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Narayanan Nambooripad & Others v. Gopalan Nair & Others

Kerala High Court
Mar 28, 1960
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Structured Summary of the Legal Opinion (Govinda Menon, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal was filed by the plaintiffs (through their next friend) seeking a declaration that the compromise decree passed in O.S. 21/1124 of the Anjikaimal District Court is invalid and not binding on the plaintiffs and their Illom (Cheruvally Swaroopam), together with ancillary reliefs.

Relevant facts from the opinion:

  • Plaintiffs 1–6 and defendants 3–7 are members of the undivided Namboodiri illom called Cheruvally Swaroopam. The 3rd defendant was the karnavan; the 4th defendant managed the illom under an udampady (Ext. P.1).
  • The 1st defendant was appointed manager under an unregistered karar (Ext. P.20) dated 4th Edavam 1123 and took over management on 8th Edavam 1123; a registered karar (Ext. P.15) was executed on 6th Mithunam 1123.
  • Allegations arose that the 1st defendant mismanaged and misappropriated illom income; defendants 3 and 4 terminated his managership by notice dated 20-12-1123 and called for accounts; no accounts were rendered.
  • The 1st defendant instituted O.S. 21/1124 claiming Rs. 5,250 (Rs. 140 salary; Rs. 5,217-3-0 as further advances/expenses) — plaintiffs in the present appeal were defendants in that suit. Defendants 3 and 4 in the present suit filed O.S. 120/1124 seeking rendition of accounts and Rs. 4,000.
  • While these suits were pending, O.S. 91/1950 was filed by the 5th defendant to remove the present defendants 3 and 4 from Karnavasthanam; a receiver was appointed and impleaded in O.S. 21/1124.
  • Compromise petitions were filed in O.S. 21/1124 (Ext. P.12) and O.S. 120/1124; the plaintiffs allege the 7th defendant (their guardian) was induced to sign blank papers and that the compromise (resulting in Ext. P.18, the compromise order) was obtained by collusion and is detrimental to the illom. The compromise provided for a decree against the plaintiffs and their illom for the plaint amount and costs, with interest, but excluded properties allotted to the 4th defendant under a separate compromise (Ext. P.11 in O.S. 90/1951).
  • The 2nd defendant had earlier obtained a decree against the 1st defendant (O.S. 317/1951, Cranganore Munsiff Court) and had attached the decree passed in O.S. 21/1124; the 2nd defendant was impleaded as an attaching-decree-holder.
  • The learned Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit, holding that the compromise decree was not vitiated by fraud, collusion or undue influence; that sanction under Order 32, Rule 7 had been substantially complied with; and that the guardian was not proved guilty of gross negligence. The plaintiffs appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the compromise decree in O.S. 21/1124 is invalid and not binding on the plaintiffs' illom.
  2. Whether a minor can avoid a decree passed against him on the ground of gross negligence of the guardian ad litem, even if the minor has not proved fraud or collusion on the part of the guardian.
  3. Whether the facts and circumstances of the present case justify a finding that the guardian ad litem acted with gross and culpable negligence in consent to the compromise.
  4. Whether the procedural requirements of Order 32, Rule 7, C.P.C. (sanction for compromise involving minors) were complied with such that the compromise is valid and binding.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The compromise decree in O.S. 21/1124 is invalid, not binding, and highly detrimental to the plaintiffs and their illom.
  • The compromise was procured by collusion between the 1st defendant, the 4th defendant and the brother of the 7th defendant; the 7th defendant (guardian) was induced to sign blank papers without understanding them.
  • The guardian was guilty of gross and culpable negligence in allowing the compromise and withdrawing valid contentions and defences; if the suit had been properly contested the falsity of the plaint claim could have been shown.
  • The compromise conferred no benefit on the minors or the illom and thus should be set aside.

Defendants' Arguments

  • 1st defendant: The Swaroopam was indebted; he had to incur expenses for management and day-to-day needs and advanced money when illom funds were unavailable. Borrowing for such purposes was not prohibited; he denied mismanagement or misappropriation and relied on accounts and vouchers (including Ext. D3) to prove his claim.
  • 1st defendant: The suits (O.S. 21/1124, O.S. 120/1124, O.S. 91/1950 and others) were compromised for the benefit of the minors and the illom; allegations of fraud and collusion were false; the compromise was bona fide and beneficial, and the decree is valid and binding.
  • 2nd defendant: The compromise in O.S. 21/1124 was a settlement of conflicting and doubtful claims and the decree is not liable to be impeached.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chunduru Punnayyah v. Rajam Viranna (I.L.R. 45 Madras 425) Madras leading case that a minor can challenge a decree obtained against him on the ground of gross negligence of his guardian even without proof of fraud or collusion. The Court treated this as a leading Madras authority supporting the proposition that gross negligence by a guardian is a sufficient ground to set aside a decree.
Haji Muhammad Ahadak Koyi Sahib v. Burra Venkata Komaraju (A.I.R. 1940 Madras 810) Followed the principle in Chunduru Punnayyah; supports right of minor to avoid decree on guardian's gross negligence. Noted as a subsequent Madras decision following the same principle.
N.P.L. Eggappa Chettiar v. Rm. S.V.L. Ramanathan Chettiar (A.I.R. 1942 Madras 384) Affirmed the view that gross negligence by guardian permits setting aside a decree. Recognized as an affirmation of the Madras line of authority.
Raghubar Dyal v. Bhimya Lal (12 Cal. 69) Early Calcutta decision that held a minor could not maintain such a suit without pleading fraud/collusion; remedy would be by way of review. Cited as an earlier view in Calcutta which was not the attracting line ultimately followed by other High Courts; contrasted with later Calcutta cases.
Lalla Sheo Churn Lal v. Ramanandan Dobey (22 Cal. 8) Contrary Calcutta view that a minor could challenge a decree for guardian's gross negligence (i.e., recognizing the right). Cited as the Calcutta authority supporting the right of the minor to bring a suit on ground of guardian's gross negligence.
Mahesh Chandra Bavan v. Mohindra Nath Das (A.I.R. 1941 Cal. 401) Held gross and culpable negligence by guardian ad litem is sufficient to enable an infant to set aside a decree obtained against him; Section 2 and Section 44 Evidence Act and Section 11 C.P.C. do not bar such a suit. Relied upon to support the proposition that statutory and procedural provisions do not prevent a substantive right to challenge for gross negligence.
Mt. Siraj Fatima v. Mahamood Ali (A.I.R. 1932 All. 293) Allahabad Full Bench held gross negligence is sufficient; articulated the test of negligence (reasonable/prudent person standard) and required serious prejudice to the minor. Adopted for the standard of what constitutes gross negligence sufficient to avoid a decree.
Iftghar Hussain Khan v. Beant Singh (A.I.R. 1946 Lah. 233) Lahore Full Bench: a minor can avoid a decree on ground of guardian's gross negligence even without proving fraud or collusion. Counted among High Court Full Bench decisions supporting the rule relied upon by the Court.
R.B. Kamakshya N. Singh v. Baldeo (A.I.R. 1950 Patna 97) Patna Full Bench held that a minor can avoid a decree for guardian's gross negligence even absent fraud or collusion. Included in the set of Full Bench decisions the Court relied on in affirming the principle.
Sankaranaryanan Namboodiri v. Kali (1955 K.L.T. 660) Travancore-Cochin High Court decision supporting the principle that gross negligence of guardian suffices. Noted as supporting authority from T.C. High Court.
Saraswathi Amma v. Krishna Menon (36 Cochin 602) Cochin Full Bench decision consistent with the view that gross negligence is a ground to set aside decree against a minor. Counted among decisions showing English and Indian authorities accept the principle.
Krishnadas Padmanabhrao Chanduvarkar v. Vithoba Annappa Shetti (A.I.R. 1939 Bombay 66) Bombay Full Bench contrary view: gross negligence alone (apart from fraud or collusion) cannot be the basis of a suit to set aside a decree obtained against a minor. The Court considered this contrary Full Bench decision, discussed it, and respectfully disagreed with it, holding it did not state the correct law.
Auraj Joharmal v. Dalpat Sunadu (I.L.R. 1937 Bombay 839) Earlier Bombay ruling followed in part by later Bombay decisions. Cited as part of the Bombay line of authority that the Court ultimately did not accept as correctly stating the law.
Nana Nandeo Patil v. Dalpat Supadu Patil (A.I.R. 1940 Bom. 33) Subsequent Bombay decision in the same line as the Full Bench view. Noted as following the Full Bench approach of the Bombay High Court which the Court disagreed with.
Gurusandas Nath v. Ladka Vahu (19 Bombay 571) Earlier Bombay decisions that had been to the effect that gross negligence gave a minor a cause of action. Cited to show earlier Bombay authority was not uniform; part of the historical analysis.
Hanmantepa v. Jiyu Bai (24 Bombay 547) Another earlier Bombay case aligning with the view that gross negligence could be actionable. Included in the historical account of Bombay decisions.
Sureshchandra Jamietram v. Bai Ishwari (A.I.R. 1938 Bombay 206) Yet another Bombay decision supporting gross negligence as a ground for relief. Noted in the review of prior Bombay authority.
Bishundas Narain v. Seogeni Raj (1951 S.C. 280) Supreme Court holding that a guardian need not obtain the court's sanction before beginning negotiations and that sanction is not necessary to enable a guardian to conclude a provisional agreement with a view to compromise. The Court relied on this authority to reject the contention that sanction under Order 32, Rule 7 must precede negotiations or provisional agreements and to explain that a final compromise without leave is voidable but preliminary negotiations are permitted.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in discrete steps, applying legal principle to the facts of the case:

  1. Preliminary framing: The main question was whether the compromise decree in O.S. 21/1124 was invalid and not binding on the plaintiffs' illom. The first specific legal question identified was whether a minor can avoid a decree obtained against him on the ground of the guardian's gross negligence even in the absence of fraud or collusion.
  2. Review of authorities: The Court reviewed decisions from multiple High Courts and Full Benches (Madras, Calcutta, Allahabad, Patna, Lahore, Travancore-Cochin, Cochin) which had held that gross and culpable negligence by the guardian ad litem suffices to enable an infant to set aside a decree obtained against him. The Court contrasted these with the Bombay Full Bench line of authority which took a contrary view, and expressly stated respectful disagreement with the Bombay Full Bench decision (Krishnadas Chanduvarkar) as not laying down the correct law.
  3. Legal-demarcation: The Court emphasized that the right of a minor to avoid a decree on grounds of guardian's gross negligence is a substantive right, not merely procedural, and does not depend on any single rule of evidence. It observed that Section 44 of the Evidence Act (which lists fraud and collusion) is permissive and does not exhaust the grounds upon which a decree may be attacked, and that Section 11, C.P.C. (the conclusiveness of judgment) does not prevent setting aside a judgment if vacated on recognised legal grounds.
  4. Application of statutory provisions governing illom transactions: The Court considered Sections 10 and 11 of the Cochin Namboodiri Act (XVII of 1114), which limit the ability of members or agents to bind the illom by sales, mortgages or other alienations unless there is illom necessity or written consent of the majority. The Court reasoned that if members' rights to contract debts are circumscribed, an agent (like the manager) could have no greater right; therefore, a creditor must prove illom necessity to bind the illom.
  5. Factual evaluation of the defence available to the minors: The Court examined the written statements (Ext. P.5 series) and evidence and concluded the minors had a "perfectly good defence" — primarily that the 1st defendant lacked authority to borrow under the karar (Ext. P.15), that there was no necessity for the debts alleged, and that the account book (Ext. D3) was not genuine.
  6. Examination of financial facts and timing: The Court considered the illom's income (admissions in evidence: annual paddy and cash income, stock of 1000 paras of paddy at change of management, mortgages Ext. P.2 and P.3 showing cash receipt of Rs. 2,000) and concluded that, prima facie, there was no necessity for the 1st defendant's alleged advances within the short period he managed the estate; the claimed advances of Rs. 5,250 appeared false or unnecessary on the material before the Court.
  7. Competency of adult members and the conduct of the guardian: The Court noted that several adult members could not have safeguarded the illom (1st plaintiff insane; 3rd defendant lacking normal mental faculty; 5th defendant insane or with lucid intervals), leaving the 4th defendant (who had an interest excluded from liability) and the guardian (7th defendant), who was an illiterate Gosha lady. The guardian swore (P.W.5) she was unaware of O.S. 21/1124 and had only been told about a different compromise (O.S. 90/51). The receiver admitted he did not read the compromise petition before joining and that no sanction had been obtained from the court at that time.
  8. Critique of trial judge's handling and evidentiary limitation: The Court criticized the Subordinate Judge's orders which prevented cross-examination on the merits of O.S. 21/1124 and therefore hampered the plaintiffs' ability to prove that they had a valid defence and that the account entries (Ext. D3) were false. It found the learned Judge's subsequent observations (paras 10 and 12 of the trial judgment) unfair in light of that evidentiary exclusion.
  9. Assessment of the compromise and sanction procedure: The Court rejected the contention that sanction under Order 32, Rule 7 must precede negotiations, relying on the Supreme Court decision in Bishundas Narain v. Seogeni Raj (1951 S.C. 280), and observed that while sanction is important, a compromise may be voidable if obtained without proper protection of the minors' interests or by gross negligence of the guardian. The Razi (compromise) petition did not explain how the compromise was beneficial to the minors nor indicate examination of accounts that would show the defence unsustainable; hence the court that granted sanction may not have been fully informed.
  10. Conclusion on gross negligence and result: Considering the totality of circumstances — existence of a prima facie good defence, the guardian's inattention or lack of understanding, the exclusion of evidence by the trial judge, the one-sided nature of the compromise (surrendering defences and suffering judgment for the entire plaint amount) and the lack of demonstrable benefit to the minors — the Court concluded the guardian's conduct amounted to gross and culpable negligence. The Court therefore found the plaintiffs had made out a case to avoid the compromise decree.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed; the decree and judgment of the court below are set aside; the suit is decreed as prayed for in the plaint.

Consequences and immediate implications (as provided in the opinion):

  • The appellants (plaintiffs) succeed on appeal and obtain the reliefs claimed in their plaint.
  • The appellants are awarded costs both in this Court and in the lower court, to be paid by the 1st defendant.

Broader implications:
The Court, after reviewing a body of authorities, held that gross and culpable negligence by a guardian ad litem is a substantive ground on which a minor can avoid a decree obtained against him even in the absence of proof of fraud or collusion. The opinion records disagreement with the contrary Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court and aligns with a prevailing line of High Court Full Bench decisions to that effect. The opinion itself does not expressly state that it establishes a new precedent beyond the application of the discussed authorities to the present facts.

Show all summary ...

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Govinda Menon, J.:— This appeal is filed by the plaintiffs and it arises out of a suit commenced by the plaintiffs through their next friend for a declaration that the compromise decree passed in O.S 21/1124 of the Anjikaimal District Court is invalid and not binding on the plaintiffs and their Illom and for ancillary reliefs.

2. Plaintiffs 1 to 6 and defendants 3 to 7 are the members of an undivided Namboodiri illom known as Cheruvally Swaroopam of which 3rd defendant is the karnavan. The 3rd defendant is said to be illiterate, dull-headed and incapable of management and the 4th defendant was therefore managing the illom affairs under an udampady, Ext. P. 1. The illom owned considerable properties in the Cochin area of the former T.C State. While the fourth defendant was in management, the 1st defendant was appointed as the manager to look after the illom properties under an unregistered karar, Ext. P. 20, dated 4th Edavam 1123. The 1st defendant took over the management on 8th Edavam 1123. The karar had provided that he should not incur any debts and that he should collect pattom, michavarom, Jenmikaram, etc., and dicharge the debts. Subsequently, a registered karar Ext. P. 15 to the same effect was also executed on 6th Mithunam 1123. Not long after the 1st defendant took over the management, it was found that he was not properly managing the illom affairs and that he was mis-managing and mis-appropriating the income of the illom. So defendants 3 and 4 issued a notice on 20-12-1123 terminating his managership and calling upon him to render accounts. No accounts were rendered; but the 1st defendant instituted the suit O.S 21/1124 against the Swaroopam claiming a sum of Rs. 5,250/- from the illom. Ext. P. 4 is the plaint in the suit. Rs. 140/- was claimed as arrears of salary and another sum of Rs. 5,217-3-0 was claimed as amounts which he had expended for the day to day expenses of the illom, for some medical treatment and for certain other ceremonies. The case of the plaintiff in this suit is that the entire claim was false and that no amounts were due to the 1st defendant. The plaintiffs in this case were defendants 3 and 5 to 10 respectively in that suit. Defendants 3 and 4 in this suit were defendants 1 and 2 and defendants 5 and 6 were defendants 4 and 5. The 7th defendant in this suit was the 11th defendant. Defendants 3 and 4 in this suit in turn had filed a suit O.S 120/1124 against the present 1st defendant for the rendition of accounts for the period the 1st defendant was in management and a sum of Rs. 4000/- was claimed from him. While these two suits were pending the 5th defendant in this suit filed O.S 91/1950 to remove the present defendants 3 and 4 from Karnavasthanam. A receiver was appointed in the suit. That Receiver was impleaded in O.S 21 of 1124 also. Defendants 3 to 5 and the receiver the 13th defendant had filed written statement contesting the claim of the 1st defendant. Ext. P. 5(b) is the written statement of defendants 1 and 2, Ext. P. 5 is the written statement of 4th defendant and Ext. P. 5(a) is the written statement of the receiver. The 7th defendant the mother was the guardian of the minors.

3. The plaintiffs in this case allege that knowing that the 1st defendant's suit was being hotly contested, he, in collusion with the 4th defendant and one Krishnan Namboodiri the brother of the 7th defendant induced the 7th defendant to sign certain blank papers without making her understand as to what they were intended for and that in those papers compromise petitions were prepared for the two suits O.S 21/1124 and O.S 120/1124 and they were filed in court. On the basis of the compromise petition Ext. D4 O.S 120/1124 filed by defendants 3 and 4 was dismissed. Ext. P. 12 is the compromise petition in O.S 21 of 1124 and Ext. P. 18 is the order of the court. By Ext. P. 12 it was agreed that a decree be passed against the plaintiffs and their illom for the plaint amount and costs with future interest to be realised from the assets of the Swaroopam excepting the properties allotted to the 4th defendant in the compromise Ext. P. 11 in O.S 90 of 1951. The plaintiffs' case is that this compromise decree is not valid and binding on them, that the decree is highly detrimental to them and their illom, that there was no justification to withdraw the contentions and permit a decree to be passed and that no benefit had accrued to the minors or the illom. They allege that the decree was brought about by the collusion of defendants 1 and 4 and the brother of the 7th defendant. They say that the 7th defendant, their guardian was guilty of gross and culpable negligence. They contend that if only the suit had been contested, the falsity of the plaint claim could have been demonstrated to the court and that no decree would have been passed in the suit.

4. The second defendant is one who had obtained a decree against the 1st defendant in O.S 317/1951 of the Cranganore Munsiff Court and in execution of that decree he has attached the decree passed in O.S 21/1124. The 2nd defendant has therefore been impleaded as an attaching-decree-holder. Defendants 1 and 2 filed separate written statements and the other defendants remained ex parte.

5. The 1st defendant contends that the plaintiffs' Swaroopam were in debts, that the members were finding it difficult to manage, huge amounts had to be paid to the creditors and it was at such a juncture that he was appointed manager. His case is that he had not received any money under the two mortgage documents referred to in the plaint and that for the purposes of management and for the day to day expenses of the illom he had to incur huge expenses and as no amount was available from the funds of the illom he had to meet the expenses out of his own pocket. According to him, borrowing for such purposes had not been prohibited. He denied mis-management and mis-appropriation and stated that the accounts and vouchers which he had produced in the court would prove the truth of his claim and that O.S 120/1124 was filed only as a counter-blast to the suit filed by him and that the claim made therein was false. According to him O.S 21/1124, O.S 120/1124, O.S 91/50 and some other suits were all compromised for the benefit of the minors and the illom and that the allegation of fraud and collusion are all false and that the compromise was made bona fide and it is beneficial to the plaintiffs' illom. Therefore he contended that the decree is perfectly valid and binding on the illom and that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the declaration, prayed for by them. The second defendant also contended that to his knowledge the compromise in O.S 21/1124 has been arrived at by the parties in settlement of conflicting and doubtful claims and that the decree passed is not liable to be impeached.

6. The main question involved in the suit was whether the compromise decree in O.S 21/1124 is invalid and not binding on the plaintiffs' illom. The learned Subordinate Judge found that the decree was not vitiated by fraud, collusion or undue influence, that sanction had been obtained from the court, that the provisions contained in Order 32, Rule 7 had been substantially complied with and that the guardian has not been proved to be guilty of gross negligence. The learned Subordinate Judge therefore dismissed the suit.

7. The learned counsel for the appellants during the course of the arguments has almost conceded and rightly too that the plaintiffs cannot be said to have succeeded in satisfactorily proving the case of fraud and collusion set up in the plaint though on the peculiar circumstances of this case it is stated such an inference is possible. The learned Subordinate Judge has dealt with all the aspects of this matter in para 10 of the judgment and has found that the plaintiffs have not succeeded in showing that there was collusion between defendants 1, 4 and the 7th defendant's brother or that blank papers were got signed from the 7th defendant. The learned counsel however contends that even in the absence of proof of fraud or collusion, proof of gross negligence on the part of the guardian would be a sufficient ground upon which a decree obtained against the minors could be set aside in a subsequent suit and it is vehemently argued that on the facts and circumstances of this case it is clear that there was culpable and gross negligence on the part of 7th defendant, the guardian, in entering into the compromise, withdrawing the valid contentions which they had and allowing a decree to be passed.

8. The 1st question for consideration therefore is whether a minor can avoid a decree passed against him on the ground of gross negligence of the guardian ad litem, even if the minor had not succeeded in proving fraud and collusion on the part of the guardian. Various decisions have been cited before us bearing on this question. We will briefly refer to some of the cases cited before us. In Madras the leading case is that of Chunduru Punnayyah v. Rajam Viranna (I.L.R 45 Madras 425). That decision has been followed in Haji Muhammad Ahadak Koyi Sahib v. Burra Venkata Komaraju (A.I.R 1940 Madras 810) and later in N.P.L Eggappa Chettiar v. Rm. S.V.L Ramanathan Chettiar (A.I.R 1942 Madras 384) the view has been affirmed. It was held that

“It is open to a minor to challenge a decree passed against him on the ground that his guardian had been grossly negligent in the conduct of the suit in which the decree was passed even in the absence of fraud or collusion.”

9. The same view is shared by the High Court of Calcutta, Allahabad, Patna and Lahore. At first the Calcutta High Court in Raghubar Dyal v. Bhimya Lal (12 Cal. 69) took the view that a minor could not maintain such a suit without pleading fraud or collusion on the part of the guardian. It was held that while a minor had a remedy against gross negligence of his next friend it was by way of application for review and not by a subsequent suit. But a contrary opinion was expressed in Lalla Sheo Churn Lal v. Ramanandan Dobey (22 Cal. 8). That opinion was maintained in a later case in Mahesh Chandra Bavan v. Mohindra Nath Das (A.I.R 1941 Cal. 401) where it was held that

“Gross and culpable negligence on the part of the guardian ad litem is a sufficient ground to enable the infant to set aside decree obtained against him. The minor's right to bring such a suit is an exception to the ordinary rule according to which a decree can be set aside only on grounds of fraud and collusion and is based on the broad principle of justice, equity and good coscience. Neither section 2 or Section 44 of the Evidence Act, nor Section 11 C.P.C bar such a suit”.

10. The Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Mt. Siraj Fatima v. Mahamood Ali (A.I.R 1932 All. 293) after dealing with the entire case law in the matter also held that gross negligence was a sufficient ground to avoid a decree but Their Lordships also stated that

“The test of negligence should be the not doing of what a reasonable man, guided by prudent considerations which regulate the conduct of human affairs would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. The negligence in order to be a good ground for the avoidance of a decree must be of such a nature as to justify the inference that the minor's interests were not at all protected and therefore he was not properly represented. The direct result of the negligence must be a serious prejudice to the minor and the negligence must not be merely such as might be innocently committed even by a reasonable person taking the ordinary precautions which he would have taken in his own case. Where the negligence is so gross as to amount to a clear violation of the duty cast upon the guardian, although not brought to the notice of the court at the time, the decree can be avoided”.

11. The Lahore High Court in the Full Bench case in Iftghar Hussain Khan v. Beant Singh minor through his maternal uncle Brabh Dayal (A.I.R 1946 Lah. 233) also has elaborately considered the case law and held that

“A minor can avoid a decree passed against him on the ground of gross negligence on the part of his guardian ad litem, even if he has not succeeded in proving fraud or collusion on the part of such guardian”.

12. The Full Bench of the High Court in R.B Kamakshya N. Singh v. Baldeo* (A.I.R 1950 Patna 97) has also after an elaborate discussion of the Indian and English case law held that a minor can avoid a decree on the ground of gross negligence of his guardian even if he has not succeeded in proving fraud or collusion. The same view has been taken by the T.C High Court in Sankaranaryanan Namboodiri v. Kali (1955 K.L.T 660) and in the Full Bench case of the Cochin High Court in 36 Cochin 602 (Saraswathi Amma v. Krishna Menon). That the English law recognizes this principle is clear from the authorities pointed out by Trevlyan and Ameer Ali, JJ. in 22 Calcutta 8 and this has been accepted in a large number of cases.

13. Our attention was drawn to the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Krishnadas Padmanabhrao Chanduvarkar v. Vithoba Annappa Shetti (A.I.R 1939 Bombay 66) which takes a contrary view. There it was held that gross negligence apart from fraud or collusion on the part of the next friend or guardian ad litem of a minor litigant cannot be made the basis of a suit to set aside a decree obtained against him. This decision wherein the leading judgment is of Beaumont, C.J follows an earlier ruling of the learned Chief Justice sitting along in Auraj Joharmal v. Dalpat Sunadu (I.L.R 1937 Bombay 839) and is followed in a subsequent decision of the same High Court in Nana Nandeo Patil v. Dalpat Supadu Patil (A.I.R 1940 Bom. 33). It must be noted that the earlier decisions of the Bombay High Court were to the effect that gross negligence gave a minor a cause of action. See Gurusandas Nath v. Ladka Vahu (19 Bombay 571), Hanmantepa v. Jiyu Bai (24 Bombay 547) and Sureshchandra Jamietram v. Bai Ishwari (A.I.R 1938 Bombay 206). The Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court has been discussed and considered in the decisions of the other High Courts referred to above and we are in respectful agreement with the views expressed therein that it does not lay down the correct law.

14. The right of the minor to avoid a decree obtained against him on account of the gross negligence of his guardian ad litem is a substantive right. It is not a mere matter of procedure and does not depend on any rule of evidence. He cannot be prevented from enforcing his substantive right simply because this may cause loss or inconvenience to the plaintiff in the previous litigation. Section 44 of the Evidence Act also does not stand in the way. A substantive right cannot be defeated simply because gross negligence is not mentioned as one of the grounds of avoiding a judgment under Section 44, Evidence Act. The provisions of Section 44, Evidence Act is permissive and not prohibitive. It allows a party to avoid a judgment by proving fraud or collusion, but it does not destory his substantive right which exists independantly of the Evidence Act. It does not enumerate or exhaust the grounds upon which a decree or order may be attacked. Similarly, if a party has a right to get a decree set aside, Section 11, C.P.C does not stand in the way. The section only says that the judgment so long as it stands is conclusive. If it is vacated on any ground upon which it can be vacated in law the bar created by Section 11 is automatically removed.

15. The next and the more important question is whether the circumstances of the present case would justify a finding that the guardian ad litem acted in a grossly negligent manner in the previous suit. The negligence of the guardian in order to be a good ground for the avoidance of a decree must, as has been stated before, be of such character as to justify the inference that the minor's interests were not at all protected and in substance though not in form the minor went unrepresented in the trial court. Gross negligence on the part of the guardian can be inferred from his conduct in not setting up proper defence. It will be seen from Ext. P. 5 series, the written statements filed in this case, that the minors had a perfectly good defence. The material contentions that were raised in the written statement were firstly that the 1st defendant was not authorised to borrow any money under the Karar Ext. P. 15 and was incompetent to burden the Swaroopam with any debts and secondly that there was no necessity for contracting these debts. It was contended that no amounts were really due to the 1st defendant and that the account book Ext. D3 relied upon by the 1st Defendant to sustain his claim is not genuine and had been got up for the occasion.

16. As far as the authority for borrowing is concerned the 1st defendant was appointed as manager under Ext. P. 15 the karar. Ext. P. 15 does not contain an express authorisation for borrowing amounts so as to bind the illom. Clause 7 of Ext. P. 15 is particularly significant. First defendant had to meet the expenses of the Swaroopam only with the collection of the income. Therefore it is stated that the so-called advance made by the 1st defendant is absolutely beyond his powers. In this connection we may refer to Sections 10 and 11 of the Cochin Namboodiri Act, XVII of 1114. Section 10 says:

“No sale, mortgage, pledge or other alienation of illom property or debt shall bind the illom unless it is executed or made or contracted for illom necessity or it is executed or made or contracted with the written consent of the majority of all the major members of the illom when there are only major members in the illom.”

17. Section 11 says:

“The burden of proving illom necessity shall be on the purchaser, mortgagee, pledgee, or other alienee, or creditor as the case may be. But the court may presume such necessity where the majority of all the major members of the illom are parties to or have given their written consent to the transaction.”

18. If therefore even the rights of members of the illom to contract debts are so circumscribed and restricted, an agent of theirs could not have any higher rights. Under these statutory provisions a debt will be binding on the illom only if it is incurred for illom necessity. The burden of proving such a necessity is on the creditor. The members of the illom by simply denying their liability could have put the creditor to the necessity of proving the truth of the loan and also the necessity for incurring the debt. The 1st defendant relies on Ext. D3 the account book to show the income that he had got from the estate and the amounts that he had expended for the illom. The learned counsel for the appellants represents that there are sufficient materials on record to show that there was absolutely no necessity for the 1st defendant to advance any amount to the Swaroopam. D.W 1 in his evidence has admitted that the annual income from the Cochin properties alone was 6000 paras of paddy and Rs. 3000/- in cash. Of the paddy income, 3000 paras are from the Medom crop. The 1st defendant assumed management just on the eve of those collections. Besides this, the illom has to get income from wet lands in direct possession. From the Travancore State besides Jenmikaram there was annual income of 1000 paras of paddy. It was also pointed out that the case set up by the 1st defendant in O.S 21/1124 was that he had to advance money for certain extraordinary items like ‘Massa’ ceremony of the mother of defendants 3 and 4 and the treatment of Savithri Antharjanam. The Swaroopam had executed 2 mortgages, Ext. P. 3 dated 2-11-1123 and Ext. P. 2 dated 2-11-1123. From the recitals of these documents it can be seen that there was a cash receipt of Rs. 2000/-. These documents were executed simultaneously with the assumption of management by the 1st defendant and it is the plaintiffs' case that this amount has been received by the 1st defendant. No doubt there is no direct evidence on this matter. In Ext. D3 account book produced by the 1st defendant, we find an entry dated 6-12-1123 showing that defendants 3 and 4 have borrowed from Govinda Menon Rs. 2000/- for the Swaroopam. There is also a collection of Rs. 2,700/- and odd by the 1st defendant. D.W 1 has admitted that when he took up management, there was a stock of 1000 paras of paddy. So during his period of management, it is stated that there was this 1000 paras of paddy apart from the other collections, the receipt of Rs. 2000/- under Exts. P. 2 and P. 3 and another amount of Rs. 2000/- borrowed on 6-12-1123. The Massa ceremony even according to the 1st defendant costs only Rs. 2000/-. It was therefore strenuously argued that with all this income there was no need for further borrowing within the short period of two months and the so-called advance of Rs. 5,250/- by the 1st defendant to the illom is false and at any rate the amounts were not spent for any genuine illom necessity.

19. It was contended by the learned counsel for the 1st defendant that O.S 21 of 1124 was a suit on accounts that there was nothing to suggest that the accounts are not correct or genuine and that all the adult members had accepted the correctness of the accounts which had been put in court and they had consented to a decree being passed. It was therefore contended that in such a case there was no duty cast on the guardian to put up a false defence. The question is whether anybody had gone through the accounts and satisfied himself about the correctness of the accounts or whether there was at least prima facie proof about the correctness of the accounts. It would be pertinent in this connection to see as to who were all the major members who could have been satisfied that the claim was true and that the compromise was beneficial to the minors and the illom. On the date of the suit the major members of the Swaroopam were defendants 3, 4, 5, 7 and the 1st plaintiff. The 1st plaintiff was admittedly an insane person and was represented by guardian. The third defendant karnavan is not possessed of normal mental faculty and the 5th defendant was also insane perhaps with lucid intervals. We have been taken through the evidence of P.W 1, a senior advocate of the Parur District Court and P.W 2, the receiver appointed by the court and from their evidence, it is clear that these 2 major members could not have properly safeguarded or were competent to safeguard the interests of the Swaroopam. The 6th defendant had only attained majority just prior to the filing of the compromise petition. The only person who, according to both the plaintiffs and the defendant, was in the know of things was the 4th defendant. He was not at all interested in the compromise since the properties set apart to his share were excluded from liability and probably that was what induced him to agree to the compromise and induce others to join in the compromise petition. Then there remained only the guardian. She is an illiterate Gosha lady. She was examined as P.W 5. She swears that she was not even aware of the suit O.S 21/1124 and that the only compromise that she was told about is the compromise in O.S 90/51, the suit to remove defendants 3 and 4 from Karnavasthanam. It is therefore idle to contend that the adult members were all satisfied with the truth and reasonableness of the claim and that there could be no negligence on the part of the guardian in having signed the compromise petition, when all the adult members had joined in the Razi petition. It was stated that the advocates appearing for the parties have also signed the compromise petition and they would not have signed if it was not beneficial to the minors. Nothing turns on this as they act only under instruction, and they cannot be expected to know the full facts or the defence that were open to the minors. So far as the receiver joining the compromise petition, we have the admission of the receiver P.W 2 himself that he did not even read the compromise petition before he affixed the signature and that no sanction was obtained from the court.

20. When the 1st defendant was examined as D.W 1 in the case the plaintiffs attempted to cross-examine him with reference to some of the entries contained in Ext. D3 account book. On the objections raised by the defendants, the learned Judge passed orders that the merits of the claim made in O.S 21/1124 cannot be gone into and the cross-examination with regard to the merits of the claim made in O.S 21/1124 cannot be allowed (Vide deposition of D.W 1). One fails to see how else the plaintiffs could prove that there was a valid defence in the suit that the claim made is unsustainable and that the giving up of such a good defence was injurious and detrimental to the interests of the minors and the illom. Having passed such an order and shut out the defence, it was unfair for the learned Judge to have observed in para 10 of the judgment.

“1st defendant had also produced Ext. D3 account to support his claim in the above suit. Plaintiffs' next friend who is examined in this case as P.W 4 or plaintiffs' mother who is examined as P.W 5 is not in a position to point out any false entry or incorrect item from Ext. D3. The learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs was also not able to point out a single circumstance which could conclusively discredit Ext. D3”.

21. So also in para 12 it is stated:

“plaintiffs have not been able to show a single circumstance to discredit or falsify any of the entries in Ext. D3”.

22. We do not wish to enter into the full details of the defence that would have been open to the plaintiffs or the genuineness of the loan or the account book or the ultimate result of such a defence. Suffice it to say that prima facie it appears that the minors had a valid and proper defence and the contention that if proper defence had been put forward the claim of the 1st defendant would have been negatived is not wholly unreasonable and without foundation. It was argued by the learned counsel for the appellants that the application for sanctioning the compromise should precede the compromise and that the terms of Order 32, Rule 7, C.P.C has not been complied with. There is no force in this contention. The Supreme Court in Bishundas Narain v. Seogeni Raj (1951 S.C 280) has held that it is not necessary that the guardian should obtain the sanction even before he begins negotiations with the other side. Such sanction is not necessary even to enable a guardian to conclude a provisional agreement with a view to compromise. What the section says is only that a final compromise without leave of the court and a decree passed thereon is voidable at the option of the minor. Here Ext. P. 5(c) is the petition for sanction under Order 32, Rule 7, C.P.C Ext. P. 17 is the order giving sanction, Ext. P. 12 is the compromise and Ext. P. 18 is the order allowing the compromise. It was argued that the court had applied its mind and granted sanction and that it should not be lightly set aside. It is also submitted that the compromise was really beneficial to the illom, that the 1st defendant agreed to suffer his costs in O.S 120/1124, that the expenditure and trouble of a prolonged litigation was ended and peace was secured to the illom. A compromise will be deemed to be beneficial to the interest of the minor if it secures to the minor some demonstrable advantage or averts some obvious mischief. No doubt in the face of the certificate of the court that the compromise is beneficial to the interest of the minors the onus lies on the plaintiffs to prove either fraud or collusion or that the interest of the minors was not properly safeguarded or that the court was not informed of all the circumstances when it accorded sanction for the compromise. The Razi petition does not give any details as to how the compromise is beneficial to the minors. It is not stated therein that even though they contested the claim and denied the genuineness of the account, they subsequently examined the accounts and satisfied themselves that the defence was unsustainable. There is also no indication in the compromise petition that any thought was bestowed on this matter. So, all the facts and grounds on which the permission of the court was sought, for entering into the compromise were not contained in the petition and hence it is not unreasonable to think that the court would not have bestowed as much attention or thought as was necessary before according sanction. Even if sanction is accorded that does not stand in the way of the minor getting the compromise decree set aside if the compromise is against the interests of the minors and brought about by the gross negligence of the guardian. Here, even if the case was not contested and no compromise petition had been put in, the same decree would have been passed. In the absence of a compromise, probably, the illom would have been in a better position because, by the compromise, the property set apart to the 4th defendant has been completely exonerated. If there was no compromise, the minors could have called upon the 4th defendant, who had appointed the 1st defendant to bear the proportionate share of the debts. So the case of the 1st defendant that real benefit had accrued to the illom cannot be easily accepted. So also the compromise cannot be justified on the ground that it is a bona fide settlement of doubtful claims. As a matter of fact there is no compromise at all in this case. It was all a one-sided affair giving up the defences that were available and suffering a decree for the entire amount claimed in the plaint with costs. So considering all these circumstances, it could be seen that the minors had a perfectly good defence, that a defence was put up, but the guardian abstained later on from adducing any evidence at the trial and gave up contesting the suit and suffered a decree to be passed by entering into a compromise. The failure on the part of the guardian to defend the suit when there was a perfectly good defence available resulting in serious loss to the plaintiffs would therefore amount to gross and culpable negligence and we have no hesitation in finding in this case that the plaintiffs have made out a case to avoid the decree. The appeal must therefore succeed.

23. In the result the appeal is allowed, the decree and judgment of the court below are set aside and the suit is decreed as prayed for in the plaint. The appellants will have their costs both here and in the lower court from the 1st defendant.