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The Deputy Commissioner Of Agricultural Income-Tax And Sales Tax, Kozhikode v. V. Sreedhara Shenoy

Kerala High Court

Feb 5, 1973

Judgment

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Comprehensive Summary of the Opinion (Kerala High Court — Revision Cases concerning Sales Tax)

Factual and Procedural Background

These are two revision petitions by the State against a common order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal concerning two different assessment years involving the same assessee (a wholesale dealer). The assessee sold rationed foodgrains (rice and wheat) and groceries including coriander (dhania) and methi. Before the Sales Tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner the assessee's claim for total exemption on turnover from sales of controlled rationed foodgrains was rejected, but the Tribunal allowed the exemption on appeal. The Tribunal also accepted the assessee's contention that a Government notification (S.R.O No. 602/63) applied to the wheat sales, and further held that coriander and methi were oil-seeds within section 14(vi) of the Central Sales Tax Act and thus exempt under section 15. Some other issues (e.g., whether the wheat sales were first sales within the State and whether containers were taxable) were not considered by the Tribunal as unnecessary in view of its principal conclusions. The High Court was asked to consider whether the Tribunal's decisions on the three main questions (taxability of wholesaler-to-retailer sales of rationed articles, applicability of the S.R.O. to wheat, and whether coriander/methi are oil-seeds under section 14(vi)) were correct.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether sales of rationed articles by the wholesaler (the assessee) to retailers are "sales" coming within the General Sales Tax Act (i.e., are taxable sales).
Whether Notification S.R.O. No. 602/63 (dated 24th April 1963) applied to the sales of wheat in these cases.
Whether coriander (dhania) and methi fall within clause (vi) of section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act (i.e., are "oil-seeds") and thereby attract the exemption in section 15.
Ancillary questions for remand/consideration by the Tribunal: whether the sales of wheat are first sales within the State, and whether containers used in the sales are taxable.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (State / Government Pleader)

The Government Pleader submitted that Notification S.R.O. No. 602/63 could not apply to the wheat sales in these cases (i.e., the Tribunal erred in applying the notification).
The Government Pleader agreed that the question whether the wheat sales were first sales within the State remained open and should be considered by the Tribunal on remand.
The Government Pleader questioned the correctness of the Tribunal's acceptance that coriander and methi were oil-seeds under clause (vi) of section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act.

Respondent's Arguments (Assessee / Counsel for Respondent)

The assessee contended for total exemption on sales of controlled rationed foodgrains; the Tribunal allowed this contention.
The assessee (and its counsel) had advanced that Notification S.R.O. No. 602/63 applied to the wheat sales; however, in the Court both counsel for the assessee and the Government Pleader agreed the notification did not apply.
The counsel for the respondent argued that the Division Bench's observation (that absence of one element of a sale would not make it cease to be a sale) exceeded the principles laid down in three Supreme Court decisions relied on by that Division Bench.
The counsel for the respondent also raised, and pressed at least as an argument, that the respondent was not bound to pay tax on containers; the Tribunal had not considered this because it was unnecessary on its view of the main questions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
R.P. Govindan & Co. v. Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal ([1970] K.L.T. 136)	Division Bench ruling of this Court answering in the affirmative that wholesaler-to-retailer sales of rationed articles are "sales".	The Court held that this Division Bench ruling remains good law and was not impliedly overruled by subsequent Supreme Court decisions relied on by the Tribunal.
Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. v. Ram Bilas Ram Gopal ([1969] 24 S.T.C. 508 — Allahabad Full Bench)	Full Bench reasoning on whether rationed goods sales constitute "sales"; noted by the Division Bench of this Court as similar in reasoning.	The Court observed the Division Bench had referred to that Full Bench reasoning; the Supreme Court later reversed that Full Bench in Chhitter Mal, but the present Court explains why that reversal does not affect its Division Bench ruling.
Chhitter Mal Narain Das v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. ([1970] 26 S.T.C. 344 S.C.)	Supreme Court decision reversing the Allahabad High Court Full Bench; contains the crucial statement that clause 3 sets up compulsory acquisition by the State Government of stocks of wheat belonging to licensed dealers.	The Court extracted and relied on the passage that stocks were compulsorily acquired, concluding that in that case there was compulsory acquisition (not a sale) — and so Chhitter Mal did not implyly overrule the Division Bench decision in R.P. Govindan.
State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd. and New India Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar	Authority for identifying four ingredients of a "sale" under the Sale of Goods Act: competent parties, mutual assent, transfer of absolute property, and price.	The Division Bench relied on these authorities to frame the four ingredients and to analyse which ingredient might be absent in certain statutory arrangements; the present Court accepted that formulation for analysis.
Indian Steel & Wire Products Ltd. v. State of Madras; Andhra Sugars Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh ([1968] 21 S.T.C. 212 S.C.); State of Rajasthan v. Karam Chand Thappar & Brothers (Coal Sales) Ltd. ([1969] 23 S.T.C. 210 S.C.)	Supreme Court decisions used to show that mutual assent was not treated as an ingredient for "sale" under the Sales Tax Act in those contexts.	The Court cited these cases as demonstrating that absence of mutual assent does not necessarily prevent a transaction from being a sale for Sales Tax purposes; used to support the Division Bench's earlier observation.
Solar Jung Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Mysore ([1972] 29 S.T.C. 246 S.C.)	Seven-Judge Bench decision clarifying prior authorities, expressly considering the scope of "sale" including compulsory sales; authoritatively held that compulsory sale can be a sale.	The Court relied on Solar Jung as making clear that compulsory sale of property for price is still a sale; this confirmed that the Division Bench ruling (R.P. Govindan) was not overruled and supported taxing wholesaler-to-retailer sales of rationed articles.
Ridge Nominees Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners (English decision)	English authority holding that there may be a compulsory sale where absence of transferor's consent does not prevent the sale from proceeding.	Solar Jung extracted a passage from this decision; the Kerala High Court relied on that passage (via Solar Jung) to support that compulsory transfers for price can still constitute sales.
State of Orissa v. Dinabandhu Sahu & Sons (Orissa Division Bench)	Interpreted clause (vi) of section 14 as if it were a definition of "oil-seeds".	The Tribunal followed this Orissa Division Bench ruling in treating coriander and methi as oil-seeds; the High Court reviewed that approach and disagreed with treating the clause as a definition.
State of Kerala v. C. Moidoo (Division Bench of this Court)	Held clause (vi) of section 14 does not embody a definition of "oil-seeds"; applied the principle that terms should be understood in common parlance and remanded for factual finding whether dhania is an oil-seed in common parlance.	The High Court agreed with Moidoo's reasoning and applied the "common parlance" test to hold coriander and methi are not oil-seeds and no concession was due.
Ramavatar Budhaiprasad v. The Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Akola; Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya-Pradesh v. Jaswant Singh Charan Singh (Supreme Court decisions)	Referenced in Moidoo as relevant precedents on statutory interpretation related to clause (vi) and related matters.	The High Court noted these Supreme Court decisions were relied upon in Moidoo to support the interpretive approach that "that is to say" is explanatory and that clause (vi) should not be read as a self-contained definition.
Krishna Iyer v. State of Kerala (Full Bench)	Full Bench decision referenced in Moidoo supporting interpretive principles applied to clause (vi) and use of common parlance.	The High Court cited this Full Bench as part of the authorities supporting the approach to interpret clause (vi) by common parlance rather than as an exhaustive definition.
C.M. Hamsa Haji v. Sales Tax Officer, Tirur (single Judge of this Court)	Earlier decision considered in a cluster of cases on whether coriander/dhania are oil-seeds.	Mentioned as one of the earlier decisions on the point; the High Court treated it as part of the corpus of authority considered in Moidoo but held that common parlance was the correct rule.
Deputy Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax and Sales Tax v. Mammootty (Division Bench)	Another Division Bench ruling adopting the view that clause (vi) is not a definition and that common parlance informs whether an item is an oil-seed.	Used to show consistent judicial practice in this Court favouring common parlance interpretation; the High Court relied on this trend in its conclusion about coriander and methi.
Bhola Prasad v. Emperor; Megh Raj v. Allah Rakhia (Federal Court and Privy Council decisions)	Held that the phrase "that is to say" is explanatory or illustrative, not a phrase of amplification or limitation.	Adopted as supporting authority for treating the words following "that is to say" in clause (vi) as explanatory; the High Court used this to justify applying common parlance rather than treating clause (vi) as a rigid definition.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through several analytical steps, applying authority and statutory interpretation strictly on the basis of the material before it:

The Court first identified the main question as whether wholesaler-to-retailer sales of rationed articles are "sales" within the Sales Tax Act. It noted that its own earlier Division Bench (R.P. Govindan) had held such transactions to be sales. The Tribunal had thought that the Supreme Court's decision in Chhitter Mal Narain Das impliedly overruled that Division Bench ruling.
The Court examined the crucial passage from Chhitter Mal (Shah, J.) which stated that clause 3 established compulsory acquisition by the State of stocks of wheat belonging to licensed dealers. The Court concluded that Chhitter Mal decided a case of compulsory acquisition — i.e., the State took the stocks — and so the transactions in that case were not "sales" for Sales Tax purposes. Because Chhitter Mal turned on compulsory acquisition, it did not have the effect of overruling the Division Bench's prior reasoning about wholesaler sales of rationed articles.
Turning to the Division Bench's formulation of the ingredients of a sale (relying on State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. and New India Sugar Mills), the Court accepted the four ingredients (competent parties, mutual assent, transfer of absolute property, price). The Court observed that only mutual assent could conceivably be absent in certain statutory or regulated transactions.
The Court considered three Supreme Court decisions relied upon by the Division Bench (Indian Steel & Wire Products Ltd.; Andhra Sugars Ltd.; State of Rajasthan v. Karam Chand Thappar) to show that mutual assent was not treated as an indispensable ingredient for a sale under the Sales Tax Act. The Court found that position consistent with later authoritative pronouncements.
The Court placed decisive weight on the later seven-judge Supreme Court decision in Solar Jung Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Mysore. Ray, J. (for the court) reviewed the entire line of authority and extracted an English passage (from Ridge Nominees) making clear that there can be a compulsory sale — that is, a compelled transfer for a price against the will of the transferor is still a sale. The Kerala High Court read Solar Jung to establish the proposition beyond doubt that compulsory disposals for price remain sales.
Applying Solar Jung, the Court held that the Division Bench ruling in R.P. Govindan (that wholesaler-to-retailer sales of rationed articles are sales) was not overruled and remains good law. From Solar Jung's reasoning, the Court also concluded there is no sound basis to regard wholesaler-to-retailer sales of rationed articles as outside the Sales Tax Act. Accordingly, it held the Tribunal erred in exempting those sales.
On the question of the notification S.R.O. No. 602/63, both the Government Pleader and the counsel for the assessee agreed the notification could not apply to these sales. The Court therefore held the Tribunal erred in applying the notification; but it left open the separate factual/legal question of whether the wheat sales constituted first sales within the State, to be considered by the Tribunal on remand.
On whether coriander and methi are oil-seeds within clause (vi) of section 14, the Court adopted the interpretive approach articulated in State of Kerala v. C. Moidoo and related authorities: the phrase "that is to say" in clause (vi) is explanatory, not a self-contained definition. The correct approach is to determine whether the items are oil-seeds as understood in common parlance and in trade practice.
Applying that common-parlance standard, and noting that coriander and methi are not, in common parlance or dealer usage, treated as oil-seeds, the Court held they do not fall within clause (vi) and therefore the assessee was not entitled to the exemption on those sales.
Finally, because the Tribunal had not considered the container-taxability point (it had deemed it unnecessary), and because the Court reached different legal conclusions on the principal issues, the Court remanded the matters of whether the wheat sales were first sales in the State and whether containers are taxable to the Tribunal for determination in light of the High Court's directions.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The High Court allowed the revision petitions and modified the Tribunal's decision as follows:

Core Ruling: The Court held that wholesaler-to-retailer sales of rationed articles (such as rice and wheat) are taxable sales under the Sales Tax Act; the Tribunal's conclusion that such sales were exempt was erroneous.
On the S.R.O. Notification: The Court held that the Tribunal erred in applying Notification S.R.O. No. 602/63 to the wheat sales; both parties agreed the notification did not apply.
On coriander and methi: The Court held that coriander (dhania) and methi are not oil-seeds within clause (vi) of section 14 as understood in common parlance, and therefore the assessee is not entitled to the concession under section 15.
Remand Directions / Further Determinations: The Tribunal is directed to determine whether the wheat sales were first sales within the State and whether containers are liable to tax; on the basis of those determinations the Tribunal shall modify its decision accordingly.
Costs: The revision cases were allowed without any order as to costs.

Implications: The decision (i) reaffirms the Division Bench position in R.P. Govindan that wholesaler-to-retailer sales of rationed articles are sales within the Sales Tax Act and (ii) applies the Solar Jung pronouncement that compulsory disposals for price may still constitute sales. The Court applied established principles of statutory interpretation (treating "that is to say" as explanatory) and the "common parlance" test to deny the assessee's claim that coriander and methi are oil-seeds. The opinion does not announce that it is laying down a new legal precedent beyond its application of existing authority; its practical effect is the modification of the Tribunal's order and remand for further factual/legal determinations on first sales and container-taxability.

Disposition: Revision petitions allowed in the manner indicated; petitions allowed; no costs ordered.

Show all summary ...

Raghavan, C.J:— These revision cases are against a common order passed by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal in two cases relating to two different assessment years. The State is the petitioner in both the cases, and the common assessee the respondent. The questions involved are also the same.

2. The assessee is a wholesale dealer in rationed foodgrains like rice and wheat and also a dealer in groceries including coriander and methi. He claimed total exemption from tax on his turnover of sales of controlled rationed foodgrains, which claim the Sales Tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner rejected, but, on appeal, was allowed by the Tribunal. He had also a contention that the wheat sold by him came within the Notification S.R.O No. 602/63 dated 24th April, 1963, published in the official Gazette on 2nd June, 1963. This contention was also accepted by the Tribunal. Yet another contention the assessee had was that coriander and methi were oil-seeds coming within section 14(vi) of the Central Sales Tax Act. This again was accepted by the Tribunal, which held that the assessee need not pay tax on the sales of coriander and methi. There were other contentions too like that the sales of wheat attempted to be taxed were not first sales within the State and that the containers were not taxable. These questions, however, were not considered by the Tribunal, since the conclusions on the other questions made a decision on these issues unnecessary. What we have to consider is whether the decisions of the Tribunal on the three questions mentioned above are correct. The main question is the first question, namely, whether the sales of the rationed articles by the assessee to the retailers were sales coming within the General Sales Tax Act. There was an earlier Division Bench ruling of this Court, to which one of us was a party, in R.P Govindan & Co. v. Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal [1970] K.L.T 136; p. 188 infra., where the question considered was whether such sales of rationed articles to the retailers by a wholesaler were sales. And the Division Bench answered the question in the affirmative. When judgment was being pronounced in that case, the Full Bench ruling of the Allahabad High Court in Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P, Lucknow v. Ram Bilas Ram Gopal [1969] 24 S.T.C 508. was brought to the notice of the Division Bench; and the Division Bench observed that the reasoning in that decision was almost on the same lines as the reasoning the Division Bench adopted in the case before it. Thereafter, the decision of the Supreme Court in Chhitter Mal Narain Das v. Commissioner Of Sales Tax., U.P [1970] 26 S.T.C 344 S.C. came. That was a decision reversing a decision of the Allahabad High Court, where the learned Judges followed their own earlier Full Bench decision in Ram Bilas Ram Gopal's case, which was referred to by our Division Bench in the decision already mentioned. As indicated already, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Allahabad High Court; and the Tribunal appears to have thought that the said decision of the Supreme Court had the effect of overruling the reasoning of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court referred to by us in our Division Bench ruling. And the Tribunal came to the conclusion that our Division Bench ruling was also impliedly overruled by the decision of the Supreme Court in Chittar Mal Narain Das's case.

3. The relevant passage from the judgment of the Supreme Court, namely, the judgment of Shah, J., was extracted by the Tribunal. Still, the Tribunal has failed to understand the significance of the passage extracted; for instance, the crucial sentence in the passage is:

“In our judgment clause 3 sets up a machinery for compulsory acquisition by the State Government of stocks of wheat belonging to the licensed dealers.”

4. This is proof positive that the finding of the Supreme Court in the said decision was that the stocks of wheat belonging to the licensed dealers were compulsorily acquired by the State Government; naturally, the sales by the licensed dealers in that case were not sales coming within the Sales Tax Act; compulsory acquisitions are evidently not sales.

5. The counsel of the respondent has argued with considerable fervour that the observation of the Division Bench “simply because one of the elements necessary to constitute ‘sale’ under the Sale of Goods Act is absent, the sale will not cease to be a sale” has gone beyond the principles laid down by the three decisions of the Supreme Court relied on by the Division Bench. We do not think that this criticism of the counsel is justified. The Division Bench has pointed out, relying on State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd. and New India Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax Bihar, that a sale as contemplated by the Sale of Goods Act had four ingredients, viz., parties competent to contract, mutual assent, a thing the absolute or general property in which was transferred from the seller to the buyer, and a price in money paid or promised. Thereafter, considering the three other decisions of the Supreme Court, Indian Steel & Wire Products Ltd. v. State of Madras, Andhra Sugars Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1968] 21 S.T.C 212 S.C. and State of Rajasthan v. Karam Chand Thappar and Brothers (Coal Sales) Ltd., Jaipur [1969] 23 S.T.C 210 S.C, the Division Bench has made the observation, the correctness of which is disputed. It is clear that, out of the four ingredients mentioned above to constitute a sale, the first, the third and the fourth could not be absent in any transaction and the absence, if an absence is possible, could only be of the second ingredient, i.e, mutual assent. Thus, the observation of the Division Bench, that the absence of one of the elements necessary to constitute a sale will not make the sale any the less a sale, can only relate to the absence of mutual assent. And from the reasoning in the three Supreme Court decisions relied on by the Division Bench, the presence of mutual assent was considered to be not an ingredient in a sale under the Sales Tax Act.

6. This position has been made more clear by the later decision of the Supreme Court ill Solar Jung Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Mysore [1972] 29 S.T.C 246 S.C.. Seven Judges constituted the Bench; and Ray, J., has pronounced the unanimous judgment of the court. The learned Judge has considered all the relevant decisions of the Supreme Court on the topic commencing with Gannon Dunkerley's case and ending with Chittar Mal Narain Das's case [1970] 26 S.T.C 344 S.C.; the learned Judge has also referred to a few English decisions, some of which at least were referred to by our Division Bench. Ultimately, Ray, J., has considered the English decision in Ridge Nominees Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, and has extracted a passage from the judgment of Danckwerts, L.J, which reads:

“It seems to me that a sale may not always require the consensual element mentioned in Benjamin on Sale, 8th ed., p. 2, and that there may, in truth, be a compulsory sale of property with which the owner is compelled to part for a price against his will. The effect of the statute in such a case is to say that the absence of the transferor's consent does not matter and the sale is to proceed without it.”

7. This passage makes the position clear beyond doubt that, if an owner is compelled to part with his property for a price even against his will, the transaction will still be a sale. And this was all that was said by the Division Bench in the passage discussed above. The result is that the Division Bench ruling of this Court thought by the Tribunal to have been impliedly overruled is not overruled and is still good law.

8. We may once again revert to the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Solar Jung Sugar Mills case, where Ray, J., has observed:

“Counsel for the appellants contended that mutual assent in the present case would not be free but compulsory and the parties would have no choice in the matter and therefore there would be no sale. The most common-place illustration of supply and acceptance of goods resulting in sale under the present conditions is furnished by the present system of sale of rationed goods. There are ration shops in particular areas. Ration cards are distributed to residents in that area. The owners of these cards are required to go to the particular shop mentioned in the card for supply of rationed articles. Price is also regulated by the Rationing Order. Therefore the parties, the price, the shop, the supply and the acceptance of goods in accordance with the provisions of the Rationing Order are all regulated. When one presents a ration card to the shop and the shop owner delivers the rationed articles and the holder of the ration card accepts them and pays the price, there is indisputably a sale.”

9. This clearly indicates (there cannot be any doubt about it either) that a sale by a retailer to a card-holder of rationed articles is a sale coming within the Sales Tax Act. Then, we are not able to understand how a sale by a wholesaler to a retailer of rationed articles is not a sale coming within the Sales Tax Act. Therefore, the decision of the Tribunal on this question is erroneous; and we hold, that the sales of rationed articles by the assessee to the retailers are taxable sales.

10. The next question is one relating to the sale of wheat. The Tribunal has held that Notification S.R.O No. 602/63 applied to the cases. The Government Pleader has pointed out that the said notification cannot apply to the sales of wheat in these cases; and the counsel for the assessee has also agreed to this. Therefore, we need not consider this question in any elaborate manner; we hold that the Tribunal has erred on this question as well.

11. But the counsel for the respondent has pointed out that, even if the notification relied upon by the Tribunal does not apply to the cases, still there will remain the further question whether the sales of wheat are really first sales within the State. The Government Pleader also has agreed that this question has to be considered by the Tribunal.

12. Then we come to the third question, namely, whether coriander and methi come within section 14(vi) of the Central Sales Tax Act. Section 14 declares that certain goods are of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce. Then section 15 gives some exemption to the goods mentioned in section 14, clause (vi) of which reads:

“Oil-seeds, that is to say, seeds yielding non-volatile oils used for human consumption, or in industry, or in the manufacture of varnishes, soaps and the like, or in lubrication, and volatile oils used chiefly in medicines, perfumes, cosmetics and the like.”

13. There is a Division Bench ruling of the Orissa High Court in State of Orissa v. Dinabandhu Sahu & Sons, where the Division Bench has interpreted this clause as if it were a definition of the term “oil-seeds”. And this decision has been followed by the Tribunal; and the Tribunal has held on the strength of this ruling that coriander and methi are oil-seeds entitled to the exemption mentioned in section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act. And the correctness of this is being questioned by the Government Pleader. The Government Pleader has drawn our attention to the recent Division Bench ruling of this Court in State Of Kerala v. C. Moidoo, where this question has been considered. The Division Bench has pointed out that there are other decisions also like the Orissa Division Bench ruling including a decision of our court by a single Judge in C.M Hamsa Haji,… v. Sales Tax Officer, Tirur,…., Tirur. Still, the Division Bench has held that the language of clause (vi) of section 14 will not justify the conclusion that the said clause embodies a definition of the term “oil-seeds”. The Division Bench has referred to relevant decisions of the Supreme Court like Ramavatar Budhaiprasad v. The Assistant Sales Tax Officer, Akola. and Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya-Pradesh v. Jaswant Singh Charan Singh, and also to the Full Bench decision of this Court in Krishna Iyer v. State Of Kerala. There is yet another Division Bench ruling of this Court taking the same view in Deputy Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax and Sales Tax v. Mammootty. The principle to be followed in such cases is to accept the meaning of the terms as they are understood in common parlance.

14. The decision of the Federal Court in Bhola Prasad v. Emperor and the decision of the Privy Council in Megh Raj v. Allah Rakhia have held that the expression “that is to say” is only explanatory or illustrative and is not an expression either of amplification or of limitation. Considering these aspects, the Division Bench has held in Moidoo's case, that clause (vi) of section 14 does not embody a definition of “oil-seeds” and the words following the expression “that is to say” are only explanatory of the term “oil-seeds”. We do not find any reason to doubt the correctness of this conclusion of the Division Bench; and we are in agreement with this view. It must, therefore, follow that the nature of coriander and methi (whether they are oil-seeds) has to be ascertained from the way or manner in which these articles are treated or understood by persons who deal in them or use them. And it is common knowledge that these articles are not understood or treated by the common man who uses them as oil-seeds; in common parlance, they are not understood or considered to be oil-seeds; nor are they considered to be oil-seeds by the dealer who sells them. We may point out that, in Moidoo's case, the Division Bench was considering dhania (coriander); and that the Division Bench has remanded the case to the Tribunal to find out whether dhania is an oil-seed or not as it is understood in common parlance. We do not think there is any need for a remand on this question, since coriander and methi are not considered to be oilseeds in common parlance. Therefore, on this question we hold that they are not oil-seeds; and that the petitioner is not entitled to any concession on the sales of these articles.

15. It is then pointed out by the counsel of the respondent that there was another question also, viz., that the respondent was not bound to pay tax on containers. As we have already stated at the commencement of the judgment, the Tribunal did not consider this question, since it was unnecessary in the view it took on the first question. Now that we have taken a different view on the said question, this question has also to be considered by the Tribunal. In the result, we allow these revision cases and hold that the respondent (the assessee) is not entitled to any exemption on the sales of rationed articles. Regarding the question of sales of wheat, the Tribunal will consider whether the sales are first sales in the State or not. The Tribunal will also, decide whether the containers are liable to tax. And on the basis of these decisions, the Tribunal will modify its decision to the extent indicated.

16. The revision cases are allowed in the manner indicated, however, without any order regarding costs.

17. Petitions allowed.