- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Godasankara Valia Raja v. Tharappan Vareed
Factual and Procedural Background
This suit concerned redemption of a mortgage with possession. The plaintiff sought possession on redemption of a mortgage instrument (Ext. B) dated August 14, 1931 A.D. (Karkadation 29, 1106 M.E.), which described certain properties as then outstanding with Tharappan under an earlier lease (Ext. A dated Karkadakam 28, 1091). Ext. A was a one-year "verumpattom" lease (no premium, no right to make improvements) fixing tax and pattom (rent) in paddy quantities; Ext. B was a "kaivasapanyadharam" (mortgage with possession) for Rs. 2,500 purporting to give possession to the mortgagee and directing him to enjoy the properties on payment of tax.
The principal factual dispute was whether the prior lease (Ext. A) subsisted after Ext. B or whether it was impliedly surrendered when Ext. B took effect. The trial court had reached a view that negatived the plaintiff's right to recover actual possession on redemption; this decision was appealed. The appellate court considered documentary terms, surrounding circumstances, and a variety of receipts and subsequent documents, and finally allowed the appeal.
Procedurally, the record shows that the plaintiff deposited Rs. 2,500 pursuant to a court order on October 17, 1951. Subsequent withdrawals by defendants (Rs. 625; Rs. 1,250) and by representatives of a deceased co-defendant are recorded. The plaintiff claimed mesne profits on redemption; the court fixed the mesne profits at 720 paras of paddy per annum (or their commuted value) from the date notice of deposit was given. The appellate court directed parties to bear their own costs in the lower court, but allowed the plaintiff his costs of the appeal against the third defendant (third respondent), and finally allowed the appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the lease created by Ext. A subsisted after the execution and taking effect of Ext. B, or whether Ext. A must be deemed to have been surrendered implicitly on the date Ext. B took effect.
- Whether, on the terms of Ext. B and in the surrounding circumstances, the relationship between the parties after Ext. B was that of mortgagor and mortgagee rather than lessor and lessee.
- Whether evidence of the subsequent conduct of the parties (receipts, applications, settlement deeds, etc.) is admissible to vary or qualify the plain and unambiguous terms of Ext. B or to show that obligations under Ext. B were dispensed with or remitted.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendants' Arguments
- Acceptance of a mortgage does not always terminate a prior lease; the acceptance of Ext. B need not be an implied surrender of Ext. A.
- What was mortgaged by Ext. B was the lessor's reversionary interest (including the right to recover leasehold and to receive rent), not the leasehold itself; therefore the lease continued.
- Authoritative instances (for example, Markose v. Godar Namboodiripad) show that where a mortgage document appropriated interest from pattom and left the balance of pattom to the mortgagor, the lease was held to subsist — this circumstance was relied on analogously.
- Pointed to disparity between the rent fixed in Ext. A (670 paras plus later enhancement) and the income stated in Ext. B (720 paras), contending that in prior decisions favourable to implied surrender the mortgage income exceeded the lease rent and that disparity was relied upon by the defendants as relevant.
- Relied on subsequent documents and receipts (Exts. X–XIII, XIX–XX, XVI–XVII, etc.) showing dealings under Ext. A (claims for pattom and applications for sub-pattah) as evidencing continued treatment of the relationship as lessor–lessee.
Plaintiff's Arguments (as reflected in the opinion)
- The terms of Ext. B indicate that possession was handed to the mortgagee and that Ext. B set out a self-contained accounting scheme (income described as "720 paras" and not as pattom), directions to the mortgagee to enjoy the property, provision for release on payment, repeated provision for payment of tax, and provision for sale — all of which indicate a mortgagor–mortgagee relationship.
- The plaintiff explained some subsequent documents and receipts as mistakenly issued by the plaintiff's karyastha and therefore not indicative of any change to the terms of Ext. B.
- The plaintiff relied on documents (Exts. XXX, XXXI, XXIX series) referring only to Ext. B as source of title, to show that subsequent dealings relied upon Ext. B rather than Ext. A — though the court ultimately treated such documents as inadmissible for the purpose urged by either party when the deed is plain and unambiguous.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Section 111, clause (f) of the Transfer of Property Act | Codifies principle that acceptance of a new lease that cannot co-exist with an existing lease is an implied surrender of the former lease (illustration included). | Used to state the statutory background for implied surrender as part of the legal framework applied to Exts. A and B. |
| Raman Velu v. Lekshmi, 1953 Ker LT 442 : AIR 1953 Trav-Co. 584 | Enunciates the principle that when two relationships concerning the same subject-matter are inconsistent and incompatible, the latter relationship will be deemed to have terminated the earlier one so that the latter may operate. | Applied as the principal rule: the court held that Ext. B created a relationship inconsistent with Ext. A and therefore Ext. A was impliedly surrendered. |
| Meenakshi Amma v. Kizhakke Valath Narayani, AIR 1957 Mad 212 | Applied the principle of implied surrender and distinguished Kallu v. Diwan. | Cited as authority applying the same principle and supporting the conclusion that a later instrument can impliedly terminate an earlier lease when inconsistent. |
| Venkayya v. Venkata Subbarao, AIR 1957 Andh-Pra. 619 | Restatement of the principle of implied surrender in similar terms. | Referred to as a corroborative authority restating the principle relied upon by the court. |
| Markose v. Godar Namboodiripad, 39 Cochin 400 | Example where mortgage document appropriated interest from pattom and left the balance to the mortgagor; held to be a conclusive circumstance that the lease subsisted notwithstanding the mortgage. | Cited by defendants as an instance contrary to implied surrender; the court treated it as distinguishable on the facts of the present case. |
| Lekshmi v. Velu, 1956 Ker LT 410 (arising from 1953 Ker LT 442) | Case where mortgaged property was the landlord's share of improvements; Division Bench did not depart from implied surrender principle. | Noted and distinguished from the present facts; used to show the principle's continued acceptance in subsequent decisions. |
| Mathai Ulahannan v. Kora Pothen, 1958 Ker LT 540 and 39 Cochin 400 | Illustrates the approach of construing documentary terms in light of surrounding circumstances. | Cited to support the court's method of interpreting Ext. B by reference to its terms and surrounding circumstances. |
| Varkey v. Untaman, 40 Cochin 280; Columbus v. Easi, 40 Cochin 430 | Decisions in which the income fixed by the mortgage deed exceeded the rent payable under the lease; cited in the context of discussing rent/income disparities. | Relied on by defendants to argue significance of income vs rent; court rejected the suggested test and treated these cases as not laying down such a test. |
| Kallu v. Diwan, ILR 24 All 487 | Earlier authority referred to and distinguished in later decisions. | Noted as a case distinguished by later courts (e.g., Meenakshi Amma); used in comparative discussion by the court. |
| Chockalingam Pillai v. Mayandi Chettiar, ILR 19 Mad 485 | Case where return (or not) of original lease deed was considered in context of preexisting permanent rights. | Cited for the proposition that non-return of the original lease is a slender circumstance; distinguished because it concerned permanent rights rather than a terminable lease. |
| Surayya v. Bala Gangadhara Ramakrishna Reddi, AIR 1948 PC 3 | Holds that when the terms of a document are plain and unambiguous, evidence of subsequent conduct of the parties is inadmissible to vary the document. | Relied on by the court to exclude subsequent conduct and documentary acts (receipts, applications) as altering the plain terms of Ext. B. |
| North Eastern Railway Co. v. Lord Hastings, 1900 A.C. 260 (quoted) | Statement that words of a written instrument must be construed according to their natural meaning and that acting by parties cannot alter plain and unambiguous words. | Quoted to support the exclusion of subsequent conduct where the instrument is plain and unambiguous. |
| Union of India v. Kishorilal Gupta and Bros., AIR 1959 SC 1362 | Supreme Court authority endorsing the rule that plain and unambiguous documents should be given effect to without permitting extraneous evidence to vary them. | Cited to reinforce the rule of inadmissibility of subsequent conduct when the deed is plain. |
| Vasudevan Namboori v. Poranchu Devassi, ILR 1956 Trav-Co. 704; Cheriyathu Mathai v. Thoma, 1956 Ker LT 214 : AIR 1956 Trav-Co. 193; George v. Mathai, 40 Cochin 1 | Illustrations of the rule excluding extraneous evidence where the language of the deed is plain and unambiguous. | Relied upon as supporting authorities for the rule that subsequent conduct or declarations cannot vary an unambiguous written instrument. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded in stages, applying established principles to the documents and surrounding circumstances set out in the record:
- Legal principle: The court began with the established doctrine of implied surrender — codified in Section 111(f) of the Transfer of Property Act and expounded in case law — that where a later instrument creates a relationship inconsistent and incompatible with an existing lease, the earlier lease is deemed terminated so the latter relationship can operate.
- Identification of the relevant question: The decisive question was whether Exts. A and B produced two incompatible relationships, i.e., whether after Ext. B the parties' relationship was exclusively mortgagor and mortgagee rather than lessor and lessee.
-
Examination of Ext. B's terms: The court analysed the terms of Ext. B in detail and identified important features supportive of a mortgagor–mortgagee relationship:
- Ext. B's schedule described the mortgaged properties and stated they were then outstanding under Ext. A;
- Ext. B expressly recited that possession of the properties was given to the mortgagee on the date of the document;
- It directed the mortgagee to enjoy the properties "directly or indirectly" and set out an accounting scheme describing the annual income as 720 paras of paddy (described as "income" rather than "pattom"), with portions appropriated to interest and the balance payable to the mortgagor;
- It provided for release of the properties on payment of the mortgage amount, repeated the payment of tax as if Ext. B were self-contained, and provided for sale of the properties to realize the mortgage money if necessary.
- Consideration of defendant arguments on income vs rent: The defendants emphasised that the income stated in Ext. B (720 paras) was less than the pattom fixed in Ext. A (670 paras plus subsequent enhancement) and sought to rely on decisions where mortgage income exceeded lease rent. The court rejected the proposition that disparity between rent and mortgage-accountable income is a conclusive test for implied surrender, noting that the cases did not support such a rigid test and that mortgage agreements allow freedom to fix accountable income.
- Temporal and formal points: The court observed that Ext. A's one-year term had expired and the lessee was holding over from year to year; Ext. A terminable on Karkadakom 28, 1106 and Ext. B took effect on Karkadakom 29, 1106 — the court found no merit in an argument based on omission to terminate the lease earlier when the parties could at any time supersede the lease by mortgage.
- Surrounding circumstances and subsequent conduct: The court considered surrounding circumstances (long possession by Tharappan, failure to claim fixity of tenure) and a number of receipts and documents showing dealings under Ext. A or referring to Ext. B. However, invoking the rule in Surayya v. Bala Gangadhara Ramakrishna Reddi (and other authorities and the North Eastern Railway dictum), the court held that where the terms of a document are plain and unambiguous, evidence of subsequent conduct is inadmissible to vary its terms. The court thus excluded such subsequent conduct evidence for the purpose of altering the plain meaning of Ext. B.
- Conclusion from the combined analysis: On the description of the mortgaged properties and the terms of Ext. B, the court concluded that Ext. B evidenced only a mortgagor–mortgagee relationship, and that Ext. A and Ext. B contemplated two inconsistent and incompatible relationships. Applying the rule in Raman Velu v. Lekshmi, the court held that Ext. A must be deemed to have been surrendered impliedly upon Ext. B taking effect.
- Remedies and ancillary determinations: The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover actual possession of the mortgaged properties on redemption of Ext. B. On mesne profits, the court found the evidence insufficient to prove more than 720 paras of paddy per annum and fixed mesne profits at that amount (or their commuted value) from the date notice of deposit of the mortgage money was given. On costs, while the lower court had directed the plaintiff to pay the defendants' costs, the appellate court ordered that the parties bear their own costs in the lower court and allowed the plaintiff his costs of this appeal against the third defendant who contested.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
THE APPEAL IS ALLOWED.
The court's dispositive rulings (direct consequences for the parties) were:
- The court held that Ext. B evidenced a mortgagor–mortgagee relationship and that Ext. A was impliedly surrendered upon Ext. B taking effect; accordingly, the plaintiff is entitled to recover actual possession of the mortgaged properties upon redemption of Ext. B.
- The plaintiff is entitled to mesne profits, fixed at 720 paras of paddy per annum (or their commuted value) from the date on which notice of the deposit of the mortgage amount was given.
- The parties are ordered to bear their respective costs in the lower court; the plaintiff is allowed his costs of the appeal against the third defendant who contested it.
Implications:
The decision applies established principles concerning implied surrender and the inadmissibility of subsequent conduct to vary a plain written instrument: the court applied those principles to the specific documents and facts before it to decide the rights of the parties. The opinion does not announce a new legal principle; its practical effect is to determine the rights of the parties in this matter (deeming Ext. A surrendered and awarding possession on redemption, fixing mesne profits and costs as stated).
1. The suit is for the redemption of a mortgage with possession, Ext. B dated August 14, 1931 A.D corresponding to Karkadation 29, 1106 M.E in favour of Tharappan, represented in this suit by this sons, defendants 1 to 3, and grandsons defendants 4 to 9. The principal question for decision is whether a prior lease, Ext. A dated Karkadakam 28, 1091, in favour of Tharappan subsisted after Ext. B, or must be deemed to have been surrendered impliedly on the date thereof. Ext. A was a ‘verumpattom’ lease with no premium and no right in the lessee to make improvements, and was for a term of one year. It stipulated the payment of tax by the lessee amounting to Rs. 48-8-1 annually, and the payment of pattom or rent at 670 paras-2 edangazhees-2 nazhees of paddy in the months of Kanni and Makaram, and a perquisite of ‘vazhakula’ at eight annas per annum.
2. Ext. B is called ‘kaivasapanyadharam’ (mortgage with possession), the mortgage amount being Rs. 2500. The mortgaged properties were the three items of properties described as such, in the schedule appended to it, which were stated to be then outstanding with Tharappan under Ext. A lease. Ext. B recited, that the possession of the mortgaged properties was given on that day to the mortgagee, and it directed him to enjoy them directly or indirectly, on payment of tax of Rs. 48-8-1.
3. The balance of the income from the mortgaged properties after payment of tax was stated to be 720 paras of paddy, out of which, 50 paras of paddy per month or 300 paras of paddy for six months, were to be appropriated towards interest on the mortgage amount, the term of the mortgage being six months, the balance of the yearly income amounting to 420 paras of paddy being payable to lie mortgagor, before the expiry of the term on Makarom 30, 1107, when the mortgagor was to pay the mortgage amount and take a release of the properties.
4. Ext. B further provided, that if the mortgage amount was not paid as aforesaid, the mortgagee may continue to appropriate interest at the rate of 50 paras of paddy per mensem from the paddy payable to the mortgagor, and the mortgage money would be paid on demand by the mortgagee, when all accounts relating to the mortgage transaction would be settled. If the mortgage money was not paid on such demand, the properties scheduled and the mortgagor were answerable, and the mortgage money may be realised by the sale of the properties.
5. It cannot be disputed, that one of the modes in which a lease may be terminated, is by surrender, which may be either express or implied. Section 111, clause (f) of the Transfer of Property Act has only codified this principle and illustration to that clause provides that:
“a lessee accepts from his lessor a new lease of the property leased, to take effect during the continuance of the existing lease. This is an implied surrender of the former lease, and such lease determines thereupon.”
6. This is not exhaustive. The principle of implied surrender is founded in English law, upon the rule of estoppel, which precludes a lessee from disputing the validity of the second lease which he has accepted and which cannot co-exist with the first lease. In India, the principle has been stated very clearly, if I may say so, in Raman Velu v. Lekshmi, 1953 Ker LT 442 : AIR 1953 Trav-Co. 584 in these terms:
“The principle is that whenever a certain relationship exists between two parties in respect of a subject-matter and a new relationship arises as regards the identical subject-matter if the two sets of relationships cannot co-exist as being inconsistent and incompatible, that is to say, if the latter can come into effect only on termination of the earlier that would be deemed to have been terminated in order to enable the latter to operate.”
7. This principle was applied by Ramaswamy, J., in Meenakshi Amma v. Kizhakke Valath Narayani, AIR 1957 Mad 212, distinguishing Kallu v. Diwan, ILR 24 All 487 and was restated in more or less similar terms by Viswanatha Sastri, J., in Venkayya v. Venkata Subbarao, AIR 1957 Andh-Pra. 619. The question is, whether under Exts. A and B, the parties stand to each other in two inconsistent and incompatible relationships, or in other words, whether the relationship between them after the date of Ext. B, was that of mortgagor and mortgagee and not that of lessor and lessee.
8. It was contended for the defendants, that the acceptance of a mortgage does not always put an end to the earlier lease, and it was urged, that though under Ext. A, the immovable properties were leased, under Ext. B, what was mortgaged was only the lessor's reversion, meaning not only his right to recover the leasehold, but also the Tight to the rent and all other rights which he may possess under the lease.
9. As an instance, Markose v. Godar Namboodiripad, 39 Cochin 400, may be referred to, where the provision in the mortgage document was to appropriate the interest on the mortgage amount from the “pattom” or “rent” payable under the lease, the balance of the pattom alone, being payable to the mortgagor which was held to be a conclusive circumstance for coming to the conclusion, that the lease subsisted notwithstanding the mortgage.
10. Lekshmi v. Velu, 1956 Ker LT 410, furnished another instance, where the mortgaged property was specifically described to be the landlord's share of the improvements under the lease transaction. This case arose on appeal from 1953 Ker LT 442 : (AIR 1953 Trav-Co. 584), cited earlier, but the Division Bench which disposed of the appeal did not depart from the principle of implied surrender enunciated by the single Judge and adverted to above. These cases are distinguishable from the present.
11. In my opinion, the question has to be answered primarily on the terms of Ext. B, understood in the light of the surrounding circumstances. See Mathai Ulahannan v. Kora Pothen, 1958 Ker LT 540 and 39 Cochin 400. The contents of Ext. B which are important in this connection, are, the description of the mortgaged properties in the schedule, the statement in it that possession of the properties was handed over to the mortgagee on the date of the document, the direction to the mortgagee to enjoy the properties directly or indirectly, the reference to 720 paras of paddy as the annual income from the properties in contradistinction with the description as rent in Ext. A, together with the provision for accounting relating to it, by appropriating part of it towards interest on the mortgage amount and by paying the balance to the mortgagor the provision in it for the release of the mortgaged properties on payment of the mortgage amount, the repetition of the provision for the payment of tax amounting to Rs. 48-8-1, as if Ext. B is self-contained, and the provision for the sale of the mortgaged properties as described.
12. These indicate to my mind, that after the date of Ext. B, the only relationship that subsisted, was that of mortgagor and mortgagee. But the learned counsel for the defendants pointed out, that though the rent fixed by Ext. A was 670 paras — 2 edangazhees — 2 nazhees and this was enhanced by 50 paras sometime later, the income fixed in Ext. B was only 720 paras, which was less than the rent stipulated in Ext. A, and he urged, that in decided cases, which have held in favour of implied surrender, such as Varkey v. Untaman, 40 Cochin 280 and Columbus v. Easi, 40 Cochin 430, the income fixed by the mortgage was higher than the rent payable under lease; this he said, was for a very good reason, because in a lease, the tenant's share of the profits is an element to be taken into consideration in fixing the rent, which is not the case in a mortgage. In support of this, the learned counsel relied on the following passage in the Cochin State Manual, page 301:
“In leases of this kind in the old days, a third of the net produce of the land, after deducting the cost of seed and an equal amount for the cost of cultivation, was reserved to the tenant, and two thirds paid to the landlord………”
13. But the passage proceeds:
“In many cases now the tenant's share is less, in varying degrees, than a third of the net produce, and in some it is hardly more than the bare cost of seed and cultivation, the tenants in such cases being practically labourers on subsistence wages.” The fixation of rent is therefore no conclusive circumstance. The cases have, not laid down this difference between rent and income, as a test for deciding the issue of implied surrender of a lease upon the execution of a mortgage. In the case decided by Ramaswami, J., the income fixed by the mortgage deed was less than the rent stipulated by the lease deed and yet this did not affect his conclusion. The freedom for the contracting parties in a mortgage, to fix what shall be the accountable income cannot be curtailed and I fail to see, how the present controversy can be resolved upon this disparity between the rent as stipulated in Ext. A and the accountable income as settled in Ext. B.
14. The learned counsel relied on the provision in Ext. B for the payment to the mortgagor of the balance of the income for the whole year, after appropriating interest on the mortgage amount within the first six mondis of its date. This was because, the mortgaged properties are paddy lands, the income from which, is derived before the end of Makarom every year, and in Ext. A to the stipulation for the payment of pattom was similar.
15. The term of one year in Ext. A having expired, and the lessee having continued to hold over, the lease was from year to year and there remained no premium to be refunded and no value of improvements to be paid to the lessee. Ext. A was terminable on Karkadakom 28, 1106, and significantly enough, Ext. B took effect on Karkadakom 29, 1106. Assuming that there has been an interval of time, a split second between Karkadakom 28 when Ext. A could have been terminated and Karkadakom 29, when Ext. B took effect, it was very well open to the parties to supersede the lease by the mortgage at any time and so no argument can be founded on the omission to terminate the lease on the 28th itself.
16. Much emphasis was laid, on the term ‘* * *’ (Malayalam, omitted) with reference to this lease, as indicative of its further continuance. I need only quote the observations of the learned Judge in 1953 Ker LT 442 at p. 446 : (AIR 1953 Tra-Co. 584 at p. 586), which furnish a complete answer to this argument. The learned Judge observed thus:
“This recognition however cannot be taken to connote the subsistence or continuation of the lease after the mortgage because the document distinctly stipulates that on demand by the mortgagor or mortgagee, they are mutually under an obligation to surrender the property and make payment of the money respectively, that is to say, there should be a surrender of the property on redemption. If this surrender should have any meaning and should be possible, an assumption of termination of the pre-existing lease is essential.”
17. I can find no better words to reject the argument. If, as argued, the subject-matter of the mortgage was only the reversionary interest of the landlord, nothing would have been easier, than to stipulate, for the appropriation of a Part of the pattom towards interest on the mortgage money, and for the further payment of the balance as pattom to the landlord. On the contrary, the parties have taken special care to refer to the amount of 720 Paras as income and not as pattom.
18. On the description of the mortgaged properties, and on the terms and provisions of Ext. B, I feel no hesitation whatever, in coming to the conclusion, that Ext. B evidences only the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee. Thus Exts. A and B contemplate two inconsistent and incompatible relations, and on the rule in 1953 Ker LT 442 : (AIR 1953 Trav-Co. 584), I hold, that the right under Ext. A must be deemed to have been surrendered impliedly on Ext. B taking effect.
19. The learned counsel also referred me to what were stated to be some of the surrounding circumstances. It is seen, that Tharappan had been a lessee for a long time even before Ext. A, and continued to hold over, after Ext. A, till the date of Ext. B. It was not pretended by the lessee, that he had thereby obtained any fixity of tenure; for, if he had, stronger grounds would have to be made out to establish, that it was given up by him. It was on this ground, that the case decided by the Allahabad High Court in ILR 24 All 487 Was distinguished by Ramaswamy, J., in AIR 1957 Mad 212.
20. That the original lease deed, Ext. A, was not) returned to the lessee on taking Ext. B, is but a slender circumstance, notwithstanding the reliance on a similar circumstance, along with more weighty reasons, in Chockalingam Pillai v. Mayandi Chettiar, ILR 19 Mad 485, which was a case of a preexisting permanent right, and not of a lease terminable at any time. There is nothing then, in these surrounding circumstances which militates against my conclusion.
21. The learned counsel next relied on a large number of receipts, evidenced by Exts. X to XIII and XIX to XX series. Some of them, like Exts. X(b) and XI (b) were receipts, as for pattom under Ext. A, with deductions towards interest on the mortgage amount under Ext. B, but in others, there is no such indication, though all of them may be token to be receipts for dues Payable under Ext. A, including ‘vazhakula’ for they evidence lcceiots of 120 pares—2 edangazhees—2 nazhees for the years 1109 and 1110, and of 150 paras—2 edangazhees—2 nazhees for the subsequent year-’, which correspond to the pattom under Ext. A after deductions towards interest under Ext. B.
22. In Ext. I notice issued on behalf of the Plaintiff, the lawyer demanded the payment of dues, which are payable under Ext. A and not under Ext. B. Exts. XVI and XVII evidence a joint application for sub-pattah under Cochin Act II of 1103, made by the plaintiff and Tharappan on the basis of Ext. A. These documents afford evidence of subsequent conduct of the parties as to how they interpreted or treated their relationship under Exts. A and B and if they are admissible, notwithstanding the explanation offered by the plaintiff that they were mistakenly or unauthorisedly issued by the plaintiff's karyastha, I have no doubt, that they go against the plaintiffs' case.
23. But I am also of the view, that where the terms, of a document are plain and unambiguous no evidence of subsequent conduct of the Parties as to how they understood them, or treated their relationship, is admissible. The rule was laid down by the Privy Council in Surayya v. Bala Gangadhara Ramakrishna Reddi AIR 1948 PC 3 and the following observations of the Earl of Halsbury, L.C in North Eastern Railway Co. v. Lord Hastings, 1900 A.C 260 were quoted:
“The words of a written instrument must be construed according to their natural meaning, and it appears to me that no amount of acting by the parties can alter or qualify words which are plain and unambiguous.”
24. The Supreme Court also has held so, in Union of India v. Kishorilal Gupta and Bros., AIR 1959 SC 1362. Other cases, such as Vasudevan Namboori v. Poranchu Devassi, ILR 1956 Trav-Co. 704, Cheriyathu Mathai v. Thoma, 1956 Ker LT 214 : (AIR 1956 Trav-Co. 193) and George v. Mathai, 40 Cochin 1 furnish illustrations of the application of this rule. In ILR 1956 Trav-Co. 704 it was stated thus:
“When the language of the deed is plain and unambiguous, extraneous evidence whether that evidence consists of oral evidence as to the intention of the parties or evidence as to their acts and conduct wherefrom their intention could be gathered, is inadmissible, and Courts of law should, in such cases, give effect to the intention expressed in the document.”
25. In 39 Cochin 400, the Cochin Court reversed the judgment of the District Judge, who relied on the subsequent declarations and acts of the parties as varying the terms of the document. The learned counsel sought to distingush these cases, suggesting, that the items of evidence are not relied on for interpreting Ext B, but that they show how Exts. A and B were reconciled by the Parties, and how the obligation under Ext. B to surrender the properties and to account to the mortgagor, was not enforced or was remitted.
26. I fail to perceive this distinction. To my mind, they only evidence the “acting by the parties” within the meaning of the rule quoted above, and are therefore hit by the rule of inadmissibility. As I understand the pleading, the defendants Had no case in the written statement, that whatever be the terms and Provisions of Ext. B, the obligation to surrender the property and to render accounts was dispensed with or remitted at any subsequent stage-of their relationship.
27. The reference in paragraph 6 of the first defendant's written statement, on which some reliance was placed for this purpose, does not amount to such a plea. If subsequent conduct can be looked into, the learned counsel for the plaintiff in his turn invited my attention to Exts. XXX and XXXI, two settlement deeds of the year 1109 executed by Tharappan in favour of two of his sons, to the lease deedsi Exts. XXIX(a), XXIX(b) and XXIX(c) taken by one of the sons of Tharappan for portions of the mortgaged properties from others, in which Ext. B alone and not Ext. A was referred to as the source of title.
28. But I hold, that equally with those on which the defendants have relied, these documents too are inadmissible. The plaintiff is therefore entitled to recover actual possession of the mortgaged properties on redemption of Ext. B and the decree of the lower court negativing such right cannot stand.
29. It was stated that the plaintiff has deposited the sum of Rs. 2500 on October 17, 1951, in pursuance of the order passed on M.P 1782 of 1951 and that the first defendant has withdrawn Rs. 625 on October 12, 1953, as per order on M.P 1479 of 1953, and defendants 2 and 3 have withdrawn Rs. 1250 as per order on M.P 1495 of 1953. It has also stated, that the legal representatives of Chummar, the deceased son of Tharappan, had also withdrawn their share of the mortgage money.
30. The plaintiff had claimed mesne profits for the properties on redemption. Some evidence was adduced to prove, that such profits would be more than 720 paras of paddy per annum, but the evidence is not acceptable. I find, that the amount of mesne profits can be fixed only at 720 Paras of paddy per annum. The plaintiff will be entitled to such mesne profits or their commuted value, from the defendants, from the date on which notice of the deposit of the mortgage amount was given to the defendants. The plaintiff was directed to pay the costs of the defendants in the lower Court, following the rule, that the mortgagee is entitled to his costs in a redemption suit; in the nature of the contentions raised by the defendants, I order, that the Parties will bear their costs in the lower court, but the plaintiff is allowed his costs of this appeal in this Court, from the third respondent—the third defendant—who contested this appeal. The appeal is allowed as above.
FE/E
31. Appeal allowed.
Alert