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Idicula Jacob v. Mariyamma .
Factual and Procedural Background
This is an appeal by the husband (the appellant) from an order of the Additional District Court, Mavelikkara dismissing his petition under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act seeking dissolution of the marriage on the ground that his wife (the respondent) had been guilty of adultery since solemnisation.
In the petition the appellant averred that: he last resided with the respondent in her house for two months in August 1967 when he was on leave; thereafter they resided together in the appellant's house for a few days and he returned to his place of work (he is in the Armed Forces and served outside the State). He asserted that after staying with his wife till 10th October 1967 while on leave, he had never lived with her as husband and wife even for a day. He alleged that when he came on leave in June 1968 he did not find his wife and child in his house, learnt that the respondent was leading an immoral life (which she denied), and that on 6th August 1969 he learned that a child had been born to his wife due to her immoral conduct (birth at Victoria Hospital, Quilon).
Procedurally, no co-respondent was impleaded in the petition and no leave was sought or granted as required by Section 11 of the Act. The case proceeded to trial: the appellant examined himself and seven other witnesses and produced Exhibits P-1 to P-12. The respondent did not give evidence. The lower court framed two points for decision: (1) whether the petition was not maintainable for non-compliance with Section 11 of the Divorce Act, and (2) whether the allegation of adultery made by the petitioner against his wife was true.
The lower court answered the first point against the appellant. On the second point the court concluded that there was not sufficient independent reliable evidence to establish adultery, but observed that the respondent appeared to have been "leading an immoral life" and inferred that the appellant had access to her in July–August 1968. In the absence of clear evidence of no access, the lower court held the child born by mid-March 1969 must be presumed to be the appellant's. The petition was dismissed. The appellant appealed from that dismissal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the petition is maintainable in view of non-compliance with Section 11 of the Indian Divorce Act (i.e., failure to implead the alleged adulterer as co-respondent or to obtain leave excusing such impleading).
- Whether the allegation of adultery made by the petitioner against his wife was proved on the evidence led at trial.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Counsel for the appellant contended that, because the case proceeded to trial and evidence was permitted, the appellant should not have been non-suited at the end of the trial for lack of a specific motion under Section 11 made at the inception to excuse impleading the co-respondent.
- It was argued that the procedural practice (rules) normally require such a motion to be supported by affidavit at the start, and that the petitioner who seeks to be excused must establish one of the three grounds enumerated in Section 11 (wife leading life of a prostitute and petitioner knows no person with whom adultery was committed; the name of alleged adulterer unknown despite due efforts; alleged adulterer dead).
- Implicitly, appellant urged that having put on evidence at trial, he should have been permitted to pursue his case rather than be dismissed solely for the initial non-compliance without an opportunity to apply for leave to dispense with impleading.
Respondent's Position
- The respondent denied the averments in the petition. No further specific legal submissions by the respondent are detailed in the opinion, and the respondent did not give evidence at trial.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bowman…(Petitioner); v. Bowman…().* AIR 1942 All 223 | Supports the view that the requirement of Section 11 is not a mere formality and is based on a matter of grave public importance (to prevent collusion between husband and wife). | The court relied on this authority to emphasise that compliance with Section 11 is a serious requirement and not procedural surplusage. |
| Susanta Kumar Mitra v. Smt. Himangshu Prova Mitra AIR 1964 Cal 33 (FB) | Holds that if Section 11 is not complied with the petition is not maintainable. | The court cited this as authority for the proposition that non-compliance with Section 11 affects maintainability of a divorce petition. |
| Charles Henry Smalley v. Mrs. Olive Muriel Smalley AIR 1928 Nag 117 | Shows that the discretion exercised by English courts in such matters is wider and not available to Indian courts because Indian discretion is circumscribed by Section 11. | The court invoked this to explain that Indian courts cannot adopt the broader English discretion and must respect the limits placed by Section 11. |
| P. Joseph v. P. Ramamma AIR 1923 Mad 9 (FB) | Holds that mere evidence of the husband or wife is not sufficient for the purpose of divorce. | The court referenced this to underscore that proof of adultery requires more than the parties' own testimony in divorce proceedings. |
| CWG Co. v. E.F. Cox ILR 45 Cal 525 : AIR 1918 Cal 156 | Holds that where a petitioner cannot name alleged co-respondents, the leave to dispense with their impleading must be sought by application/motion founded on affidavit before the hearing; the court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition before such leave is obtained. | The court relied on this authority to support the procedural requirement that leave to dispense with impleading must be obtained by application before hearing; this informs the court's view on how Section 11 should be operationalised. |
| Jones v. Jones 1896 P. 165 | States that where the alleged paramour is alive and his name and identity are known, the petitioner must make that person a co-respondent; the court ought not to excuse him merely because evidence against that co-respondent cannot be obtained. | The court quoted this as an example of an authoritative statement of the obligation to implead known alleged adulterers, but treated it alongside later commentary limiting its absolute application. |
| Saunders v. Saunders 1897 P. 89 (Lindley, L.J.) | Commentary rejecting a rigid rule from Jones v. Jones; holds there is no universal rule and each case must be decided on its own circumstances, guided by statute, rules and experience. | The court cited this passage to indicate that the rule in Jones v. Jones is not invariably applied and that discretion (within statutory limits) must be exercised having regard to the facts of each case. |
| Muspratt v. Muspratt (1861), Carryer v. Carryer (1865), Jinkings v. Jinkings (1867), Bagot v. Bagot (1890) | Cases referred to in the opinion as examples of judicial course relevant to the question of impleading and discretion (listed to show differing approaches in earlier English authorities). | The court referenced these cases (through the Saunders passage) to show that there is no single settled rule and that historical authorities present varying approaches; they inform the court's analytical framework rather than establishing a new rule. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court's analysis proceeded in a series of logical steps, tied closely to statutory requirements and the evidence on record:
- The court emphasised the statutory import of Section 11 of the Indian Divorce Act: the requirement to make an alleged adulterer a co-respondent (or obtain leave excusing such impleading) is not a mere formality but is grounded in public interest, principally to prevent collusion between spouses. Authorities were cited to support this proposition.
- The lower court's framing of the two points (maintainability for non-compliance with Section 11, and truth of adultery allegation) was accepted as the proper analytical structure for the case.
- On evidence, the court noted the undisputed fact of a child born in March or April 1969 and recognised the legal presumption arising under Section 112 of the Evidence Act (a presumption as to paternity from non-access and dates). The burden to rebut that presumption lies on the appellant.
- The court reviewed the lower court's factual conclusion that there was insufficient independent reliable evidence to establish adultery, but also noted indications in the record that the wife had been leading an immoral life and that it was not unreasonable to infer access in July–August 1968. In the absence of clear evidence of non-access, the lower court had presumed that the child born by mid-March 1969 was the appellant's.
- The appellate court observed that if the appellant is to attempt to discharge the burden of rebutting the presumption under Section 112, more or different evidence may be necessary. However, to consider that evidence properly there must be a properly constituted petition — either by impleading the co-respondent or by obtaining leave under Section 11 (one of the three statutory grounds).
- The court noted that the evidence on record may be insufficient to demonstrate that the appellant had made "due efforts" to discover the name of any alleged adulterer (one ground under Section 11), and that the appellant must decide which statutory ground (wife leading life of a prostitute, inability to discover name after due efforts, or death of alleged adulterer) he will rely upon if seeking to be excused from impleading.
- Balancing these considerations, and having regard to the weight of evidence already on record suggesting prima facie bad conduct by the respondent, the appellate court concluded that the interests of justice required giving the appellant an opportunity to make the appropriate Section 11 application and to adduce further evidence or amend his petition as necessary.
- The court therefore set aside the dismissal by the lower court and remitted the matter to the lower court with directions permitting the appellant to apply for leave under Section 11, to produce fresh evidence, and to seek amendment of the petition; the respondent would also be permitted to give evidence if she chose to do so. The court made no order as to costs.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
ORDER SET ASIDE; CASE REMITTED TO THE LOWER COURT
The appellate court set aside the dismissal of the petition by the lower court and remitted the case, permitting the appellant to make an application for leave to dispense with impleading the co-respondent under Section 11, to adduce fresh evidence, and to seek amendment of the petition in accordance with the directions given in the judgment. The respondent may, if she wishes, give evidence on remand. There was no order as to costs.
Implications:
- The immediate practical consequence is procedural: the appellant is granted an opportunity to regularise the petition under Section 11 (by impleading a co-respondent or obtaining leave on one of the statutory grounds), to adduce additional evidence, and to amend the petition if he so chooses.
- The respondent is permitted to give evidence upon remand.
- The court did not purport to decide the substantive question of adultery finally; rather it allowed a further opportunity to address procedural deficiency and supplement the record so that the substantive issue may be properly adjudicated.
- The opinion does not state that a new legal precedent is being established; it applies and reconciles existing authorities concerning Section 11, the need to prevent collusion, the limits on discretion in Indian courts, and procedural requirements for seeking leave to dispense with impleading.
Govindan Nair, C.J:— This is an appeal by the husband from the order passed by the Additional District Court, Mavelikkara dismissing his petition under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act (for short the Act) praying that his marriage with the respondent may be dissolved on the ground that his wife has, since the solemnisation thereof, been guilty of adultery.
2. In the petition the appellant averred that he last resided with the respondent in her house for two months in August, 1967 when he came on leave, and immediately afterwards they resided together in the petitioner's house for a few days and thereafter the appellant returned to his place of work. He is in the Armed Forces and has been serving outside the State. There is the further averment that when he came on leave in June, 1968 he did not find his wife and child in his house and he learnt that the respondent was leading an immoral life and that when she was questioned she denied it. He returned to his place of work. There is a specific assertion that after the appellant stayed with his wife till the 10th October, 1967 when he was on leave he had never lived with his wife as husband and wife even for a day. It is said that when he came on leave on the 6th August, 1969 to his house he learned that a child was born to his wife due to her immoral conduct and that she gave birth to the child at the Victoria Hospital in Quilon. The allegations in paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 9 may be extracted. (The portion in Malayalam is transliterated in English-Ed.)
(Text in Malayalam Language.)
(Text in Malayalam Language.)
3. In the petition no one was therefore impleaded as co-respondent. The averments in the petition were denied by the respondent. No leave was sought for or granted as required by Section 11 of the Act. The case went to trial and the appellant examined himself and 7 other witnesses and produced Exts. P-1 to P-12. The respondent did not give any evidence. The court framed two points (1) whether the petition is not maintainable for non-compliance of Section 11 of the Divorce Act IV of 1869 and (2) whether the allegation of adultery made by the petitioner against his wife is true.
4. The first point was found against the appellant. On the second point after considering the evidence in the case the court came to the conclusion that regarding the case of adultery set up by the petitioner, sufficient, independent reliable evidence was not available but at the same time “it would appear that the counter-petitioner has been leading an immoral life”. The court also found that it is not unreasonable to infer that the appellant had access to her in July-August, 1968. In the absence of clear evidence that there was no such access it was held that it must be presumed that the child born by the middle of March, 1969 must be his. The petition was accordingly dismissed.
5. Counsel for the appellant contended that since the case proceeded to trial and the evidence was permitted to be let in the appellant should not have been non-suited at the end of the trial on the ground that there was no specific motion as envisaged by Section 11, at the inception, for excusing him from making the co-respondent a party. The procedure to be followed in such cases is often prescribed by rules and the rules normally provide that there must be motion supported by an affidavit, at the inception. The applicant for divorce will also have to establish that one or the other of the three conditions mentioned in Section 11 of the Act is satisfied. That section is in these terms:
“11. Adulterer to be co-respondent.- upon any such petition presented by a husband, the petitioner shall make the alleged adulterer a co-respondent to the said petition, unless he is excused from so doing on one of the following grounds, to be allowed by the court:
(1) that the respondent is leading the life of a prostitute, and that the petitioner knows of no person with whom the adultery has been committed;
(2) that the name of the alleged adulterer is unknown to the petitioner although he has made due efforts to discover it;
(3) that the alleged adulterer is dead”.
6. The requirement of section is not a mere formality. It is based on a matter of grave public importance (Bowman…(Petitioner); v. Bowman…().*) AIR 1942 All 223. The object is to prevent collusion between husband and wife. If Sec. 11 is not complied with the petition is not maintainable (Susanta Kumar Mitra v. Smt. Himangshu Prova Mitra) AIR 1964 Cal 33 (FB). The discretion in such matters exercised by the English Courts is a wider discretion and is not available to the Indian Courts because the discretion of Indian Courts is circumscribed by the provisions in Section 11 (Charles Henry Smalley v. Mrs. Olive Muriel Smalley) AIR 1928 Nag 117. Mere evidence of the husband or wife is not sufficient for the purpose of divorce, has been ruled in P. Joseph v. P. Ramamma, AIR 1923 Mad 9 (FB). In CWG Co. v. E.F Cox, ILR 45 Cal 525 : (AIR 1918 Cal 156 (2)) where the husband was petitioner for divorce but could not name the alleged co-respondents and at the hearing the petitioner applied for leave to dispense with the co-respondents, it was held that the direction for such leave must be by application to the Judge on motion founded on affidavit before the hearing of the petition and it was further held that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition before such leave had been obtained. In Jones v. Jones, 1896 P. 165 it was observed:
“Where the relief sought by the petitioner is on the ground of adultery alleged to have been committed with a man, who is alive, and whose name and identity are known, the petitioner must make that person a co-respondent; and the court ought not to excuse him from so doing merely because he finds that he cannot obtain evidence which will prove his case as against that co-respondent”.
7. But this statement was not accepted as a rule to be invariably applied. Lindley, Lord Justice in Saunders v. Saunders, 1897 P. 89 referred to the above passage and commented as follows:—
“If I understand this passage correctly it means that, it a husband seeks a divorce from his wife on the ground of adultery, and he knows the name of a person who, he is informed was her paramour, the petitioner must make a co-respondent although he is convinced that he cannot obtain evidence to prove the man's guilt, and although he adduces satisfactory evidence that he really cannot do so. No such rule can, in my opinion, be extracted from the statute, nor from the rules promulgated under their authority, nor from previously decided cases. It is, in my opinion, rather opposed to than supported by the course adopted by Sir Cresswell Cresswell, Lord Hannon. See Muspratt v. Muspratt (1861-31 LJPM and A 28) Carryer v. Carryer (1865-4 SW and Tr 94); Jinkings v. Jinkings (1867-1 P and D 330); Bagot v. Bagot (1890-62 LT 612); some cases before Butt. J. appear to be in conflict with these. But the truth is, there is no settled rule applicable to all cases, nor can I see how there should be. The rule laid down in Jones v. Jones, (1896) P. 165 might be well suited to many cases, yet it might in many other cases press very hardly on a petitioner, without being the least necessary for the protection of the public. Such a rule might well be often relaxed where a wife had been living in a brothel, or where she had had a child of which her husband could not have been the father, and the rule would be most mischievous in those common cases in which a wife falsely accuses one man in order to screen another. Instead of following any such rule as that laid down in Jones v. Jones, the Court ought, in my opinion, to apply its mind to each particular case, and, being guided by the statute, the Rules of Court and what experience shows to be dangers to be avoided, the Court should decide what in each case it is most just and expedient to do”.
8. The averments in the petition are wide enough to cover the case that the wife was leading “the life of a prostitute”. The petition can at least, subject to Section 11, be sustained on the ground that she had committed adultery. One fact that is not disputed is the birth of the child in March or April, 1969; March according to the wife and April according to the husband. If non-access is established by the appellant he may be able to get a divorce in a properly constituted petition. The court below has come to the conclusion that there was no sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption arising under Section 112 of the Evidence Act. No doubt the burden is on the appellant to rebut the presumption arising under that section. The question is whether on the facts of the case that burden has been discharged.
9. Perhaps more evidence may be necessary for this purpose. But for a consideration of this evidence there must be a properly constituted petition with the co-respondent on the party array or the petitioner should have been excused on the ground that after “due effort” he could not discern the name of the respondent. The evidence in the case may not be sufficient to make out that he made due efforts to find out the name of the co-respondent. And the appellant must make up his mind on what ground he would seek to sustain his petition for excusing him from making the co-respondent a party; that the wife was “leading the life of a prostitute” or she had committed adultery. Though the former will involve adultery the proof required for establishing that is quite different from that for establishing adultery.
10. There is evidence in the case which as the court below has observed indicates that the wife has been leading an immoral life.
11. In the above circumstances we are faced with the predicament either of upholding the dismissal of the petition or setting aside the dismissal and sending back the case for a proper application being made by the appellant for excusing him from making the co-respondent a party. Considering the weight of evidence already on record which indicates prima facie very bad conduct on the part of the respondent we feel that interests of justice require that the appellant must be given an opportunity to make an application for excusing him from making the co-respondent a party and of establishing his case. We therefore set aside the order and remit the case to the lower court. He will be permitted to adduce fresh evidence if he wants. It will also be open to the appellant if he deems it fit to seek an amendment of the petition in the light of what is stated in this judgment. The respondent of course if she cares will also be permitted to give evidence. The case is disposed of on the above terms. There will be no order as to costs.
12. Order accordingly.
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