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Lekhraj Sathramdas Lalvani v. Mathur And Others

Kerala High Court
Dec 6, 1960
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Structured Summary of the Opinion — Ansari, C.J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeals arise from an order by a learned Judge who vacated two subordinate orders (Exts. P13 and P16) that terminated the services of the writ petitioner, L.S. Lalvani, as Manager of two evacuee businesses, and directed that the petitioner be put back in possession. The respondents to the writ petition appealed against that mandamus. The writ petitioner appealed against the learned Judge's refusal to issue a writ restraining respondents from selling the businesses by public auction and from acting in violation of the Central Government's order (Ext. P5). Connected to these appeals was an application for contempt based on alleged failure by respondents to comply with the mandamus issued by the learned Judge. The consolidated question is whether the writ of mandamus was rightly issued or properly withheld.

Material factual background (as narrated in the opinion):

  • Two firms (Adam Hajee Peer Mohammed Essak and Hajee Ebrahim, Kassem Cochinwala) vested in the Custodian of Evacuee Properties for the State of Madras under Section 8 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 (the 1950 Act) after their proprietors migrated to Pakistan circa 1947.
  • In February 1952 the writ petitioner (a refugee from Pakistan) applied to the Custodian to be allotted the two businesses; the Custodian approved and the petitioner furnished security and took possession as Manager on March 21, 1952.
  • On April 24, 1956, the Central Government issued an order (Ext. P5) deciding in principle that the evacuee concerns would be allotted to the petitioner and directing that he "will continue to function as the Custodian's Manager for these concerns" in terms of Section 10(2)(b) of the 1950 Act and Rule 34 of the Rules.
  • Subsequent steps toward valuation and sale were taken by the Custodian, and advertisements for sale by public auction appeared in 1956 and 1958. The petitioner sought interlocutory relief in O.P. No. 204/59, and a Division Bench in June 1959 restrained the District Collector from selling the properties without an appropriate order by the Chief Settlement Commissioner under the 1954 Act.
  • On December 18, 1959, the Deputy Custodian issued orders (Ext. P13 and a contemporaneous proceeding Ext. P16) terminating the petitioner's services as Manager and effecting forcible dispossession. The petitioner then filed the writ petition seeking mandamus, certiorari and prohibition to protect his position and possession under Ext. P5.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the writ of mandamus issued by the learned Judge restoring possession and office to the petitioner was rightly issued or should be set aside.
  2. Whether Exts. P13 and P16 (the orders terminating the petitioner and taking possession) were ultra vires or valid, given the competing provisions and actions under the 1950 Act and the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (the 1954 Act).
  3. Whether the petitioner could obtain other prerogative writs (certiorari, prohibition) to challenge or restrain acts taken by subordinate officers or other authorities in respect of appointment, dismissal and sale.
  4. Whether the contempt application based on alleged non-compliance with the learned Judge's mandamus should succeed.

Arguments of the Parties

Writ Petitioner (Appellant) — Principal Arguments

  • The petitioner relied on Ext. P5 and associated communications (e.g., Ext. P8) showing that the Central Government decided in principle to allot the concerns to him and directed that he continue as Custodian's Manager in terms of Section 10(2)(b) of the 1950 Act and Rule 34; he contended that subordinate officers could not vary or cancel that appointment.
  • The petitioner asserted that as a Manager he was a Government servant and could not be dismissed without compliance with Article 311 of the Constitution.
  • He sought mandamus to restore possession and certiorari to vacate Exts. P13 and P16 on the ground that those orders were passed by an authority not competent to do so.

Respondents (Deputy Custodian / District Collector / Advocate General) — Principal Arguments

  • The Deputy Custodian and District Collector contended that the dispossession and cancellation of the petitioner's managership were in pursuance of orders by properly constituted authority under the 1954 Act (Ext. R.1), and that the actions were authorised under the 1950 Act.
  • The Advocate General advanced three main contentions:
    • (a) Res judicata: The petitioner had earlier sought appropriate orders in prior proceedings and was precluded from raising again a claim under the 1950 Act;
    • (b) Identity of authority: The authorities under the two enactments (1950 Act and 1954 Act) were the same, and the Manager could be dismissed by the appointing authority; the fact that an order was said to be under the 1954 Act would not make it illegal if the officer had power under the 1950 Act to dismiss;
    • (c) Mandamus futility: Mandamus is a special prerogative writ and should not be issued where the court's direction would likely be negated by another competent authority (i.e., issuance of mandamus would be futile because a properly constituted authority could nullify the court's direction).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
P. Balakotaiah v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 232 Orders valid in substance if within competence, even if purportedly passed under a wrong provision; validity judged by substance not form. The court invoked this principle to hold that an order should not be vacated merely because it purported to be under the 1954 Act if the officer had power under the 1950 Act to pass it; thus the notification's inapplicability to movables would not necessarily be fatal if the impugned orders were within power under another provision.
Velayudhan Pillai v. State, 1959 Ker LT 636 Rules made by a government as subordinate legislature are valid if power to make them exists, notwithstanding omissions in preamble or references (supporting the substance-over-form principle). Cited to reinforce the proposition that a rule or order should be judged on substance and competence rather than formal inaccuracies in its stated source.
Halsbury's Laws of England (Vol. XI, para.199) Mandamus will not issue where it would be futile or the party complained of has powers which could render the order inoperative. The court relied on this authoritative text to support the conclusion that mandamus should be refused when a properly constituted authority could nullify the court's direction.
American Jurisprudence (Vol. XXXIV, p.831) Courts will not compel the doing of a useless thing by writ of mandamus; mandamus is withheld where it would be unavailing, nugatory or useless. Used to support the same practical principle — mandamus will not be issued where it would be futile or immediately nullified by another competent authority.
Shankar v. Returning Officer, Kolaba, AIR 1952 Bom 277 Mandamus should not be issued where the court's command would likely be set at naught by another tribunal or authority dealing with the same matter. The court relied on this authority to emphasize that a prerogative writ should not be issued if it is likely to be overridden by another competent body, and applied that reasoning to the present facts.
Rex v. Axbridge Corporation (1777) 98 ER 1220 Old authority stating that courts will not grant mandamus when the body seeking relief would undoubtedly remove the person again — principle of not compelling a futile restoration. Referred to as historical support for the established rule that mandamus is not issued where restoration would be immediately undone by the authority's repeat action.
Himmatlal v. State of M.P., AIR 1954 SC 403 Instances where courts issued mandamus — cited by the learned Judge below. The court distinguished Himmatlal on the basis that in that case parties had property rights that could not be nullified by another tribunal; hence Himmatlal did not support issuance of mandamus in the present factual matrix.
Sohan Lal v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 529 Another case referenced by the learned Judge; involved enforceable rights not susceptible to being nullified. Distinguished similarly: Sohan Lal involved rights that could not be nullified by another authority, so it did not displace the court's principle here that mandamus would be futile.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded step by step, adhering to the material in the record and established principles:

  1. Substance-over-form principle: The court began by reiterating the settled rule (citing P. Balakotaiah and Velayudhan Pillai) that an order should be judged by its substance and not invalidated merely because it was said to have been made under an incorrect statutory provision, provided the authority had competence under some other provision to make the order. Applying this, the court observed that if the authority that made the impugned orders had power under the 1950 Act (for example under Sections 8, 10 and, by implication, Section 12 of the General Clauses Act) to appoint and revoke a Manager, then the fact that the orders ostensibly were under the 1954 Act would not automatically render them invalid.
  2. Availability of prerogative writs: The court considered the availability of certiorari and prohibition in these circumstances and concluded they were inappropriate. The appointment and cancellation of a Manager were characterised as executive acts (not quasi-judicial) and therefore certiorari would not lie. Similarly, prohibition was not available.
  3. Mandamus and futility principle: The court turned to whether mandamus was appropriate. Relying on Halsbury, American Jurisprudence, and domestic authorities (including Shankar and historical authorities such as Rex v. Axbridge), the court emphasized the well-settled principle that mandamus will not be issued where it would be futile or where obedience to the writ would be nullified by a competent authority's subsequent lawful direction. Because higher authorities under the 1950 Act plainly retained discretion to remove the petitioner from managership, any mandamus restoring him could be negated by those authorities — making the writ essentially futile.
  4. Nature of Ext. P5: The court analysed Ext. P5 (the Central Government decision in principle to allot the concerns to the petitioner) and concluded that any right under Ext. P5 was contractual in nature and not a right enforceable by mandamus. Therefore the relief the petitioner sought under Ext. P5 could not be compellingly enforced by prerogative writ.
  5. Distinction from cited decisions below: The court noted that the learned Judge below relied on cases such as Himmatlal and Sohan Lal, but distinguished them because in those cases the parties had property interests that could not be nullified by some other tribunal; by contrast, in the present case the petitioner’s position could be revoked by competent authorities, making mandamus inappropriate.
  6. Consequent orders: On these bases the court held that the mandamus granted by the learned Judge was not in accordance with the principles governing the issuance of the writ, and therefore should be vacated. Because the mandamus was vacated, the contempt application based on non-compliance with that mandamus was also dismissed.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The court's core rulings were as follows:

  • The appeal A.S. 484/60 is allowed and the order granting mandamus is vacated.
  • The appeal A.S. 445/60 is dismissed.
  • The Contempt Application No. 6/60 is dismissed.
  • The court ordered that, having regard to the petitioner's status as a displaced person, he should not be saddled with costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The mandamus that had compelled restoration of the petitioner to possession and office was set aside, and the petitioner's separate appeal was dismissed; the contempt proceeding founded on non-compliance with the vacated mandamus was dismissed as well.
  • On legal principle: The court affirmed that mandamus will not be issued where obedience to the command would be futile because a properly constituted authority could lawfully negate the court's direction; it applied the substance-over-form principle in assessing the validity of administrative orders.
  • No broader precedent beyond the application of these established principles was announced in this opinion; the decision resolves the parties' dispute by applying settled rules rather than creating a new legal test.

Order concluded: "This order will govern all the three cases." (As recorded in the opinion.)

Show all summary ...

Ansari, C.J:— These two appeals arise from the order by a learned Judge, whereby he has vacated two orders, Exte. P. 13 and P. 16, which had terminated the services of the writ petitioner as the Manager of two evacuee businesses, and has directed the petitioner's being put back in possession. The respondents to the petition fave appealed against the mandamus so granted. The learned Judge has not issued any writ restraining the aforesaid respondents from selling the business by public auction and not to do anything in violation of the petitioner's right under the Central Government's order, Ext. 5. The writ petitioner hasi therefore, appealed against the refusal to issue such a writ. Connected with the aforesaid two appeals, is the application for contempt on the ground of the respondents to the writ petition failing to comply with the mandamusi issued by the learned Judge. It follows that the question arising for consideration in the aforesaid consolidated cases is whether the writ of mandamus has been rightly issued or properly withheld.

2. The facts of the case are not complicated and can be briefly narrated. The proprietors of two firms, “Adam Hajee Peer Mohammed Essak” and “Hajee Ebrahim, Kassem Cochinwala” had, in or about the year 1947, migrated to Pakistan, and both the businesses, therefore, became vested in the Custodian of the Evacuee Properties for the State of Madras, under Section 8 of the Administration of Evacuee Proper Act, 1950, hereinafter referred to as the 1950 Act. The writ petitioner, L.S Lalvani, who is a refugee from Pakistan, and averse to have under the Displace Persons (Claims) Act, 1950 registered his claim as a displaced person, had in February 1952 applied to the Custodian for being allotted the two businesses, as Kozhikode then formed part of Madras State and the two businesses were situated in Kozhikode. On March 8, 1952, the prayer was allowed by the Custodian, who thereby approved the proposal of the Deputy Custodian about the management of the firms being allotted to the writ petitioner. The petitioner was asked to furnish security of Rs. 20,000/- which he did; and on March 21, 1952, took possession as the Manager. Thereafter, the Assistant Custodian of Evacuee Property addressed a communication on October 27, 1952, asking whether the writ petitioner would accept the allotment of the aforesaid business concerns; but nothing further appears to have been done in that year, nor during the next year. On October 9, 1954, the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, was passed, which will hereinafter be referred to as the 1954 Act. Also no steps were taken during 1955 about the two concerns being allotted to the writ petitioner; but on April 11, 1956, the proposals for the sale of the aforesaid evacuee properties by public auction appeared in ‘The Hindu’. It is petitioner's case that he under the 1954 Act applied to the Chief Settlement Commissioner for orders stopping the sale of the two concerns and that the Central Government by proceedings dated April 24, 1956 stopped the sale, and ordered their allotment to the writ petitioner on terms and conditions to be communicated later. This order is marked Ext. P. 5 and its relevant part reads as follows:

“I am directed to state that it has been decided in principle that the aforesaid evacuee concerns will be allotted to you. The terms of allotment will be communicated to you separately. Meanwhile, you will continue to function as the Custodian's Manager for these concerns, in terms of Section 10(2)(b) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, read with Rule 34 of the Rules made under the Act.”

3. The order was communicated to the Custodian of Evacuee Property, Madras; and, in pursuance Messrs T.K Menon and Co. Chartered Accountants, were appointed to submit valuation report regarding the assets. The copy of the letter from the Custodian of Evacuee Property received by the petitioner is Ext. P-8 and reads thus:

“The Deputy Custodian is informed that the Government of India have decided that, the two evacuee concerns viz., firms of Adam Hajee Peer Mohammed Essak and Hajee Ebrahim Kassem Cochinwala of Kozhikode, are to be allotted to the present Manager Sri L.S Lalvani and ultimately sold to him. He is also informed that until the question of terms and conditions of allotment of the concerns in question is decided Sri Lalvani will continue to function as Custodian's Manager for these concerns in terms of Section 10(2)(b) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, read with R. 34 of the Rules made thereunder.

4. The Deputy Custodian is requested to evaluate the business concerns properly alter getting prepared a balance sheet of each year of the vesting of the concerns. In evaluating the concerns, the Deputy Custodian should keep in view the other assets and liabilities of the concerns and their goodwill etc. His comment and suggestions as to how, and by what easy instalments the value of the concerns, if sold to Sri Lalvani, is to be realised from him should also be intimated.” The bargains contemplated have not been concluded and on March 25, 1958, an advertisement appeared in “The Hindu” about the sales by public auction of these concerns as well on April 10, 1958. The petitioner thereafter filed to this Court O.P No. 204/59 praying for a writ of prohibition to restrain the District Collector from selling by public auction or otherwise the two concerns to any other than himself and for the issuance of other appropriate writs, and a Division Bench on June 25, 1959, directed the District Collector not to sell the properties, of which the writ petitioner was the Manager, without are appropriate order by the Chief Settlement Commissioner, the Order is Ext. P9 and runs as follows:

“No order, general or special, of the Chief Settlement Commissioner is forthcoming, and in view of that, the respondent has to be directed not to sell the items by public auction or otherwise without an appropriate order under that Rule…………”

5. The aforesaid judgment, therefore, rests on the short ground of there being no order under the 1954 Act by the Chief Settlement Commissioner for the sale of the properties as directed by Rule 101 of the Rules framed under the 1954 Act. Thereafter the writ petitioner was given notice of the tour programme of the Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property, Southern States, who reached Kozhikode on December 12, 1959; and on December 18, 1959, received an order, Ext. P13, The relevant extract of the order is as follows:

“……..is informed that his services as manager of the business concerns of Adam Hajee Peer Mohammed Essack and Hajee Ebrahim Kasiam Cochinwala, at Kozhikode are hereby terminated with immediate effect. He is further required to hand over immediate possession of the premises and the stock-in-trade account bonks and other assets of the business including furniture, etc. On his failure to do so, possession of the same will be taken with force.”

6. The petitioner's case is that he only accepted the direction under protest and prayed for two days to consult his lawyer, which was rejected; and, on December 18, 1959, he was forcibly dispossessed of all the assets, of which he was the manager. On the same date a proceeding was drawn up, showing what exactly Shappened, whose copy is Ext. P16, and its paragraph 8 reads as follows:

“Sri Lalvani having refused to give possession, it has been taken in the presence of witnesses, who have signed below and who have signed all the inventories aforesaid………”

7. Thereafter the writ petition, from which these appeals arise, was filed in this court. Therein the petitioner has asked for mandamus restraining the respondents from doing any act in violation of the petitioner's right under the order which is Ext. P5. The grounds, on which the writ has been asked are firstly that, having regard to the terms of the Government's direction about the possession in favour of the writ petitioner continuing till allotment the subordinate officers cannot vary and cancel the appointment of the writ petitioner as the Manager. The next is that, the petitioner being a Manager was a Government servant and cannot be dismissed in violation of Article 311 of the Constitution. The mandamus has been asked to restore the possession of the firms and certiorari for being vacated Exts. P13 and P16, because of their being passed by authority not competent to pass the orders. In reply, the Deputy Custodian and the District Collector, Kozhikode have taken up the position of the sale being in pursuance of the order of properly constituted authority under the 1954 Act which was marked as Ext. R. 1. It was further pleaded that the dispossession from as well as the cancellation of the writ petitioner's managership was authorised under the 1950 Act.

8. The learned Judge in partly granting the writ petition has held that the interests of a quasi-permanent allottee are not ‘property’ within the concept of the word so as to attract the protection of the fundamental rights, that the initial entrustment was nothing more than management of the firms with reference to Sec. 10(2)(b) of the 1950 Act, that R. 34 did not change the original nature of the possession, and that as the writ petitioner could not find his way to accept the terms and conditions in their entirety, the offer to allot had lapsed. Therefore, the learned Judge has further held:

“It is impossible to hold that by Exts. P5 and P8 the petitioner was granted a right of management to enure till the final allotment, whenever it may be made, or as the contention implies, indefinitely if no allotment is to take place………. But it seems unreasonable to hold that an indefeasible right of management has been conferred on the petitioner or still survives to him after all that had transpired.”

9. He has accordingly disallowed the claim for mandamus on the basis of Ext. P15 but has held Exts. P13 and P16 to be ultra vires and illegal. The reasons for his so deciding are that the aforesaid two orders were under the 1954 Act, which vested the property under S. 12 only after proper notification, the notify cation Ex. P-21, covers urban immovable properties, and would not extend to movables, Exts. P. 13 and P. 16 not being by the Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property, the petitioner's right of management, though not indefeasible, had not been terminated, for such a right can be terminated only by authority competent to do so. The learned Judge concludes his judgment with these words:

“……that the managing officer under the 1954 Act is not a proper authority, and I did not understand the learned Advocate General to contend that he is. I therefore hold Exts. P13 and P16 are ultra vires.”

10. In the appeals, the position taken up by the writ petitioner's learned counsel is that the right of management under Ext. P5 and Ext. P8 was by the Central Government, which has under Section 54 of the 1950 Act, the authority to issue directions; and as the cancellation orders were by an officer not competent to vary the order passed by such an authority, even though empowered under Section 12 of the 1950 Act to cancel appointment of a Manager, the writ petitioner was still the Manager and was entitled to mandamus for enforcement of the duties of the Cutodian and the Deputy Custodian not-to cancel the orders of their superior officers under the 1950 Act. The arguments by the learned Advocate General on behalf of respondents to the writ petition are:

(1) The petitioner in the earlier proceedings had from this court asked for appropriate order on the ground of being aggrieved by unauthorised exercise of powers under the 1954 Act and was, therefore, precluded by the principle of res judicata from complaining again about some right under the 1950 Act having been infringed.

(2) The authorities under the two enactments being the same, the Manager could be dismissed by authority appointing him and the authority passing the orders not having properly described his office would not justify the court's treating the exercise to be illegal, when the orders are by the authority that can under 1950 Act dismiss the writ petitioner.

(3) The writ of mandamus is a special writ and would not be issued where there be probability of another authority negativing the court's direction.

11. Now it is clear that courts cannot vary orders of authorities professedly under certain enactments should the authorities legally have power to issue the orders under some other laws. In other words if there the sufficient legal justification for passing orders, they cannot be vacated on the ground of their purporting to be under some power that does not confer the jurisdiction. That we think is a settled proposition by P. Balakotaiah v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 232 at p. 236, where Venkatarama Aiyar, J. observed as follows:

“It is argued that when an authority passes an order which is within its competence, it cannot fail merely because it purports to be made under a wrong provision if it can be shown to be within its powers under any other rule and that the validity of an order should be judged on a consideration of its substance and not it form. No exception can be taken to his proposition,……….”

12. Similar view has been taken in Velayudhan Pillai v. State, 1959 Ker LT 636 at p. 641 where Raman Nayar J. observes as follows:

“It is not and indeed cannot be disputed that in making the rules, the Government were acting as a subordinate Legislature and not as an executive authority. The intention to make rules to provide for punishments being manifest and the power to make such rules under S. 72 read with Sec. 323 being indisputable, it would follow that the rules actually made were rules validly made in exercise of this power notwithstanding the omission to refer either to S. 72 or to S. 323 in the preamble as the Section from which the power is derived………”

13. It follows that should the authority making the orders impugned have powers under 1950 Act to revoke the petitioner's appointment, the notification not extending to movables would not be fatal to the orders being accepted as legal. The learned Advocate General has contended that the business concerns having under S. 8 of file 1950 Act vested in the Custodian and the Deputy Custodian, they would have the power under S. 10 of the same enactment to appoint a Manager which power, having regard to the provisions of Section 12 of the General Clauses Act would include the authority to vary the appointment. Therefore he has urged that the order directing the petitioner to hand over the possession of the business concerns and dismissing him from the office are proper, though they appear to be under the 1954 Act particularly when the officer making the orders has powers under Ss. 8 and 10 of the 1950 Act. The petitioner's learned counsel does not challenge the correctness of the Custodian's and Deputy Custodian's power to vary an order of appointment, and the position taken by him is that the appointment orders being by the Central Government, which have the power of direction under Section 54 of the 1950 Act, a subordinate officer cannot vary them. It is clear, however, that the crucial issue in the case is not which authority has passed the appointment order but by what writ the impugned orders should be vacated. We do not see how a writ of certiorari can be issued; for, the appointment of a Manager, being essentially an executive act, the cancellation of such an appointment would also be an executive act, and, therefore such a writ would not be available in this case, there being no quasi-judicial approach required.

14. It also follows that no writ of Prohibition can be issued. The next question is whether mandamus in these circumstances can be issued either for enforcement of the order under Ext. P-5 or for enforcement of the duty to keep the petitioner; which brings us to the last ground taken by the Advocate General in support of his appeal as well as for dismissing the appeal by the writ petitioner. Now it is well-settled that mandamus would not be issued where its effect would be nullified by a properly constituted authority giving direction within its competence that nullifies the court's direction contained in the writ. In this connection we would begin by referring to the following passage in Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. XI, Page 106, Para. 199:

“A mandamus will not go when it appears that it would be futile in its result. Accordingly, the Court will not, by mandamus, order something which is impossible of performance by reason of the circumstance that the doing of the act would involve a contravention of law, or because the party against whom the mandamus prayed does not, for some other reason, possess the power to obey. A mandamus will not be granted if the party complained of has powers which would enable him to make the order Inoperative; or when it seems that obedience to the command would not be followed by any result different from that in respect of which complaint is made”.

15. We further find the position similar in the American Jurisprudence (Vol. XXXIV, Page 831) where these words occur:

“It is a fundamental principle that courts will not employ their coercive process to compel the doing of a useless thing. Particularly is this true with respect to such a summary and expeditious process as mandamus. The writ is invariably withheld where it would be unavailing, nugatory or useless and its issuance an idle act…………Thus, the court may well refuse to award the writ to compel the reinstatement of the petitioner in his office or employment where his term has almost expired, or has expired, or the office itself has been abolished, or where because of ineligibility or for other reason, he could, it restored to office, be at once removed or to compel submission to the electors of a city, of a proposed ordinance which if adopted would be unconstitutional.”

16. In this country the position is the same; for the learned Chief Justice in Shankar v. Returning Officer, Kolaba, AIR 1952 Bom 277 at p. 2811 has refused to issue mandamus to an election officer on the following grounds:

“There is another objection also to the issue of a writ of mandamus which is equally serious. A writ of mandamus is a high prerogative writ. The Court issues a command in order to remedy a grave error or to set right injustice, and the Court would never issue such a command unless it is certain that command would be respected and carried out Looking to the scheme of the Representation of the People Act, it is quite possible that our decision and our command, which may take the form of a writ of mandamus, may be set at naught by another Tribunal which may have to deal with the same matter. If, for instance, we were to take the view in this case that the rejection of the petitioner's nomination paper was an improper one, it would be perfectly competent to the Election Tribunal, if an election petition were to be filed after the election, to take a contrary view and come to the conclusion that the nomination paper of the Petitioner was rightly rejected by the Returning Officer and the Election Tribunal would thereupon act upon that view of the law. Now, an Court issuing a prerogative writ should never put itself in a position where as I said before, its command is likely to be set at naught.”

17. Now the aforesaid rule appears to have been settled as far back as 1777, when Lord Mansfield in Rex v. Axbridge Corporation (1777) 98 ER 1220 held that the court would not grant a party the assistance of this prerogative writ when it was acknowledged that the Corporation had very sufficient cause to remove him; and when they would undoubtedly remove him again, the very instant he should be restored. It follows that should the higer authorities under the 1950 Act have the discretion of removing the petitioner from the managership — and it is not disputed that they have — a writ of mandamus directing, the petitioner's restoration to possession and office in the light of the aforesaid principle, should not be issued. The learned Judge; in issuing the mandamus, has relied on Himmatlal v. State of M.P, AIR 1954 SC 403 and Sohan Lal v. Union of India, (S) AIR 1957 SC 529, but in both the cases the parties had properties and the-court's order could not be nullified by some-action of any other tribunal. Therefore the case relied upon do not establish a legal proposition contrary to what we have stated earlier. On the other hand the Manager of the evacuee property under 1950 Act has neither a right under Article 19 nor under Article 31; and he can be-removed by the authority, who had appointed him, with the result that any mandamus restoring, him to the possession of the two concerns cate be nullified by the order of the proper authority dismissing him. Under these circumstances, we think the writ of mandamus given in the case ls not in accordance with the principle governing the issuance of the writ. It is equally clear that we cannot issue mandamus for enforcing what is claimed under Ext. P-5, as any right under it would be contractual and not enforceable by the writ it follows that we should allow the Custodian's appeal and dismiss that by the writ petitioner. It is a hard case; but we cannot help him in view of the aforesaid legal position; and the concerned authorities, we hope, having regard to the circumstances of this case, would make proper orders. Having taken the view, it is clear that the contempt application should also be dismissed.

18. Therefore, A.S 484/60 is allowed, and the order granting mandamus is vacated. A.S 445/60 is dismissed and also the Contempt Application 6/60. Having regard to the fact of the writ petitioner in this case being a displaced person we feel he should not be saddled with costs.

19. This order will govern all the three cases.

AF/M./K.S.B

20. Order accordingly.