full Bench considered the point but addressed whether the scope of the incorporating Act could be cut down by terms of the incorporated Act.
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Kandimalla Subbaiah (AIR 1961 SC 1241) (1961-2 Cri LJ 302) Interpreted S.7(3) (of the Criminal Law Amendment Act) to mean that a Special Judge, where foundation jurisdiction is satisfied by an offence specified in S.6, may try other offences (not specified in S.6) that are charged at the same trial. The Full Bench applied this principle to hold that once the foundation jurisdiction existed by reason of an offence under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the Special Judge could try other offences with which the accused were charged in the same trial.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Full Bench's legal analysis proceeded through a sequence of statutory interpretation and application of jurisdictional principles derived from the Criminal Law Amendment framework and the Kerala State Amendment of 1962.

  1. Statutory context: The Court reviewed the legislative landscape — the meaning of "public servant" in S.21 I.P.C., the existence of special Acts that deem categories of persons to be public servants for certain purposes, and the development of special judges' jurisdiction under the Criminal Law Amendment Acts (notably the Criminal Law Amendment Act XLVI of 1952 and later amendments). The Court noted that S.7(1) of the 1952 Act made the special judge's jurisdiction exclusive for specified offences (Ss. 161–165A IPC and Section 5(2) of the Anti-Corruption Act) and S.7(3) permitted the special judge to try other offences charged at the same trial.
  2. Character of the Kerala State Amendment (1962): Section 2 of the State Amendment expanded the Explanation to S.161 IPC by adding items (i)–(viii), expressly including members of executive/ managing committees and officers/servants of co-operative societies within the meaning of "public servant" for the purposes of those provisions of the Penal Code (Ss. 161, 162, 163, 164, 165 and 165A). Section 3 substituted a new Section 2 in the Prevention of Corruption Act to define "public servant" as having the meaning assigned under the Explanation to Section 161 of the I.P.C. as amended by the Kerala Amendment.
  3. Petitioners' narrow construction rejected: The petitioners argued that the expanded definition in Section 2 was limited to the specified sections of the Penal Code and therefore should not be read to enlarge the meaning of "public servant" under the Prevention of Corruption Act (despite Section 3). The Full Bench found this argument to be fallacious: Section 3 does not merely transplant verbatim text into Act II of 1947 in a manner that defeats the Amendment's purpose. A literal construction that confined the expanded definition only to Chap. IX of the I.P.C. would frustrate the evident object of the State Amendment.
  4. Purposive interpretation: Reading Sections 2 and 3 in light of the object sought—to make the prevention of corruption more effective—the Court concluded that Section 3 was intended to assign the enlarged meaning of "public servant" effected by Section 2 to the Prevention of Corruption Act as well. In short, the concept of "public servant" was enlarged for the Prevention of Corruption Act by incorporating items (i)–(viii) into the clauses of S.21 I.P.C. for the purposes of that Act.
  5. Authority and consistency with precedent: The Full Bench endorsed the Division Bench decision in K.J. Sahadevan (1976 Ker LT 134) which reached the same conclusion — that officers and servants of co-operative societies were to be regarded as public servants under the amended statutory scheme and that the Special Judge therefore had jurisdiction. The Court distinguished cases (such as Zahoor Ahmed and others) where the Special Judge lacked jurisdiction because there was no foundation offence under Section 5(2) or required sanction was absent.
  6. Application of the principle allowing additional charges to be tried by Special Judge: Relying on State of Andhra Pradesh v. Kandimalla Subbaiah (AIR 1961 SC 1241), the Full Bench applied the established principle that where the foundation of jurisdiction of the Special Judge is satisfied (here, by an offence under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act), the Special Judge may, subject to the Code of Criminal Procedure, try any other offences with which the accused are charged at the same trial.
  7. Conclusion of analysis: Because the expanded definition of "public servant" applied to the Prevention of Corruption Act (and because offences under S.5(2) of the Act provided the foundation of jurisdiction), the Special Judge at Trichur had jurisdiction to try the offences in the petitions before the Court.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Full Bench held that the Special Judge, Trichur, has jurisdiction to try the cases involved in these petitions; the objections to his jurisdiction were groundless.

Disposition: These petitions were dismissed.

Implications: The direct legal consequence is that the Special Judge at Trichur may proceed to try the accused on the charges as framed (including offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, read with the enlarged statutory meaning of "public servant" effected by the Kerala State Amendment of 1962). The opinion expressly endorses the reasoning of the Division Bench in K.J. Sahadevan and applies the established principle (from State of Andhra Pradesh v. Kandimalla Subbaiah) that a special judge who has foundation jurisdiction under the specified offences may try other offences charged at the same trial. The opinion does not purport to set out any novel, separate legal principle beyond these applications; its immediate effect is the confirmation of the Special Judge's jurisdiction and the dismissal of the jurisdictional objections in these petitions.

Note: This summary is confined to the material and reasoning contained in the provided opinion. No information beyond the text of the opinion has been added.

Show all summary ...

Gopalan Nambiyar, A.C.J:— These petitions were heard together by a Full Bench as they raised the question of the correctness of a Division Bench ruling of this Court in K.J Sahadevan… v. State Of Kerala…. (1976 KLT 134). The questions raised are: whether the Special Judge Trichur, appointed under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 had jurisdiction to try the cases in question in respect of the offences charged; and whether the reasoning and the conclusion of the Division Bench ruling in 1976 KLT 134, which had considered a similar question, can be said to be correct.

2. Crl. M.P No. 862 of 1976 is by the 10th accused in C.C No. 76 of 1976 on the file of the Special Judge, Trichur. The offences charged are under Ss. 120-B, 408, 465, 467, 477 and 477-A of the I.P.C and Sections 5 (1)(c) and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The 10th accused is a Member of the Executive Committee of the Co-operative Society No. R. 192, Chalakudy.

3. In Crl. M.P No. 1096 of 1976 the two petitioners are charged in C.C No. 32 of 1975, with offences under Ss. 408 and 477-A of the I.P.C and Sections 5 (1)(c) and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. for misappropriation of funds of the Arimbur Service Co-operative Society. The Ist petitioner is the Secretary and the 2nd petitioner is the Head-clerk of the Society.

4. In Crl. M.P No. 1093 of 1976 the sole accused is charged under Sections 408, 465, 471 and 477-A of the I.P.C and Sections 5 (1)(c) and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The accused was the Secretary of the Arimbur Service Co-operative Society.

5. Counsel for the petitioners in the above three petitions alone addressed arguments before us. No arguments were addressed in Crl. M.P Nos. 910 and 1076 of 1976. In Crl. M.P No. 910 of 1976, the charge is under Ss. 408 and 477-A of the I.P.C and Sections 5 (1)(c) and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The accused was the Secretary of the Ernakulam Milk Supply Union. In Crl. M.P No. 1076 of 1976 the charge is under Section 408 of the I.P.C and Sections 5 (1)(c) and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The accused was the Secretary of the Wadakkancherry Service Co-operative Society.

6. Section 21 of the I.P.C defines the term ‘public servant’. As it now stands there are twelve clauses with three explanations to the last one. Clause (1) has been deleted; Cls. (11) and (12) are later additions; and the explanations appear in their present form - all as a result of amendments effected from time to time. None of the clauses take in Directors Executive Committee Members or Servants or employees etc. of a Co-Operative Society within the definition.

7. There are a series of special acts which contain provisions that certain classes of persons shall be deemed to be public servants within the meaning of Section 21 of the I.P.C A list of such Acts would be found collected and set out, for instance, in Sir Hari Singh Gour's Commentary on the Indian Penal Code (9th Edn. (1972) Vol. I Footnote 3 at pp. 179, 184 and 194). To mention only a few, such provisions are found in the Railways Act, the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, the Factories Act, the Merchant Shipping Act, etc.

8. Chapter IX of the I.P.C is entitled: ‘Offences by or relating to public servants’, and comprises of Ss. 161 to 171. In regard to the offence under S. 161 of the I.P.C (Bribery) the question arose whether prior sanction under Section 197 of the Cr PC and under Section 270 of the Government of India Act, 1935, were necessary before the commencement of a criminal prosecution. It was held in Gill's case (AIR 1948 P.C 128) : (49 Cri LJ 503) and in Phanindra Chandra v. The King (AIR 1949 PC 117) : (50 Cri LJ 395) that sanction under neither of the Sections was necessary, as bribery was not something which a public servant was required or expected to commit in the discharge of his duties as a public servant, and the sections required sanction only for such acts.

9. Meanwhile, even before the above rulings of the Privy Council, the Prevention of Corruption Act II of 1947 (referred to also as the Anti-Corruption Act) had been passed by the Indian Legislature, “for the more effective prevention of bribery and corruption” (vide the preamble). S. 5(1) specifies when a public servant can be said to commit the offence of ‘criminal misconduct’, and S. 5(1)(c), (with which we are concerned in these cases) specifies one of the modes, as dishonest or fraudulent misappropriation or conversion of property entrusted or allowing any person to do so. Section 5(2) provides the punishment for the offence under S. 5 (1). Section 6 provides that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence under S. 161 or 164 or 165 of the Penal Code or under sub-s. (2) or sub-s. (3-A) of S. 5 of Act 2 of 1947 alleged to have been committed by a public servant except with the previous sanction (a) of the Central Government in case of persons employed in connection with the affairs of the Union; (b) of the State Government in case of persons employed in connection with the affairs of a State; and (c) of the competent authority in case of other persons. The Act has been amended from time to time adding, substituting and amending certain sections or clauses or sub-clauses therein. Some of these may be noticed.

10. By the Criminal Law Amendment Act XLVI of 1952, various amendments were effected to the Prevention of Corruption Act, the I.P.C and the Code of Criminal Procedure. By S. 3 of this Act, a new S. 165A was added to the Penal Code punishing as a separate and independent offence abetment of the offence under S. 161 or 165. Section 6 conferred the power to appoint special judges to try the offences under S. 161, 165 or 165A of the I.P.C or Section 5(2) of the Anti-Corruption Act, or conspiracy to commit those offences. By the Criminal Law Amendment Act 50 of 1955, Ss. 162, 163 and 164 of the I.P.C were added to the range of offences for the trial of which special judges could be appointed; so that, after these amendments the foundation of jurisdiction for the appointment of a special judge is the commission of offences under Ss. 161 to 165A of the I.P.C or under Section 5(2) of the Anti-Corruption Act. Section 7(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 makes the jurisdiction of the special judge to try the aforementioned offences, an exclusive one; and S. 7(3) provides that while trying any of those offences the special judge may also try any of the other offences with which the accused may under the Code of Criminal Procedure be charged at the same trial.

11. The Criminal Law Amendment Act 2 of 1958 and Act 30 of 1964 are two further Statutes which amended the provisions of the Penal Code and the Anti-Corruption Act. It is unnecessary to notice their provisions.

12. Meanwhile, by an amendment effected by the Kerala State Legislature, by Act 27 of 1962, certain important amendments were effected to the I.P.C and to the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. As these amendments are important for the purpose of these cases, Ss. 2 and 3 thereof are quoted in full:

“2. Amendment of Section 161 of the Central Act. XLV of 1860.

In Section 161 of the I.P.C (Central Act XLV of 1860), after the explanation relating to “A motive or reward for doing”, the following explanation shall be inserted, namely:

“Public servant”.

For purposes of this section and Ss. 162, 163, 164, 165 and 165A, the words “public servant” shall denote, besides those who are public servants under S. 21 or who are deemed to be “public servants” within the meaning of that section under any law for the time being in force, persons falling under any of the descriptions hereinafter following, namely:

(i) Even officer in the service or pay of the Travancore Devaswom Board or the Cochin Devaswom Board;

(ii) Every officer in the service or pay and every member of the Wakfs Board constituted under the Wakfs Act, 1954 (Central Act, XXIX of 1954);

(iii) The President and every member of a Village Court or Village Panchayat Court;

(iv) Every member of the Board of Directors or of the executive or managing Committee and every officer or servant of a co-operative society registered or deemed to be registered under the law relating to co-operative societies for the time being in force;

(v) Every member of the governing body and every officer or servant in the service or pay of a society registered under the Travancore-Cochin Literary, Scientific and Charitable Societies Registration Act, 1955 or the Societies Registration Act, 1860, and receiving aid or grant from the Government;

(vi) Every teacher or other officer or servant of the University of Kerala;

(vii) Every examiner of a University Examination or a Government Examination;

(viii) Every Manager, or teacher or servant of an educational institution which receives or has received aid or grant from the Government or the University of Kerala”.

3. Amendment of Central Act II of 1947.

In the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Central Act II of 1947)—

(i) for Section 2, the following section shall be substituted, namely,—

“2. Interpretation.

For the purposes of this Act, “public servant” shall have the meaning assigned to it under the Explanation to Section 161 of the I.P.C as amended by the Kerala Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1962”:

(ii) in S. 5A, for the words, figures and letter, “under S. 161, S. 165 or S. 165A,” the words, figures, and letter “under Ss. 161, 162, 163, 164, 165 or 165A” shall be substituted.

(iii) in sub-sec. (1) of S. 6, after Cl. (b), the following clause shall be inserted, namely:

“(bb) in the case of a person falling under any of the descriptions mentioned in items (i) to (viii) in the Explanation relating to “Public servant” in Section 161 of the I.P.C as amended by the Kerala Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1962, save by or with the sanction of the State Government”.

13. It will be noticed that the definition of the term ‘public servant’ in S. 21 of the I.P.C has been widened for the purposes of Ss. 161 to 165A of the Penal Code, by cls. (i) to (viii) introduced by Section 2 of the Kerala Amendment Act. Counsel for the petitioners was anxious to record that he should not be understood as having advanced any arguments in regard to the validity of the amendment. Section 3 of the Kerala Amendment Act amended the Prevention of Corruption Act by substituting a new S. 2 in the said Act. The enlarged meaning of the term ‘public servant’ is to apply for the purpose of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Although this appears comprehensive and runs through the entire gamut of the Prevention of Corruption Act, Counsel for the petitioners urged that the comprehensiveness is considerably curtailed, if not altogether destroyed, by the operation of the amended definition of ‘public servant’ introduced by S. 2 of the State Amendment.

14. By that section, according to Counsel, the definition of ‘public servant’ is only for the limited purpose of Ss. 161, 162, 163, 164, 165 and 165A of the I.P.C, and if this definition is read into S. 3 of the State amendment, the apparent comprehensiveness of the latter section is cut down. If that be so, Directors, Executive Committee Members etc. of a Co-operative Society would not be ‘public servants’ except for the limited purpose of Chap. IX offences of the I.P.C As no such offence has been charged in any of these cases, the special judge will have no jurisdiction - So ran the argument of Counsel.

15. We think there is a fallacy in the above argument. Section 3 of the State Amendment Act of 1962 only provides that the term ‘public servant’ “shall have the meaning assigned to it” under the Explanation to Section 161 of the I.P.C as amended by the State Amendment Act of 1962. It does not bodily transplant or incorporate into Section 2 of the 1947 Act the amendment effected by Section 2 of the State Amendment Act to S. 161 of the Penal Code. Indeed, to understand Section 3 of the State Amendment Act as having introduced such a bodily transplantation or incorporation, would be to make a mockery of the amendment and to defeat its very purpose.

16. It is purposeless to confine the amendments for purposes of the Anti-Corruption Act, to the provisions of Chap. IX of the I.P.C only, and to leave Act II of 1947 untouched : A literal reading of Sections 2 and 3 of the State Amendment might support such a construction. But understanding the State Amendment in the light of the object sought to be achieved, it seems reasonable to conclude that nothing more was contemplated by Section 3 of the State Amendment than an assignment of the extended meaning of the term ‘public servant’ effected by Section 2 of the State Amendment for the purposes of Act II of 1947 as well. So understood, the concept of the term ‘public servant’ would stand enlarged for the purpose of Act II of 1947 by the addition of Cls. (i) to (viii) in S. 2 of the State Amendment, to the clauses in S. 21 of the I.P.C

17. It remains now to notice the Division Bench ruling of this Court in K.J Sahadevan… v. State Of Kerala…. (1976 Ker LT 134) : (1977 Cri LJ 637). The prosecution there was for offences under S. 5 (1)(c) and (d) read with Section 5(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Ss. 408 and 409 of the I.P.C The Division Bench referred to an earlier judgment of a learned Judge of this Court in Arunachalam v. State of Kerala (1974 Ker LT 7) holding that the Secretary of the Co-operative Society cannot be said to be a public servant as he did not fall in any of the categories in Cls. (1) to (9) and (11) and (12) of the I.P.C, nor even Cl. (10) thereof. The decision did not notice the amendment effected by the State Amendment Act 27 of 1962. We agree with the Division Bench ruling in Sahadevan's case (1976 Ker LT 134) : (1977 Cri LJ 637) that the learned Judge's decision in 1974 Ker LT 7 cannot be regarded as authority for the view that employees of a Co-operative Society are not ‘public servants’ for the purpose of Chap. IX of the I.P.C

18. The learned Judges of the Division Bench held that under the amended provisions of Section 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the expression ‘public servant’ is to be assigned the same meaning as has been given to it in the Explanation to S. 161 of the Penal Code as amended by Section 2 of the State Amendment Act, 1962. Therefore the officers and servants of Co-operative Societies were deemed public servants and the Special Judge had jurisdiction. Apparently, the Division Bench proceeded on the view that we have expressed, viz., that the extended concept of ‘public servant’, introduced by Section 2 of the State Amendment Act should apply for purposes of the Prevention of Corruption Act as well, without any limitation that it should operate only within the sphere of Chap. IX offences under the I.P.C We think the conclusion of the Division Bench was right.

19. Our attention was called to Zahoor Ahmed v. State of Rajasthan (1975 Crl LJ 978)(Raj). The police report in that case was to the effect that no case has been made out under Section 5(2) of Act 2 of 1947 and S. 161 of the I.P.C Cognizance was taken only of the offence under S. 409 of the I.P.C by the Special Judge constituted to try the offences. It was rightly held that the Special Judge had no jurisdiction. Reference was made to Ramautar Mahton v. State (AIR 1961 Pat 203) : (1961-1 Cri LJ 694) where the proceedings were held to be without jurisdiction for want of sanction under Section 6 of Act 2 of 1947; and to Sahabhan Umerkhan v. State, (1963) 2 Crl. L.J 556 (Guj) where the proceedings were held to be without jurisdiction on similar reasoning. There can be no quarrel with these decisions. But the point for decision in these cases is somewhat different.

20. The learned Advocate General pointed out that the definition of the term ‘public servant’ given by Section 2 of the State Amendment of 1962 is an incorporated definition with the result that the subsequent amendments effected to the incorporated Act would be available to the incorporating Statute. The conditions and circumstances under which the principle operates have been explained in the recent decision of the Supreme Court in State Of Madhya Pradesh v. M.V Narasimhan ((1975) 2 SCC 377 : AIR 1975 SC 1835) : (1975 Cri LJ 1639) to which our attention was drawn. But the question is whether the amplitude of the incorporating Act is cut down by the terms of the incorporated Act.

21. The learned Advocate General drew our attention to State of Andhra Pradesh v. Kandimalla Subbaiah (AIR 1961 SC 1241 : (1961-2 Cri LJ 302). There, the question considered was regarding the jurisdiction of the Special Judge to try offences other than those mentioned in Section 6 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act (46 of 1952). That section specifies only offences under Sections 161 to 165A of the Penal Code and Sections 5(1) and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. In the case before the Supreme Court, the charges were under SSection 109 of the I.P.C read with Ss. 420, 466 and 467 of the I.P.C and Sections 5 (1)(c) and (d) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and also under S. 120-B of the I.P.C (against accused 2 to 9). It was held:

“11. Sub-section (3) of S. 7 provides that when trying any case, a special judge may also try any offences other than an offence specified in S. 6 with which the accused may under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, be charged at the same trial.

12. Clearly, therefore, accused No. 1 could be tried by the Special Judge for offences under S. 120-B read with Ss. 466, 467 and 420, I.P.C Similarly, the other accused who are said to have abetted those offences could also be tried by the Special Judge. The view of the High Court is thus erroneous and its directions with respect to those offences are set aside”.

22. Therefore in this case, the foundation of jurisdiction of the Special Judge being satisfied with reference to the offence under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, he could, subject to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, try any other offence with which the accused were charged (besides the Chapter IX offences under the Penal Code and under Sections 5(1) and 5(2) of the Anti-Corruption Act.)

23. In the result, we hold that the Special Judge.

24. Trichur has jurisdiction to try the cases involved in these petitions and the objection to his jurisdiction is groundless. These petitions are accordingly dismissed.

25. Petitions dismissed.