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State Of Kerala & Another v. Jacob Mathew & Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion delivered by M.S. Menon, C.J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The court considered an appeal in which the first and second respondents in O.P. No. 1266 of 1963 (the appellants before this Court) were the State of Kerala (represented by the Chief Secretary) and the Principal of the Medical College, Trivandrum. The controversy concerned the validity of a Government order (Ext. R1) dated 7th June, 1963, which prescribed admissions rules for the M.B.B.S. course in the State. Ext. R1 reserved 13% of M.B.B.S. seats for Ezhavas, 9% for Muslims, and 3% for Latin Catholics inclusive of Anglo-Indians. Ext. R1 also contained a provision that 50% of seats be distributed on a district-wise ("District-war merit") basis according to the 1961 census, and separate small reservations for (a) children of registered Medical Practitioners (two seats for M.B.B.S., one seat for Pre-Medical) and (b) outstanding sportsmen (three seats for Pre-Medical).
The judgment under appeal (reported at 1963 K.L.J. 820) had struck down aspects of Ext. R1; this Court reviewed the questions of (i) whether the community-based reservations (Ezhavas, Muslims, Latin Catholics inclusive of Anglo-Indians) offended Articles 14, 15 and 29 of the Constitution; (ii) whether the district-wise distribution of seats was sustainable; and (iii) whether reservations for children of registered medical practitioners and for outstanding sportsmen were valid. The opinion records the appellate disposition and directions to the State concerning further fact-finding.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the reservations in Ext. R1 (13% for Ezhavas, 9% for Muslims and 3% for Latin Catholics inclusive of Anglo-Indians) are constitutionally permissible under Articles 14, 15 and 29, read with Article 15(4) (inserted by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951).
- Whether Ext. R1's provision that fifty per cent of the M.B.B.S. seats be allocated on a district-wise ("District-war merit") basis (using 1961 census population percentages) is rational and constitutionally valid.
- Whether the reservations in Ext. R1 for (a) children of registered Medical Practitioners and (b) outstanding sportsmen (for Pre-Medical) have a sufficient rational basis to be sustained under constitutional equality principles.
- Ancillary question: on whom lies the burden of proof when Article 14 equality is alleged to be violated by such classification and reservation measures.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments (State / Supporters of Ext. R1)
- Ext. R1 is a mere executive direction and therefore does not fall within the definition of "law" under Article 13; consequently Article 14's protection against denial of equality before the law would not apply to Ext. R1.
- The reservations (including community-based reservations) are founded on a factual assessment of social and educational backwardness of the named communities; affidavits and historical sources were produced in support of the Government's classification.
- The reservations for children of registered Medical Practitioners and for outstanding sportsmen were advanced as measures designed to achieve particular objectives (encouraging medical families and sportsmanship), implying a policy choice by the State.
Opponents' / Challengers' Arguments
- The reservations amounted to discrimination and violated Articles 14 and 15 (and Article 29), particularly the attack being strongest against the reservation in favour of the Ezhavas.
- It was contended that statutory and constitutional measures (for example Travancore and Cochin Temple Entry Proclamations, Madras Temple Entry Authorization Act of 1947, and Article 17) had altered the social status of the Ezhava community such that they could not be treated as socially backward.
- The district-wise ("District-war merit") distribution, it was argued and held by the High Court below, was arbitrary and lacked rational basis.
- Reservations in favour of children of registered Medical Practitioners and for outstanding sportsmen were challenged as not being founded on a proper classification having a reasonable relation to the object of selecting the best students for professional courses.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income-tax (A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 149) | Article 14 protects persons against both legislative and executive discrimination; the term "State" in Art. 14 includes the executive. | The Court relied on this authority to hold that an executive order (Ext. R1) can fall within the ambit of Article 14 and thus may be challenged as discriminatory. |
| M.R Bataji v. State of Mysore (A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 649) | The backwardness under Article 15(4) must be both social and educational (i.e., not merely one or the other). | The Court cited this principle when determining that the relevant communities must be shown to be socially and educationally backward to justify special provisions under Article 15(4). |
| M.R Balaji v. State of Mysore (A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 649) | Two principles: (1) caste may be a relevant circumstance in ascertaining social backwardness; (2) caste cannot be the sole or dominant test of backwardness. | The Court interpreted these passages to conclude that caste names can be used as indicators if the caste (or a substantial portion thereof) is socially and educationally backward; caste may be considered but is not necessarily decisive. |
| Civil Appeals Nos. 1056 & 1057 of 1963 (majority judgment — Supreme Court) | Observation (quoted) that Article 15(4) "does not speak to castes, but only speaks of classes", with an implication that the Constitution did not explicitly adopt castes as units of backwardness. | The Court examined the passage and rejected an interpretation that would categorically prohibit reservations based on caste; it read that majority passage in the context of M.R. Balaji and concluded caste can be a relevant criterion where appropriate evidence shows backwardness. |
| Civil Appeals Nos. 262 to 266 of 1963 (Wealth-tax Act, 1957) | The burden of proof: the party who alleges denial of equality must adduce facts to prove such denial; it is not for the State to prove Article 14 is inapplicable. | The Court applied this principle to place the burden on the first respondent (the challenger) to show that the named communities were not entitled to protection under Article 15(4). The Court found that the challenger had not discharged that burden. |
| Writ Petition No. 857 of 1963 (High Court of Andhra Pradesh; judgment of Jaganmohan Reddy, J.) | Recognition that integrated individuals who combine academic merit and outdoor attainments (sports) may be especially suited for professions; reservations for sportsmen can be a legitimate encouragement. | The Court relied on this High Court view in holding that the reservation for outstanding sportsmen has a rational relation to the objectives of producing well-rounded medical professionals and therefore should be sustained. |
| Judgment under appeal (1963 K.L.J. 820) | The High Court had analyzed and struck down certain provisions of Ext. R1 (notably the district-wise selection and some other reservations) as arbitrary. | This Court agreed with the High Court's conclusion that the district-wise ("District-war") distribution was arbitrary and upheld that part of the High Court's decision; however, it reversed the High Court insofar as it struck down the community reservations (Ezhavas, Muslims, Latin Catholics inclusive of Anglo-Indians) and sustained the sportsmen reservation. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded through a sequence of legal analyses tied directly to the constitutional provisions and the factual material before it.
- Applicability of Article 14 to executive orders: The Court rejected the State's contention that Ext. R1, as a mere executive direction, was outside the definition of "law" for Article 14 purposes. Relying on Basheshar Nath, the Court held that Article 14 protects against discriminatory action by both legislature and executive; therefore Ext. R1 could be examined for compliance with Article 14.
- Scope of Article 15(4): The Court observed that Article 15(4) permits special provisions for "socially and educationally backward classes." Citing M.R. Bataji, it emphasized that backwardness under Art. 15(4) must be both social and educational. The Court then examined the factual material (affidavits filed by the State and others, and historical and administrative publications) and concluded there was sufficient material to hold that the Ezhavas, Muslims and Latin Catholics inclusive of Anglo-Indians constituted socially and educationally backward classes within the meaning of Article 15(4).
- On the contention that statutory and constitutional reforms (temple entry proclamations, Article 17) had altered the Ezhavas' status: the Court reasoned that legal change does not instantaneously erase social disabilities and that social change requires time; habits and occupations that carry stigma may persist across generations and decades. Therefore the existence of legal reforms did not automatically negate the factual conclusion of social and educational backwardness.
- Interpretation of Supreme Court authority: The Court considered a majority passage from Civil Appeals Nos. 1056 & 1057 of 1963 suggesting Art. 15(4) speaks of "classes" and not "castes." The Court declined to accept a reading that would categorically preclude considering caste. It read the passage in the light of M.R. Balaji which recognized that caste may be a relevant circumstance though not the sole or dominant criterion. The Court concluded that where a whole or a substantial portion of a caste is socially and educationally backward, the caste name may function as a symbol for a backward class under Art. 15(4).
- Burden of proof on challenge: Relying on the reasoning in Civil Appeals Nos. 262–266 of 1963, the Court observed that the person who alleges denial of equality must adduce facts to prove such denial. Applying this, the Court found that the first respondent (the challenger to Ext. R1) had not proved that the named communities were not entitled to protection under Article 15(4).
- District-wise ("District-war merit") reservation: The Court agreed with the High Court that the adoption of district-wise selection as embodied in Ext. R1 lacked a rational basis and was arbitrary. The judgment under appeal's detailed discussion (paragraphs 110–119 and conclusion in para 120) was accepted; the Court saw no rational basis for differential treatment by district.
- Reservations for children of registered Medical Practitioners and for outstanding sportsmen: The Court accepted the High Court's statement (paras 121–122 of the judgment under appeal) that any reservation must rest on a proper classification with a reasonable relation to the object (selecting the best students). The Court agreed that reservations for children of registered Medical Practitioners did not exhibit such a rational relation and should be struck down. However, the Court differentiated the sportsmen reservation: it found that athletic achievements can produce qualities (physical energy, leadership, readiness for emergencies) valuable in the medical profession, and thus the reservation for outstanding sportsmen had a rational nexus to the object of forming suitable medical professionals and should be sustained.
- Evidence quality and the need for updated enquiry: The Court noted a paucity of up-to-date data and acknowledged that its conclusion had been influenced to some extent by judicial experience. It stressed that an enduring conclusion should be founded on up-to-date factual enquiry and therefore directed the State to undertake an immediate fact-finding enquiry and frame appropriate orders in light of it; the inquiry should be completed no later than before the academic year 1965–1966.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling:
The appeal is allowed in part: the Court reversed the High Court's judgment insofar as it struck down the reservation of seats in favour of the Ezhavas, Muslims and the Latin Catholics inclusive of Anglo-Indians (thereby upholding those community-based reservations under Article 15(4)); the Court agreed with the High Court that the district-wise ("District-war merit") distribution of fifty per cent of seats was arbitrary and must be struck down; the reservations in favour of children of registered Medical Practitioners were held to be without a rational basis and were struck down; the reservation in favour of outstanding sportsmen was sustained as having a rational relation to the object of selecting suitable candidates for the medical profession.
Implications and Consequences:
- Direct effect on the parties: The State's community-based reservations (13% Ezhavas, 9% Muslims, 3% Latin Catholics inclusive of Anglo-Indians) are upheld; the district-wise allocation and the reservations for children of registered Medical Practitioners are invalid; the reservation for outstanding sportsmen is valid. The appellate direction modifies the operative content of Ext. R1 accordingly.
- Fact-finding directive: The State was directed to undertake a fact-finding enquiry into relevant matters and to frame appropriate orders on the basis of up-to-date data; the Court directed completion of the enquiry before the beginning of the academic year 1965–1966 (noting it may not be possible before 1964–1965).
- Costs and administrative note: The appeal was allowed in the manner indicated and with the direction in paragraph 21 (i.e., the enquiry direction). No costs were awarded. The Advocate-General's submission that the decision should not detrimentally affect students already admitted was recorded.
- Precedential note: The opinion applies and interprets existing Supreme Court authorities (as catalogued above) but the Court did not purport to lay down a novel constitutional principle beyond applying those precedents and the Constitution to the facts before it. The direct effect therefore is on the validity of the specific provisions of Ext. R1 and the requirement for the State to perform further fact-finding; the Court did not state that a new broader precedent was being established beyond its reasoning in this case.
This summary strictly reflects only the material and reasoning contained in the provided opinion text. No facts, arguments, or consequences beyond those expressly present in the opinion have been added.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
M.S Menon, C.J:— The first and second respondents in O.P No. 1266 of 1963 are the appellants before us. They are the State of Kerala represented by the Chief Secretary to the Government, and the Principal of the Medical College, Trivandrum.
2. The controversy relates to the validity of Ext. R1, an order of the Government regarding the selection of candidates for admission to the Medical College in the State. The order is dated the 7th June, 1963, and is the successor of earlier orders on the subject. Ext. R1 reserves thirteen per cent of the seats for the M.B.B.S Course to Ezhavas, nine per cent to Muslims and three per cent to Latin Catholics inclusive of Anglo-Indians. The first question for consideration is whether these reservations can be sustained in the light of Articles 14, 15 & 29 of the Constitution.
3. Article 14 of the Constitution provides that “the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.” Clause (3) of Article 13 of the Constitution defines the expression “law” for the purposes of that article. According to that definition the expression, unless the context otherwise requires, includes “any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law.”
4. A contention on behalf of the appellants is that Ext. R1 being a mere executive direction will not come within the ambit of the definition, and as a result no question of any violation of the equality before the law guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution can possibly arise for consideration. We do not agree. Any threat to the equality enshrined in Article 14—whether it emanates from the legislature or the executive—is met by the Constitution. As stated by the Supreme Court in Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income-tax (A.I.R 1959 S.C 149):
“The very, language of Art. 14 of the Constitution expressly directs that ‘the State’ which by Art. 12 includes the executive organ, shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws. Thus Art. 14 protects us from both legislative and executive tyranny by way of discrimination.”
5. The question as to whether Ext. R1 is discriminatory in character and thus violative of Article 14, therefore, does arise for consideration and has to be dealt with on the merits. The discussion that follows, however, will show that there is a rational basis for the governmental action, and that the reservation of seats in favour of the three communities mentioned in paragraph 3 above cannot be considered as a violation of the fundamental right embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution.
6. Article 15(1) of the Constitution provides that “the State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them” and Article 29(2) that “no citizen shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State Funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them.” Clause (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution which was added by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, says that nothing in that article or in clause (2) of Article 29 “shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.”
7. We are not concerned in this case with any Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe; and the only question for consideration—in view of Article 15(4) of the Constitution—is whether the Ezhavas, Muslims and Latin Catholics inclusive of Anglo-Indians can be considered as “socially and educationally backward classes of citizens”. In M.R Bataji v. State of Mysore (A.I.R 1963 S.C 649) the Supreme Court said:
“The backwardness under Art. 15(4) must be social and educational. It is not either social or educational, but it is both social and educational.”
8. In these regions of human life and values the clear-cut distinctions of cause and effect merge into each other. Social backwardness contributes to educational backwardness; educational backwardness perpetuates social backwardness; and both are often no more than the inevitable corollaries of the extremes of poverty and the deadening weight of custom and tradition. In view of the details furnished in the affidavit on behalf of the State dated the 10th August, 1963 and the Affidavit of the guardian of the third respondent dated the 14th August, 1963, we have no hesitation in holding that the Ezhavas, Muslims and the Latin Catholics inclusive of Anglo-Indians constitute “socially and educationally backward classes of citizens” within the meaning of Article 15(4) of the Constitution.
9. As a matter of fact the social and educational backwardness of the Muslims and the Latin Catholics inclusive of Anglo-Indians was not—and we thinly correctly—in serious dispute. The attack was essentially against the reservation of seats in favour of the Ezhavas.
10. The Ezhavas form about twenty-five per cent of the population of the State, and on the material before us it is not possible to say that the Government was wrong in its assumption that they constitute a community which is “socially and educationally backward.” A perusal of the relevant entries in the Cochin Tribes and Castes by Mr. L.K Ananthakrishna Ayyar, the Cochin State Manual by Mr. C. Achutha Menon, the Report of the Backward Classes Commission appointed by the President of India, the Report of the Evaluation Committee constituted by the Government of Kerala and the other publications to which our attention has been drawn indicate that the three communities in whose favour the reservations have been made should be considered as backward, both “socially and educationally.”
11. It was contended before us that the Travancore Temple Entry Proclamation of 1112 M.E, the Cochin Temple Entry Proclamation of 1123 M.E, the Madras Temple Entry Authorization Act of 1947 and Article 17 of the Constitution which says:
“‘Untouchability’ is abolished and its practice in any form is forbidden. The enforcement of any disability arising out of ‘Untouchability’ shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law.”
12. Have altered the ancient character of the Ezhava community, and that they should not now be treated as socially backward. It is true that at certain times, and in certain countries, society has given the lead to law. In India, however, it has been the other way about. In his introduction to “Some Aspects of Indian Law Today” Mr. M.C Chagla says:
“It is true that at certain times society has given the lead to law, but in India at least it is the other way about. Law has given the lead to society, and law has placed before society ideals and values to which people should conform.”
13. Conformity in such cases does not synchronize with the promulgation of statutory enactments or constitutional documents. Time has to play its part, and time alone transmutes the ideals of the law into the realities of everyday life. No one can say that the introduction of progressive measures is the end, and not the beginning, of a process of amelioration. Habits of thought the hard and slow and occupations like toddy tapping carry their social stigma from one generation to another and through decades of conduct and behavior.
14. We have been furnished with a typed copy of the majority judgment of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeals Nos. 1056 and 1057 of 1963. We have not seen the blue-print of the decision and are quite unaware of what has been said in the judgment of the Judges who have dissented. Our pointed attention was drawn to the following passage in the decision:
“The important fact to be noticed in Art. 15(4) is that it does not speak to castes, but only speaks of classes. If the makers of the Constitution intended to take castes also as units of social and educational backwardness, they would have said so, as they have said in the case of the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes.”
15. The contention on the basis of the majority decision was that there is the authority of the Supreme Court to say that there shall be no reservation on the basis of castes. We are unable to understand the decision in that way. The judgment refers to certain passages in M.R Balaji v. State of Mysore, A.I.R 1963 S.C 649 and says:
“Two principles stand out prominently from the said observations, namely (1) the caste of a group of citizens may be a relevant circumstance in ascertaining their social backwardness and (2) though it is a relevant factor to determine the social backwardness of a class of citizens, it cannot be the sole or dominant test in that behalf.”
“To put it differently, the authority concerned may take caste into consideration in ascertaining the backwardness of a group of persons; but, if it does not, its order will not be bad on that account if it can ascertain the backwardness of a group of persons on the basis of other relevant criteria.”
16. According to Funk and Wagnalls Standard Dictionary “caste” is no more than an hereditary class into which Hindu society is divided. And we see nothing in the decision of the Supreme Court which precludes the conclusion that if the whole or a substantial portion of a caste is socially and educationally backward, then the name of that caste will not be a symbol or a synonym for a class of citizens who are socially and educationally backward and thus within the ambit of Clause (4) of Article 15 of the Constitution.
17. In the light of what is stated above we must reverse the judgment under appeal (1963 K.L.J 820) in so far as it strikes down the reservation of seats in favour of the Ezhavas, Muslims and the Latin Catholics inclusive of Anglo-Indians. We do so.
18. In Civil Appeals Nos. 262 to 266 of 1963 the Supreme Court had to consider whether the provision relating to Hindu undivided families in the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, violated the equality before law guaranteed by Article 14 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court said:
“We should like to point out that the High Court seemed to take the view that it was for the State to show that Art. 14 was not applicable. This is not correct, for it is for the party who comes forward with the allegation that equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws is being denied to him to adduce facts to prove such denial.”
19. In this view the burden of proof will be on the first respondent, and, perhaps, all that we need say is that he has not proved that the Ezhavas, Muslims and Latin Catholics inclusive of Anglo-Indians are bot entitled to the protection afforded by Article 15(4) of the Constitution.
20. This is a State where if anything untoward is done, there will be an immediate clamour on the floor of the assembly, in the press, and on the platform. There is nothing on evidence to show that Ext. R1 or its predecessors provoked an adverse criticism. The very quiescence may be indicative of the correctness of the reservation.
21. We must, however point out that the paucity of up-to-date data has been a source of considerable worry. It is impossible to say that our conclusion has not been influenced, to some extent at any rate, by our own experience of life and work in this State.
22. An enduring conclusion, however, should not be based on data that is not absolutely up-to-date or on judicial experience which such data may disprove or modify. We think it is essential that the State should immediately embark upon a fact finding enquiry into matters that are relevant and frame appropriate orders in the light of that enquiry. We direct the State to do so.
23. It may not be possible to have the enquiry completed before the beginning of the academic year 1964–1965. But there is no reason why it should not be completed before the beginning of the academic year 1965–1966.
24. Ext. R1 directs that fifty per cent of the seats for the M.B.B.S course should be distributed on a “District-war merit basis” and says:
“The seats reserved to be filled on District-war merit basis will be distributed among the nine districts on the basis of the population reported at the 1961 census as follows:
District Population (In lakhs) Percentage of seats Trivandrum 17.45 10.3 (10) Quilon 19.41 11.4 (11) Alleppey 18.11 10.7 (11) Kottayam 17.33 10.2 (10) Ernakulam 18.60 11.0 (11) Trichur 16.40 9.7 (10) Palghat 17.77 10.5 (11) Kozhikode 26.17 15.4 (15) Cannanore 17.80 10.5 (11) Total 100
25. The second question for consideration is whether this reservation can be sustained.
26. The judgment under appeal dealt with this question in paragraphs 110 to 119 thereof and said in paragraph 120.
“To conclude on this aspect: The adoption of the principle of district-war selection in the impugned order Ext. R1 is arbitrary and has to be struck down.”
27. We are in entire agreement with the conclusion, and as the matter has been elaborately discussed in the paragraphs mentioned above, we consider it unnecessary to go over the ground afresh, except to state that we top are unable to see any rational basis for the differential treatment embodied in the district-war reservation.
28. In dealing with the M.B.B.S Course Ext. R1 says:
“Two seats will be reserved for admission of, children of registered Medical Practitioners in Modern Medicine of the State who are Science graduates in the subjects specified under item I above, on State-wide merit basis from among applicants who have not been selected otherwise.”
29. And in dealing with the Pre-Medical Course:
“One seat will be reserved for admission of children of registered Medical Practitioners in Modern Medicine of the State on State-wide merit basis from among applicants who have not been selected otherwise.”
30. The concluding paragraph of Ext. R1 is:
“Two seats have been reserved for First M.B.B.S Course and one seat for the Pre-Medical Course, for children of Registered Medical Practitioners in the State; of these 3 seats two will be reserved for children of Registered Medical Practitioners in State As far as the Pre-Medical Course is concerned there is also a reservation in 4 favour of outstanding sportsmen. The provision is:
“Three seats will be reserved for outstanding sportsmen who are otherwise qualified for admission to the Pre-Medical Course, the selection being made from a panel of candidates recommended by the Kerala Sports Council.”
31. The third question for consideration is the validity of these reservations. The question is dealt with in paragraphs 121 and 122 of the judgment under appeal. The learned Judge says:
“However much I sympathise with this claim made by the Government, regarding the children of Registered Medical Practitioners and also the necessity to encourage sports, I am not able to find any legal basis for sustaining these reservations either. After all, any reservation made, as I have already indicated, must be on a proper classification, and that classification must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. The object sought to be achieved, is to get the best, among the student population, for admission into the professional colleges. The classification itself cannot be considered to be rational. In any event, in my view, it can have no reasonable relation to the object, namely that of admitting the best students in the professional colleges” (Paragraph 122).
32. We are in agreement with the learned Judge as far as the reservations in favour of the children of Registered Medical Practitioners are concerned and are unable to see any rational basis for such a reservation.
33. The question of outstanding sportsmen, however, stands on a different footing. Various talents and attainments are necessary for the discharge of the various types of work that a generation of medical men may be called upon to perform. It cannot be said that achievements in atheletics will not produce a necessary type, with reserves of physical energy, capable of leadership, and unafraid of emetgencies. In this view the judgment under appeal should be reversed on this point and the reservation in favour of outstanding sportsmen should be sustained. We do so.
34. A similar question came up before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Writ Petition No. 857 of 1963 Jaganmohan Reddy, J. Said:
“An integrated individual who is good at studies and good at outdoor activities is far more suited not only to this profession (medical) but also to any other profession, and if the Universities have given protection and encouragement in this field they can only be commended for their farsighted policy. I find no basis for declaring this reservation as arbitrary or irregular.”
35. The appeal is allowed in the manner and to the extent indicated above and with the direction embodied in paragraph 21. No costs. The learned Advocate-General submitted that whatever be our conclusion in the appeal, that conclusion will not react to the detriment of any of the students who have been admitted. The submission is recorded.
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