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Advocate-General, Kerala v. Thevar Tharakan .
Structured Summary of Opinion — Govinda Menon, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
This application was brought by the Advocate-General under Section 3 of the Contempt of Court Act against the respondent, Chakidiyil Thazhathethil Thevar Tharakan.
The respondent was the 8th defendant in suit O.S. 64 of 1943 before the Sub-Court, Ottapalam. A preliminary decree for partition had been passed and an application for final decree was pending and stayed by the High Court. A receiver (Commissioner) Shri A.N. Parameswara Iyer, Advocate was appointed to manage the tarwad properties and filed reports complaining of obstructions by the respondent. The respondent was unrepresented and he did not pursue appeals; instead he sent letters by post to the Subordinate Judge, Ottapalam.
The first receiver resigned, and a second receiver, Mr. C. Sankaran Nair, was appointed and he too filed reports about the respondent's conduct. The respondent persisted in sending letters to the Subordinate Judge. Several letters (marked Exts. P.1 to P.8) contained scurrilous attacks on the Subordinate Judge, Kumari P. Janaki Amma, including attacks on her personal character and imputations of partiality and improper motives.
The contempt application, supported by an affidavit containing the offending passages, was served on the respondent. He failed to appear, the court ordered his arrest, and he was produced before the court. He was undefended by a lawyer; he sought to file a counter-statement expressing regret and was released on personal bond to appear for hearing. He filed a statement admitting authorship of the letters, setting out circumstances in which they were written, and tendering an unconditional apology and prayer for exoneration.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the letters sent by the respondent to the Subordinate Judge constituted contempt of court.
- If they did constitute contempt, what action or punishment should be imposed on the respondent.
Arguments of the Parties
Advocate-General's Submissions
- The Advocate-General invoked established English and Indian authorities concerning contempt of court, drawing attention to principles that private communications to a judge intended to influence a pending matter and scandalous attacks on judges can amount to contempt.
- He pointed to authorities classifying contempts and asserting that communications intended to influence or to scandalise judges obstruct the administration of justice.
- He argued that the respondent's letters fell within these principles and therefore amounted to contempt of court.
Respondent's Statement
- The respondent admitted having sent all the letters and filed a statement explaining the circumstances under which they were written.
- He tendered an unconditional apology and expressed regret, stating that now that the Advocate-General has shown the letters to be wrong, he apologises and prays that the apology may be accepted and he be exonerated.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Halsbury's Laws of England — Third Edition, Vol. VIII (para 10 and para 9) | “Every private communication to a Judge for the purpose of influencing his decision upon a pending matter ... is a contempt of court.” and that “Scandalous attacks upon Judges are punished ... as an obstruction to public justice.” | The court relied on these passages to frame the principle that private communications and scandalous attacks on a judge can amount to contempt and obstruct justice. |
| Rex v. Gray (1900-2 Q.B. 36) | Acts or writings calculated to bring a court or judge into contempt or to obstruct the due course of justice are contempt of court; includes 'scandalising' the judge. | Used to support the proposition that writings calculated to lower the authority of a judge or obstruct justice constitute contempt. |
| Helmera v. Smith (1886, 35 Ch. D. 449) (Bowen L.J.) | The object of contempt discipline is to prevent undue interference with the administration of justice rather than to vindicate the personal dignity of judges. | Cited to underline that contempt proceedings protect the administration of justice and the public, not merely the judge personally. |
| Rex v. Parke (1903-2 K.B. 432) | Publication of articles that deprive the court of the power to administer justice impartially and to eliminate prejudice is treated as contempt of court. | Relied on to show why scandalous publications or attacks are treated as contempt because of their tendency to undermine impartial adjudication. |
| Rex v. Davies (1906-1 K.B. 32) | Root principle: punish attacks on courts to protect the public and those subject to jurisdiction from the mischief of undermining tribunal authority. | Adopted to emphasize that contempt law protects public confidence and the functioning of justice. |
| Rex v. Almon (1765), Wilmot's Opinions 243 | Attacks on judges excite public dissatisfaction and fundamentally shake allegiance to the laws, constituting a dangerous obstruction of justice. | Quoted to stress the historic rationale for punishing attacks on judges to preserve public confidence in judicial processes. |
| In the matter of Tushar Kanti Gosh, Editor, Amrit Bazar Patrika (A.I.R. 1935 Cal. 419) | Discusses classification of contempts; recognises three sorts: scandalising the court, abusing parties, and prejudicing persons before the cause is heard. | Referred to as an Indian Full Bench decision that elaborately discussed case law and classification of contempts; used as authority for categorisation and principles. |
| Sunnulal Radhavallabha v. Yeshwantsingh (A.I.R. 1951 Madhya Bharat 98) | Gravamen of contempt is interference or likelihood of interference with the course of justice; motive of contemner is immaterial. | Applied to support the court's conclusion that the intention or motive of the writer is immaterial and the effect or tendency to obstruct justice is decisive. |
| I.L.R. 45 Calcutta 169; I.L.R. 47 Bombay 76; I.L.R. 6 Lahore 528 | Authorities (several) indicating private communications to judges intended to influence or otherwise undermine the judicial process are contemptuous. | Referenced collectively; the court stated it was not necessary to deal separately with these cases but treated them as consistent with the principles relied upon. |
| Sub-Judge First Class, Hoshangabad v. Jawahar Lal Ramchand Parwar (A.I.R. 1940 Nag. 407) (Vivian Bose, J.) | An apology must be genuine contrition and not a last-moment device to escape punishment; an insincere apology cannot be a defence to contempt. | Quoted and applied to reject the respondent's apology as an insufficient and insincere attempt to avoid consequences. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in a stepwise analysis strictly tied to the facts and the authorities cited:
- Characterisation of the letters: The court examined the letters (Exts. P.1 to P.8) and found they contained scurrilous attacks on the Subordinate Judge's conduct and character in relation to her judicial duties, and in some passages attacked her personal integrity and imputed improper motives and partiality.
- Legal standard: The court set out established legal principles from English and Indian authorities stating that private communications to a judge for the purpose of influencing decisions, and scandalous attacks upon judges calculated to obstruct public justice, amount to contempt. The authorities emphasised that contempt proceedings protect the administration of justice and the public rather than merely vindicating a judge's personal dignity; and that motive is immaterial — what matters is the effect or tendency to obstruct justice.
- Application of law to facts: Applying those principles, the court concluded that the letters—by suggesting the Subordinate Judge favoured receivers, accusing her of corrupt motive and declaring she disgraced her office—were calculated to impugn the impartial administration of justice and thus constituted contempt. The court explicitly stated "it cannot be disputed that these letters amount clearly to contempt of court."
- Assessment of the apology: The respondent's admission and unconditional apology were examined. The court agreed with the Advocate-General that the apology appeared to be an instrument to avert consequences rather than genuine contrition. Relying on the passage from Vivian Bose, J., the court held that an apology given only when exposed and as a last resort is not evidence of sincere remorse and therefore could not avail the respondent.
- Determination of appropriate punishment: The court characterised the contempt as "very grave" and "deliberate" and concluded that a fine would be inadequate as an effective deterrent. Accordingly, the court determined that imprisonment was required and imposed a sentence of simple imprisonment for three months. The court also ordered that there be no order as to costs.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
RESPONDENT FOUND GUILTY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT AND SENTENCED TO UNDERGO SIMPLE IMPRISONMENT FOR THREE MONTHS.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The respondent, Chakidiyil Thazhathethil Thevar Tharakan, was convicted of contempt for sending the impugned letters and was sentenced to three months' simple imprisonment; there was no order as to costs.
- On the apology: The court expressly held that the respondent's unconditional apology was insincere and could not avert punishment; an apology which is merely a last-moment device to avoid liability is inadequate.
- Broader implications: The opinion applies existing principles to the facts but does not purport to announce or record any new legal precedent beyond applying settled authorities that private communications intended to influence judges and scandalous attacks calculated to obstruct justice are punishable as contempt. The court emphasised deterrence against making false or scandalous allegations against the subordinate judiciary.
All contents of this summary are drawn exclusively from the provided opinion. No information has been added or inferred beyond that opinion.
Govinda Menon, J.:— This is an application made by the Advocate-General under Section 3 of the Contempt of Court Act against the respondent, Chakidiyil Thazhathethil Thevar Tharakan.
2. The facts that gave rise to this petition are as follows: The respondent is the 8th defendant in a suit O.S 64 of 1943 pending in the Sub-Court, Ottapalam. The suit was one for partition and a preliminary decree for partition had been passed. Application for the passing of the final decree is pending and the same had been stayed by the High Court. The Commissioner Shri A.N Parameswara Iyer, Advocate was the receiver appointed by the Court to manage the properties of the tarwad. There were reports filed by him complaining of various acts of obstructions committed by the respondent. The respondent was not being represented by a lawyer and he did not also appeal in court, in response to the notice issued to him for the disposal of the petition. But instead, he was sending letters by post to the Subordinate Judge Mr. Parameswara Iyer, however, found it difficult to continue as receiver and he tendered his resignation. After his discharge, one Mr. C. Sankaran Nair was appointed as receiver in his place. He also filed reports about the conduct of the respondent. Then also the respondent did not appear in court, but persisted in sending letters addressed to the Subordinate Judge.
3. Some of the letters have been marked as Exts. P. 1 to P. 8 in this case. It is not necessary to extract them here. A reading of the letters would show that they contained scurrilous attacks on the conduct and character of Kumari P. Janaki Amma, the Subordinate Judge of Ottapalam with reference and in relation to the discharge of her duties as Subordinate Judge. Some of the letters have gone further and attack is made even on her personal character and integrity and imputing motives that she was helping the receiver with some purpose.
4. The application for contempt together with the affidavit in support of it containing the offending passages in the letters written by the respondent were served on the respondent and he was asked to show cause why action should not be taken against him. As he did not appear in court on the date of hearing, this court had to order his arrest and he was produced before the court. He is not defended by a lawyer. On being questioned, he wanted to file a counter-statement expressing regret for what he had done. He was released on his executing a personal bond to appear at the hearing of the case. He has filed a statement. In that statement he has detailed the peculiar circumstances under which he happened to send those letters and he says that now that the Advocate-General has pointed out that what he did was wrong, he is tendering an unconditional apology to this court and to the Subordinate Judge, Ottapalam. To our specific question he admitted having sent all the letters and said that he had nothing further to add to what he had already stated in his statement and that he is expressing regret and tendering an unconditional apology to the court and praying that the apology may be accepted and he may be exonerated.
5. The question for decision is whether the various letters which, he admits he had sent to the Subordinate Judge, constitute a contempt of court. The learned Advocate-General has invited our attention to certain principles applicable to such matters as laid down in leading English and Indian decisions.
6. in Halsbury's Laws of England—Third Edition, Vol. VIII—dealing with contempt of court, at page 7, para 10, it is stated:
“Every private communication to a Judge for the purpose of influencing his decision upon a pending matter, and whether or not accompanied by the offer of a bribe or by personal abuse, is a contempt of court as tending to interfere with the course of justice.”
7. Again in para 9, it is stated:
“Scandalous attacks upon Judges are punished by attachment or committal upon the principle that they are, as against the public, not the judge, an obstruction to public justice; and a libel on a judge, in order to constitute a contempt of court, must have been calculated to cause such an obstruction.”
8. In Rex v. Gray (1900-2 Q.B 36), Lord Russell, the then Lord Chief Justice of England says:
“Any act done or writing published calculated to bring a court or a judge of the court into contempt, or to lower his authority, is a contempt of court. That is one class of contempt. Further, any act done or writing published calculated to obstruct or interfere with the due course of justice or the lawful process of the courts is a contempt of court. The former class belongs to the category which Lord Hardinake had characterised as scandalising a court or a judge.”
9. Bowen L.J, in Helmera v. Smith (1886, 35 Chancery Division 449 at p. 455) observes:
“The object of the discipline enforced by the court in case of contempt, of court is not to vindicate the dignity of the court or the person of the Judge, but to prevent undue interference, with the administration of justice.”
10. In Rex v. Parke (1903-2 K.B 432 at 436) Wills, J. observes as follows:
“The reason why the publication of articles like those with which we have to deal is treated as a contempt of court is because their tendency and sometimes their object is to deprive the court of the power of doing that which is the end for which it exists namely, to administer justice duly, impartially and with reference solely to the facts judicially brought before it. Their tendency is to reduce the court which has to try the case to impotence, so far as the effectual elimination of prejudice and pre-possession is concerned. It is difficult to conceive an apter description of such conduct than is conveyed by the expression “contempt of court”.”
11. In Rex v. Davies (1906-1 K.B 32), Mr. Justice Wills who delivered the judgment of the court observes as follows:’
“What then is the principle which is the root of and underlies the cases in which persons have been punished for attacks upon courts and interferences with the due execution of their order? It will be found to be, not the purpose of protecting either the court as a whole or the individual Judges of the court from a repetition of them, but of protecting the public, and especially those who, either voluntarily or by compulsion, are subject to its jurisdiction, from the mischief they will incur if the authority of the Tribunal be undermined or impaired.”
12. The learned Judge cites from the judgment of Chief Justice Wilmot in Rex v. Almon, (1765), Wilmot's Opinions 243:
“Attacks upon the judges, he says, ‘excite in the minds of the people a general dissastifaction with all judicial determination……..and whenever men's allegiance to the laws is so fundamentally shaken, it is the most fatal and dangerous obstruction of justice, and in my opinion, calls out for a more repaid and immediate redress than any other obstruction whatsoever; not for the sake of the Judges as private individuals, but because they are the channels by which the King's justice is conveyed to the people. To be impartial and to be universsally thought so are both absolutely necessary for the giving justice that free, open, and unimpaired current which it has for many ages found all over this kingdom.”
13. These well-known principles have been followed by the various High Courts in India. The learned Advocate-General cited the Full Bench decision in In the matter of Tushar Kanti Gosh, Editor, Amrit Bazar Patrika (A.I.R 1935 Cal. 419). The entire case law has been elaborately discussed in that case and they have given a classification of contempts. It is there stated:
“There ale three different sorts of contempt, one kind of contempt is scandalising the court itself. They may likewise be a contempt of court in abusing parties who are concerned in causes. There may be also a contempt of court in prejudicing mankind against persons before the cause is heard. There cannot be anything of greater consequence than to keep the streams of justice clear and pure, that parties may proceed with safety both to themselves and their characters.”
14. In Sunnulal Radhavallabha v. Yeshwantsingh (A.I.R 1951 Madhya Bharat 98), it has been observed:
“The gravamen of the offence of contempt of court is any interference or the likelihood of interference with the course of justice. If the flow of the stream of justice is obstructed for any reason, that obstruction whether resulting from a proper motive or from indifference or from disregard of the consequences or from accidental omission cannot be excused. Motive of the contemner cannot be considered in determining his guilt.”
15. The intention of the writer therefore is immaterial. The question to consider in such cases is what is the effect. If it has a tendency to obstruct or interfere with the due and proper course of administration of justice, the author will be guilty of contempt.
16. Reference was also made to other decisions viz., I.L.R 45 Calcutta 169, I.L.R 47 Bombay 76; and I.L.R 6 Lahore 528 being some of them. It is not necessary to separately deal with all these cases. Suffice it to say that from the principles laid down in all these cases, it is clear that every private communication to a Judge or a Magistrate for the purpose of influencing his decision upon a matter publicly before him, always is and ought to be reprobated. It is a course canculated, if tolerated, to divert the course of justice and is considered as a serious contempt of court.
17. In this instant case, the respondent has in more than one letter stated that the court and the Presiding Officer have become a “business centre to fill the pockets of the receivers”. In Ext. P. 3, it is stated that the Subordinate Judge places importance more on favoritism than on administration of justice and that the respondent is going to leave the Ottapalam Sub-Court which is a business centre of the receivers and seek redress in another court. In para 2 of Ext. P. 5, it is stated that filling up of the pocket of the advocate was done in her own interest and he winds up by saying that she (the Subordinate Judge) is a disgrace to the seat which she occupies, to the gown that she wears and to the college which gave her the degree. In all these letters, it has been suggested without any justification whatsoever that she was not administering justice impartially and was always siding the receivers and that the receivers were perpetrating various atrocities purely because of the help rendered by the Subordinate Judge. In view of all these, it cannot be disputed that these letters amount clearly to contempt of court.
18. The next question is what is the action that must be taken against the respondent. The respondent has filed a statement expressing regret and tendering unconditional apology for his thoughtless conduct. We agree with the learned Advocate-General that the apology is only an empty formality and that it is made only with a view to avoid or avert the consequences of the contemptuous act. What the respondent states in his statement is that because the Advocate-General has presented this petition pointing out that the letters amount to contempt of court, he is apologising. We feel that it is not an expression of genuine contrition of the contemner. In the words of Vivian Bose, J. in Sub-Judge First Class, Hoshangabad v. Jawahar Lal Ramchand Parwar (A.I.R 1940 Nag. 407):
“There appears to be an impression abroad that an apology consists of a magic formula of words which has but to be uttered as an incantation at the last possible moment when all else has failed and it is evident that retribution is inevitable, to stage off punishment. It appears to be felt that a man should be free to continue unfounded attacks upon another's honour and character and integrity with the utmost licence till the last possible moment and then when he is unable to stave off the consequences of his infamous conduct any longer, all he needs do is to waive this magic formula referred to as an apology in a Judge's face in order to emerge triumphantly from the fray. Nothing can be further from the truth.
An apology is not a weapon of defence forged to purge the guilty of their offences. It is not an additional insult to be hurled at the heads of those who have been wronged. It is intended to be an evidence of real contriteness, the manly consciousness of a wrong done, of an injury inflicted and the earnest desire to make such reparation as lies in the wrong-doer's power”.
19. The apology which has been tendered by the respondent cannot be of any avail.
20. This is a case where there was definite suggestion and allegations made in the various letters against the integrity, impartiality and personal character of the Subordinate Judge and a person who makes such scandalous allegations must not be permitted to assume that he can do so and then plead immunity from punishment by expressing apology. It is necessary that this tendency to make false, scandalous and loose statements against the Subordinate Judiciary should be put an end to with a firm hand. The next question which calls for consideration relates to the proper nature of the punishment which should be awarded in this case. We have already indicated our view that the contempt of which the respondent is found guilty is of a very grave nature. It is a deliberate act persisted in and calls for a punishment which should be sufficiently severe in order to be effectively deterrent. A sentence of fine will be of no purpose for bringing home to the respondent, the full significance of the gravity of his conduct and a term of imprisonment is called for in this case. We, therefore, sentence the respondent to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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