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Kamalakshi & Others v. Bahulayan & Others

Kerala High Court
Aug 31, 1971
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit concerned the Ollal Devaswom, the properties of which were described in the plaint, and sought:

  • a declaration that the Ollal Devaswom is a private trust of the joint family composed of the plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 11;
  • removal of the first defendant from the management of the Devaswom;
  • recovery of assets and properties of the Devaswom held by the first defendant; and
  • settlement of a scheme for management of the Devaswom.

A preliminary decree was entered in favour of the plaintiffs declaring the Devaswom to be a private family trust, removing the first defendant from management, directing recovery of properties and funds in the first defendant's possession, vesting management in the second defendant, and directing preparation of a scheme for administration. The matter was posted for settling a scheme; the plaintiffs submitted a draft scheme, no other party did, and the court accepted the plaintiffs' scheme on the ground that no objections had been filed.

Two second appeals arise from this suit:

  • S.A. No. 1229 of 1966 — filed by defendants 4 to 7 and 9 to 11, challenging both the preliminary decree and the final decree (scheme adoption); and
  • S.A. No. 1152 of 1966 — filed by defendants 20 and 21, challenging the preliminary decree.

A principal procedural contention was that the suit was instituted on behalf of the wider family (tarwad) but did not implead all members; the plaintiffs sought to treat the suit as representative and filed a petition under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure and sought publication of notice. The appellants attacked the proceedings, contending that no formal order granting permission under Order 1 Rule 8 had been passed and thus the decree was invalid for non-joinder.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the preliminary and final decrees are vitiated by non-joinder of members of the tarwad when the plaintiffs relied on representation under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure but no formal order granting permission was recorded.
  2. Whether a direction to publish notice (without a formal recorded order granting permission under Order 1 Rule 8) is sufficient to treat absent members as represented and make the proceedings binding on them.
  3. Whether the adoption of the scheme as a final decree was valid given the time allowed (or not allowed) for parties to object to the scheme.
  4. Whether defendants 1 and 6 (and, separately, defendants 20 and 21 as legal representatives of defendant 1) have any special right in respect of the E schedule item (a released mortgage) and any special right in respect of the building in A schedule.
  5. Whether any part of the decree purports to direct recovery of properties from appellants other than the first defendant (i.e., whether an appellate observation wrongly extended the decree).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties: although some members of the tarwad were impleaded as plaintiffs and some as defendants, the plaintiff and defendant parties do not exhaust the tarwad's membership; many members were omitted (addresses unavailable or not locally residing) and the suit cannot bind them without proper joinder or valid representative procedure.
  • The plaintiffs failed to obtain a formal order granting permission under Order 1 Rule 8; publication alone is insufficient and, absent such an order, the decree is bad and those not actually parties cannot be deemed represented.
  • Objection that the preliminary decree directed recovery of properties and that the appellants (other than the first defendant) are aggrieved by that purported recovery decree (an appellate observation was claimed to indicate recovery from all properties generally).
  • Complaint that insufficient time was provided to file objections to the proposed scheme (final decree adopting the scheme is therefore objectionable).
  • Claim of special right in respect of E schedule item: release of the mortgage was executed in the joint names of first defendant and sixth defendant, thus sixth defendant (and, by extension, successors to first defendant) have an interest.
  • Defendants 20 and 21 (legal representatives of the first defendant) claimed entitlement to the special right in respect of E schedule.

Plaintiffs' / Respondents' Position (as presented in the opinion)

  • The suit should be treated as representative; a petition under Order 1 Rule 8 was filed and the court directed publication of notice — thus absent members are deemed represented.
  • Because publication was directed and no objections were filed to the scheme, the plaintiffs' proposed scheme was properly accepted.
  • With regard to the E schedule mortgage and A schedule building, the factual circumstances (first defendant coming into management under power of attorney in 1952 and the release occurring thereafter for Rs. 199/-) do not support any special right claimed by defendants.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Punjab Co-operative Bank v. Hari Singh (AIR 1933 Lahore 749) The view that omission to pass a formal order granting permission under the representative procedure does not necessarily vitiate the proceedings; permission may be inferred from the proceedings of the trial court. The court relied on the precedent to support the proposition that permission may be inferred where the trial court's conduct (e.g., directing publication) manifests an intention to allow representation even if no formal order was recorded.
Mukaremadas v. Chhagan Kisan (AIR 1959 Bom. 491) That a formal order granting permission under Order 1 Rule 8 is not strictly necessary; permission can be recognized even if not formally recorded and may, in some views, be granted at appellate stage. The court cited this authority to show judicial recognition that the formal recorded order is not an absolute prerequisite and to support the inference of permission from subsequent procedural acts such as publication.
Kunhalavi Musaliar v. Abdulla (1965 KLT. 907) The statement (as cited) that "the court must be deemed to have given its permission when it ordered the publication of the notice in the paper." The court adopted this formulation and expressly held that a direction to publish notice is sufficient in the present case to infer that the court had granted permission under Order 1 Rule 8.
Muthukaruppa v. Appavao (AIR 1943 Mad. 161) Earlier authority on representative proceedings and the effect of notice by publication in representative suits. Cited as part of the line of authorities supporting the inference of permission from an order for publication; used to bolster the court's conclusion that publication may indicate permission.
Chatrabhoj Keshavji v. Ghanshyamalalji Ratanji (AIR 1952 Kutch 92) Authority referred to in the same line of cases concerning representative proceedings and the court's power to bind unimpleaded members when appropriate notice/representation procedure is followed. Used in conjunction with other authorities to justify the court's approach of inferring permission from the order for publication of notice.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis centers on the law and practice under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure concerning suits involving numerous parties and representative procedure:

  1. The court explained that whether parties are "numerous" depends on the plaint and nature of the suit and is not a term of art; the determination is a matter for the court when considering an application for representative relief under Order 1 Rule 8.
  2. The party seeking representation must inform the court who is to be represented and, where practicable, must furnish addresses. Publication of notice is to be resorted to only when personal service is not reasonably practicable. This information allows the court to assess whether publication and/or personal service should be ordered.
  3. Because of the serious consequence of binding absent persons (potentially barring them by res judicata from later litigating the same question), courts should not treat applications under Order 1 Rule 8 lightly; judicial discretion must be exercised carefully, and courts should insist on address particulars where ascertainable and order personal service where practicable in addition to publication.
  4. Despite these requirements, the court accepted the line of authority (citing the precedents above) holding that a formal recorded order granting permission under Order 1 Rule 8 is not invariably necessary and that permission may be inferred from the trial court's proceedings — in particular, an order directing publication of notice was treated as sufficient in the present case to infer that permission was granted.
  5. Applying that principle, the court found that in the present case the decree was not shown to be prejudicial to those sought to be represented. Because no injustice was shown and given the considerable time elapsed (more than eight years) and the extensive litigation already consumed, the court declined to reopen the decree on the basis of a technical irregularity in the permission proceedings.
  6. On the contention that the decree ordered recovery of properties from appellants generally, the court observed that the decree was against the first defendant and properties in his possession. The court regarded an appellate observation suggesting a broader recovery as clearly erroneous and contrary to the scope of the decree.
  7. Regarding the final decree adopting the scheme, the court noted that no specific objections to the scheme were presented at hearing. The court reviewed the scheme and saw no facial reason to interfere; it also pointed out that any aggrieved party may, after observing the scheme's working, seek modification by appropriate application.
  8. On the E schedule mortgage and related special-right claims: the court held that the release of the mortgage in the joint names of the first and sixth defendants occurred after the first defendant had come into management under a power of attorney (1952), and the consideration for the release was only Rs. 199/-. Considering the Devaswom's assets and the factual matrix, the court saw no basis to disturb the courts below in denying any special right to defendants 1 and 6 with respect to that item.
  9. For defendants 20 and 21 (legal representatives of the first defendant), the lower court's rationale that they lacked locus because the first defendant had asserted the claim was regarded as incorrect; however, on the merits the appellate court found no case in support of their claim because the mortgage release occurred after the first defendant assumed management. A similar claim regarding the A schedule building was not shown to have any foundation.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Both second appeals are dismissed.

The court directed that the parties shall suffer costs in these appeals.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The preliminary decree (declaring the Devaswom a private family trust, removing the first defendant from management, directing recovery from the first defendant's possession, vesting management in the second defendant, and directing preparation of a scheme) and the final decree adopting the plaintiffs' scheme stand; the appeals challenging these orders are dismissed and costs are awarded against the appellants.
  • On representative procedure under Order 1 Rule 8: the court endorsed the view, supported by earlier authorities, that a direction to publish notice may be sufficient to infer that the court granted permission for representation even if no formal recorded order exists. However, the court also emphasized that this is not an endorsement of lax practice: courts should exercise judicial discretion, require address particulars when available, and direct personal service where such service is practicable in addition to publication to protect the interests of absent persons who may be bound by the litigation.
  • No new substantive proprietary rights were recognized for defendants 1, 6, 20 or 21 in respect of the E schedule mortgage or the A schedule building based on the material before the court; the court found no foundation for the special-right claims and declined to interfere with the courts below on these points.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to the matters and reasoning contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

1. Both these second appeals arise from the same suit. The suit is one for declaration that the Ollal Devaswom, the properties of which are scheduled to the plaint, is a private trust of the joint family of plaintiffs and defendants 1 to 11, for removal of the first defendant from the management of the Devaswom, for recovery of the assets and properties of the Devaswom in his bands and for settling a scheme with regard to the management of the Devaswom. A preliminary decree was passed declaring that the plaint Devaswom was a private family trust, removing the first defendant from management and directing recovery of possession of properties and funds in the possession of the first defendant, vesting the management in the second defendant and directing the preparation of a scheme for the effective administration of the plaint Devaswom. Pursnant to this preliminary decree, the court posted the matter for settling the scheme. When the plaintiffs put in a draft scheme, and none else did so, the scheme proposed by the plaintiffs was accepted on the ground that there was no objection filed by any party to the scheme though it was posted for such objection. S.A No. 1229 of 1966 is by defendants 4 to 7 and 9 to 11 challenging both the preliminary decree as well as the final decree. S.A No. 1152 of 1966 is the appeal by defendants 20 and 21 challenging the preliminary decree. In the main appeal, S.A No. 1229 of 1966, the challenge to the preliminary decree is on the ground that the suit which is apparently instituted as one on behalf of the family of the plaintiffs is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. It is contended that though some members of the tarwad are impleaded as plaintiffs and some as defendants, the parties so impleaded do not exhaust the entire membership of the tarwad. That, of course is seen to be true as admitted by Pw. 1 himself when he was cross-examined. A number of members have been left out from the suit. It would appear that considerations of expediency and convenience have alone been the guiding factor in impleading parties in the suit. The members whose addresses were not available and who were not residing locally, have apparently been left out. In answer to the plea of non-joinder of these parties, the plaintiffs would point out that there has been a motion for treating the suit as a representative one and, therefore, though all the members are not on the party array, they must be deemed to have been represented in the suit. Along with the replication filed in answer to the written statement, a petition was filed seeking permission under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure and requesting orders for publication of notice to the respondents and, on that, court directed publication. Counsel attacks these proceedings on the ground that no order has been passed granting permission under Order 1 Rule 8 and, therefore, the decree passed in this case is bad. Consequently, therefore, according to counsel, those who are not actually parties, shall not be deemed to be represented in the suit. It is, therefore, urged that for that reason the suit must be found to be had and must be dismissed.

2. In suits where there are numerous parties, it is open to any party to seek representation by resort to Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The term ‘numerous’ has received judicial interpretation and it has been said that this is not a term of art. It is not to be read either as innumerable or as limitless or even as unascertainable. The determination of the question whether the parties are ‘numerous’ must necessarily depend upon the allegations in the plaint and the nature of the suit. These are matters for consideration by the court at the time of granting permission. Who are sought to be represented and whether they are persons whose addresses are ascertainable is a matter which the court must be told. The party who seeks such representation under Order 1 Rule 8 must necessarily furnish addresses of such persons. That is because notice to such persons by publication is to be resorted to only when personal service on them is found to be not reasonably practicable. The court will be in a position to decide whether such notice by personal service could be taken only when all these facts are before court. When the court decides to grant permission, and issues notice to the parties, the proceedings in the suit will be binding on the parties who are sought to be represented. Since the consequence of a decision reached with parties represented under Order 1 Rule 8 is one of debarring them from raising the question over again, courts have necessarily to consider the requirements under Order 1 Rule 8 not as mere formalities or matters of form. I am mentioning this here because in my experience, motions made under Order 1 Rule 8 have been considered by the subordinate courts very lightly and as a matter of course. Judicial discretion of the courts in the matter of grant of such permission has rarely been seen exercised. Courts must remember that by granting such permission, the court is really seeking to bind those parties who are not on the party array in the suit, and any contest by them on the same question later would be barred by res judicata. Therefore, the court owes a duty to those who are not on the party array but are still considered as represented in the suit to see that they are not prejudiced. In considering any application that may come up before court seeking permission to represent parties under Order 1 Rule 8, the courts have to keep this in view. The court must insist upon parties furnishing the addresses of persons when their addresses are ascertainable and when the number is such that personal service would not be impracticable, the court must necessarily direct such personal service on the parties besides publication. I am referring to this aspect in this case for a particular reason. I have found that applications moved for such permission are being treated very: lightly. Notwithstanding the failure of a court to pass an order on a petition under Order 1 Rule 8, the court shall assume such permission being granted to the parties where the court has directed publication. In resorting to that course, I have satisfied myself that no injustice was done to the parties concerned. I am satisfied that the decree is, in no way, prejudicial to those sought to be represented and therefore no necessity to reopen the decree arises at this distant date. On the other hand, to reopen the decree on the basis that there has been technically an irregular approach to the case in the matter of granting permission under Order I Rule 8 would be to put the clock back by more than eight years and to start the litigation afresh, a litigation which has consumed considerable time of the court and the parties. I see no reason to adopt such a course.

3. The view that mere omission to pass a formal order granting sanction would not vitiate the decree was expressed by the Division Bench of the Lahore High Court in Punjab Co-operative Bank v. Hari Singh (AIR. 1933 Lahore 749). The learned Judges referring to various decisions on this question said: “It is wall settled that the permission may be inferred from the proceedings of the trial court”. That such a formal order giving permission under Order 1 Rule 8 is not necessary is the view expressed by Justice Gokhale of the Bombay High Court in Mukaremadas v. Chhagan Kisan (AIR. 1959 Bom. 491). In fact, the learned Judge took the view that the permission under Order 1 Rule 8 can be granted even at the appellate stage. Referring to the decision of the Madras High Court in Muthukaruppa v. Appavao (AIR. 1943 Mad. 161) and that in Chatrabhoj Keshavji v. Ghanshyamalalji Ratanji (AIR. 1952 Kutch 92), Mathew J. said in Kunhalavi Musaliar v. Abdulla (1965 KLT. 907) thus:

“……that the court must be deemed to have given its permission when it ordered the publication of the notice in the paper.”

4. Though in the cases which are relied on by the learned Judge in that case the permission sought for was granted before the disposal of the suit, my learned brother was prepared to extend the rule even to cases where no permisison was specifically granted at any stage but the court had directed publication of notice to the persons who are said to be represented deeming such order as necessarily involving; prior grant of permission. I would respectfully adopt the view and hold that in this case a direction to publish notice is sufficient to infer permission being granted by the court. Though that is the result reached in this case, I think it will be necessary to avoid such circumstances and consider applications judicially.

5. Counsel also contended that he has objection to the preliminary decree on the ground that his properties are directed to be recovered from him. I do not understand the statement. The decree as it appears is against the first defendant and the properties in his possession. I cannot see how about this the appellants before me in S.A No. 1229 of 1966 can have any grievance. Counsel points out that in the appellate judgment there is a reference to a decree for recovery of all properties and that is how he feels aggrieved. I must state here that observation of the learned Judge is clearly erroneous and it is contrary to the scope of the decree.

6. It is also contended by the appellants in S.A No. 1229 of 1966 that the final decree passed is objectionable as sufficient time was not given to file objection to the scheme; Even at the hearing I am not told of any particular objection to the scheme which has been adopted. If really parties were aggrieved by the scheme, they would be ready with their objection and would be in a position to say what their objections are. I have gone through the scheme myself and I do not see any reason why it should, on the face of it, appear to be objectionable. Of course, it is open to any party who, after the working of the scheme, feels that it operates to the prejudice of the family, to seek to alter or modify the scheme properly and, therefore, on the score there cannot be any grievance.

7. There is yet another contention and that relates to E schedule item. It is contended that the release of a mortgage in regard to this item was taken in the names of first defendant and sixth defendant jointly and, therefore, sixth defendant has got interest in regard to the mortgage so far as that item is concerned. But it has to be remembered that first defendant came into management under a power of attorney in 1952 and the release is taken long thereafter and the consideration for the release was only Rs. 199/-. Considering the assets of the Devaswom available to the first defendant and the fact of association of the first defendant along with the sixth defendant in taking the release, I see no reason to interfere with the decision of the courts below on the question of special right claimed by defendants 1 and 6 in regard to that item.

8. The last of the arguments concerns the question raised in S.A No. 1152 of 1966. There, the complaint, is that defendants 20 and 21, who are the legal representatives of the first defendant, have not been found to be entitled to the special right in regard to E schedule. This is a claim similar to that set up by the 6th defendant. In meeting this contention, the court below said that the first defendant set up this claim and, therefore defendants 20 and 21 have no locus standi. This is not correct, On the merits, I said earlier that the appellants have no case since the mortgage right is released after the first defendant came into management. There is a similar claim for special right in regard to the building in A schedule. It is not shown how there is any foundation for this claim. In the case, it has not been proved that the first defendant is entitled to any such right. In the result, both the second appeals are dismissed. Parties are directed to suffer costs in these appeals.

9. Dismissed.