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K.I Viswambharan & Bros. v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Namboodiripad, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
Two brothers, K.I. Viswambharan and K.I. Sukumaran, carried on business as a registered firm in the name "K.I. Viswambharan & Bros.", Ernakulam. In 1960 a building was purchased in the name of K.I. Viswambharan with partnership funds; the building and subsequent improvements were recorded in partnership accounts and shown as an asset of the firm. On 20-6-1966 the house property was sold by the firm for Rs. 45,000.
For the assessment year 1967-1968 the firm estimated the cost (including improvements) at Rs. 15,000 and admitted capital gains of Rs. 30,000. The assessees additionally claimed a deduction of Rs. 20,000 under S. 54(1) on the ground that, subsequent to the sale, partner K.I. Sukumaran purchased a residential house within the statutory time limit. The Income-tax Officer rejected the S. 54(1) claim, found (from firm records) that the actual total cost was Rs. 10,682 and assessed capital gains at Rs. 34,318; the firm's assessment was finalized on 23-12-1967.
The individual assessment of Sri K.I. Sukumaran was made on the same date, including one-half of the firm's capital gains. The firm and the partner appealed to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and then to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal; both appeals failed. On motion, the Tribunal referred three questions under S. 156(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which the High Court considered in these References.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in law in sustaining the levy of the capital gains on the registered firm?
- Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in law in disallowing the benefits under S. 54(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the value of the house property purchased by one of the partners for the residence of the partner?
- Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was correct in law in disallowing the exemption in respect of Rs. 25,009/- being the basic exemption granted to a registered firm and whether the interpretation placed on the Finance Act of 1967 read along with S. 114 of the Income-tax Act is in accordance with law?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' (Firm and Partner) Arguments
- The firm (and partner) argued that although a firm is treated as an independent unit for assessment under the Income-tax Act, under partnership law the firm has no corporate existence to own property in its own name; therefore, there cannot be a transfer by a firm attracting S. 45 (i.e., capital gains should not be treated as arising to the firm).
- The assessees claimed that, on the sale of the house property, deduction under S. 54(1) should be available because partner K.I. Sukumaran purchased a residential building within the statutory time limits, and thus the cost of the new purchase (Rs. 20,000) should be deductible from capital gains.
- The firm contended it was entitled to claim the basic exemption of Rs. 25,000 under paragraph C of the First Schedule to the Finance (No. 2) Act of 1967 (applying to registered firms for the assessment year commencing 1 April 1967).
Revenue's (Assessed Authority) Position as Reflected in the Record
- The Income-tax Officer rejected the claim under S. 54(1) and found, from the firm's records, that the total cost of the building was Rs. 10,682, resulting in assessable capital gains of Rs. 34,318.
- The assessing authorities treated the capital gains as income of the firm and assessed tax accordingly; they refused the Rs. 25,000 basic exemption claimed under paragraph C of the Finance Act on the basis that Chapter XII (S. 114) governed the determination of tax in such cases.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Narayanappa v. Bhaskara Krishnappa, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 1300 | Interpreting Partnership Act provisions: partnership property brought in or acquired for the firm becomes property of the firm; partners have rights to share of profits and on dissolution to share in value of property; firm has no separate legal existence but partnership property is treated as firm property for practical purposes. | The Court relied on this decision to reject the assessees' argument that a firm cannot own property so as to give rise to capital gains under S. 45. It supported the proposition that a firm is legally competent to own or hold property and to realize gains on its sale. |
| S.N. Syed Mohammed Saheb & Bros. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, 68 I.T.R. 791 | Held that where a firm is the owner of house properties, the income from such properties should be assessed to tax as the income of the firm (under S. 21), and S. 26 (association of persons) cannot be invoked to distribute such income among partners for assessment. | The Court cited this authority to reinforce that house property owned by the firm is to be assessed as the firm's income, thereby supporting the conclusion that capital gains on sale of firm-owned property are exigible to tax in the hands of the firm. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded by examining the relevant statutory framework and the Partnership Act provisions relied on by the assessees, and then applying those rules to the facts.
1. Statutory context under the Income-tax Act: The Court noted that S. 4 charges income-tax on the total income of every person; S. 2(31) defines 'person' to include a 'firm'; S. 182 provides special provisions for registered firms including determination of income-tax payable by the firm; and S. 45 deems profits or gains from transfer of a capital asset to be income of the previous year in which transfer occurred. Taken together, these provisions treat a registered firm as an entity distinct for assessment purposes and make capital gains assessable as the firm's income.
2. Partnership law arguments: The assessees argued that because a firm has no corporate existence under partnership law, it cannot own property and therefore cannot transfer a capital asset so as to attract S. 45. The Court examined S. 14 of the Indian Partnership Act, which defines partnership property and includes property acquired with firm money as deemed acquired for the firm. The Court also referenced S. 19(2)(f) and (g) (limited implied authority of partners regarding immovable property) and relied on the Supreme Court decision in Narayanappa v. Bhaskara Krishnappa to conclude that partnership provisions show that property brought in or acquired for the firm becomes the firm's property; partners are entitled to shares of profits and on dissolution to a share in the value, and during subsistence partners cannot treat partnership property as their own individual items.
3. Application to capital gains: On the basis of these partnership provisions and the cited authorities (including S.N. Syed Mohammed Saheb & Bros.), the Court concluded that a firm is legally competent to own and deal with property; therefore any profit or gain derived by the firm on sale of a capital asset is exigible to tax under the Income-tax Act. This disposes of the contention that S. 45 could not apply to a firm.
4. Claim under S. 54(1): The Court read S. 54(1) and explained that the benefit is relevant only for the person who has realized a capital gain by transfer of a capital asset. In this case, the capital gain accrued to the firm. What a partner is entitled to is his share in divisible profits, not a share in each category of income; consequently, Sri K.I. Sukumaran could not be said to have realized capital gains on the sale so as to attract S. 54(1). Therefore the partner's claim for deduction of Rs. 20,000 was rejected.
5. Claim for Rs. 25,000 basic exemption under the Finance Act, 1967: The Court analyzed S. 2 of the Finance Act (sub-section (1) and sub-section (3)). Sub-s. (3) provides that in cases to which Chapter XII of the Income-tax Act applies, tax chargeable shall be determined as provided in that Chapter. Section 114 (included in Chapter XII for the assessment year 1967-1968) applied to determination of tax on capital gains in cases of assessees other than companies; S. 114(b)(ii) first proviso established a minimum rate of 15% on net capital gains. Consequently, where Chapter XII applies, rates and provisions in that Chapter govern taxation of capital gains and the rates specified in sub-s. (1) of S. 2 of the Finance Act (including paragraph C's basic exemption for registered firms) cannot be invoked to grant the claimed exemption. The Court therefore held the assessing authorities were correct in rejecting the Rs. 25,000 deduction claimed on that basis.
6. Outcome of analysis: Applying the statutory provisions and authorities to the facts, the Court answered all three referred questions in the affirmative against the assessees and upheld the assessments as made.
Holding and Implications
Holding: All three questions referred were answered in the affirmative and against the assessees.
Direct implications for the parties (as stated in the opinion):
- The Appellate Tribunal was correct in sustaining the levy of capital gains on the registered firm — the capital gains arisen on sale of the firm-owned building are exigible to tax in the hands of the firm.
- The Appellate Tribunal was justified in disallowing the benefit under S. 54(1) for the partner (Sri K.I. Sukumaran); the partner could not claim the deduction of Rs. 20,000 because he did not personally realize the capital gains (the firm did).
- The Appellate Tribunal was correct in disallowing the firm's claim to the basic exemption of Rs. 25,000 under paragraph C of the First Schedule to the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1967, because Chapter XII (S. 114) governed the determination of tax on capital gains for the firm and prescribed the applicable rate (including the minimum 15% rule in the proviso).
- The Court made no order as to costs.
Broader implications:
The opinion applies and affirms existing statutory and judicial principles concerning (a) treatment of registered firms as separate taxable entities for assessment purposes under the Income-tax Act, (b) the availability of S. 54(1) relief only to the person who has realized capital gains, and (c) the application of Chapter XII (S. 114) to computation of tax on capital gains for non-company assessees for the assessment year 1967-1968. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel principle beyond these applications to the facts; its effect is to uphold the assessments as recorded.
Postscript from the opinion:
A copy of the judgment under the seal of the High Court and signature of the Registrar was to be sent to the Appellate Tribunal.
Namboodiripad, J.:— These two References under S. 156(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 arise out of the assessments to income-tax of a firm and one of its partners respectively for the assessment year 1967-1968; and the three common questions referred are:
“(1) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in law in sustaining the levy of the capital gains on the registered firm?
(2) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in law in disallowing the benefits under S. 54(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the value of the house property purchased by one of the partners for the residence of the partner?
(3) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal was correct in law in disallowing the exemption in respect of Rs. 25,009/- being the general exemption granted to a registered firm and whether the interpretation placed on the Finance Act of 1967 read along with S. 114 of the Income-tax Act is in accordance with law?”
2. Two brothers, K.I Viswambharan and K.I Sukumaran, formed a partnership and carried on business in the firm name “K.I Viswambharan & Bros.”, Ernakulam. In the year 1960, a building was purchased in the name of K.I Viswambharan, one of the partners, with funds belonging to the partnership concern and both partners fixed up residence in that building. In the partnership records, the building was shown as an asset of the firm and the price paid as well as the costs incurred later on in effecting certain improvements thereto went into the partnership accounts. On 20-6-1966, the house property was sold by the firm for an amount of Rs. 45,000/-. For the purposes of the assessment for the year 1967-1768, the assessee firm estimated the cost of the building and improvements thereto at Rs. 15,000/, and deducting such outlay from the total sale consideration of Rs. 45,000/-, admitted the total “capital gains” to the tune of Rs. 30,000/-. Before the assessing authority, a further deduction of Rs. 20,000/- from the aforesaid capital gains was claimed by the assessees on the ground that subsequent to the sale, Sri K.I Sukumaran, one of the partners, purchased a residential house within the time limit specified in S. 54(i) of the Act. The Income-tax Officer rejected the claim based on S. 54(i) of the Act and found that the total cost of the building as disclosed by the records of firm was only Rs. 10,682/-. The capital gains assessable to tax was, therefore, determined at the Rs. 34,318/- and the firm's assessment for the relevant year was finalized accordingly on 23-12-1967. On the same date, the individual assessment of Sri K.I Sukumaran, one of the partners, was also made including in his total income one half of the capital gains received by the firm. Both the firm, and the partner took the matter in appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, where they contended that, in addition to the deductions claimed before the Income-tax Officer, the firm was entitled to a further deduction of Rs. 25,000/- from the capital gains as the basic exemption granted to registered firms under the Finance Act of 1967. As far as the “capital gains” was concerned, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner confirmed the order of the Income-tax Officer though he granted a marginal benefit in one case under another head. The appeals preferred before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal also did not succeed. On motion by the assessees, the Tribunal referred the questions stated above. As far as the first question referred is concerned, the controversy lies within a narrow compass in as much as certain basic propositions relating to the assessment of registered firms are not seriously challenged before us. Under S. 4 of the Income-tax Act, the charge of income-tax is on the total income of every person. The definition of ‘person’ contained in S. 2(31) of the Act includes a ‘firm’. S. 182 of the Act, inter alia, provides that, in the case of registered firms, after assessing the total income of the firm, the income-tax payable by the firm itself shall be determined and that upto a specified limit the firm shall be liable to pay the tax which is not recoverable from a partner. The profits or gains arising from the transfer of a capital asset shall be deemed to be the income of previous year in which the transfers took place, by virtue of the provisions contained in S. 45 of the Act. In view of the combined operation of these provisions, it is clear that for purposes of assessment to tax, the Income-tax Act treats a registered firm as an entity distinct from the partners and that “capital gains” also goes as assessable income. The short point urged on behalf of the assessee is that, though under the Income-tax Act a firm may be an independent Unit for assessment, under the law relating to partnerships, the firm has no corporate existence so as to own any property in its own name, and consequently, there cannot be a transfer of any capital asset by a firm so as to attract S. 45 of the Act. This argument runs counter to certain provisions of the Partnership Act. S. 14 of the Indian Partnership Act, dealing with the property of a firm, is in the following terms:
“Subject to a contract between the partners, the property of the firm includes all property and rights and interests in property originally brought into the stock of the firm, or acquired, by purchase or otherwise, by or for the firm, or for the purposes and in the course of the business of the firm, and includes also the goodwill of the business.
Unless the contrary intention appears, property and rights and interests in property acquired with money belonging to the firm are deemed to have been acquired for the firm.”
3. S. 19(2)(f) and (g) provide that, in the absence of any usage or custom of trade to the contrary, the implied authority of a partner does not empower him to acquire immovable property on behalf of the firm or to transfer immovable property belonging to the firm. The various provisions of the Partnership Act dealing with property of a firm came up for consideration of the Supreme Court in Narayanappa v. Bhaskara Krishnappa (A.I.R 1966 S.C 1300). The Court held:
“From a perusal of these provisions it would be abundantly clear that whatever may be the character of the property which is brought in by the partners when the partnership is formed or which may be acquired in the course of the business of the partnership it becomes the property of the firm and what a partner is entitled to is his share of profits, if any, accruing to the partnership from the realisation of this property, and upon dissolution of the partnership to a share in the money representing the value of the property. No doubt, since a firm has no legal existence, the partnership property will vest in all the partners and in that sense every partner has an interest in the property of the partnership., During the subsistence of the partnership, however, no partner can deal with any portion of the property as his own. Nor can he assign his interest in a specific item of the partnership property to anyone. His right is to obtain such profits, if any, as fall to his share from time to time and upon the dissolution of the firm to a share in the assets of the firm which remain after satisfying the liabilities set out in Cl. (a) and sub-Cls. (i), (ii) and (iii) of Cl. (b) of S. 48.”
4. A firm's tax liability with respect to house property came up for consideration in S.N Syed Mohammed Saheb & Bros. v. Commr. of Income-tax (68 I.T.R 791). In that case, it was contended on behalf of the assessee that the income from house property owned by the firm should be assessed under S. 26 of the Act treating the property as owned by an association of persons. The court repelled that contention and observed as follows:
“In this case, the assessee is the firm; and admittedly, the firm is the owner of the house properties as well. Therefore, S. 26 cannot be invoked, nor can any claim be made under that section that the income should be assessed in the bands of the several partners of the firm. The assessment by the department under S. 21 of the Act including the income of the house properties in the total income of the firm appears to be correct.”
5. In view of the specific provisions of the Partnership Act relating to the property of a firm and the judicial pronouncements on the matter, there cannot be any doubt that a firm is legally competent to own or hold property and also to deal with such property. Any profit or gain derived by a firm in pursuance of the sale of a capital asset owned or held by the firm is, therefore, exigible to tax in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Income-tax Act.
6. After the sale of the house property belonging to the firm. Sri K.I Sukumaran, one of the partners, purchased in his name a residential building for Rs. 20,000/-. It was contended before the assessing authorities that the cost of the new purchase is also deductible from the proceeds realised by the firm on the sale of its building by virtue of S. 54(1) of the Income-tax Act. We may read S. 54(1) of the Act:
“Where a capital gain arises from the transfer of a capital asset to which the provisions of S. 53 are not applicable, beings or land appurtenant thereto the income of which if chargeable under the head ‘Income from house property’, which in the two years immediately preceding the date on which the transfer took place, was being used by the assessee or a parent of his mainly for the purposes of his mainly for the purposes of his own or the parent's own residence, and the assessee has within a period of one year before or after that date purchased, or has within a period of two years after that date constructed; a house property for the purposes of his own residence, then, instead of the capital gain being charged to income tax “as income of the previous year in which the transfer took place, it shall be dealt with in accordance with the following provisions of this section, that to say,—
(i) if the amount of the capital gain is greater than the cost of the new asset, the difference between the amount of the capital again and the cost of the new asset shall be charged under S. 45 as the income of the previous year; and for the purpose of computing in respect of the new asset any capital gain arising from its transfer within a period of three years of its purchase or construction, as the case may be, the cost shall be nil; or
7. It is not quite clear from the records whether the benefit conferred by S. 54(i) is claimed by the firm, or the partner Sri K.I Sukumaran or by both. It was rightly conceded by the learned counsel for the assessees that the benefit cannot be claimed for the purposes of assessment of the firm, for more reasons than one. It is not possible to envisage the usage of the building by the firm for its residence within the meaning of S. 54(i); nor has there been, in this case, a subsequent purchase of a residential building by the firm, by utilizing the proceeds received on the sale of its building. The question is whether, for the purposes of his individual assessment, partner Sri K.I Sukumaran can claim and deduction under S. 54(i). The relief granted by S. 54(i) of the Act has relevancy only in the matter of computing capital gains for the purposes of taxation. In other words, the person claiming the benefit must have realised profit or gain by the transfer of a capital asset. In this case, the capital gain accrued to the firm and on such accrual, it became part of the firm's total income just like any other receipt that satisfies the attributes of ‘income’ as understood in law. What the partner Sri K.I Sukumaran was entitled to get at the end of the year was his share in the divisible profits of the firm, and not a share in each category of income derived by the firm. It cannot, therefore, beheld that Sri K.I Sukumaran realised any capital gains on the sale of a building used for his residence so as to attract S. 54(i) of the Act; and the claim made by him for deduction of Rs. 20,000/- in computing his taxable income for the relevant year has only to be repelled.
8. The third question which is primarily concerned with the firm arises out of the contention of assessee that, being a registered firm, it is entitled to claim a basic exemption of Rs. 25,000/- in accordance with the provisions of the Finance (No. 2) Act, XX of 1967, which admittedly applies to the assessment involved in these proceedings. sub-section (1) of S. 2 of the Finance Act 1967 reads as follows:
“(1). Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) for the assessment year commencing on the 1st day of April, 1967, income tax shall be charged at the rates specified in Part I of the First Schedule and, in the cases to which Paragraphs A, B, C and D of that Part apply, shall be increased by a surcharge for purposes of the Union and a special surcharge for purposes of the Union calculated in either case in the manner provided therein.”
9. As far as registered firms are concerned, rates are specified in paragraph C of the First Schedule. Paragraph C, no doubt, provides for a basic exemption of Rs. 25,000/- and it is on that basis that the disputed claim has been made by the assessees. An analysis of sub-section (1) of S. 2 shows that the provision does not apply to cases covered by sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of S. 2. Sub-s. (3) which is relevant to the matter in controversy is in the following terms:
“In cases to which Chapter XII of the Income tax Act, 1961 (XLIII of 1961) (hereinafter referred to as the Income tax Act) applies, the tax chargeable shall be determined as provided in that Chapter, and with reference to the rates imposed by sub-s. (1) or the rates as specified in that Chapter, as the case may be.”
10. In view of this provision, in cases to which Chapter XII of the Income-tax Act applies, the rate applicable is the rate specified in that Chapter and the rates specified in sub-s. (1) of S. 2 can apply only if no special rate is specified in any of the provisions included in Chapter XII of the Act. S. 114 of the Income-tax Act was included in Chapter XII. S. 114 was omitted and in its place S. 80T was inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act of 1967. But since the omission was to take effect only with effect from 1st April 1968, S. 114 applied to assessments for the assessment year 1967-1968, and the case on hand falls within that category. S. 114 provided for determination of tax on capital gains in cases of assessees other than companies. Since the assessee in this case is a firm, the provisions of S. 114 undoubtedly applied. The first proviso to S. 114(b)(ii)is in the following terms:
“Provided that where the amount payable under sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) is less than the amount equal fifteen per cent of the net capital gains in respect of which tax is payable under that sub-clause, then the amount payable thereunder shall be fifteen per cent, of such net capital gains.”
11. By virtue of this proviso, the minimum rate at which net ‘capital gains’ to be taxed is fifteen percent, and the assessee firm has been assessed only at that rate. It is not necessary to examine in detail the method of computation specified in S. 114. It follows that the assessing authorities were right in rejecting the assessees' claim for deduction of Rs. 25,000/- on the basis of paragraph C of the First Schedule to the Finance (No. 2) Act of 1967. In the result, all the three questions are answered in the affirmative and against the assessees in both the References. In the circumstances of these cases, we make no order as to costs.
12. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and signature of the Registrar will be sent to the Appellate Tribunal.
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