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George v. The Athimattam Rubber Company Ltd. .

Kerala High Court
Mar 5, 1964
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Summary of Opinion: Raman Nayar, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from a winding-up petition presented under the "just and equitable" clause by a contributory (the petitioner). When the petition came on for admission, counsel for the company entered appearance and sought an opportunity to be heard as to whether the petition disclosed a case for ordering winding-up. The company subsequently applied for dismissal in limine on the grounds that the petition disclosed no adequate grounds, was prompted by mala fides, and that the petitioner had other adequate remedies but was unreasonably seeking winding-up instead. The judge considered the company's application before deciding whether to admit the winding-up petition and whether to direct advertisement of the petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the winding-up petition, brought under the just and equitable clause by a contributory, disclosed prima facie grounds for ordering the company to be wound up.
  2. Whether the court should dismiss the petition in limine on the grounds that it disclosed no adequate grounds, was prompted by mala fides, or that the petitioner had other remedies and was acting unreasonably in seeking winding-up.
  3. Whether the court should hear the company before directing advertisement or admitting the petition (as recognised by Rule 96 of the Companies (Court) Rules and supporting authorities).
  4. Whether the specific factual allegations — (a) mismanagement/misappropriation by related directors, (b) company operating at a loss, and (c) sale of undertakings leading to disappearance of the company's substratum — cumulatively justify a winding-up order.
  5. Whether the petitioner should instead pursue statutory remedies under section 398 of the Companies Act (and the practical effect of section 399 on bringing such a remedy).

Arguments of the Parties

Company's Arguments

  • The winding-up petition disclosed no adequate grounds and should be dismissed in limine.
  • The petition was prompted by mala fides.
  • The petitioner had other remedies available (notably a remedy under section 398 of the Companies Act) and was acting unreasonably in seeking winding-up instead of pursuing those remedies.
  • Practical and factual points relied on by the company included: the new Board took charge in August 1963 and there were no substantive allegations against the new Board; debentures had been purchased and cancelled and significant sums remained in the debenture redemption account; the company held regular AGMs and laid duly audited accounts; the company was not commercially insolvent and share values had improved after the new Board took charge.

Petitioner's Allegations (as presented in the petition)

  • The company's directors, who were closely related to one another, were mismanaging the company's affairs for their own benefit and had been guilty of misappropriation and other misconduct.
  • The company has been working at a loss (no dividends from 1958–59 onwards except for 1960–61, which the petitioner alleged was paid by manipulation).
  • The company had sold a number of its undertakings and was about to sell its two remaining undertakings, resulting in disappearance or disappearance of its substratum.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rule 96 of the Companies (Court) Rules Recognises that a judge may, before directing advertisement of a winding-up petition, direct notice to be given to the company and hear the company to decide whether advertisement should be made at all and whether the petition should proceed. The court treated Rule 96 as justifying hearing the company before deciding on admission/advertisement; the judge accepted that hearing the company was appropriate in deciding whether to admit the petition.
Cercle Restaurant Castiglione Co. v. Lavery (18 Ch. D. 555) Cited in connection with the court's duty to satisfy itself of prima facie grounds before admitting a winding-up petition and/or directing advertisement. Listed among authorities supporting the proposition that the court should hear the company before ordering advertisement or permitting a petition to proceed.
In re A Company (1894) 2 Ch. 349 Cited in the same context as governing admission and advertisement requirements for winding-up petitions. Relied on as part of the body of authorities showing the court's duty to ensure prima facie grounds and to hear the company before advertisement.
Pioneer Bank, Limited, in the matter of Chaniram In re (I.L.R. XXXIX Bombay 16) Referenced among authorities on admission/advertisement and the court's duty to be satisfied of prima facie grounds. Included in the list of cases supporting the principle of hearing the company before advertisement/admission.
W.I. Theatres v. Asst. Bom. Cinemas (A.I.R. 1959 Bombay 170) Referenced in connection with the procedure surrounding advertisement and admission of petitions. Used as one of the authorities demonstrating the court's role in determining whether to advertise and proceed with a petition.
Lord Krishna Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Abnash Kaur (1961) 31 Comp. Cas. 587 Referenced among authorities concerning admission and the requirement of prima facie grounds. Listed as supporting authority for hearing the company before advertisement/admission.
Charles Forte Investments Ltd. v. Amanda (1963) 3 W.L.R. 662 Referenced in relation to the court's approach to admission/advertisement of winding-up petitions. Included among cases indicating the court may hear the company before advertisement and should be satisfied of prima facie grounds.
R. Sabapathy Rao v. Sabapathy Press (A.I.R. 1925 Madras 489) Example of when close relationships among directors fostered misconduct and domination of the company, supporting a winding-up claim. The court cited this case as a contrast: such close-relationship-driven domination can justify winding-up in some cases, but the present facts were materially different.
Gopal Chetti v. The Ripon Press & Sugar Mill Co. Ltd. (A.I.R. 1925 Madras 633) Similarly cited as an authority where close relationships fostered misconduct and domination justifying relief. Used as a comparator to show circumstances in which close family control could support a winding-up order; applied by distinction here because the present facts did not show domination by the allegedly related directors to the petitioner's detriment.
Re Kitson & Co. Ltd. (1946) I All E.R. 435 Authority for the proposition that even where the sole undertaking of a company has been sold, substratum is not necessarily gone if there is some other business within the company's memorandum. The court relied on this principle to hold that sale of undertakings does not automatically mean the company's substratum has disappeared if other authorised business remains.
Re Taldua Rubber Co. Ltd. (1946) 2 All E.R. 763 Same proposition as Re Kitson: holding that substratum may persist where other authorised business exists. Applied to support the conclusion that the company's sale of some estates did not necessarily destroy its substratum because it retained other undertakings and broad objects in its memorandum.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court followed a structured analysis focused on whether the petition's allegations, singly or cumulatively, established prima facie grounds for winding-up under the just and equitable clause.

  1. Procedure and Admission:

    The court noted the duty to satisfy itself of prima facie grounds before admitting a winding-up petition and the appropriateness of hearing the company before directing advertisement (as recognised in Rule 96 and supporting authorities). The company was properly heard on its application to dismiss in limine.

  2. Allegation of Mismanagement and Misconduct:

    The petition alleged mismanagement and misappropriation by directors who were closely related. The court accepted that close familial relationships among directors are a factor to consider, but not by itself a ground for winding-up. The court compared the present facts to authorities (R. Sabapathy Rao and Gopal Chetti) where close relationships had led to domination and misconduct; in contrast, here most allegations related to acts said to have occurred under the previous Board.

    The court emphasised that the new Board, which took charge in August 1963, was not alleged to have been privy to the earlier mismanagement or to have failed to pursue remedies. Allegations specific to the new Board were limited to a resolution (subject to general meeting sanction) to sell part of an estate and to terminate an agreement with payment of compensation; the judge found no substance in these acts amounting to misconduct by the new Board.

  3. Accounting and Use of Sale Proceeds:

    The petitioner alleged that proceeds from past sales were not fully accounted for (e.g., Rs. 1,60,000 received but only Rs. 91,000 shown in the debenture redemption account). The company produced details showing debentures had been purchased and cancelled to a certain extent, approximately Rs. 89,000 remained in the debenture redemption account, and the balance had been utilised for working and development of another estate. The court found no grounds to think misappropriation had been shown.

  4. Meetings, Accounts and Shareholder Participation:

    The company had been regularly holding annual general meetings and laying audited accounts; no objections had been raised by the petitioner or other members at those meetings. There was no allegation that non-director shareholders were powerless or apathetic such that directors dominated them.

  5. Company's Financial Position:

    The court found the allegation of the company working at a loss to be weak. The balance sheet for 1962–63 showed a small profit and a modest accumulated loss relative to paid-up capital; there was no suggestion that the company lacked reasonable prospect of earning profits. The company was not shown to be commercially insolvent. The market price of fully paid shares had increased since the new Board took charge.

  6. Substratum Argument:

    The court addressed whether the sale of undertakings had caused the company's substratum to disappear. It noted the company's memorandum had broad powers (including buying other estates and planting) and that it had acquired other estates. Citing authorities (Re Kitson & Re Taldua), the court held that selling one undertaking does not destroy substratum if the company still has business it is authorised to carry on. The present position—retaining part of the Little Flower Estate and the Munderi Group, with the Board favouring retention of Munderi and proposing sale of part of Little Flower subject to general meeting—was insufficient to establish disappearance of substratum.

  7. Petitioner's Standing and Motive:

    The petitioner held only 200 shares (less than 1/800th of paid-up capital). The court noted an offer by the director-in-charge to buy the petitioner's shares at a 50% premium over face value, which the petitioner rejected. The court observed the petitioner had been an employee until September 1963 and suggested the petition appeared to be brought primarily for the petitioner's individual interest rather than on behalf of a larger group of members.

  8. Availability of Alternative Statutory Remedy:

    The court stated that, even if the allegations would justify winding-up under the just and equitable clause, the petitioner's proper remedy would be an application under section 398 of the Companies Act. The court rejected the argument that section 399's requirements (support thresholds) made section 398 unavailable, observing that that objection mainly indicated other members did not support the petitioner's allegations.

  9. Conclusion of Analysis:

    On the facts alleged, and given the predominance of alleged misconduct predating the new Board, the absence of substantive allegations against the present management, the company's accounting explanations, the absence of commercial insolvency, and the availability of an alternative statutory remedy, the judge found the petition's grounds insubstantial and incapable, even cumulatively, of justifying winding-up.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court allowed the company's application and dismissed the winding-up petition.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the petition for winding-up under the just and equitable clause was rejected and the company will not be wound up pursuant to this petition.
  • The court indicated that the petitioner has an alternative statutory remedy under section 398 of the Companies Act and that inability to secure support under section 399 does not make that remedy unavailable; the opinion therefore encourages pursuit of statutory relief where appropriate.
  • The opinion contains no statement that it is creating or extending legal precedent beyond applying existing authorities; the decision is presented as applying established principles (as reflected in cited cases and Rule 96) to the particular facts, and no broader novel legal principle was announced.
Show all summary ...

Raman Nayar, J.:— When this winding up petition, brought by a contributory under the just and equitable clause, came on for admission, Mr. Meenattoor entered appearance for the company and asked for an opportunity to be heard on the question whether the petition disclosed a case for ordering a winding-up. Subsequently the company made an application praying for the dismissal of the winding up petition in limine on the score that it disclosed no adequate grounds, that it was prompted by mala fides, and that the petitioner, if he was really aggrieved, had other remedies and was acting unreasonably in seeking to have the company wound up instead of pursuing those other remedies.

2. The very institution of a winding up petition against a company, more so its advertisement, adversely affects the reputation of the company and, if done without reasonable and probable cause, is a wrong which can be restrained by suit. It is also the duty of the court before admitting a winding up petition, especially one brought by a contributory, to satisfy itself that there are prima facie grounds; and it is well-settled that, even after the court has admitted a petition, it can, on being moved for the purpose by the company or some other interested person, stay proceedings and revoke the admission. Rule 96 of the Companies (Court) Rules, which deals with the admission of winding up petitions and directions as to advertisement, recognises this, for, it says that the judge may, if he thinks fit, direct notice to be given to the company before giving directions as to the advertisement of the petition—the hearing to be given to the company is not for the purpose of deciding the manner of the advertisement, but for deciding whether the advertisement should be made at all and the petition proceeded with. (See in this connection Cercle Restaurant Castiglione Company v. Lavery (18 Ch. D. 555), In re A Company, (1894) 2 Ch. 349, Pioneer Bank, Limited, in the matter of Chaniram In re (I.L.R XXXIX Bombay 16), W.I Theatres v. Asst. Bom. Cinemas (A.I.R 1959 Bombay 170), Lord Krishna Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Abnash Kaur, (1961) 31 Comp. Cas. 587 and Charles Forte Investments Ltd. v. Amanda, (1963) 3 W.L.R 662). In fact the maintainability of the application made by the Company is not questioned; nor is it suggested that I would be wrong in hearing the company before deciding whether the winding up petition should be admitted or not. As I have said, the winding up petition is brought under the just and equitable clause and the grounds alleged are:

(1) that the directors of the company, who are closely related to one another, are mismanaging its affairs for their own benefit and have been guilty of misappropriation and other misconduct;

(2) that the company has been working at a loss;

(3) that the company has sold a number of its undertakings and is about to sell its two remaining undertakings with the result that its substratum has disappeared or is disappearing.

4. I am satisfied that there is not much substance in any of these grounds so that they add up to little and can, even cumulatively, scarcely justify a winding up order. Taking the first ground first, it is true that four of the five directors of the company are closely related to one another, two being brothers, a third being their first cousin, and the fourth, a son-in-law of one of the brothers. The fifth is, however, not related to the remaining four and is, in fact, the paternal uncle of the petitioner. Close relationship between the several directors of a company is however no ground for winding up although it is a factor to be considered in cases where that close relationship has fostered misconduct and mismanagement and has enabled the directors to dominate the other share-holders and mono-police the company for their own individual benefit as in R. Sabapathy Rao v. Sabapathy Press (A.I.R 1925 Madras 489) and Gopal Chetti v. The Ripon Press & Sugar Mill Co. Ltd. (A.I.R 1925 Madras 633). I might also mention that there was a reconstitution of the Board in August 1963 by which four of its old members were replaced. The previous Board also consisted of close relations. The common member of the two Boards is the petitioner's paternal uncle. Of the remaining four members of the old Board, two others were also paternal uncles of the petitioner while a third was a son-in-law of one of these paternal uncles. The remaining member also, it is said, was a relative of the petitioner, being his step-mother's brother. So we find that what happened in August 1963 was that a Board composed almost entirely of the petitioner's close relatives was replaced by a Board composed predominantly of persons who, though closely related to one another, are not related to the petitioner.

5. Misconduct and mismanagement are not by themselves sufficient for a winding up order, and the significant feature in the present case is that almost all the acts of misconduct and mismanagement alleged by the petitioner relate to periods before the new Board took charge. It is not the petitioner's case that any member of the new Board, in particular, the director-in-charge who is actually conducting the management, was in any manner privy to the mismanagement which took place while the old Board was functioning or that the new Board has failed to pursue remedies available to the company against the old Board. All that is alleged against the new Board is that on the 5th October, 1963 it resolved to sell what remained of the Little Flower Estate, one of the two undertakings owned by the company, the rest of the Little Flower Estate having already been sold while the old Board was functioning. It is also alleged that, for the purpose of this sale, the Board had decided to terminate an agreement for slaughter tapping, paying to the other contracting party compensation of as much as Rs. 40,000/- which is exactly half the consideration for the agreement. But, in fact, the resolution is that, “subject to the concent of the company in general meeting, the remaining portions of the company's Little Flower Estate be sold and the sale proceeds utilised for the discharge of the debentures issued by the company and the balance amount for the day to day working and development of the Munderi Group of Estates”, the other remaining undertaking of the company. I fail to see how this can conceivably amount to misconduct.

6. It is also alleged, but not against the present Board, that moneys received by previous sales of the company's undertakings have not been fully accounted for, that, in particular, although portions of the Little Flower Estate were sold for Rs. 1,60,000/-, ostensibly for the purpose of redeeming debentures raised for the purpose of purchasing the Munderi Group, only Rs. 91,000/- has been deposited in the debenture redemption account. But the company's case is that debentures to the value of Rs. 26,000/- and odd have been purchased and cancelled, that a sum of Rs. 89,000/- and odd still remains in the debenture redemption account with the State Bank of Travancore—the debentures are actually redeemable only in 1968—and that the rest of the money has been utilised for the working of the company including the development of the Munderi Group. That the debentures have been purchased and cancelled and that a sum of Rs. 89,000/- and odd lies in deposit in the Bank is not disputed, and, with regard to the balance, there are certainly no grounds disclosed for thinking that the money has not been duly brought to account but has been misappropriated.

7. It is not denied that the company has been regularly holding its annual general meetings and laying its duly audited accounts before the meeting and that neither the petitioner nor any other member has so far raised any objection. It is not alleged that the directors dominated over the other shareholders or that the shareholders outside the directors' group were apathetic or powerless to interfere.

8. As I have already pointed out, the new Board took charge only in August 1963; no allegation of any substance is made against it; and, even if the allegations against the old Board are well-founded—I express no opinion whatsoever as to this—that, in the absence of anything to show that the members of the new Board were privy to the mismanagement and misconduct, is a matter of no consequence. Even if there was mismanagement in the past, the new Board should be given sufficient time to manage the affairs of the company properly and free it from the results of the past mismanagement.

9. The allegation that the company has been working at a loss does not appear to have much substance. What is said is that the company has paid no dividend from the year 1958–1959 onwards except for the year 1960–1961 for which year a dividend of five per cent was “paid by some manipulation of account.” It would thus appear that till 1958–1959 the company was working at a profit, and the balance sheet for the year 1962–1963 shows that, for that year, there was a profit of Rs. 2,000/- and odd and that the total loss carried forward was only Rs. 23,000/- and odd which is not very much having regard to the company's paid up capital of Rs. 3,25,000/-. There is no allegation that there is no reasonable prospect of the company being able to earn a profit, and the fact that between 1958–1959 and to-day it has suffered a loss of Rs. 23,000/- and odd is certainly no ground for saying that the company should be wound up.

10. It is not suggested that the company is commercially insolvent, not even that it is not a sound concern. In this connection I might remark that it is not disputed that the company's two rupee fully paid up shares which were selling at between 80 and 85 nP. per share before the new Board took charge are now selling at Rs. 1,23 nP. This is not an indication that the company's affairs are deteriorating.

11. Coming now to the alleged disappearance of the substratum it is true that the company has, in the past, sold some of its undertakings and acquired new undertakings in their place. The company was formed for the purpose, among other purposes, of acquiring two estates, the Little Flower Estate and the Kainakary Estate, but its memorandum is very widely worded, and, by clauses expressly declared to be independent main objects clauses, empowers it to buy other estates and carry on the business of planting among other activities. That it sold one of the estates it was formed to acquire and a substantial portion of the remaining estate, does not mean that its substratum has gone so long as it has acquired other estates and is in a position to carry on the business it is authorised by its memorandum to do.

12. The company has now two undertakings, namely, the unsold portion of the Little Flower Estate and the Munderi group of estates. The previous Board had passed a resolution on the 6th May, 1963 constituting a committee to negotiate for the sale of the Munderi Group, but no action has so far been taken to sell these estates. But the present Board seems to have thought it better to retain the Munderi Group and sell instead the remaining portion of the Little Flower Estate utilising the sale proceeds for the discharge of the debentures and for the development of the Munderi Group—reference has already been made to its resolution of the 5th October, 1963. So the present position is that no action has been taken for the sale of the Munderi Group, that the present Board seems to be in favour of retaining this group of estates and that a resolution has been passed for the sale of the remaining portion of the Little Flower Estate subject to the sanction of the company in general meeting. Even where the sole undertaking of a company has been actually sold, it cannot be said that its substratum has disappeared so long as there is some other business it can carry on coming within the objects stated in its memorandum—see Re Kitson & Co. Ltd., (1946) I All E.R 435 and Re Taldua Rubber Co. Ltd., (1946) 2 All E.R 763. In the present case, however, the company still owns undertakings for carrying on its business, and the fact that it at one time thought that it might be desirable to dispose of one of its undertakings and now thinks that it might be desirable to dispose of the other undertaking, is very far from saying that its substratum is disappearing.

13. I might mention that the petitioner holds only 200 shares, i.e, less than 1/800th of the paid up capital of the company. It is not his case that, in a winding-up, he will be able to get even the face value of the shares, and, in bringing this petition, it can scarcely be said that he is acting for anyone but himself. In the circumstances the only injury he can legitimately apprehend if the company continues to work instead of being wound up is that in a future winding up he would not get what he would get to-day. But an offer was made to him by the director-in-charge of the company to buy his 200 shares not merely at their face value but at a premium of 50 per cent. This offer the petitioner summarily rejected and this indicates that he has not brought the petition in order to safeguard his legitimate interests—in this connection it might be as well to remember that the petitioner was an employee of the company till September 1963 when he chose, or, according to the company, was compelled to resign.

14. I might also mention that I told counsel for the petitioner that, if the petitioner so desired, I would convene a meeting of the members of the company to assertain their wishes. But the petitioner was not prepared for such a course. Even if the allegations made by the petitioner would justify a winding, up order under the just and equitable clause, I think that, on the allegations made the petitioner's proper remedy would be an application under section 398 of the Companies Act and that he is acting unreasonably in seeking to have the company wound up instead of pursuing that remedy. To say that remedy is not available to the petitioner since he cannot muster the support required by section 399 of the Companies Act seems to me no answer and only serves to show that other members are not prepared to subscribe to the allegations made by the petitioner.

16. In the result I allow the application brought by the company and dismiss the winding up petition.