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Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez .

Kerala High Court
Jan 15, 1971
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Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion (Mathew, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal was filed by the 2nd defendant against a decree passed by a learned Single Judge in a second appeal concerning a suit for redemption of a melotti and kuzhikanam evidenced by Ex. P-1.

Key factual sequence (dates as recorded in the opinion):

  • The plaint property belonged to Kunchena Narayanan. In 1060 he gave the property on otti and kuzhikanam under Ex. D-1 to Thomas Fernandez (described as husband of the 1st defendant and father of defendants 2 to 10).
  • In 1069 there was a partition of Kunchena Narayanan's assets among his seshakars and children; the seshakars who received the plaint property executed a melotti and kuzhikanam in 1079 (Ex. P-1) in favour of Perumal Potha directing her to redeem Ex. D-1.
  • Perumal Potha redeemed Ex. D-1 and reduced the property to her possession. In 1097 the heirs of the executrix under Ex. P-1 transferred the rights under that document to Thomas Fernandez.
  • The 11th defendant (who had acquired the plaint property under a partition among the seshakars) sold it to the plaintiff under Ex. P-3. The plaintiff instituted the suit to redeem Ex. P-1.

Procedural history:

  • The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's suit for failure to prove title.
  • The plaintiff appealed; the appellate court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit.
  • The 2nd defendant filed a second appeal; the learned Single Judge dismissed that second appeal. The matter then reached the present Bench.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Ex. P-1 constitutes an "ottikuzhikanam" within the meaning of Section 2(39-A) of Act 1 of 1964 as amended by Act 35 of 1969.
  2. Whether the 2nd defendant is a "tenant" or a "deemed tenant" within the meaning of Section 4-A(1) of Act 1 of 1964 as amended by Act 35 of 1969 (and relatedly whether Section 4-A is constitutionally valid as applied to the facts of the case).
  3. Whether, in relation to the land in question, the tenure is "pandarapattom" in the Travancore area and, if so, whether such tenure falls within the definition of "estate" in Article 31-A(2)(a) of the Constitution (this question had been referred to a larger Bench and determined in favour of pandarapattom being an "estate").

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (2nd defendant) Arguments

  • The appellant contended that Ex. P-1 evidences an ottikuzhikanam falling within Section 2(39-A) of the 1964 Act as amended (i.e., that the document is not a redeemable mortgage but a transfer of enjoyment for improvement).
  • Alternatively, the appellant argued that he is a deemed tenant under Section 4-A(1) of the 1964 Act as amended, which would prevent a suit for redemption of Ex. P-1.
  • The appellant also raised specific factual contentions rejected by the Single Judge: that Thomas Fernandez was not the husband of the 1st defendant and not the father of defendants 2 to 10, and that the 11th defendant did not acquire title — the court treated these as concurrent findings and rejected the appellant's contentions.

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff challenged the constitutional validity of Section 4-A as applied to the appellant, and contended that the tenure of the land was pandarapattom (in the Travancore area) so that Section 4-A could not have the protection of Article 31-A of the Constitution in light of the earlier Full Bench decision in Govindaru Nambooripad v. State.
  • As a consequence of these contentions, the constitutional question and the classification of the tenure as an "estate" were referred to larger Benches; ultimately a five-judge Bench answered that pandarapattom land in the Travancore area is an "estate" within Article 31-A(2)(a).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Govindaru Nambooripad v. State, 1962 Ker LT 913 : AIR 1963 Ker 86 (Full Bench) Previously raised doubt whether Article 31-A protection would apply (as between Sec. 4-A and pandarapattom tenure). The plaintiff relied on this decision to argue that Sec. 4-A could not have Article 31-A protection as applied to pandarapattom land; the question was referred to a Bench of five Judges which ultimately held pandarapattom to be an "estate" under Article 31-A(2)(a).
Mathai v. Narayanan Unnithan, 1961 Ker LT 13 : AIR 1962 Ker 27 Described a literal meaning of "kuzhikanam" and interpreted "ottikuzhikanam" as a mortgage with a 12-year term and an undertaking to pay for improvements on redemption. Cited by the court as an example of earlier judicial interpretation of kuzhikanam; the court noted and then moved beyond the literal meaning to consider established legal/parlance meanings.
Raghavan v. Krishnan Nair, 1968 Ker LT 11 Reiterated the view stated in Mathai about the literal meaning and character of "ottikuzhikanam". Referenced as a subsequent reiteration of the earlier view; used by the court in reviewing judicial approaches to the term "kuzhikanam" but not accepted as the exclusive meaning.
Sankaran Govindan v. Thymookil Swamiar, 7 Trav LR 44 (Bench of five Judges) Considered the nature and incidents of "kuzhikanam" (majority treated it as an improving lease of 12 years with compensation for improvements; dissent emphasised the term as a generic category of improving leases). The court relied on the analysis in this decision (majority and dissenting observations) to explain that "kuzhikanam" in legal parlance denotes an improving lease of about 12 years with compensation for improvements and that such characteristics may attach even where the specific word does not appear.
A.S. No. 163 of 1043 (Travancore Full Bench) and related Travancore Sadr Court decisions (A.S. No. 203 of 1040; A.S. No. 124 of 1042) Earlier Travancore authorities recognizing the nature of kulikanam/kuzhikanam and the reasonableness of a 12-year term for such improving leases. Cited within the Sankaran Govindan discussion and relied on by the court for historical and judicial support that a 12-year term and compensation for improvements are characteristic incidents of kuzhikanam-like tenures.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a stepwise manner, grounded in statutory text and prior judicial interpretations:

  1. Concurrent factual findings of the courts below (on questions such as identity and title transfers) were accepted because they were not shown to be vitiated by any error of law; accordingly, these contentions of the appellant were repelled.
  2. The court examined the statutory definition of "Ottikuzhikanam" in Section 2(39-A) of Act 1 of 1964 as amended by Act 35 of 1969, which defines ottikuzhikanam as "a transfer for consideration by a person to another of any land other than nilam for the enjoyment of that land and for the purpose of making improvements thereon" and excludes a mortgage under the Transfer of Property Act.
  3. The court reviewed earlier case law and Travancore authorities to determine the legal meaning of "kuzhikanam"/"kulikanom" and "ottikuzhikanam." It noted that some earlier single-judge decisions treated the term in a literal or mortgage-like sense, but Travancore Full Bench and other authorities characterized kuzhikanam as an improving lease typically involving a 12-year period and compensation for improvements at redemption.
  4. The court analyzed Ex. P-1's text and operative language (including words emphasizing enjoyment of the property and an express 12-year term and provision for payment for improvements). On this basis, the court found Ex. P-1 to contain the incidents of an ottikuzhikanam rather than a mortgage under the Transfer of Property Act.
  5. Because Ex. P-1 was a transfer for enjoyment of the property for consideration and for making improvements, the court concluded the 2nd defendant falls within the definition of "tenant" in Section 2(57) of the Act (as amended). Consequently, the appellant was held entitled to fixity of tenure by virtue of Section 13 of the Act as amended.
  6. Given this conclusion, the court did not need to decide whether the appellant was a "deemed tenant" under Section 4-A(1) or to address the constitutional validity of Section 4-A; those issues were left undecided as unnecessary to the final determination.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court allowed the appeal. It set aside the decrees of the learned Single Judge and the District Court that had allowed redemption of Ex. P-1 and directed recovery of the plaint property. The court restored the Munsif's decree (the trial court's earlier decree) though on a different legal ground and ordered that the parties bear their costs throughout. (The formal outcome is recorded as: "Appeal allowed.")

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The appellant (2nd defendant) is held to have rights under Ex. P-1 as an ottikuzhikanam transferee and as a tenant entitled to statutory fixity of tenure; the decrees in favour of the plaintiff permitting redemption and recovery were set aside and the Munsif's decree restored.
  • The court expressly refrained from deciding the alternate contention on deemed tenancy under Section 4-A(1) and the constitutional validity of Section 4-A, since resolution on the ottikuzhikanam and tenant definitions made those determinations unnecessary.
  • No broader constitutional or precedent-setting pronouncement on Section 4-A's validity was made by this court in this opinion; the decision's practical effect is focused on the parties' rights in respect of Ex. P-1.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond the text.

Show all summary ...

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Mathew, J.:— This is an appeal by the 2nd defendant from a decree passed by a learned Single Judge in second appeal in a suit for redemption of a melotti and kuzhikanam evidenced by Ex. P-1.

2. Since the 2nd defendant among other things contended in the appeal that he is a deemed tenant coming within the ambit of Section 4-A of Act 1 of 1964 as amended by Act 35 of 1969 and as his constitutional validity was challenged by the plaintiff, the case was referred to a Bench of three Judges. When the case was argued before that Bench, the plaintiff contended that the tenure of the land involved in the case is pandarapattom in the Travancore area of the State and so Sec. 4-A in its application to that land cannot have the protection of Article 31-A of the Constitution in view of the decision of a Bench of three judges in Govindaru Nambooripad v. State, 1962 Ker LT 913 : (AIR 1963 Ker 86) (FB). As considerable doubt was entertained on the question whether pandarapattom land in the Travancore area of the State is ‘estate’ within the meaning of Article 31-A(2)(a) that question was referred to a Bench of five Judges. That Bench answered the question by saying that pandarapattom land in the Travancore area of the State is ‘estate’ within the definition of the term in Article 31-A(2)(a). The appeal was thereafter posted for argument before us. The plaint property belonged to one Kunchena Narayanan. He gave the property on otti and kuzhikanam in 1060 under Ex. D-1 to Thomas Fernandez, the husband of 1st defendant and father of defendants 2 to 10. There was a partition of the assets of Kunchena Narayanan in 1069 among his seshakars and his children. The seshakars who got the plaint property under the partition executed a melotti and kuzhikanam in 1079 (Ex. P-1) in favour of Perumal Potha directing her to redeem Ex. D-1. She redeemed Ex. D-1 and reduced the property to her possession. In 1097 the heirs of the executrix under Ex. P-1, transferred the rights under the document to Thomas Fernandez. The 11th defendant who got the plaint property under a partition among the seshakars of Kunchena Narayanan, sold it to the plaintiff under Ex. P-3. The plaintiff instituted the suit to redeem Ex. P-1.

3. The trial court dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff did not prove his title to the plaint property. The plaintiff filed an appeal from the decree which was allowed, and the suit decreed. The second appeal filed against that decree by the 2nd defendant was dismissed.

4. The contentions of the 2nd defendant in the second appeal that Thomas Fernandez who took Ex. P-2 was not the husband of the 1st defendant and the father of defendants 2 to 10 who took Ex. D-1, and that the 11th defendant did not get title to the property were overruled by the learned Single Judge and he agreed with the findings of the court below on these questions. Since the findings are concurrent and not vitiated by any error of law, we accept them and repel these contentions of the appellant.

5. The appellant, however, contended that Ex. P-1 under which he holds the property evidences an otti kuzhikanam coming within the meaning of Section 2(39-A) of Act 1 of 1964 as amended by Act 35 of 1969; or in the alternative that he is a deemed tenant falling within ambit of Section 4-A(1) of Act 1 of 1964 as amended by Act 35 of 1969, and therefore, the suit for redemption of Ex. P-1 must be dismissed.

6. It is necessary to read Section 2(39-A) to understand the first contention of the appellant.

“In this Act unless the context otherwise requires,—

“Ottikuzhikanam” means a transfer for consideration by a person to another of any land other than nilam for the enjoyment of that land and for the purpose of making improvements thereon, but shall not include a mortgage within the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882;”

7. Ex. P-1, as already stated, is styled as a melotti and kuzhikanam. The operative part of the document reads: (Original in Malayalam omitted.)

8. In Mathai v. Narayanan Unnithan, 1961 Ker LT 13 : (AIR 1962 Ker 27) a learned Single Judge said that the literal meaning of ‘kuzhikanam’ is ‘kanom’ or money paid for digging ‘kuzhi’ or pit, and that “ottikuzhikanam” means a mortgage with a term of 12 years containing an undertaking by the mortgagor to pay for the value of improvements effected by the mortgagee at the time of redemption. This view was reiterated by the learned Judge in Raghavan v. Krishnan Nair, 1968 Ker LT 11. We do not think that the literal meaning of ‘kuzhikanam’ is the meaning to be attached to the term in legal parlance. The term has acquired a special meaning, and that meaning has been recognised in judicial decision. In Sankaran Govindan v. Thymookil Swamiar, 7 Trav LR 44 a Bench of five Judges of the Travancore High Court had occasion to consider the meaning of ‘kuzhikanam’ when dealing with a venpattom lease reserving an annual rent and containing an express stipulation to surrender the property leased on demand. The contention in that case was that although the document in question there was a venpattom, it was really a ‘kuzhikanam’ and that the lessee had the right to remain in possession for a period of 12 years by virtue of the clause in it which permitted him to plant trees and to get compensation for the same at the time of the surrender of the leasehold interest. The court by a majority negatived the contention. In dealing with the contention the learned Judges considered the nature and incidents of kuzhikanam. Govinda Pillai, J., who wrote the leading judgment for the majority proceeded on the assumption that kuzhikanam means a lease for a period of 12 years for improving the property leased with an undertaking by the lessor to compensate the lessee for the value of improvements at the time of surrender. He distinguished the case before him on the ground that there was nothing in the document in question there to show that “a kuzhikanam lease was meant” as there was a definite clause in it to terminate the lease on demand by the landlord. He further said that “in the case of kuzhikanam” a sum is generally advanced by the lessee to the lessor as a mortgage debt., and that such advances are not usual in venpattom leases.” He distinguished the Travancore Full Bench decision of the Sadr Court (A.S No. 163 of 1043) by saying that, the mortgage there was expressly called a Kuzhikanam Kunhiraman Nair, J. who dissented from the majority view, said:

“The word Kulikanom is rarely found used in North Travancore to which the parties to this suit belong. The term Kulikanom is a generic term used to denote all sorts of improving leases which, in different parts of Travancore, are known by different appellations such for instance as Karikur pattern, Vettalivoo pattom, Kuyi Pathi pattom and Natavu Kur Anubhavom.

XXXXXX

The term Kulikanom, derived from the Dravidom Kuli (pit) and Kanom (money) and meaning literally, compensation for digging and planting the land, is popularly understood to embrace leases of dry lands or Purayidoms wholly or partly uncultivated, granted on condition of the lessee's planting out the waste portion of the land let. Wherever there is an engagement on the part of a lessee to bring new land under culture, by planting trees for which compensation is payable at the time of the lessee's ejectment, the tenure may, fou all practical purposes be regarded as Kulikanom. The compensation ultimately payable for digging and planting is regarded as an encumbrance or charge (kanom) on the land and, hence, probably the term Kulikanom came to be applied to all improving leases.”

9. He supports his conclusion as regards the nature of Kulikanam by referring to the earlier decisions of the Travancore Courts. He said:

“In a case (No. 135 of 1943) decided by a Full Bench of the Sadr Court of this State, the general right of a tenant under Kulikanom, to hold the land till he should enjoy the fruits of his outlay of labour and capital, was recognised. The lease in that case was substantially the same, in its terms, as the lease evidenced by Ex. A. In another case (A.S No. 203 of 1040) in which the tenure was denominated Vettalivoo Pattom, very similar to Kulikanom, the Court held 12 years to be a reasonable time to be allowed to the tenant. In A.S No. 124 of 1042 in which the Kulikanom deed expressed a definite period (12 years), the Sadr Court observed, ‘Even if a minimum period were not mentioned, we should say, in regard to this very tenure that 12 years was a most reasonable and necessary period to protect the interests of the planter for the intention of both parties clearly is, in respect of lands taken up for planting that the planter should have a long enough tenure to enable him a reap the benefit of his labour outlay, and that at the end of his period, the proprietor should receive his estate well improved and stocked with trees. For this, 12 years is the shortest period that can be needed.”

10. The judgment of Kunhiraman Nair, J., would show that ‘Kulikanam’ means an improving lease for a period of 12 years with an undertaking to pay for the value of improvements at the time of redemption. And Ormsby, J., observed in the case:

“Documents have often, unless my memory misleads me, been interpreted by the Court as ‘kulikanom’ documents, where the word ‘kulikanom’ did not appear, it being sufficiently obvious that what the parties meant was that the usual incidents of a Kulikanom lease should attach to the conveyance.”

11. In T.K Vein Pillai's Travancore State Manual, Vol. in at page 206, the incidents of Ottikuzhikanam are stated to be:

“In this instance, the Ottikkaran gets also the lease of a property, generally garden lands, for the payment of a certain sum of money called Artham and gets into the possession of the property for a period of not less than 12 years; at the time of redemption he is entitled to receive the amount back together with the ponnu or compensation for any improvements he may have made.”

12. We do not think that Ex. P-1 document is a mortgage within the meaning of the Transfer of property Act, 1882. Apart from the lable given by the parties to the document, there is clear indication in the document to show that the property was given for enjoyment by the mortgagee. The words (Original in Mallyalam omitted) in the operative portion of the document would put it beyond any doubt that the property was given for enjoyment. We fail to see why the words (Original in Mallyalam omitted) were used in the operative part of the document unless it be that the transfer was for enjoyment of the land by the mortgagee. If kuzhikanam has come to mean in legal parlance a lease for improvement with a term of 12 years, we can find no reason why the parties used the expression (Original in Mallyalam omitted) in juxtaposition with the word (Original in Mallyalam omitted) unless it be to emphasise the enjoyment aspect of the transaction. The document contains an express period of 12 years and provides for payment of value of improvements effected at the time of redemption. These terms are generally implied in a kuzhikanam. We can conceive of no reason why the document should expressly provide for a period of 12 years and for payment of value of improvements effected at the time of redemption and yet state in its operative portion (Original in Mallyalam omitted) unless it be to highlight the lease aspect of the transaction. An already stated, Ex. D-1 was also styled as an “ottikuzhikanam” and the document contained an enumeration of the trees standing on the property. That would show that the property was fully planted with trees. It would appear from Ex. P-1 that all the trees except one were standing on the property on the date of Ex. P-1. Therefore, it was, that Ex. P-1 stated that if necessary the mortgagee may plant more trees and that the value of those trees would be paid at the time of redemption. It cannot therefore be said that the document was not for the purpose of making improvements also. The purpose of making improvements is implied in the operative portion of the document when it is said (Original in Mallyalam omitted).

13. In these circumstances, we are of the view that Ex. P-1 evidences an ottikuzhikanam corning within the purview of Section 2(39-A) of Act 1 of 1964 as amended by Act 35 of 1969. We also think that the transfer under Ex. P-1 being for enjoyment of the property for the consideration mentioned in it, the 2nd defendant would be a ‘tenant’ within the body of the definition in Section 2(57) of Act 1 of 1964 as amended by Act 35 of 1969. Therefore, the appellant is entitled to fixity of tenure by virtue of Section 13 of that Act as amended.

14. In this view it is quite unnecessary for us to consider the question whether the appellant is a deemed tenant within the meaning of Section 4-A of Act 1 of 1964 as amended by Act 35 of 1969, or the constitutional validity of that section. In the result, we allow the appeal, and set aside the decrees of the learned Single Judge and the District Court allowing redemption of Ex. P-1 and recovery of the plaint property. We restore the decree passed by the Munsif, though for a different reason, and direct the parties to bear their costs throughout.

15. Appeal allowed.