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Rukiya Bai v. George D'Cruz .
Factual and Procedural Background
This opinion arises from an appeal against the order of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Trivandrum, in Case No. 59 of 1955. The Commissioner found that the 1st respondent was a workman employed by the appellant and had suffered permanent total disablement due to an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The Commissioner determined the workman's monthly wage to be between Rs. 70 and Rs. 80 and awarded compensation of Rs. 3,360 under Schedule IV of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, deducting Rs. 240 already paid and directing the appellant to pay the balance of Rs. 3,120 within thirty days. The appellant challenged the award on the grounds that the compensation was excessive, disputing the findings on the monthly wage and the extent of disablement.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Commissioner erred in determining the amount of the workman's monthly wage.
- Whether the Commissioner was correct in concluding that the workman suffered permanent total disablement.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The compensation awarded was excessive.
- The monthly wage of the workman was only Rs. 40, not between Rs. 70 and Rs. 80 as found by the Commissioner.
- The workman’s disablement was partial, not permanent total disablement, based on the medical evidence indicating some capacity to work.
Respondent's Arguments
- This information was not available in the provided opinion.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ball v. William Hunt and Sons, Ltd., 1912 AC 496 at p. 500 | Definition and understanding of "incapacity for work" in the context of total disablement under workmen's compensation law. | The court relied on this precedent to clarify that incapacity for work means having a physical defect that makes labor unsaleable in any reasonably accessible market, supporting the finding of total disablement. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed the evidence presented regarding the monthly wage and the extent of disablement. It upheld the Commissioner’s finding on the wage, noting that the Commissioner relied on credible testimony from the workman, his co-workers, and the Union President, while the appellant failed to produce wage accounts despite admitting their existence. Regarding disablement, the court examined the medical certificate and testimony of the Civil Surgeon, who confirmed permanent total disablement due to spinal injury, including incapacity to walk or stand and inability to perform any work requiring locomotion. The court rejected the appellant's argument that the disablement was partial based on the possibility of the workman performing limited work while seated, emphasizing the legal definition of total disablement under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, and relying on established legal principles distinguishing incapacity for work from mere incapacity to work. The court found no reason to overturn the Commissioner's conclusion that the disablement was total.
Holding and Implications
DISMISSED
The appeal was dismissed, affirming the Commissioner's award of compensation to the workman. The appellant was ordered to pay the balance compensation along with the costs of the respondent, including an advocate's fee of Rs. 100. No new precedent was established; the decision reinforces the application of existing legal principles relating to wage determination and the assessment of total disablement under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
M.S Menon, J.:— This is an appeal from the order of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Trivandrum, in Case No. 59 of 1955. The Commissioner came to the conclusion that the 1st respondent was a workman of the appellant, that he has suffered permanent total disablement as the result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, that he was in receipt of a monthly wage exceeding Rs. 70/- but not Rs. 80/-, that he was entitled to a compensation of Rs. 3,360/- under Sch. IV to the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. He deducted from the said amount the sum of Rs. 240/- already paid to the workman and directed the appellant to deposit the balance of Rs. 3,120/- within thirty days from the date of his order.
2. The contention of the appellant is that the compensation awarded is excessive. The contention is based on the assumption that the Commissioner went wrong in finding:
(a) the amount of the monthly wage; and
(b) the extent of the disablement.
3. According to the appellant the workman was in receipt of only a monthly wage of Rs. 40/-. The Commissioner fixed the monthly wage on the basis of the evidence of the workmen, two co-workers of his, and the President of his Union, Mr. Raghavan, who is also an advocate of this Court. We see no reason to hold that the Commissioner was wrong in accepting their testimony. The appellant was not examined in the ease. Her agent, Mr. A.A Patel, was the sole witness on her behalf. He admitted that accounts were being kept of the wages disbursed to the workmen. The appellant, however, has not chosen to produce those accounts and the Commissioner has rightly commented on their non-production.
4. We are also not satisfied that the Commissioner was wrong in his conclusion that the workman has suffered permanent total disablement. Exhibit P-1 is the medical certificate issued by the Civil Surgeon of the Government Hospital, Palluruthy, who examined the workman at the request of the Commissioner. The certificate reads as follows:
“I examined today Sri George D'Cruz referred to in your letter noted above and found him permanently disabled due to the spinal injury sustained by him.”
5. The Civil Surgeon was examined before the Commissioner as A.W 2. He said:
“As per the requisition by the Commissioner for W.C, I have examined the applicant. Ext. P-1 is the certificate sent by me to the Commissioner. He was found to be permanently disabled as a result of the spinal injury. He is totally disabled from walking. He can't stand and attend to any work by which he must make use of his lower limbs. He can only creep.”
6. There was no cross-examination. The Commissioner asked a question:
“Can he attend to any work?”
The answer was:
“He can sit and work provided the raw materials are supplied to the work spot. He can't do anything which requires locomotion.”
7. According to the counsel for the appellant the answer to the question put by the Commissioner indicates that the disablement was not total but only partial. We are not satisfied that the answer by itself is sufficient to dislodge the Commissioner's finding and compel a different conclusion.
8. Section 2(1)(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, defines “total disablement” as such disablement “as incapacitates a workman for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident resulting in such disablement”. There is no evidence to show that the workman was at the time of the accident capable of doing any work other than that of an ordinary labourer engaged in the physical handling of cargo at the Port, or that it is possible for him to obtain any employment whatsoever in his present condition. “Incapacity for work” is not the same thing as “incapacity to work”. As stated by Earl Lorebum, L.C, in Ball v. William Hunt and Sons, Ltd., 1912 AC 496 at p. 500, “there is incapacity for work when a man has a physical defect which makes his labour unsaleable in any market reasonably accessible to him.” (Butterworth's Workmen's Compensation Cases, Vol. V, p. 459).
9. The Commissioner has considered the entire evidence on record and come to the conclusion that the disablement is total and not partial. We see no reason to differ from him on the ground that it is theoretically possible for the workman to manipulate his untrained fingers in the extraordinary circumstance of an employer choosing to supply raw materials as and when required at the place to which he is confined. In the light of what is stated above the appeal has to be dismissed and we decide accordingly. The appellant will pay the costs of the 1st respondent, advocate's fee Rs. 100/-.
KD/R.G.D
10. Appeal dismissed.
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